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 Grace sows the seeds of God’s sacred word in every human life.  One of 
theology’s most important functions is to furnish people with ways of perceiving these 
divine intimations in their concrete lives and relationships.  Orientation to transcendental 
mystery is the sine qua non for initiation into faith.  Theology must therefore lead people 
more deeply into the mystery of everyday existence as a preparation for the Christian life.  
At the same time, theology aims at expounding Christian teaching in as clear and 
intelligible a manner as possible.  Theology accomplishes this by adapting its modes of 
presenting doctrine to the needs and capabilities of its addressees.  This two-fold 
responsibility is properly understood as theology’s mystagogical task. 
 This dissertation argues that film is a crucial reference point for mystagogy—a 
locus mystagogicus.  Film interprets human experience in ways conceptual theology 
cannot.  It is thus a rich source for theological reflection.  Theology is also an 
indispensable resource for film interpretation and a natural dialogue partner since it seeks 
to disclose the deepest dimensions of existence.  More importantly, film needs theology 
as the hermeneutic that formally interprets religious experience—something that many 
human beings only vaguely sense, often misunderstand, and can easily misrepresent.  
With the help of film experts, theology can turn its discerning eyes to the stories and 
images of film and present viewers with a unique language by which they can articulate a 
response to their film experience.  Film thus requires theology to bear witness to its 
artistry when it does succeed in opening people in wonder and humility to the ever-
greater God. 
 This dissertation in Catholic systematic theology investigates the theoretical and 
practical conditions of possibility for film as a locus for and of mystagogy.  The question 
that it attempts to clarify is the extent to which Karl Rahner’s fundamental theology 
provides an apposite and needed model for the way Catholic theology relates to film.  
There are three basic goals:  (1) to outline existing ecclesial and theological foundations 
for a Catholic theology of film by way of a survey of magisterial documents on cinema 
and the writings of individual Catholic theologians and film scholars; (2) to provide 
greater theological grounding for Catholic approaches to film by developing the model 
that film is a locus mystagogicus on the basis of Rahner’s transcendental method, creative 
retrieval of ancient mystagogy, and theological aesthetics; and (3) to test the viability and 
vitality of this model by way of analysis of the film Babette’s Feast. 
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KEYNOTES 
 
 
The invisible things of God from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being 
understood by the things that are made. 
      - St. Paul, Romans, 1:20 
 
 
Come, I will show you the Word and the mysteries of the Word, and I will give 
you understanding of them by means of images familiar to you. 
      - St. Clement of Alexandria 
 
 
Theology must somehow be “mystagogical,” that is, it should not merely speak 
about objects in abstract concepts, but it must encourage people really to 
experience that which is expressed in such concepts. 
      - Karl Rahner, S.J. 
 
 
Art must make perceptible, and as far as possible attractive, the world of the 
spirit, of the invisible, of God.  Christ himself made extensive use of images in his 
preaching, fully in keeping with his willingness to become, in the Incarnation, the 
icon of the unseen God. 
      - Pope John Paul II 
 
 
My function is to make whoever sees my films aware of his need to love and to 
give his love, and aware that beauty is summoning him. 
      - Andrei Tarkovsky 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Background and Need for the Study 
Filmmaker Stanley Kubrick once claimed his medium to be “the most powerful 
art form ever devised.”1  While clearly a subjective assessment about a comparatively 
young art, the statement acknowledges an inexorable fact:  Film is a cultural reality that 
continues to document and shape the way countless people feel, think, and dream.  In 
many ways it is the dominant vernacular of our time.2  Certainly film has made a 
powerful impact on the Catholic church over the last century.  The church, too, has had 
an important influence on both the movie industry and the manner in which people 
experience film.  “The cinema has always been interested in God,” wrote Catholic film 
critic André Bazin; the “Gospel and The Acts of the Apostles were the first best sellers on 
the screen, and the Passions of Christ were hits in France as well as in America.”3  
Indeed, shortly after Thomas Edison and his assistant William Dickson unveiled the 
Kinetoscope in 1894, and Auguste and Louis Lumière the cinématographe in 1895, 
Christianity and cinema were linked with the production of three short films about Jesus 
between 1895 and 1897:  The Life and Passion of Jesus Christ; The Horitz Passion; and 
The Mystery of the Passion Play at Oberammergau.  One might also say that the Catholic 
                                                
 1 Martin Scorsese, ed., The Making of 2001:  A Space Odyssey.  New York:  Modern Library, 
2000, p. 255. 
 
 2 The term “film” can sometimes connote obscure, often foreign, art-house movies.  Here, the term 
is used broadly—to designate any movie regardless of production value or country of origin.  While film 
scholars will make distinctions among the terms “film,” “movies,” “motion picture” and “cinema,” here, 
for stylistic reasons, they will be used interchangeably. 
 
 3 André Bazin, “Cinema and Theology,” in Bazin at Work:  Major Essays & Reviews from the 
Forties & Fifties.  New York:  Routledge, 1997, p. 61.  Bazin’s essay originally appeared in Esprit (No. 19) 
in February 1951. 
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church has also always been interested in cinema.  This interest has manifested itself at 
many levels of Catholic life.  For instance, in 1928, the International Catholic 
Organization for Cinema and Audiovisual (OCIC) was formed as an association of 
Catholics working in the film industry.  In 1930, two Catholic men, Martin Quigley and 
Daniel Lord, S.J., drafted the Production Code, which was for decades the standard set of 
directives for motion picture moral content.  For more than three decades the Code was 
kept in force by the church sponsored “Legion of Decency,” one of the industry’s moral 
watchdogs.4  The Vatican’s first official teaching on film—the encyclical Vigilanti 
cura—was promulgated in 1936; and prior to that, ten papal communiqués on cinema had 
been issued.  Since then, Rome has propagated dozens of letters and statements and 
hosted numerous conferences on cinema.  Film was discussed at Vatican II and officially 
addressed in the decree Inter mirifica.  In 1995, the Pontifical Council for Social 
Communication released a list of forty-five films it deemed religiously, artistically, and 
morally laudable.5  Periodicals like America and Commonweal have reviewed movies 
regularly for decades.  Priests and deacons often reference films in homilies.  And since 
the dawn of video accessibility, teachers and religious educators in Catholic schools and 
parishes have augmented their courses and sacrament preparatories with film. 
 Yet amid the range of associations made between Catholicism and film in the last 
century there was little engagement between Catholic theology and film.  The majority of 
theologians remained virtually silent about cinema and how it might relate to their field.  
While some theologians were consulted for their responses to movies like The Exorcist, 
and The Last Temptation of Christ, these were mainly ad hoc solicitations about 
                                                
 4 See the excursus “Legion of Decency” at the end of this chapter. 
 5 See:  <http://www.usccb.org/fb/vaticanfilms.htm>.  (Last accessed 2/9/10). 
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controversial films.  Whereas the area of “religion and film” was for decades an 
established category of study with its own experts, “theology and film” was not.  Even 
those working in related areas like “theological aesthetics,” “theology and culture,” and 
“narrative theology” did not manifest direct interest in film. 
 Only in the last two decades has the subfield of “theology and film” explicitly 
emerged by way of a contingent of scholars who believe film to be a not-so-distant 
cousin of theology.  Today many others are joining them in considering film as an object 
for serious theological reflection.  Inaugurated by theologians from a variety of ecclesial 
confessions, their pioneering work helped:  (1) a larger public know that there were 
indeed theologians working with film in university courses and in their own research and 
that their work spanned as far back as the 1950s—albeit in something of an academic 
ghetto; (2) begin to establish theology and film as a legitimate academic field of research 
and teaching; and (3) communicate innovative theories for discerning possible 
theological implications in films that may or may not treat explicitly of religious themes.  
As pioneers of a nascent theological style, these scholars had to contend with the 
professional circumspection of colleagues and film experts alike.6  They would have to 
justify that their motivation for engaging film was not owing to theological ascendency or 
a desire to colonize film for the church.  The onus was also on them to develop a basic 
knowledge of film interpretation and to explain theology’s function as a mode of film 
criticism.  Yet the earliest theologians of film saw such challenges as risks worth taking.  
                                                
 6 John May writes that “theologians’ general ‘discomfort’ with films, even distrust of them, is 
acknowledged and regretted, though explanations for the phenomenon may be hard to come by—except 
perhaps as a reflection of earlier ecclesiastical disputes over the seductive potential of images, or as a 
recurring but fortunately minority tendency these days to consider ‘popular’ culture as an unworthy ally in 
the process of evangelization (John R. May, ed., New Image of Religious Film.  Kansas City:  Sheed & 
Ward, 1997, p. ix). 
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Perhaps galvanized by the prescience that “the grammar of the next phase of theology is 
being hammered-out in non-theological, and even non-believing circles,”7 these 
pacesetters took the risk of developing a novel theological style. 
 A cohort of theologians, more Protestant than Catholic at first, began to see the 
possibilities a partnership between theology and film might foster for the theological, 
catechetical, aesthetic, and spiritual life of the church.  Gradually, their numbers grew 
and today there are theologians thinking about Christian faith from the perspective of 
film and on film from the perspective of Christian faith to the extent that university 
courses are offered in this field, supported by numerous publications in books and 
journals.  The field has its own online resources, modules at academic conferences, and 
even film festivals.  Indeed, the explosive growth in the field has led to such an 
outpouring of research methodologies that it is impossible to define what ought to be 
included or excluded under the rubric “theology and film,” and one cannot construct a 
unilinear summary of existing approaches toward their interaction. 
 Many of the existing studies that connect Catholic theology and film are 
foundational and valuable at the level at which they operate, and this project remains 
beholden to them in many ways.  Yet, among those committed to the field, few are 
writing explicitly from the standpoint of systematic theology.  Present works on theology 
and film generally take the form of scholarly essays, collected in thematically allied 
compendia.  While such studies are not entirely unsystematic in character, none of these 
volumes can be said to be a single, extensive treatment of the cinema written from within 
a Catholic systematic framework.  A consequence of systematic theology’s inattention to 
                                                
 7 Sebastian Moore, “Four Steps Towards Making Sense of Theology,” Downside Review 383, 
April 1993, p. 100. 
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film is that the broader question of what engenders and sustains their relationship remains 
underdeveloped.  Existing studies only attend cursorily to the historical and doctrinal 
preconditions for how the two are actually already connected.  The classic systematic 
question of the “conditions of possibility” for the relationship between theology and film 
remains largely untried.  Greater theoretical precision concerning the very prospect of 
their association is thus needed.  Overall, there is an urgent need for theologians across 
the disciplines to consider the “reading” of film, even at a bare minimum, a relevant 
theological talent in relation to our cinema-enthusiastic, but often uncritical, generation.  
Yet it is fitting that systematic theologians be especially involved in deepening the links 
between religious experience and film since one of the substantive tasks of this area is the 
critical correlation of Christian faith and culture.  Indeed, systematicians are trained to 
find and strengthen connections often between seemingly disparate enterprises.  They 
will thus raise questions about the points of connection between theology and film that 
others might not think to consider. 
This problematic situation is heightened by the fact that the backstory of the 
Vatican’s teaching on cinema is little known.  Many of those working in theological and 
pastoral circles remain unaware of the content, if not the existence, of official ecclesial 
pronouncements on cinema.  To date, no critical study has assembled and carefully 
examined the many documents pertaining to the church’s position vis-à-vis cinema.  
Consequently, certain foundational principles communicated in these writings that would 
necessarily have a bearing on Catholic approaches to film have not been given the 
exposure they deserve.  A critical appraisal of these documents is essential in the 
development of a Catholic theology of film. 
 6 
At the same time, Vatican teaching on cinema is itself challenging to grasp, given 
that it constitutes a cumulative response to film by various popes and councils over an 
entire century.  This teaching comes in many forms—speeches, letters, decrees.  Some of 
the texts treat film directly, while others regard film under a more comprehensive rubric 
(“social communication” or “art”).  Further, since most of these documents are addressed 
to the church directly, they presume Catholic faith.  A consequence of this is that 
theological presuppositions underpinning Vatican opinion remain tacit or undeveloped 
altogether.  It is necessary, therefore, to read these documents in concert with others that 
may not reference “cinema” or “media” but nonetheless more vigorously define the 
theology behind Roman proclamations on film. 
To summarize the need for the dissertation, procedural and substantive lacunae in 
the existing literature necessitate a more thoroughgoing, systematic approach, one that 
has at its center a unifying method broad enough to assimilate foundational strands of 
Catholic teaching on film into a larger theological framework and specific enough to 
move the discourse into new territory.  Present works on Catholic theology and film are 
insufficient to the extent that they:  (1) do not consider Roman magisterium’s positions 
on cinema; (2) abbreviate the theoretical preconditions of theology’s relationship to film; 
(3) only moderately insist that theology can offer film scholars a language and a 
conceptual framework helpful for interpreting religious impulses in film; and (4) need to 
convey methods which safeguard film against facile theological uses that risk 
contravening film’s artistic integrity.  In short, these writings beg more substantial 
reflection on the transcendental question pertinent to Catholic systematic theology 
concerning the a priori conditions of possibility for the correlation of theology and film.  
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This dissertation attempts to reinforce the foundations laid down in the body of Catholic 
writing on film as it searches for hermeneutical tools and other resources in the tradition 
that substantiate the correlation of theology and film and illustrate possibilities for their 
dialectical “give and take.”  Greater wisdom concerning what the two have in common 
and what, indeed, differentiates them, will lead to a more meaningful and lasting 
exchange between the two. 
 
Thesis 
 The movement of Catholic theology toward film has come about in waves—
gradually, but intermittently.  A treatise that sets forth a Catholic interpretation of film 
formally and systematically has yet to emerge.  Whereas this dissertation does not 
presume to attempt such a monumental—and perhaps unachievable—task as developing 
a comprehensive systematic theology of film, it does represent a sustained theological 
exploration of film from a Catholic theological perspective.  The study is designed in part 
to illustrate the many ways Catholic Christianity in particular helped cultivate the 
relatively new area of “theology and film.”  It endeavors to contribute to the conversation 
by building upon the pioneering efforts mentioned above, placing the relationship 
between theology and film within a broader historical and theological context, providing 
further foundational principles for their interaction, and hopefully leading the dialogue in 
new directions.  What is needed is an approach that at once encompasses the valuable 
insights of existing Catholic literature and specifies the doctrinal presuppositions for the 
correlation between theology and film which many of the present writings seem to take 
for granted. 
 8 
 This project operates under the conviction that the soil generative of “theology 
and film” will be better irrigated and its produce heartier and more abundant if those in 
the field are equipped with these implements.  It thus turns to the storehouse of Catholic 
theology to uncover these already available yet overlooked instruments and adapt them 
for the cultivation of this innovative theological field. 
 The dissertation discovers in the fundamental theology and theological aesthetics 
of twentieth-century Jesuit theologian Karl Rahner elements that provide theoretical 
foundations and give further justification and encouragement for Catholic theology’s turn 
to secular sources like film for critical reflection and learning.  The project attempts to 
elucidate the extent to which the interrelated topics of Rahner’s theology provide an 
apposite and needed framework for the growing rapprochement between Catholic 
theology and film.  While Rahner never wrote about film directly, his teaching on the 
arts, which is founded upon his larger systematic project of integrating Christian faith and 
basic human experience, can be extended to include film.  According to Rahner, already 
inherent to theology is an aesthetic dimension that comprises both verbal and non-verbal 
forms.  Conversely, he holds that the transcendental orientation of genuine art suggests it 
has at least an implicit theological capacity.  His assertion that there is a poetic impulse 
within theology lays the foundation for what he names the “mystagogical” dimension of 
theology.  This dissertation takes its cue from Rahner’s intuition that the concept of 
mystagogy—“initiation into mystery”—is a promising tool for facilitating a stronger 
integration between theology and art and posits the thesis that film is a promising locus 
mystagogicus.  This thesis suggests that film is important cultural reference point for and 
of Christian mystagogy, artistically descriptive of the human search for meaning in 
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wonder and in struggle and disclosive of the mystery dimension implicit in all human 
experience, to which theology may turn in its task to help people discover in their daily 
lives the truth of Christian faith and lead them more deeply into the mystery of faith.  The 
study investigates the theoretical and practical conditions for this possibility from the 
perspectives of Vatican teaching on cinema, the approaches of individual Catholic film 
experts and theologians, the patristic tradition of mystagogy, Rahner’s fundamental 
theology, and film itself. 
 
Procedure 
 The dissertation argues the thesis in a course of six chapters.  The first chapter 
surveys what might be called the Vatican’s “first phase” of official teaching on cinema.  
It consists of a critical analysis of four of the magisterium’s main documents on film 
promulgated between 1936 and 1963.  The chapter sets forth the seminal themes of the 
earliest ecclesiastical teaching on cinema since these would become foundational for all 
future Catholic discourse on the topic. 
 The second chapter complements the first by examining the “second phase” of 
Vatican teaching on film, beginning with the conciliar document Gaudium et spes and 
ending with John Paul II’s Letter to Artists.   The documents chosen for analysis do not 
all treat film as an explicit topic, yet they establish principles that relate directly to 
Catholic interpretations of film.  The chapter will track shifts and expansions made in the 
Vatican’s teaching on film between its first and second phases.  These initial chapters of 
the dissertation represent an original contribution to Catholic scholarship on film since, to 
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date, no study has assembled Rome’s major texts on cinema and critically examined them 
as part of the larger conversation about Catholic theology and film. 
 The third chapter then turns to the writings of a representative group of Catholic 
film experts and theologians.  The purpose is to present a sense of the range of 
specifically Catholic ideas on film and theology, especially some of the more advanced 
theoretical models for relating theology and film.  Each author appreciates the complexity 
of the film-theology colloquy and works toward a resolution of a specific aspect of that 
conversation.  The chapter demonstrates how the dissertation’s thesis both draws from 
and expands these prototypes.  Indeed, because each writer has had a decided influence 
on the ideas in and need for this dissertation, the chapter constitutes more than a survey 
of existing models:  it is designed to be constructive, with each approach adding a 
theoretical layer to the thesis that film is a source for mystagogy.  The analysis will 
attempt to reveal those characteristics that define each approach as distinctly Catholic and 
judge what they may or may not have in common with the teaching espoused by the 
official church.  Thus, the third chapter represents something of a primer in the 
foundational literature of Catholic theological approaches to film. 
 The fourth chapter provides historical and theological warrant for the 
employment of mystagogy in the dissertation’s main thesis.  As noted, the project 
proposes to develop a model for the way theology relates to film based in part on Karl 
Rahner’s distinctive construal of mystagogy.  To appreciate how his restoration expands 
the scope of what constituted mystagogy in the early church, the chapter explores the 
methods the fathers used in their mystagogical homilies.  Characteristic elements of 
patristic mystagogy are highlighted that provide substantial grounding for the thesis that 
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film is a potential source for and of mystagogy, including:  the fathers’ turn to elements 
in secular culture to help illuminate the symbols of Christianity; the importance they 
accorded direct experience over conceptual knowledge of sacramental initiation; the role 
narrative, symbol, and imagination played in their rhetorical analysis of the mysteries; the 
fact that mystagogy was multivalent and easily adaptable; and that mystagogy was 
considered to be an abiding process for all Christians, not only neophytes. 
 The fifth chapter is the hub of the dissertation as a systematic project.  Using 
mystagogy as the interpretive key to Rahner’s methodology, the chapter establishes 
further theoretical warrants for the claim that film is a valid and crucial locus 
mystagogicus.  According to him, receptivity to transcendence is the sine qua non for 
initiation into the theological life.  Mystagogy, for Rahner, is more than reflection on 
sacramental experience; mystagogy is orientation to the transcendental dimension of 
human experience as preparation for the explicit encounter with the God of the gospels.  
Rahner relates mystagogy through and not in addition to his fundamental theology, which 
is the process by which he outlines the logic of Christianity, gives a reasonable basis for 
religious belief, and demonstrates how the doctrines of faith are inherently 
interconnected.  The chapter discusses Rahner’s conception of the nature and purpose of 
theology, including the cultural situation to which his retrieval of mystagogy attempts to 
respond and which, as this project’s thesis suggests, film can serve to complement and 
inform.  By laying down the theoretical foundations for Rahner’s mystagogy the chapter 
attempts to define with more precision many of the presuppositions underlying the 
Catholic literature on film studied in earlier chapters. 
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 The first half of the sixth chapter considers Rahner’s theological aesthetics.  
Through his writings on poetry and the arts, Rahner insists that all theological language, 
whether verbal or non-verbal, ultimately serves to negotiate divine Mystery—not with a 
mind to contain or explain it away but rather to be opened transcendentally by and guided 
toward its horizon.  His approach leads one to see that theology and film, while distinct, 
are already related and can be mutually illuminating.  The chapter substantiates that film 
is an important source of theology since it can reveal the religious dimension of human 
experience in concrete, imaginative forms beyond what conceptual theology can 
accomplish on its own.  It also argues that theology is a required hermeneutic for 
disclosing the religious dimension in film.  Though film, as art, is incommensurable, it 
still needs to be interpreted by way of methods outside itself.  These twin impulses of 
Rahner’s aesthetics provides further basis for a Catholic mystagogy that uses film as a 
source which leads people through film’s form, dramaturgy, images, and symbols into 
awareness of the sacred principle of human life as a preliminary step to fuller initiation 
into the gospel. 
 The second half of the final chapter is essentially a practicum that tests the 
viability and vitality of theology as a form of film criticism.  Tutored by Rahner’s 
transcendental and mystagogical theology, it engages in a deep look at the film Babette’s 
Feast.  The first step of the analysis is an aesthetic evaluation.  The film is approached as 
a work of art that “speaks for itself.”  The structure, narrative, and symbols of the film are 
described and interpreted for the possible messages they communicate.  Such a 
descriptive approach intends to guard against theological eisegesis without precluding the 
need to submit the film to a Catholic theological reading—a unique perspective sensitive 
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to symbols that might escape the eyes of those with other interpretive strategies.  The 
further advantage of a Catholic semiotics is that it can help disclose possible religious 
messages latent in the film and aid the exegesis of symbols that others may be less 
equipped to assess.  The second step is a theological evaluation of the film, which takes 
the interpretation to another level in the sense that it sees the film as a touchstone for 
deeper theological engagement.  Application of theology’s hermeneutical tools—the 
determiners of gospel and tradition—can serve to discern the validity and genuineness of 
the Christian message already expressed in the film but it can also provide a reading that 
the director and his collaborators might not have anticipated. 
 The concluding portion of the dissertation rounds out the discussion, as it 
recapitulates the conviction that one of the most important functions of theology is that it 
clarify and lead people more deeply into the mystery of existence as a preparation for the 
explicit profession of faith.  The section draws out implications of the dissertation and 
judges whether in fact the project has proved successful at illustrating film to be a 
indispensable source for theology’s mystagogical task.  It treats of how the dissertation 
can be helpful across a number of theological fields (pastoral theology, religious 
education, comparative theology) and highlights further desirable possibilities for a 
cooperation of film and theology. 
 
Delimitations 
 It should be clear by now that the dissertation is expressly Catholic and 
theological in nature since it aims at increasing an understanding of Christian faith by 
way of believing conversation about God through an investigation of theology and film.  
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It is important to confirm this position from the beginning in order to demarcate the 
project.  For instance, the study should not be misconstrued as broadly religious or 
operating under the heading “religion and film,” an area that typically accommodates 
cinema to more rather than fewer religious Weltanschauungen.  Neither is it a study of 
the (interesting) history between Hollywood and the Catholic church.8  Nor is it an 
exhaustive account of initiatives made by theological scholars to connect their area of 
expertise to film.  Indeed, since the dissertation is Catholic in nature, and since there are 
limits to such studies, it does not intentionally try to accommodate theological 
approaches to film developed by Protestant and Orthodox scholars.  Whereas the hope is 
that much of the study can be helpful to those of other confessions, it does not purport to 
have designs on an all-encompassing methodology that would be acceptable to other 
theological sensibilities.  Finally, the intention of the study is not so much to mount an 
argument against other contrasting theoretical positions than it is to build a theological 
model in accordance with existing strands of Catholic teaching about cinema.  This does 
not to suggest the dissertation is uncritical of the literature it places under scrutiny, as an 
analytical approach is maintained throughout.  The hope is that the model developed by 
the project helps to broaden the scope and amplify the insights of these antecedent works.  
Still, the idea that film can become a mode of mystagogical theology is certainly not an 
original insight.  As will be shown, the intention, if not the structure, of this theoretical 
approach can be found in the work of other theologians of film.  Thus, the study does not 
so much hammer out an original theoretical model than it does explicate and apply one 
                                                
 8 Film scholar Gregory D. Black is an expert in this history, as demonstrated in his critiques of the 
Catholic church’s far-reaching control over motion picture production policy.  See Hollywood Censored: 
Morality Codes, Catholics, and the Movies.  New York:  Cambridge University, 1994; and The Catholic 
Crusade Against the Movies, 1940-1975.  Cambridge:  University Press, 1998. 
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that is already available, yet underemployed.  It is believed that these constructive and 
integrative intentions of the dissertation align with the true nature of Catholic systematic 
theology. 
 Good, relevant theology is always intensely linked to exchanges with modern 
culture (the aggiornamento pole) and yet without forfeiture of the fruits already within 
the tradition (the ressourcement pole).  The hope is that this dissertation will perform 
according to these twin Catholic initiatives.  Finally, it is hoped that the dissertation 
encourages theologians of every field to place a higher esteem on exceptional film for its 
ability to engage students, colleagues, and others in theological exploration and to lead 
people deeper into transcendental mystery. 
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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction 
 Over the last century, the Roman Catholic magisterium has promulgated dozens 
of official statements and documents concerning motion pictures.  Taken together, this 
literature defines, in greater and lesser degrees, the Vatican’s perspective on film.  Since 
these writings are seldom discussed in Catholic sectors, it may come as a surprise to 
many in the church that the Vatican has a fairly substantive, if not systematically 
developed, doctrine on the cinema.  One of the problems in discussing Catholic positions 
on film is that “not enough people read these documents.”1 
 Describing the church’s position on cinema and charting its development, 
however, is not a simple matter.  For one, Vatican opinion on film is not encoded in any 
single pontifical statement and can be delineated only through an evaluation of several 
decrees and papal speeches.  Some of these treat cinema directly, while others handle the 
subject under larger headings such as social communication or art.  Also, because these 
documents presuppose Christian faith, a Catholic worldview, and a basic knowledge of 
church doctrine, few articulate the theological principles underlying the claims made 
about cinema.  It is necessary, therefore, to read these documents in concert with others 
that may not reference cinema but nonetheless more vigorously define the theology 
behind the church’s teaching on the subject.  Explicating the Vatican’s attitude toward 
cinema is also challenging because no independent study exists that has assembled all of 
the pontifical material on film and presented it in any comprehensive manner.  Even 
pioneering Catholic studies in the area of “theology and film” (covered in chapter three of 
                                                
 1 Rose Pacette, “Is Hollywood Anti-Catholic?”  National Catholic Reporter, May 13, 2009.  See:  
<http://ncronline.org/news/hollywood-anti-catholic> (last accessed 1/6/10). 
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the dissertation) seldom refer to these documents.  Indeed, a thoroughgoing study of 
Roman Catholic approaches to cinema—Vatican and otherwise—has not been tried.  
Thus, the attempt in the next two chapters to describe where the magisterium stands with 
regard to motion pictures is something of a pilot endeavor.  Such an effort is necessary 
for a dissertation in Catholic systematic theology that attempts to understand and 
strengthen the relationship between theology and film, for it situates the study within the 
context of the church’s “official” conversation about cinema and demonstrates that the 
study is theoretically warranted by the magisterium and grounded in doctrine. 
 The chapter explores four documents seminal to the church’s position on film up 
to and including the beginning of the Second Vatican Council.  Vigilanti cura, Pope Pius 
XI’s encyclical letter on motion pictures, was the first significant pontifical statement on 
film and provided a platform for all future ecclesiastical discourse on the topic.2  
Discourses on the Ideal Film, which is the text of two speeches given by Pope Pius XII to 
professionals in the Italian film industry, exhorts filmmakers to be mindful of the spiritual 
affects that film content and technique have on audiences and to make movies that aid the 
common good of society.  Miranda prorsus, an encyclical from the same pope, attends to 
film alongside television and radio.  It declares mass media to be providential and 
couches the church’s position on cinema in more explicitly theological terms.  Inter 
mirifica (Decree on the Means of Social Communication) is the only document 
promulgated at Vatican II that pertains directly to cinema.  While the decree includes 
                                                
 2 The chapter analyzes only the Vatican’s main declarations on film.  There are numerous smaller 
communiqués, the quantity of which grew in proportion to Rome’s interest in cinema.  For instance, ten 
documents were issued prior to Vigilanti cura, forty-five before Discourses on the Ideal Film (1955), and 
fifty-four before Miranda prorsus (1957). 
 
 18 
slight shifts in the magisterium’s opinion of film, it largely repeats earlier teachings; yet 
these modifications are noteworthy for the nuances they make to earlier doctrine. 
 The documents are analyzed in chronological order, which allows for 
developments in church teaching to emerge and leads the investigation up to the 
expansions Vatican II would make to Rome’s perspective on film (covered in chapter 
two).  The chapter places each document in its historical context, explains its salient 
philosophical, moral, and theological points, and draws conclusions for Catholic 
theological reflection on film.  Whereas several themes get repeated across this first 
phase of Vatican doctrine on cinema, each of the four texts chosen offer unique 
contributions to the magisterium’s standpoint.  After a formal conclusion, the chapter 
finishes with an excursus on two Catholic groups that have played important roles in the 
history of the relationship between the church and cinema:  the Legion of Decency and 
SIGNIS. 
 
Vigilanti cura (1936)3 
Written nearly forty years after the invention of cinema, Pope Pius XI’s 1936 
encyclical, with the English title “On the Motion Picture,” was the first papal letter 
devoted entirely to the then burgeoning form of entertainment, art, and industry.4  
Addressed to bishops in the United States, yet intended for a wider audience, its occasion 
                                                
 3 See Vigilanti cura:   
<http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/pius_xi/encyclicals/documents/hf_p-xi_enc_29061936_vigilanti-
cura_en.html> (last accessed 1/17/10). 
 
 4 Vigilanti cura was not the first papal statement on cinema, but it was the most substantial.  Prior 
to it, in the encyclicals Divini illius magistri (1929) and Casti connubii (1930), Pius XI condemned 
“immoral films for harming the sound training of youth and making a mockery of the religious and 
Christian concept of matrimony,” (E. Baragli, “Media of Social Communication, II (Attitude of the 
Church),” in Encyclopedia of Catholicism, p. 553). 
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was to applaud initiatives made in the U.S. by the Legion of Decency and to encourage 
the group to continue its “holy crusade against the abuses” of motion pictures.5  Pius XI 
levels a critical eye at the motion picture industry and urges his audience to keep a 
“vigilant watch” (the encyclical’s title) against the possible inimical effects of cinema on 
those under their episcopal care.  With such an attitude of cautious optimism the letter 
also describes certain benefits of film such as recreation and its potential as an instructor 
in morals.  A number of points are covered within its exhortative lines, chiefly:  the 
cultural impact, popularity, and importance of motion pictures; the nature and effects of 
its depictions, especially on the minds of young people; the moral responsibility of 
industry leaders in producing films; and the duty of the Catholic church as a whole in 
supporting the making of morally “decent” movies. 
Vigilanti cura amplified a fundamental teaching of Pius XI, one first articulated in 
his inaugural encyclical Ubi arcano Dei consilio (1922),6 namely that as long as nations 
refused to faithfully submit to Jesus Christ’s “sovereign rule over the family and 
society”7 there would be no prospect of a lasting world peace.  The pope expressed deep 
concern over the rapid secularization and materialism that spread across Europe after the 
First World War, highlighting that these currents would only increase the pain and 
alienation of a people already suffering.  Piux XI believed the catastrophes of the Great 
                                                
 5 Vigilanti cura, op. cit.., par. 1.  Hereafter, all quotations from and references to church 
documents from the Vatican’s official website will be noted according to the organization of paragraph 
sections as it appears on the document’s webpage.  Some online documents already have sections 
numbered.  For others, section breaks have been counted and numbered for ease of reference. 
 
 6 See Ubi arcano Dei consilio:  
<http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/pius_xi/encyclicals/documents/hf_p-xi_enc_19221223_ubi-arcano-dei-
consilio_en.html> (last accessed 1/17/10). 
 
 7 Ubi arcano Dei consilio, ibid., par. 54. 
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War had served to wrench humankind from its revealed spiritual path and obliterated “all 
traces of those natural feelings of love and mercy which the law of Christian charity ha[d] 
done so much to encourage.”8  The “active and fruitful tranquility which is the aspiration 
and the need of [hu]mankind,”9 would not be achieved by denial of religious values, the 
amassing of wealth, or a facile yearning for a peaceable world.  Rather, he writes, the 
peace of Jesus proclaimed in the gospels comes from the “acquisition of spiritual 
treasures.”10 
Accordingly, the Catholic church must help lead nations and individuals together 
in search of “the peace of Christ in the Kingdom of Christ”11 by “extending farther and 
farther the boundaries of the Kingdom of Christ,”12 setting “both public and private life 
on the road to righteousness,” and demanding through its own example that all human 
beings “become obedient to God”13 at every level of their lives.  The church has the 
indispensable duty to “watch over the entire education of her children, in all institutions, 
public or private,”14 and, especially for the sake of the young, to ward off “the moral 
poison which at [their] inexperienced and changeable age more easily penetrates the mind 
and more rapidly spreads its baneful effects.”15 
                                                
 8 Ibid., pars. 18 and 20. 
 
 9 Ibid., par. 7. 
 
 10 Ibid., par. 57. 
 
 11 Ibid., par. 55.  This was Pius XI’s papal motto. 
 
 12 Ibid. 
 
 13 Ibid., par. 54. 
 
 14 Ibid., par. 23. 
 
 15 Ibid., par. 24. 
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Vigilanti cura applied this mandate of Ubi arcano to a particular public 
institution:  the cinema.  Because film had become “the most popular form of diversion . . 
. offered for the leisure hours . . . of all classes of society,”16 the Holy Father believed it 
important to identify its merits and safeguard against its (perceived) deficiencies and 
pernicious effects.  Vigilanti cura communicates overlapping philosophical, ethical, and 
theological themes that pervade subsequent church discourse on cinema—themes that 
would ultimately provide a platform for future Catholic teaching about film. 
Philosophically, film is identified by Pius XI as art.17  The medium is lauded as 
capable of being more than a popular entertainment:  “The motion picture should not be 
simply a means of diversion, a light relaxation to occupy an idle hour; with its 
magnificent power, it can and must be a bearer of light and a positive guide to what is 
good.”18  The statement also hints that cinema’s considerable influence on the minds of 
audiences means that the magisterium must treat it more seriously than a mere pastime.  
A brief attempt is made to explain film’s massive appeal and why, indeed, it had become 
the “most powerful” medium of art and communication: 
The power of the motion picture consists in this, that it speaks by means of vivid 
and concrete imagery which the mind takes in with enjoyment and without 
fatigue.  Even the crudest and most primitive minds which have neither the 
capacity nor the desire to make the efforts necessary for abstraction or deductive 
reasoning are captivated by the cinema.  In place of the effort which reading or 
listening demands, there is the continued pleasure of a succession of concrete and, 
so to speak, living pictures.19 
 
                                                
 16 Vigilanti cura, op. cit., par. 23. 
 
 17 Ibid., par. 1. 
 
 18 Ibid., par. 27. 
 
 19 Ibid., par. 25. 
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Today, one may be struck here by the apparent air of condescension toward cinema and 
its patrons.  Though film is deemed a powerful art, the passage could be interpreted as 
suggesting it to be a somewhat “lesser” art compared to traditional arts like literature and 
music, not only perhaps in its form but because of its association with the “crudest and 
most primitive minds.”  This might insinuate that film cannot be “high art” because it is 
enjoyed by so many.20  However, he might also be simply implying that film is able to 
captivate a wider audience, much like music.  Whereas the church would in time modify 
such rhetoric, still, the main point of the passage should not be lost:  namely that given 
film’s potency and artistic value it should be evaluated according to a higher standard 
than would an amusement or simple pastime.  Cinema, it states, should be held to “the 
supreme rule which must direct and regulate the great gift of art in order that it may not 
find itself in continual conflict with Christian morality or even with simple human 
morality based upon the natural law.”21  Because film is “in reality a sort of object lesson 
which, for good or for evil, teaches the majority of [people] more effectively than abstract 
reasoning, it must be elevated to conformity with the aims of a Christian conscience and 
saved from depraving and demoralizing effects.”22  The encyclical mandates that Catholic 
leaders lobby the motion picture industry to produce films of such elevated standing and 
take responsibility for the formation and direction of moviegoers who might lack the 
wherewithal to assess the value of the messages communicated in film. 
                                                
 20 Indeed, it would be more than a decade after Vigilanti cura before film would begin to receive 
widespread artistic praise throughout the world.  It was primarily the critical work of film scholars 
associated with the journal Cahiers du Cinema, which began in the mid-1950s, that opened up critical 
inquiry into the artistry of film (cf. the section on André Bazin in chapter three of this dissertation). 
 
21 Ibid., par. 6. 
 
 22 Ibid., par. 27. 
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 The pope’s philosophical reflections lead to certain moral conclusions about the 
“magnificent power” of motion pictures.  He includes film’s accessibility as a major 
factor in its cultural, intellectual, and emotional force.  Because film is often less 
removed from the average person than other fine arts, it stands a greater chance of having 
a persuasive influence—a consequence Pius XI thinks is double-edged: 
Everyone knows what damage is done to the soul by bad motion pictures.  They 
are occasions of sin; they seduce young people along the ways of evil by 
glorifying the passions; . . . they destroy pure love, respect for marriage; . . . and 
are capable also of creating prejudices among individuals and misunderstandings 
among nations, among social classes, among entire races.  On the other hand, 
good motion pictures are capable of exercising a profoundly moral influence upon 
those who see them.  In addition to affording recreation, they are able to arouse 
noble ideals of life, . . . to present truth and virtue under attractive forms, . . . to 
favor understanding among nations, social classes, and races, to champion the 
cause of justice, to give new life to the claims of virtue, and to contribute 
positively to the genesis of a just social order in the world.23 
 
Judging from this passage, the church’s perspective on motion pictures might appear 
dichotomous:  Films are either “good” or “bad” depending on their contributing effect to 
moral lives of viewers.  While such a viewpoint might be criticized as ignoring the fact 
that film, like any art, often thrives in ambiguity—the “grey area” of life—the point being 
made here is that, given cinema’s enormous capacity to influence the development, 
character, and behavior of countless people, film art “must itself be moral.”24  Piux XI 
contends that the essential function of art, its raison d'être, is “to assist in the perfection 
of the moral personality.”25  This assertion is made in part to urge film producers not to 
                                                
 23 Ibid., pars. 28-29. 
 
 24 Ibid., par. 6.  This seeming dichotomous vision of films (“good” and “bad”) would carry over 
into subsequent Vatican documents on cinema, only to be superseded by a more balanced concern not only 
for film’s moral effects but for its artistic expression of the many dimensions of human life. 
 
25 Ibid., par. 6. 
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lower “the moral standard of the spectators,” discredit “natural or human law,”26 or 
otherwise be “offensive to Catholic moral principles.”27  He also suggests that because 
those in the industry do not always hold to these values, it is up to the church to sustain 
its “crusade” against the “parade of vice and crime”28 on the screen and demand from the 
motion picture industry “clean films which are not offensive to good morals or dangerous 
to Christian virtue.”29  As witness to the fullness of moral perfection—Jesus Christ—the 
church must take up the task of keeping a “watchful eye” on cinema and promoting it as 
“a valuable auxiliary of instruction and education rather than of destruction and ruin of 
souls.”30 
Whereas Vigilanti cura was not intended as a theological tract on film, one 
important declaration it makes would serve to influence and be further developed within 
future ecclesiastical teaching on cinema.  It says that the arts and sciences (film is 
simultaneously art and technology) “are true gifts of God [that] may be ordained to 
[God’s] glory and to the salvation of souls and may be made to serve in a practical way to 
promote the extension of the Kingdom of God upon earth.”31  The passage sustains the 
position of Ubi arcano concerning the need for the international church to seek out 
cultural resources for advancing the gospel; however, it leaves largely to speculation 
                                                
 26 Ibid., par. 12. 
 
 27 Ibid., par. 15. 
 
 28 Ibid., par. 13. 
 
 29 Ibid., par. 18. 
 
 30 Ibid., par. 7.  Practical recommendations are made as to how this vigilance should be 
maintained.  These include recruitment of more Catholics to the Legion of Decency, the creation of 
national film review boards facilitated by Catholic bishops, organized boycotts of theaters showing movies 
with questionable content, and the widespread screening of “approved” films in parish halls. 
 
 31 Ibid., par. 9, emphasis mine. 
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what film as a “gift of God” exactly means and stops short of describing how films in 
particular effectively “extend” God’s kingdom, serve as vehicles toward moral 
perfection, or are instrumental to God’s salvation of the world.  One possible 
interpretation of the statement is that it refers to films which are illustrative of Christian 
principles.  Since depictions of charity can lead to imitative action that builds God’s 
kingdom, film is in fact providential and God can be experienced in the righteous deeds 
inspired by film.  In this sense, the text refers to film’s divine giftedness as potentially 
motivating Christian behavior.  Little more in the text suggests that Pius XI accords film 
with any further theological value. 
A criticism of the document is that it holds to a utilitarian or consequentialist 
notion of the nature of art, one that measures the worth of film solely on its usefulness in 
the training of morals.  The letter would have Catholics judge film as “good” only insofar 
as it functions as a potential motivator for Christian action.  Taken too far, such a 
reduction of film to an ethical tool runs the risk of limiting the craft of filmmaking—and 
any other art for that matter—to its practicability, a position that constrains the medium’s 
autotelic dimension (l’art pour l’art).  That is to say, taking only this approach to film 
evaluation not only disregards the need to appraise a film’s production quality but 
eclipses its full aesthetic value:  its capacity to elicit wonder, for instance; or train the 
emotions; or mediate an experience of beauty. 
A related shortfall of the encyclical is that it remains on the level of abstraction 
when discussing cinema.  As mentioned earlier, its condemnation of cinematic portrayals 
of “sin and vice” outweighs efforts to extol cinema.32  Yet no sense is given as to what 
                                                
 32 Ibid., par. 3. 
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constitutes on-screen “sin and vice.”  And whereas the encyclical admits that “classic 
masterpieces . . . and original creations of uncommon worth”33 had been produced by 
1936, it does not identify these masterpieces by name or present concrete rationale as to 
what makes for exemplary cinema.34 
Vigilanti cura’s language has been criticized.  Certainly from the perspective of 
twenty-first century sensibilities its style and censorial leanings seem outmoded.  Thus, 
its “authoritative and even arrogant” manner and “one-sided view of cinema as a 
‘spectacle nuisible,’ [are positions] more intelligible under the circumstances of those 
days.”35  Its defensive, even pejorative, tone is certainly consistent with the language of 
Vatican pronouncements from the time.  And from the perspective of twenty-first century 
sensibilities, the encyclical’s attitude, style, and censorial leanings may seem outmoded.  
One might wonder if the letter would have been more impressive had it encouraged U.S. 
bishops to invite writers, producers, and directors into dialogue with the Catholic church 
about principles for cinematic content rather than demand, as it does, that they “conform 
entirely to our standards.”36  Clearly, the piece is of a different time and ecclesiastical 
ethos.  Still, there is appreciable value in Pius XI’s cautious optimism and defensive 
positioning of the church vis-à-vis cinema and its industry.  For instance, his approach 
expresses the church’s parental concern to protect the vulnerable—young people, in this 
                                                
 33 Ibid., par. 17. 
 
 34 His successor, Pius XII, would work to remedy this problem in part through his 1955 Discorsi 
sul film ideale—talks in which he presented the qualities of an “ideal” film.  The next section of the 
dissertation evaluates these lectures. 
 
 35 John May, “Approaches to Film Criticism,” in John May, ed., New Image of Religious Film.  
Franklin, WI:  Sheed & Ward, 1997, p. 9. 
 
 36 Vigilanti cura, ibid., par. 54. 
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case, and audiences yet unequipped to make informed judgments about what they see on 
screen.  Pius XI might well have taken as his cue the words of Jesus:  “Whoever causes 
one of these little ones who believe in me to sin, it would be better for him if a great 
millstone were put around his neck and he were thrown into the sea” (Mark 9:42).  
Indeed, this instinct would be borne out in subsequent pronouncements on film. 
 
Discorsi sul film ideale (1955)37 
The years between Pius XI’s Vigilanti cura and Pius XII’s Discourses on the 
Ideal Film—alternatively titled Exhortations to Representatives of the Cinema World—
saw extraordinary changes in the world of cinema.  In many ways these were the defining 
two decades of film history.  The motion picture industry (“Hollywood”) went through its 
Golden Age, consisting of the rise and eventual reformation of the studio system, the 
grooming of movie “stars,” and the proliferation of movie theaters.  Unprecedented 
capital was gained from these ventures.  Technology and the ease of transportation made 
the artistic vision of filmmakers more realizable.  Literary artists began to collaborate 
with film artists.  The field of film criticism was inaugurated.  Two major wars and the 
shifting dynamics of geo-politics created international and existential situations that could 
be interpreted through the camera eye.  Between 1936 and 1955, style- and genre-
defining films were produced, including nine of the American Film Institute’s top-25 
movies38 and international works long lauded as masterpieces.39  The OCIC (Office 
                                                
 37 See Exhortations to Representatives of the Cinema World: 
<http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/pius_xii/apost_exhortations/documents/hf_p-xii_exh_25101955_ideal-
film_en.html>   (last accessed 1/17/10). 
 
 38 Gone with the Wind (1939), The Wizard of Oz (1939), The Grapes of Wrath (1940), Citizen 
Kane (1941), Casablanca (1942), It’s a Wonderful Life (1946), Sunset Blvd. (1950), Singin’ in the Rain 
(1952), On the Waterfront (1954).  These movies are on the American Film Institute’s top-25 list of 2007.  
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Catholique International du Cinéma) awarded its first seventeen awards at film festivals 
during this period.40 
 Pius XII gave his Exhortations in two speeches.  The first was an address to 
representatives of the “Italian Cinematograph Industry” on June, 21 1955; the second, to 
representatives of the “International Union of Cinema Theatre Managers” and the 
“International Federation of Film Distributors,” on October 28, 1955.41  The discourses 
were thus offered to film industry constituents, not clergy.  Conceivably, it is owing to 
the fact that he was not communicating an ecclesiastical directive but rather inviting 
filmmakers to listen to a Catholic perspective on their medium that it has a more 
“diplomatic” tone than Vigilanti cura.42  Exhortations sustains the former encyclical’s 
twin attitudes of optimism and caution, yet it also expresses a firmer trust in film and its 
possibilities—a confidence ascribable perhaps to the many artistic successes cinema 
enjoyed in the intervening years.  There is continuity between the two pronouncements in 
their sketching the contours of a Catholic approach to cinema.  For instance, both (a) 
                                                
The previous list of 1997 included three additional movies from this period:  All About Eve (1950), The 
Maltese Falcon (1941), The African Queen (1951). 
 
 39 Films such as Bicycle Thieves (1948), Diary of a Country Priest (1951), Tokyo Story (1953), La 
Strada (1954), and The Seven Samurai (1954). 
 
 40 The OCIC awardees included six American productions:  The Fugitive (1947); Home of the 
Brave (1949); Intruder in the Dust (1949); The Quiet Man (1952); On the Waterfront (1954); and Marty 
(1955). 
 
 41 For ease of analysis the two speeches will be treated if they were one document—
“Exhortations.”  Indeed, they were intended to be complementary.  References will be numbered according 
to section breaks in the first speech (I) and the second (II) as they are organized on the Vatican’s website. 
 
 42 While generally more positive in character than Vigilanti cura, certain passages in Exhortations 
suggest Pius XII wished the church to remain at a critical distance from film:  “Certainly it seems that the 
cinema, being by its nature an art and a diversion, ought to remain confined, as it were, to the fringe of life, 
governed, of course, by the common laws which regulate ordinary human activities; but since, in fact, it has 
become for the present generation a spiritual and moral problem of enormous importance, it cannot be 
passed over by those who have at heart the fate of the greater part of [humankind] and of its future” 
(Exhortations II, par. 2). 
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recognize the importance of film as art and industry; (b) acknowledge film, as a free 
expression of human creativity, to be a gift of God which obliges responsibility on 
cineastes and audiences alike; and (c) think through the social and spiritual impact of 
film.  Exhortations builds on the foundations set down almost twenty years earlier and 
fleshes out some of Vigilanti cura’s more hypothetical concerns, particularly those 
related to the impact of film on the human psyche. 
 In stating the purpose of his discourses, Pius XII declared that because of the 
“tremendous dynamic activity to which the cinema ha[d] given life” and the 
“extraordinary influence” motion pictures had on society, it was time for a “proper study 
of the art of the cinema.”43  This “study” would entail considering film both “as it 
actually is” and “as it ought to be”—i.e., in its “ideal” form.  The pope hoped his 
examination would help raise film “to the dignity of an instrument devoted to God’s 
glory and [humanity’s] full development.”44 
From the start, it is important to state what Exhortations is not attempting when it 
discusses the “ideal film,” for prima facie it might appear presumptuous for a pope to 
pronounce definitively on standards for artistic excellence and to delineate criteria 
prescriptive for an entire type of art.  Pius XII readily admits that it is not the place of the 
church to tell filmmakers how to do their job or to make definitive claims as to what 
qualities make for a superlative film.  As he says, “no discerning person could ignore or 
deride your conscientious and well-weighed judgment in matters concerning your own 
                                                
 43 Exhortations I, par. 5. 
 
 44 Exhortations II, par. 1. 
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profession.”45  Indeed, the pope applauds the merits of film artists, encouraging them to 
put to “good use” 
that pre-eminence and authority which your knowledge, your experience, and the 
dignity of your work confer on you.  In the place of irrelevant or harmful shows 
present pictures that are good, noble, beautiful, which undoubtedly can be made 
attractive and uplifting at the same time, and even reach a high artistic level.  You 
will have the agreement and approval of everyone of upright mind and heart, and 
above all the approval of your own consciences.46 
 
With full knowledge of the universal appeal of cinema, the position Pius XII takes here 
would seem to be that of a spiritual leader who is faced with a very popular, very 
influential source of information and entertainment and considering its effect on those 
under his pastoral care.  In offering representatives of the film industry a Catholic 
perspective on the nature and prospects of their craft,47 the pope explains that the term 
“ideal film” is not intended to denote any singular movie, one inclusive of all the 
elements he will lay out.  Instead, Pius XII’s remarks suggest advocacy of something like 
a humanism informed by Christian anthropology as an ideal framework from out of 
which filmmakers can tell their stories.  Movies, he says, ought to “strengthen and uplift” 
audiences in the knowledge of the dignity conferred upon them by God; increase people’s 
“gifts of energy and virtue”; galvanize them to “overcome obstacles and avoid erroneous 
solutions”; urge them to “rise after every fall and return to the right path”; and encourage 
people to “go from good to better through the use of [their] freedom.”48 
                                                
 45 Exhortations I, par. 22. 
 
 46 Ibid. 
 
 47 Exhortations anticipates by forty years John Paul II’s Letter to Artists, which offers an even 
more thoroughgoing model for collaboration between the church and artists.  This text will be considered in 
Chapter 2 of the dissertation. 
 
 48 Ibid., par. 29. 
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 Pius XII cites the classic philosophical triad of transcendental values—Truth, 
Goodness, Beauty—as qualities that should inhere in an ideal film.  A film 
will be ideal in content to the extent that, in perfect and harmonious form, it 
measures up to the original and essential demands of [being human].  Basically, 
these demands are three:  truth, goodness, beauty—refractions, as it were, across 
the prism of consciousness, of the boundless realm of being, which extends 
beyond [human beings], in whom they actuate an ever more extensive 
participation in Being itself.  . . . It is clear that the content, or rather the choice of 
the plot, such as comes from looking with all possible fidelity at reality in its 
goodness and beauty, is of fundamental importance in the creation of the ideal 
film.49 
 
Whereas Exhortations largely encourages filmmakers to produce such movies, since the 
“range of plots remains wide, rich, rewarding and attractive, no matter what may be the 
element of the triad which predominates in the individual film,”50 still, the pope asks 
whether film is a “suitable vehicle” for the expression of the transcendentals—the very 
things of Being itself?51  He answers that “even, in the case of a film worthy to be 
classified as good,” obstacles “of an entirely practical nature interfere, which check the 
filmmaker on the threshold of the ideal, as, for example, the intrinsic impossibility of 
giving a visible representation to some truths, goodness or beauty.”52  This principle—
that there are limits to the artistic expression of truth, goodness, and beauty—cautions 
against the potential idolatry of art.  It also urges filmmakers to bear in mind the gravity 
of what they do; given cinema’s public and influential reach into the private sphere, 
filmmakers should not approach their craft facilely. 
                                                
 49 Exhortations II, pars. 6-7. 
 
 50 Exhortations II, par. 7. 
 
 51 Ibid., par. 6. 
 
 52 Ibid. 
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 Nowhere in the discourses does Pius XII name as a criterion for the ideal film that 
it be explicitly Christian or even thematically religious.  Indeed, he speaks about 
problems related to the expression of spiritual and religious realities: 
Not every religious action or occurrence can be transferred to the screen, because 
either a scenic representation of it is intrinsically impossible, or piety and 
reverence are opposed to it.  Moreover, religious topics often present particular 
difficulties to authors and actors, among which perhaps the chief is how to avoid 
all trace of artificiality and affectation, every impression of a lesson learnt 
mechanically—since true religious feeling is essentially the opposite of external 
show, and does not easily allow itself to be "declaimed.”53 
 
Certainly, Pius XII does not oppose the production of religious films; yet there is need for 
“considerable finesse and depth of religious sentiment and human tact, in order not to 
offend and profane what [people] hold sacred.”54  Further, the interpretation of religious 
experience, even when “carried out with a right intention, rarely receives the stamp of an 
experience truly lived and as a result, capable of being shared with the spectator.”55 
 With the understanding that no single movie can be expected to embody all the 
proposed ideals, specific features of an exemplary film are further named and defined.  
Foremost of these should be respect for human beings, a value grounded in the 
theological anthropology of Genesis 1:26, which claims for all people a dignity and 
nobility bestowed by God “in whose image and likeness” they are made.  Pius XII calls 
the human person “the universe in miniature,” equipped by God with the “heights and 
depths” of an emotional life; the world of the senses “with its numerous powers, 
                                                
 53 Exhortations II, par. 24. 
 
 54 Ibid., par. 25. 
 
 55 Ibid.  This may be more evident today as one looks back to the religious epics of that era.  In 
some cases, the dramaturgy and primitive visual effects of many mid-century biblical epics might be 
characterized as overwrought, pietistic, and stilted.  Chapter three examines how both André Bazin and 
Richard Blake treat the question of filming the religious. 
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perceptions and feelings”; and the body itself, “formed even to its minutest parts 
according to a teleology not yet fully grasped.”56  Secondly, film should express 
humanity in its struggle and development.  In this sense, film ought to be tailored to suit 
the stages of human life, meeting both children and adults according to their “own 
manner of seeing and understanding things.”57  Finally, film should aid people “in 
maintaining and rendering effective [their] self-expression in the path of right and 
goodness.”58 
Exhortations also examines more carefully than Vigilanti cura the question of 
cinema’s “terrific power,” specifically its mimetic effects:  “Many, particularly if their 
spiritual formation is weak, are allowing themselves to be brought to adopting behavior 
in their private and public lives, which is determined by the artistic fictions and the 
unsubstantial shadows of the screen.”59  Yet Exhortations goes into a deeper assessment 
of cinema’s capacity to impress itself on the human spirit.  A fair portion of the document 
explains film’s impact from the perspective of “the important part played in it by the laws 
of psychology.”60  While today it is taken for granted that filmmakers use various 
techniques to influence audiences intellectually, viscerally, and subliminally, in 1955 the 
                                                
 56 Exhortations I, par. 28. 
 
 57 Ibid., par. 33. 
 
 58 Ibid., par. 47.  Recall that Vigilanti cura did not offer specific filmic instances where its 
magisterial prescriptions had obtained.  Here again no movies are referenced by name, perhaps keeping in 
line with the general principle of the document that no individual film will epitomize all the “ideals.”  Still, 
it would be helpful to have some sense of particular films that approach the pope’s vision of an exemplary 
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under the auspices of Rome.  Thus, one possible indicator of films Pius XII had in mind as ideal are those 
that received prizes by the OCIC in the year he gave the Exhortations (1955):  Sinha Moca (dir., T. Payne, 
Brazil); Marty (dir. D. Mann, U.S.); and Amici per la Pelle, (dir., F. Rossi, Italy). 
 
 59 Exhortations I, par. 3. 
 
 60 Ibid., par. 12. 
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science of psychoanalysis was, like cinema itself, just beginning to mature.  Pius XII 
made it a point to incorporate language about the “internal structure of psychic process”61 
to explain the way viewers are so intensely affected by film: 
Through the whole time of this sort of enchantment, due in large part to the 
suggestion of the actor, the viewer moves in the actor's world as though it were 
his own, and even, to some degree, lives in his place, and almost within him, in 
perfect harmony of feeling, sometimes even being drawn by the action to suggest 
words and phrases. This procedure, which modern directors are well aware of and 
try to make use of, has been compared with the dream state, with this difference, 
that the visions and images of dreams come only from the inner world of the 
dreamer, whereas they come from the screen to the spectator, but in such a way 
that they arouse from the depths of his consciousness images that are more vivid 
and dearer to him. Often enough then it happens that the spectator, through 
pictures of persons and things, sees as real what never actually happened, but 
which he has frequently pondered over deep within himself, and desired or feared. 
With cause, therefore, does the extraordinary power of the moving picture find its 
profoundest explanation in the internal structure of psychic process, and the 
spectacle will be all the more gripping in proportion to the degree in which it 
stimulates these processes.62 
 
Today one marvels at the depth of psychological insight this passage offers; indeed, its 
grasp of the interior processes triggered in the experience of film viewing was truly ahead 
of its time.  But what does Pius XII conclude about this process in relation to his vision of 
the ideal film?  Where to his mind do such vicarious experiences lead audiences? 
[T]he internal dynamisms of the spectator's ego, in the depths of [one’s] nature, of 
[one’s] subconscious and unconscious mind, can lead . . . thus to the realm of 
light, of the noble and beautiful, just as they can bring [a person] under the sway 
of darkness and depravation, at the mercy of powerful and uncontrolled instincts, 
depending on whether the picture plays up and arouses the qualities of one or the 
other field, and focuses on it the attention, the desires and psychic impulses.63 
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Perceivable here is a slight movement beyond Vigilanti cura’s bifurcation of film into 
“good” or “bad” depending on its effect on the morality of spectators.  Whereas the 
concern remains as to which direction film leads the spectator—good or evil—in 
Exhortations a greater effort is made to take into account the cumulative and lasting 
effect of film on the human spirit, which may or may not express itself in direct action. 
To conclude, while on first impression it may appear an odd if not presumptuous 
gesture for a pope to summon film producers to the Vatican in order to posit criteria for 
an ideal film, a closer examination has revealed the real intention behind Exhortations, 
which surfaces most clearly in his closing remarks: 
As we spoke, there came before our mind the immense crowds of men and 
women, of youths and of children, to whom daily the film speaks its powerful 
language.  We gathered up their longings and hopes with love and fatherly 
solicitude.  The majority of them who are, in the depths of their souls, good and 
sound, ask no more from the cinema than some reflection of the true, the good, 
the beautiful:  in a word, a ray of God.  You, too, listen to their plea, and answer 
their expectations, so that the image of God, stamped on their souls, may always 
glow clear in the thoughts, the feelings, the deeds inspired by your art.64 
 
As chief pastor of the Catholic church, the pope’s primary concern is the spiritual 
wellbeing of God’s people.  Pius XII’s recourse is directly to filmmakers:  Not to tell 
them what to do, but to petition them to consider seriously the real impact their medium 
can (and does) make on the individual and society.  His intention is to humanize movie 
audiences so that filmmakers treat viewers not as idle spectators or commercial pawns 
but as people who have absolute worth in the eyes of God.  Speaking with the conviction 
that film is an art form blessed by God, the pope exhorts industry leaders to consider that 
the motivating force behind the creative talents of even the most principled of producers 
ought to be more than simple altruism:  cinema’s terminus should be nothing less than 
                                                
 64 Exhortations II, par. 61. 
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“the education and development of the soul.”65  Filmmakers have the rare and great 
opportunity to reflect through their craft something of the truth, goodness, and beauty of 
the human person.  Yet it is an opportunity they must approach responsibly, which, to his 
mind, is only possible when done according to Christian principles. 
 Finally, Exhortations implies that film is a providential instrument which, in its 
expression of aspects of truth, beauty, and goodness, can lead people to more deeply 
experience these values and thus predispose them to the gospel of Jesus Christ.  Yet is 
does not make this judgment explicit.  Whereas Exhortations opens wider the possibility 
that film can prompt people to recognize the experience of God already present in their 
lives—a possibility that both Vatican documents studied so far suggests is real—it does 
little to flesh out the meaning of this judgment.  It is therefore incumbent upon a survey 
of Vatican approaches to cinema to determine whether this position is sustained and 
further substantiated in future documents.  This question will be kept in mind as the 
dissertation turns to the third major ecclesiastical document about motion pictures, 
Miranda prorsus. 
 
Miranda prorsus (1957)66 
 This encyclical by Pius XII was the first papal document to make mass 
communication an object of Catholic church inquiry and teaching.  Here, radio and 
television are considered along with motion pictures to be technologies worthy of papal 
attention on a number of counts, including:  the great influence of the media on the lives 
                                                
 65 Exhortations II, par. 3. 
 
 66 See Miranda Prorsus:  
<http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/pius_xii/encyclicals/documents/hf_p-xii_enc_08091957_miranda-
prorsus_en.html>  (last accessed 1/17/10). 
 37 
of people worldwide; the position of the church as the principal disseminator of Jesus’ 
message of salvation; and the possibility that electronic forms of communication can aid 
the church in its task to spread the gospel and unite humanity.67  The intention of this 
section is to trace the contributions Miranda prorsus made to Rome’s then nascent 
understanding of film.  The letter represents the Vatican’s most systematic treatment of 
the subject of film to date (some fifty years hence) and it laid the groundwork for the 
decrees Inter mirifica and Communio et progressio, works that will be taken up in the 
next chapter.  The encyclical is divided into two main parts.  The first inquires into the 
nature of social communication as a whole and outlines general principles that ought to 
govern the production and reception of mass media; the second half evaluates cinema, 
television, and radio each in their particularity.68  Throughout, the letter covers the 
specific role the church should play with reference to these media. 
 Pius XII recapitulates earlier church teaching on the cinema by identifying film, 
television, and radio as “forms of art [that] exercise very great influence on the manner of 
thinking and acting of individuals and of every group of [people],”69 noting that, since 
their inception, the church welcomed these arts with “great joy.”70  At the same time he 
states that ecclesial enthusiasm for them is curbed by an instinct to guard against the 
possible hazards of such potent influences with “motherly care and watchfulness.”71  The 
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 68 While the encyclical’s first half addresses the three forms of mass media as a whole, for the sake 
of style, the present analysis treat Miranda prorsus as if it were reflecting only on film. 
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pastoral intention and cautionary tone of Miranda prorsus echo Vigilanti cura.  Like the 
earlier text, this missive acknowledges the tremendous effect media has on society, sets 
out the high ideals toward which they ought to strive, and warns against potential dangers 
that can result when such heights are not reached.  It fortifies its addressees against such 
hazards with the knowledge of the providential nature of all media.  It is assumed that 
possession of this wisdom will oblige responsible participation in the creation and 
patronization of these arts. 
 The letter, however, does more than restate Vatican teaching; it develops several 
themes found in the earlier documents.  Previously, the church had taught that motion 
pictures are “true gifts of God [that] may be ordained to [God’s] glory and to the 
salvation of souls and may be made to serve in a practical way to promote the extension 
of the Kingdom of God upon earth.”72  Further, it taught that film can contribute to moral 
development and is capable of reflecting something of the beauty, truth, and goodness of 
God.  However, these claims went largely unsupported by theological principles 
developed within the literature.  Miranda prorsus expanded Catholic opinion on cinema 
by defining the theological nature of social communication as well as the origin, object, 
and proper use of media forms.  For instance, it states that all instruments of 
communication originate as a cooperative effort between Providence and human 
ingenuity.  Whereas these “remarkable technical inventions” are the result of “human 
intelligence and industry,” they are “nevertheless the gifts of God, our creator, from 
whom all good gifts proceed.”73  The real gift, however, does not consist in media alone; 
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rather it is the knowledge that God has given human beings the means of free self-
expression and hence willed them to be participative in God’s own creative spirit: 
[Since God] longs to see in man the image of His own perfection, He even wills 
him to be made a sharer in this supreme generosity, and has linked him with His 
own activity as the proclaimer of those good tidings, making him become their 
donor and dispenser to his brethren and to the whole human race.  From the 
beginning of time, it has been man's natural and normal tendency to share with 
others the treasures of his mind by means of symbols whereby he daily tried to 
develop a more perfect means of expressing his material problems.  Thus, from 
the drawings and inscriptions of the most ancient times down to the latest 
technical devices, all instruments of human communication inevitably have as 
their aim the lofty purpose of revealing men as in some way the assistants of 
God.74 
 
Here, Pius XII accords nobility to the work of media artists.  Just as God has made all 
human beings capable of assisting in the dissemination of “good tidings,” so into the 
hands of producers, directors, announcers, actors, technicians, etc., “have been placed 
these useful instruments by which the priceless treasures of God may be spread among 
[people] like good seed which bring forth fruits of truth and goodness.”75  The encyclical 
teaches that because all human communication derives from God, its use should be 
proportional to its providential design.  Thus, the “first aim of the arts” must be “to serve 
truth and virtue.”76  This means that all those involved in the art/technology of electronic 
communication should 
refrain from error, from lies, from deceit of all kinds, [and] shun everything that 
can encourage a manner of living and acting which is false, imperfect, or harmful 
to another party.  But above all, let the truths, handed down by God's revelation, 
be held sacred and inviolable.77 
                                                
 74 Ibid., par. 25.  There is a conscious attempt to use gender-neutral language throughout the 
dissertation.  Consequently, many quotations have been altered.  However, in certain cases such as this, for 
stylistic purposes, quotations have been kept in the original. 
 
 75 Ibid., par. 26. 
 
 76 Ibid., par. 45. 
 
 77 Ibid., pars. 47-48. 
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The freedom that artists enjoy in plying their craft will be the exercise of “true freedom” 
when their work makes “the bonds between peoples become yet closer.”78 
 As construed by Pius XII, just as the authentic use of media is capable of 
supplying “good seed” for intellectual and moral cultivation, so can its abuse spread seed 
which “become the means, and as it were, the paths leading to evil . . ..”79  The letter 
reproaches those who would deny “Christian teaching and the principal end of these arts . 
. . [and] desire to use these inventions exclusively for the advancement and propagation 
of political measures or to achieve economic ends, and who treat our noble aim as if it 
were a mere business transaction.”80  Such a degradation of the art of cinema is even 
more reprehensible in the hands of those who “assert and claim freedom to depict and 
propagate anything at all, even though there has been established beyond dispute [in 
Vigilanti cura and Exhortations] both the kind and the extent of the damage to both 
bodies and souls which has had its source in these principles.”81  As author of human 
intelligence and freedom, God has equipped people to develop the—morally neutral—
media forms for the purposes laid out above.82  Too often, however, an attitude of 
                                                
 78 Ibid., par. 46. 
 
 79 Ibid. pars. 27-28. 
 
 80 Ibid., par. 33. 
 
 81 Ibid., par. 34. 
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“uncontrolled freedom, which disregards all precautions” is taken and “can result in 
serious danger to souls”83: 
[It] is true that an explicitly moral or religious function is not demanded of art as 
art; but if artistic expression gives publicity to false, empty and confused forms—
those not in harmony with the Creator's design; if, rather than lifting mind and 
heart to noble sentiments, it stirs the baser passions, it might, perhaps, find 
welcome among some people, but only by nature of its novelty, a quality not 
always of value and with but slight content of that reality which is possessed by 
every type of human expression.  But such an art would degrade itself, denying its 
primary and essential element:  it would not be universal and perennial as is the 
human spirit to which it is addressed.84 
 
 Miranda prorsus makes more explicit than previous documents the sense of the 
church’s responsibility in relation to film and defines this in terms of the church’s basic 
mission:  to announce the “message of eternal salvation.”85  It must take the role of 
pastoral teacher, instructing those involved in filmmaking so that their work remains at 
the service of truth and virtue, unites people, and advances civilization.  Through local 
offices the church must continue to keep a “watchful eye” on the industry so that there be 
“a lessening of the dangers which can threaten harm to morals;”86 it must educate 
spectators so that they might “practice mature consideration and judgment on the various 
items which the film . . . puts before them . . ..”87  Finally, the church should support 
efforts by filmmakers that extend the gospel and otherwise enable people to grow in 
wisdom and virtue.  The encyclical claims the “right” of the church to utilize film for the 
sake of its mission, the rationale being that because Jesus commissioned his followers to 
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proclaim his gospel of deliverance from evil throughout the world, it is the church’s duty 
in every age to employ for this purpose every effective means of communication 
available—cinema notwithstanding. 
 As in Exhortations, Pius XII does not insist that a film have as its primary subject a 
religious personae or promote an explicitly religious message for it to be laudable in the 
eyes of the church.  What is suggested, however, is that filmmakers strive through their 
work to serve the truths handed down by divine revelation and instill “into minds that 
Christian truth which alone can provide the strength from above to the mass of [people], 
aided by which they may be able with calmness and courage, to overcome the crises and 
endure the severe trials of the age in which we now live . . .."88  The pope goes so far as 
to state that film is a medium which can “permit Christians, through the new knowledge 
they acquire to raise their minds to a contemplation of heavenly truths.”89  This nuances 
the earlier position of Exhortations that cinema is capable of conveying to viewers some 
perception of divine goodness, truth, and beauty and makes clear Pius XII’s belief that 
film has a profound theological purpose:  to lead people to God.  Film is a “worthy 
instrument” by which people can “be guided towards salvation, raised to higher things, 
and become really better.”90  It does this when it communicates human dignity, reflects 
the wonders of God, and inspires holiness by opening people to the wisdom and hope of 
the gospel. 
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 It is now possible to summarize how Miranda prorsus advanced Vatican teaching 
on cinema.  For one, in discussing film within the larger context of social communication 
and art it does not sequester film, as it were, in an exclusive corner.  This does much to 
diminish the earlier impression that film is a spectacle nuisible.  Instead, film it is looked 
upon as a multidimensional medium that operates socially, artistically, technologically, 
and spiritually and can be fully engaged by Christians.  Also, with this document the 
Catholic church confirmed the compatibility between the belief and practice of faith and 
the experience of film.  It pushed reflection on the subject into a more explicitly 
theological arena, beyond the strictly moral discourse of Vigilanti cura and its utilitarian 
view of film.  Still, as with the previous Vatican teaching, the document considers film in 
abstraction from real movies and the relation they bear on the concrete lives of 
believers.91  It leaves to speculation how, in practical terms, film is capable of interpreting 
the “things” of God and leading people to contemplate “heavenly truths.”  This is the 
same question that remained open at the end of Exhortations. 
 As noted, Miranda prorsus sustains some of the tone and rhetoric of Vigilanti cura, 
particularly with reference to the perceived negative affects of cinema.  Consider, for 
instance, Pius XII’s assertion that the media “introduce a most powerful influence into 
[human] minds both because they can flood them with light, raise them to nobility, adorn 
them with beauty, and because they can disfigure them by dimming their luster, dishonor 
them by a process of corruption, and make them subject to uncontrolled passions.”92  Or 
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again, media “can be the source of countless evils.”93  By comparison, this language was 
noticeably absent in Exhortations.  The variance is noteworthy for two reasons.  First, 
because the positive character of Exhortations with its clear excitement for cinema and its 
promises seems dimmed here.  Whereas Miranda prorsus expanded the Vatican’s moral 
discourse about film to include theology, it does not acknowledge the need for aesthetic 
discourse:  the question of how from the perspective of Christianity film might serve an 
important artistic function in itself.  In other words, Pius XII does not develop the “art for 
art’s sake” motif in his Exhortations.94  Second, with respect to cinema there is a 
consistent dichotomy in Catholic doctrine up through Miranda prorsus:  A film is either 
good or evil, virtuous or shameful.  If a movie is of the first class, it unmistakably 
enlightens all who view it and helps to build God’s kingdom; if from the second, it 
fosters incalculable evil into the human mind and ushers into the world only corruption.  
At this stage in Vatican teaching, there is little room for degrees of film interpretation, no 
grey matter, as it were, that would require critical analysis.  This ignores the fact that 
different movies reach people differently and that the many dimensions of a film obtain 
in viewers in varying ways—often, over time, in a single viewer.  As the next chapter 
will illustrate, later Vatican teaching would move away from such a polarized view of 
film.  However, the attitude established in these earlier writings continues to influence the 
way many Catholics approach cinema today. 
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Inter mirifica (1963)95 
 On January 25, 1959, Pope John XXIII announced that he would convene the 
twenty-first ecumenical council of the Catholic church.  He intended the council, which 
would open nearly four years later, to be a pastoral rather than strictly dogmatic 
undertaking.  As the pope said in his opening address, the salient point of the Second 
Vatican Council was not to hold discussions about one article or another of the 
fundamental doctrines of the church, rather what 
is needed at the present time is a new enthusiasm, a new joy and serenity of mind 
in the unreserved acceptance by all of the entire Christian faith . . ..  What is 
needed, and what everyone imbued with a truly Christian, Catholic and apostolic 
spirit craves today, is that this doctrine shall be more widely known, more deeply 
understood, and more penetrating in its effects on [people’s] moral lives.  What is 
needed is that this certain and immutable doctrine, to which the faithful owe 
obedience, be studied afresh and reformulated in contemporary terms.  For this 
deposit of faith, or truths which are contained in our time-honored teaching is one 
thing; the manner in which these truths are set forth (with their meaning preserved 
intact) is something else.  This, then, is what will require our careful, and perhaps 
too, patient, consideration.  We must work out ways and means of expounding 
these truths in a manner more consistent with a predominantly pastoral view of 
the church's teaching office.96 
 
John XXIII hoped the bishop’s pastoral focus and presentation of doctrine in new ways 
would resonate with the lived experience of Catholics and lead to renewal within the 
church and a greater openness to the world. 
 Even before the announcement of Vatican II, John XXIII had appointed a 
committee to gather materials on the subject of mass communication in preparation for 
the approaching convocation.  He commissioned the group to 
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identify the problems raised by the press and the audiovisual media and, while 
recognizing the individual character of each sector, to assemble all this material 
into a single study which would yet leave room for future developments in which 
the different instruments of social communication, as they were called from then 
on, would find their proper place and receive due consideration within the 
church’s renewed ministry.97 
 
The committee’s work eventually led to the writing of Inter mirifica (Decree on the 
Media of Social Communication), one of the first documents propagated by the Second 
Vatican Council.  Like Miranda prorsus, it concerns basic Christian principles for mass 
media as a whole and so only indirectly handles cinema.  An immediate difference 
between this document and the foregoing literature on film is its nature as a conciliar 
edict.  This is significant for two reasons:  first, it did not come from the hand of an 
individual pope but from the collective thought of a panel of bishops (specifically the 
Commission for the Lay Apostolate) and ratified by the ecumenical council (1,960 to 160 
votes); and second, its composition reflects something of the spirit and objectives of the 
general council.  As will be shown, Inter mirifica largely restates prior papal teaching on 
cinema.  The focus of the present analysis, therefore, will be on the modifications and/or 
enlargements it makes to earlier positions.98 
 Inter mirifica recapitulates several themes present in earlier Vatican statements on 
film.  Briefly, it reemphasizes the teaching that the church has deep insight into the nature 
of the medium by virtue of the revealed knowledge of film’s transcendent origin and 
goal.  Film is ordained by God to be instrumental in the welfare and healing of 
humankind; to assist the church in disseminating the gospel; and to mediate “the 
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salvation and perfection of [Christians] and of the entire human family.”99  Whereas the 
magisterium acknowledges how film “greatly contribute[s] to [people’s] entertainment 
and instruction,”100 its primary interest remains the opportunities it affords evangelization 
and catechesis.  God has imparted to the world various means by which the gospel can be 
propagated.  The church claims an inherent right to employ all media appropriate for the 
pastoral formation and “instruction of Christians and all its efforts for the welfare of 
souls.”101  Film, a product of humanity’s God-given creative spirit, is one such medium. 
 A leitmotif throughout Inter mirifica is its emphasis on the “proper use” of film.  
For its part the church has the responsibility to instruct the world in Christian principles 
and to ensure that the gospel remains the criterion for judging human action.  The 
document insists that the film industry has a share in this “gravely important 
responsibility”102 by producing works that are ordered to the common good of 
humankind.  Because filmmakers are in a position “to lead the human race to good or to 
evil by informing or arousing [hu]mankind”103 through their work, their efforts need to be 
guided by an “upright conscience,” one which corresponds at the very least to natural 
law, i.e., the “absolute primacy of the objective moral order.”104  The decree thus 
subordinates the “rights of art” to the “norms of morality” with the justification that the 
moral order “by itself surpasses and fittingly coordinates all other spheres of human 
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affairs—the arts not excepted—even though they be endowed with notable dignity.”105  
Practical directives are given for Catholic advocacy of morally wholesome films.  For 
instance, Catholics can cooperate in “projects and enterprises for the production and 
distribution of decent films by encouraging worthwhile films through critical approval 
and awards [and] by patronizing or jointly sponsoring theaters operated by Catholic and 
responsible managers.”106 
 Yet all of this is essentially a reiteration of prior doctrine.  So, what exactly did 
Inter mirifica newly contribute to church teaching on film?  One change can be detected 
in the rhetoric concerning portrayals of “moral evil.”  Since Vigilanti cura, the church 
had considered cinematic representations of violence harmful to viewers, particularly if 
the violence was not plainly condemned as such during the course of the movie.  Here, 
allowances are made if the depiction of depraved acts is intended to chronicle the sinful 
condition that Christ came to heal.  As the decree states, such portrayals of moral evil can 
“bring about a deeper knowledge and study of humanity” and thus “reveal and glorify the 
grand dimensions of truth and goodness.”107  Despite the qualification that these 
representations remain “subject to moral restraint,” what is shown in this slight doctrinal 
shift is greater ecclesial flexibility regarding the need for art to investigate humanity in all 
its aspects, including the errant and corrupt.108 
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 Also new in this document is the Vatican’s advocacy for a more informed 
reception of film on the part of viewers.  Those who watch movies have moral 
obligations along with those who produce them.  Not only should Catholics select to see 
motion pictures that excel artistically and that promote virtuous living, they should also 
acquire some skill at film evaluation so as to “deepen their understanding of what they 
see, hear or read.  [This should lead them] to discuss these matters with . . . teachers and 
experts, and learn to pass sound judgments on them.”109  The text stresses the need for 
anyone involved in catechesis to be “equipped with the proper skills for adapting these 
media to the objectives of the apostolate”—a recommendation that builds on the earlier 
mandate that the church make “proper use” of the arts to proclaim the gospel.110  For its 
part, the church should ensure that Catholic universities offer programs of education on 
the media that are governed by Christian foundations. 
 Over the decades since Inter mirifica’s promulgation several criticisms of the 
decree have been issued from within the church.  There are those who feel the document 
was a missed opportunity, that the council fathers did not reflect deeply enough on the 
nature of media and on the benefits and challenges it holds for Christian faith.  For 
instance, Gustave Weigel, S.J. said that the decree did not strike him as “being very 
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remarkable.  It is not going to produce great changes.  It does not contain novel positions 
but gathers and officially states a number of points previously stated and taught on a less 
official level.”111  Others cite a problem with the document’s overall ecclesiology and 
sense of the church’s relationship to culture.  Avery Dulles, S.J. remarked that Inter 
mirifica “represents the institutional model of the church as authoritative teacher.  The 
decree is filled with presumptions about the power of the church to control and influence 
the mass media.  Its authors failed to understand that unlike previous times, the church 
was now entwined and dependent on a channel of communication, which was outside its 
control.”112  A group of American media experts, with the backing of council theologians 
like John Courtney Murray, S.J. and Jean Danielou, S.J., claimed that the decree has a 
“hopelessly abstract view of the relationship of the church and modern culture.  . . . [It] 
may one day be cited as a classic example of how the Second Vatican Ecumenical 
Council failed to come to grips with the world around it.”113  Robert Waznak, S.S. writes 
that it is “an irony that Inter mirifica, which dealt with the most pervasive force in our 
culture, became the least significant document of the council that sought to ‘read the 
signs of the times.’”114  Its authors, he continues, “failed to grasp the fact our video 
culture is not just a challenge to religion, but a form of religion.  It, too, reads the signs of 
the times.”115  Waznak also comments on Inter mirifica’s seeming isolation from other 
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conciliar documents and the general spirit that imbued them, namely that it lacks “the 
wisdom and theological embrace of the later documents of the church and its relationship 
to the world.”116  Richard McBrien echoes this perspective:  The “decree was one of the 
first two documents approved by Vatican II . . . at the end of the first session.  That may 
explain why it is so clearly out of touch with the theological and pastoral character of the 
council as a whole.  It is indeed . . . one of the two weakest documents produced by 
Vatican II.”117  Finally, the general tenor of the decree has also solicited much discussion.  
John Richard Neuhaus admits that “when the decree was adopted, the tone of council 
documents had not yet develop in a more dialogical, rather than admonitory mode.”118  
Further, the “title Inter mirifica suggests a sense of openness and wonder, while the 
diction of the decree seems at times more like a laying down of rules.”119  Neuhaus 
asserts that it is not part of Catholic orthodoxy to believe that  
the Holy Spirit guarantees that the teaching of the truth will be done with literary 
grace and persuasive argument.  What might be called the tonalities of the decree 
leave much to be desired.  There is a certain defensiveness in speaking of the 
numerous problems and abuses connected with the instruments of 
communication.  Obviously, such abuses abound, but one might have wished for 
more of an exploratory reflection on opportunities.  Then too, it is said that the 
decree tends to speak of the church as an institution concerned about protecting its 
own institutional interests, rather than the church as a “sacrament” in service to 
the world, a theme developed so powerfully in the council’s later deliberations.120 
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Neuhaus counteracts criticisms that the decree exhibits “a narrow, institutional self-
interest in how the media can serve the church.”  Communicating the gospel, he says, “is 
not institutional self-interest but the constituting mandate and raison d'être of the 
church.”121  Indeed, to his mind there is an inherent modesty to Inter mirifica, one that 
defines honestly the church’s boundaries in relating to the instruments of communication: 
The decree calls for a world of communications that is very different from the one 
that we have.  It envisions social communications in the service of morality, truth, 
charity, and the common good.  But is also recognizes the limits of what the 
church can do to bring about such a change—calling upon faithful Catholics to 
exercise their influence in trying to effect the transformation envisioned.122 
 
 The legitimacy of the foregoing expert comments is not diminished when one 
reads Inter mirifica as a transitional document in the Vatican’s teaching on mass media.  
The decree came at a time when the world was also in transition, as many cultures rapidly 
became more technologically sophisticated and media-dependent.  The fact that the 
bishops of Vatican II dedicated special attention to social communication meant that this 
sector of culture would remain a permanent subject for church reflection and teaching.  
Their treatment of media would in time prove prescient, for they “sensed that the media 
were offering new challenges and blessing to the church.  They grappled with the fact 
that people today are influenced more by image than abstract thought.”123  The document 
reflects the magisterium’s gradual movement from a fairly instrumentalist and morally 
focused vision to one integrative of the gospel and communication theory.  Because 
Vatican II was such a transformational council, many people inside and outside the 
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church became more aware that the magisterium had for nearly thirty years been thinking 
formally about Catholicism’s relationship to cinema and other forms of mass media. 
 Inter mirifica was transitional for another reason, for it was a “stimulus to further 
reflection and action” on an issue “in tune with the lives of many people.”124  This begot 
a larger ecclesial conversation about the relationship between theology and film.  In point 
of fact, toward “the end of their debate on the schema, the bishops realized that they were 
confronting a topic beyond their expertise,”125 and they mandated that further pastoral 
instruction on communication be presented in a future statement: 
So that the general principles and norms of this sacred Synod with respect to the 
media of social communications may be put into effect, by the express will of the 
Council, the office of the Holy See mentioned in Number 19 should undertake, 
with the assistance of experts from various countries, to issue a pastoral 
instruction.126 
 
That instruction would become the document Communio et progressio (1971) which 
“was written by media experts and is a more intelligent and practical document than Inter 
mirifica.”127 
 
Conclusion 
 This chapter gathered the strands that formulated the Vatican’s earliest teaching 
on cinema and looked at them from an explicitly theological perspective.  Spanning 
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nearly thirty years, the four documents analyzed represent what can be termed the “first 
stage” of the Roman magisterium’s approach to film.  The investigation highlighted the 
motivating factors behind the documents, looked at attendant philosophical, ethical, and 
theological themes, and traced how the literature developed the Vatican’s official stance 
toward a novel form of art and recreation.  The church expressed a position of “cautious 
optimism” toward cinema in this early phase.  And while it is difficult to summarize 
succinctly the Vatican’s opinion on cinema, there are certain characteristics that help us 
understand it as a whole.  For instance, the Vatican acknowledged that cinema serves the 
common good of recreation; yet, the church also recognized that, given film’s potential to 
grip audiences in emotive and deeply psychological ways, it should not be considered by 
Catholics to be a mere pastime or harmless entertainment.  In general, the magisterium 
interpreted film within the grand scope of salvation history, wherein everything comes 
from God and returns to God.  Within this theological framework, film is understood to 
be a gift of God; and, like all divinely bestowed gifts, is intended to lead people to back 
to God.  Rome acknowledged that film is capable of chronicling the human condition and 
expressing the spiritual dimensions of human nature, i.e., the struggle for life and 
meaning.  Film can aid people in perceiving the invisible reality of the spirit.  In other 
words, film is capable of raising the mind to contemplate the truth, beauty, and goodness 
of Being.  Given its providential giftedness and potential to express humanity’s 
transcendental orientation, the church is justified in turning to film as a means for 
evangelization and catechesis. 
 And yet film is also capable of degrading the values of religion, virtue, and the 
human person, of compounding the spiritual ills that debilitate our culture—of spreading 
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semina perditionis.  The belief “that film corrupts morals and perverts theological vision 
is . . . particularly prevalent in the earlier Catholic documents considering film.”128  As 
illustrated, these early documents judged films to have “considerable power in changing 
people’s behavior and beliefs”129 and encouraged Catholics to become critically engaged 
with cinema and to maintain an active role in promoting “moral” film by influencing film 
producers through various means (e.g., financing and awarding “good” cinema; 
boycotting “bad” cinema).  The Vatican urged film producers to remain mindful of the 
immense impact their works can have on audiences and to create films that have as their 
end the common good of viewers rather than the intake of profit.  Viewers, too, have a 
responsibility to develop skills in film evaluation to deepen their understanding of what 
they see and hear and so discern the value of a film based on Christian principles. 
 The documents studied thus far claim film to be a legitimate art form, independent 
of the church for its life and imagination.  At the same time film, seen from a Catholic 
point of view, is a “gift of God” in the sense that it is a product of the human person’s 
God-given freedom and creative ability.  As such, film has something of a theological 
purpose, in the sense that its use must be proportional to its providential design as an 
instrument of revelation and unity that should “serve truth and virtue.”  Yet even 
portrayals of moral evil can disclose a deeper knowledge of the reality and darkness of 
sin and serve as a study of humanity in need of redemption. 
 There is a tendency in the Vatican’s early literature on cinema to focus on the 
moral benefits or detriments of film content, rather than on any of film’s artistic merits.  
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A dichotomous and utilitarian notion of movies prevailed in the formative teaching that 
would for decades carry forward in the church’s “film consciousness.”  As suggested, 
church leaders and supporters of the Legion of Decency remained highly critical of film 
content judged to be injurious to viewers mainly in an effort to protect young people 
given the possible mimetic effect of film.  And while today one might “look back at 
Catholic and Protestant attempts at censorship with a mixture of bemusement and 
fascination,”130 there is a tendency to focus only on the censorious character of the 
Catholic church’s early attitude toward film, rather than its positive valuation of film.  
For instance, religion and film scholar John Lyden offers his perspective on the Vatican’s 
first stage of opinion: 
Roman Catholic approaches to popular film have not always been open to seeing 
a harmony between the values of movies and those of Christianity.  Even before 
the advent of sound films, Roman Catholic leaders had been among the most 
vocal in the denunciation of popular films.  They had a crucial role in the 
founding of the Legion of Decency, which policed cinema, and they aided in its 
censorship during the decades when the Hays Code ruled.  In the 1960’s, 
however, the Roman Catholic Church realized that the days were past when it 
could or should try to engage in this sort of heteronomous critique.  After the 
Second Vatican Council, there was a new openness to culture that, in part, helped 
to open up possibilities for seeing the cinema in a fresh light.131 
 
Lyden is correct in his assessment that the Catholic church was historically one of the 
first religious institutions to take interest in cinema and to decry the perceived abuses of 
film industry.  Catholic leaders pressured production companies to make movies that met 
the church’s standards.  He is also right that with Vatican II a shift occurred in the 
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magisterium’s rhetoric; Rome began to approach film on its own terms.132  Lyden’s 
overall judgment of the pre-conciliar approach to cinema is nevertheless fairly typical.  
Because Lyden focuses only on what he judges to be the negative aspects of Vatican 
opinion, he glosses over what are clearly positive inroads made by the church that would, 
in time, lead to a stronger bond between the church and cinema and lay the ground for 
appreciable advances between theology and film.  For instance, the Vatican accorded 
nobility to the work of filmmakers—artists who, as the documents say, have the rare and 
great opportunity to reflect through their craft the truth, goodness, and beauty of the 
human person.  Providence has placed in their care “useful instruments by which the 
priceless treasures of God may be spread among [people] like good seed which bring 
forth fruits of truth and goodness.”133  In the right hands film has the potential to lead 
people to God by raising them to “higher things” so that they can become “better 
people.”134  Yet not once did the Vatican name as a criterion that the “ideal” film be 
expressly Christian or even thematically religious.  No other Christian church or religious 
group had this as its official teaching on cinema as early as the Catholic church. 
 Looking back to Vigilanti cura, the Vatican’s position on film can be judged as 
comparatively ahead of its time.  The intellectual world of the early-1900s had not yet 
accept film as culturally or artistically important; the discipline of film criticism had yet 
to materialize; and few if any other Christian churches or religious authorities by 1936 
had heeded more than the destructive capabilities of film.  With this watershed document 
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the attitude of the Catholic church toward cinema began to take shape.  The magisterium 
emphasized film’s potential as a powerful instrument for the good of the individual and 
society and its capacity to be a sensational classroom that, along with formal religious 
education, can train people in Christian conduct.  This allowed for the church to, in time, 
take a more magnanimous view of cinema, even to the point of commending particular 
films for the aesthetic, ethical, and spiritual values they express.135  One might wonder 
where Catholic theological conversation about film would be today had the magisterium 
taken an altogether condemnatory approach, as did several Protestant denominations.  
The Vatican’s early recognition of cinema’s artistic integrity, its divine giftedness and 
evangelical potential, and other important claims opened up symbiotic possibilities for 
theology and film that would begin to be developed only decades later. 
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EXCURSUS 
The Legion of Decency and SIGNIS 
 The Catholic Legion of Decency was a censorship board established in the early 
1930s by U.S. Catholic bishops as a campaign to identify and protest the screening of 
movies with objectionable moral content.  The “vividness with which films could portray 
morally questionable activity—love triangles, suggestive dancing and speech, disrespect 
for authority—worried many.  The movie industry had adopted a self-censoring 
production code, but church leaders judged this as insufficient.”136  Criticism was 
directed at Will H. Hays (namesake for the Hays Code for censorship of American films) 
and his office’s ineffectiveness in enforcing the Hollywood production code which 
controlled movie conventions; and for allowing movies with alleged evil and immoral 
content to continue to be made.137  The Legion became a powerful lobby group that 
imposed its standards on Hollywood producers (the majority of whom were Jewish 
immigrants from Eastern Europe and Russia) as to what could and could not be shown on 
the silver screen.  To avoid possible boycotts by the group, production companies would 
submit motion pictures to a board of reviewers who would demand that certain scenes 
offensive to the church be removed prior to public release.  Producers generally complied 
with their demands for fear of extreme financial loss.  Indeed, the Legion’s approval or 
condemnation of a film had a considerable influence on the business of motion pictures.  
The group “exerted enormous pressure on the industry, whose own self-regulatory 
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production code lacked provisions for effective enforcement.”138  For more than three 
decades—pivotal years when “Hollywood” cam into its own—producers were 
compelled, more for reasons of capital than for concern for public morality, to take into 
serious consideration how the Legion would evaluate their motion pictures. 
 The Legion attracted a number of Protestant and Jewish leaders as well, 
prompting a change to the organization’s name to the National Legion of Decency.  Both 
lay and clerical members were required to take a pledge dedicating themselves to the 
condemnation of “all indecent and immoral films” and to the boycott of any theater that 
might show them.  Catholics took the pledge at Mass each year on the Sunday following 
the Feast of the Immaculate Conception (December 8).  The group syndicated lists of 
movies with ratings based on moral suitability as judged according to Catholic principles:  
“A” for no objectional content; “B” for moderately objectional content; and “C” for a 
film condemned by the organization as abominable.  Between “the years 1937 and 1968, 
the National Legion of Decency reviewed over thirteen thousand films, 2 percent of 
which received a C (Condemned) rating at the time.”139 
 All Catholics were expected to avoid condemned films entirely.  To legionnaires, 
the C-rating was a clarion call to boycott all theaters showing condemned material, no 
matter what other movies might be showing there.  James O’ Toole relates one telling 
anecdote: 
The threat of Catholic boycotts was a powerful one, and sometimes backed up by 
direct action.  A movie house in Sayville, Long Island, was showing Belle of the 
Nineties, starring Mae West, until a priest from the local parish showed up and 
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stood outside, examining the faces of those who bought tickets to see if any of his 
parishioners were among them.  Attendance dropped off immediately, and the 
manager closed the picture down.140 
 
This trend continued until the mid-1960s, when the Legion felt 
increasing pressure to change its image in the face of rapidly changing public 
taste and a liberal interpretation of obscenity by Federal courts.  In 1966 the 
National Legion of Decency changed its official name [again] to the National 
Catholic Office for Motion Pictures and, in line with Pope John XXIII’s policy of 
updating Catholic thought, announced a more progressive attitude.141 
 
In the 1980s, the National Catholic Office for Motion Pictures was renamed and 
incorporated into the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops' “Office for Film and 
Broadcasting,” which is operative today.142  This office syndicates movie reviews to 
diocesan newspapers throughout the country and is also available online.143 
 In November of 2001, two groups—the International Catholic Organization for 
Cinema and Audiovisual (OCIC—Office Catholique International du Cinéma) and the 
International Catholic Association for Radio and Television (Unda)—merged to form the 
World Catholic Association for Communication (SIGNIS), a non-profit organization with 
a mission to unite Catholics already working as professionals in the media in order to 
                                                
 140 O’Toole, ibid., p. 170. 
 
 141 Katz, ibid., p. 837. 
 
 142 For a more complete historical analysis of the Legion in its various phases, see especially 
Gregory D. Black, Hollywood Censored:  Morality Codes, Catholics, and the Movies.  New York:  
Cambridge University Press, 1996; and his The Catholic Crusade against the Movies, 1940-1975.  
Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 1995.  See also Phillip Lopate, ed., American Movie Critics:  An 
Anthology from the Silents Until Now.  New York:  Library of America, 2006; Frank Walsh, Sin and 
Censorship:  The Catholic Church and the Motion Picture Industry.  New Haven:  Yale University Press, 
1996; James M. O’Toole, The Faithful:  A History of Catholics in America.  Cambridge, MA:  Belknap, 
2008; and Stephen Tropiano, Obscene, Indecent, Immoral, and Offensive:  100+ Years of Censored, 
Banned, and Controversial Films.  Milwaukee:  Limelight, 2009. 
 
 143 See:  <http://www.usccb.org/movies> (last accessed 1/16/10). 
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promote and educate Christian values through the media.  This mission is articulated on 
the group’s website as follows: 
SIGNIS is a worldwide network of associations, institutions and individuals 
working in the mass media, with the aim of alerting Christians to the importance 
of human communication in every culture, and encouraging them to speak out in 
this sector.  The association, which represents Catholic media in all the 
governmental and nongovernmental organizations and institutions, is committed 
to lobbying for policies to encourage communications that respect Christian 
values, justice and human rights; to involving media professionals in the dialogue 
on questions of professional ethics, and to fostering ecumenical and interfaith 
cooperation in the media sector.144 
 
OCIC was founded in 1928 at the Hague and so pre-dates the Legion of Decency.  
Though by design both groups had the same motivation, de facto the OCIC was less 
involved in shunning “bad” motion pictures than on the positive recommendation of 
“good” films.  After World War II, the organization 
set up an international film prize.  Here was a Catholic body which had moved 
beyond censoring cinema and was now keen to celebrate some films, particularly 
those “most capable of contributing to the moral and spiritual elevation of 
humanity.”  The OCIC award has been conferred on directors such as John Ford 
and Francis Ford Coppola.  OCIC (now SIGNIS) not only supports the awarding 
of prizes and the development of national film offices, but it also organizes 
Catholic film juries, which continue to serve alongside ecumenical juries at the 
world’s major film festivals.  There are no restrictions on the kind of films that 
can receive awards.145 
 
Since 1947, the OCIC has “awarded prizes at the great international festivals to films that 
by their inspiration and artistic qualities have contributed to spiritual progress and the 
development of human values.”146  Through its national offices, the OCIC initiated a 
                                                
 144 See:  <www.signis.net> (last accessed 1/16/10). 
 
 145 Jolyon Mitchell, “Theology and Film,” op. cit., p. 743. 
 
 146 L. Lunders, “Office Catholique International du Cinéma,” in The Catholic Encyclopedia, p. 
656.  Along with productions from Italy, Spain, Sweden, Brazil, Japan and others, several American 
productions have won awards over the years.  These include The Fugitive (dir. John Ford) at Venice in 
1948; On the Waterfront (dir. Elia Kazan) at Venice in 1954; Twelve Angry Men (dir. Sydney Lumet) at 
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number of actions to promote cinema, including the formation of cinema clubs and 
courses in film study and appreciation. 
 Many American Catholics still remember the Legion of Decency; many more 
consult their diocesan newspapers and the USCCB’s website for film reviews.  Very few, 
however, are aware of SIGNIS and the significant contributions that OCIC made toward 
formulating the church’s overall positive attitude to motion pictures.  That is to say, there 
is a sense in several sectors of American culture that the Catholic Church has always 
been and remains today suspicious of motion pictures and that it is, as a rule, “anti-
Hollywood.”  This sense might be mitigated by knowledge of SIGNIS and its mission as 
well as the group’s history of recognizing the excellence of movies that many film 
scholars and devotees independent of the church would consider masterpieces of 
cinema.147 
 
                                                
Berlin in 1957; The Miracle Worker (dir. Arthur Penn) at San Sebastian in 1962; and Hud (dir. Martin Ritt) 
at Berlin in 1963. 
 
 147 For more on the OCIC and its relationship to Vatican teaching on cinema, see Gaye Ortiz, “The 
Catholic Church and its Attitude to Film as an Arbiter of Cultural Meaning,” in Jolyon Mitchell and Sophia 
Marriage, eds., Mediating Religion:  Conversations in Media, Religion, and Culture.  New York:  T&T 
Clark, 2003. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
Introduction 
 The last chapter took a careful look at the Vatican’s “first stage” of teaching on 
cinema, beginning with the first significant document promulgated, the encyclical 
Vigilanti cura, and ending with one of the first decrees presented by the Second Vatican 
Council, Inter mirifica.  The current chapter turns to the “second stage” of official 
Catholic teaching on film, a period that was inaugurated (though not explicitly) with the 
promulgation of Gaudium et spes (Pastoral Constitution of the Church in the Modern 
World) in 1965 and which essentially brings us up to the present day. 
 Vatican II as a whole marked a sea change in the church’s understanding of its 
relationship to and within world culture.  Whereas a number of conciliar documents 
advanced positions of open, critical dialogue with cultural elements as normative for the 
church, Gaudium et spes was the landmark document to articulate this attitude as the 
church’s formal position.  Cinema is not mentioned in this important text; yet, the 
principles that the constitution sets forth regarding the relationship between church and 
culture hold deep implications for Catholic approaches to film.  This chapter highlights 
the principles in Gaudium et spes that serve to justify the church’s turn to secular culture 
as a source for Christian reflection. 
 A consistent theme in the first stage of Vatican literature on cinema was the 
importance of film as a medium for evangelization and communicating the message of 
the gospel.  Few of the documents, however, discussed the question of this possibility 
from a theological standpoint.  Is it legitimate, for instance, for the message of sacred 
revelation, as spoken by Jesus Christ, recorded in scripture, and expressed in the tradition 
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of the church to be conveyed in a non-traditional medium like film?  To help clarify this 
question and approach an answer, the chapter includes an analysis of Dei verbum (The 
Constitution on Divine Revelation).  While film and other instruments of social 
communication are not the subject of this text, its teaching on revelation will be shown to 
have consequences for a Catholic understanding of film. 
 The post-conciliar document Communio et progressio represents the Vatican’s 
interest in further investigating the nature of human communication and the many media 
through which social interaction takes place.  This it does in connection to the council’s 
judgment that Jesus Christ, as God’s incarnate Word, is the perfect form of 
communication.  Unique to this document is the fact that it includes a section specifically 
on the cinema.  Because this section represents the magisterium’s first statement about 
film directly after the council, it is worth investigating how its material reflects the 
overall concerns of Vatican II and ushers in any new teaching about cinema. 
 John Paul II’s Letter to Artists invites the world’s artistic community, including 
filmmakers, into a dialogue on the relationship between the Catholic church and art.  It is 
a seminal text for the dissertation because it reinforces and expands the teaching, 
extending back to Vigilanti cura, that film is a form of art.  This is significant since 
several of the documents in between Vigilanti cura and Letter to Artists tend to regard 
film only as a medium of social communication.  Several principles that the holy father 
sets out for the interplay of church and art help evolve Rome’s approach to cinema. 
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Gaudium et spes, 19651 
 
 While cinema is not discussed by name in this revolutionary treatise, it is 
nevertheless germane to this dissertation because it explores the relationship of the 
church to the world and advocates for ecclesial discovery of new channels of dialogue 
between Christianity and society’s secular dimensions.  It was the final constitution 
promulgated at Vatican II and many consider it the council’s crowning achievement.2  It 
is divided into two main parts.  The first is wider in scope and develops the following 
themes:  (a) the mystery, dignity, and freedom of the human person made in God’s image 
and likeness; (b) the social structures of the world, the interdependence of its people, and 
the responsibilities persons have for one another; (c) the solidarity the church must have 
with the world and its obligation to serve humankind in every respect.  The second part 
narrows the focus to social issues specific to the current age and which require the 
church’s urgent attention, including marriage and family, the development of culture, the 
nature of peace and the prevention of war, and other questions related to economic and 
political exigencies.   
Analysis of this sophisticated statement on Catholic social teaching can be 
approached from any number of angles.  Here the discussion is limited to those aspects 
that contextualize and give emphasis to magisterial teaching on film, particularly its 
                                                
 1 See Gaudium et spes:  <http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-
ii_cons_19651207_gaudium-et-spes_en.html> (last accessed 2/9/10). 
 
 2 Though Gaudium et spes was overwhelmingly ratified (in a vote of 2307 to 75), a number of 
council bishops and theologians raised reservations about several of the constitution’s elements.  Chief 
among them was then Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger, who called it a “counter-Syllabus” (Thomas Rausch, 
Pope Benedict XVI:  An Introduction to his Theological Vision.  Mahway, NJ:  Paulist Press, 2009, p. 51).  
He believed the document abrogated much of the teaching of Pius IX who in his Syllabus of Errors (1864), 
among other injunctions, encouraged the church to resist modernism.  While Ratzinger would later praise 
aspects of Gaudium et spes, he represented those who were critical of the (apparent) concessions the 
constitution makes to the modern world. 
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theological anthropology, Christology, and vision of a reciprocal relationship between 
church and culture. 
 Pope John XXIII convened Vatican II with the hope that the church might renew 
itself through a process of intense self-examination and internal reformation as well as a 
more open communication with the larger society.  He envisioned that the council would 
give the church a chance to reinvigorate elements of its theology, ritual life, and internal 
structure; rekindle Catholic spiritual life; and open new relations in the world—
particularly to Christians of other confessions.3  John XXIII used the Italian word 
aggiornamento (“bringing up to date”) to describe the spirit of change, openmindedness, 
and modernization he believed was overdue in Catholic intramural (ecclesia ad intra) and 
extramural (ecclesia ad extra) affairs.4  Gaudium et spes represented the council’s formal 
effort to divest the church of any sectarian or “ghetto” mentality that had infiltrated 
certain sectors of its life and which kept the church effectively closed off from the post-
war Zeitgeist.  In this way it revised aspects of the ecclesiology of the First Vatican 
Council (1869-70) which 
essentially severed the church’s relationship with the world by declaring that the 
church was supreme and self-contained, divorced from this world though in it.  As 
a result, the dominant communication model was also non-dialogic.  The church 
defended itself against anti-Catholicism and falsehood, but it was a community of 
                                                
 3 The document is deeply indebted to the ecclesiological vision of John XXIII and to the spirit in 
which he ushered in the council.  His writings are referenced no fewer than twenty times. 
 
 4 Among the council fathers were those who believed that the key to Catholicism’s relevance in 
the modern world lay not only in the church’s ability to speak to (and with) the present situation but in 
recovering the forgotten riches of its tradition.  Hence “updating” the church would at the same time 
require that it return to the early sources in Christianity, many of which sources of teaching and spirituality 
had come to be neglected by the mid-twentieth century.  The French term ressourcement—associated with 
the “new” theologies of Henri de Lubac and Yves Congar—was used to describe this process of consulting 
ancient and medieval reference points of the church (scripture, ancient liturgy, the writings and practices of 
theologians, mystics, and saints) and integrating them into contemporary theology and preaching. 
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people who had little need to know about the world, and nothing to learn from it 
that it did not already know.5 
 
A century later, Gaudium et spes presented the model of a church inseparable from the 
world and its historical and cultural developments.  Embedded in history, though not 
determined solely by it, the church could no longer conceive of itself as operating 
alongside the world as if from within a sacred enclave.  Like Christ’s entrance into the 
throng gathered for the Jerusalem festival, the church must accomplish its mission among 
and not apart from those it is called by Christ to serve.6 
 In 1964, the council promulgated Lumen gentium (The Dogmatic Constitution on 
the Church), a document that probed into the nature and mission of the church.  Gaudium 
et spes flowed out from Lumen gentium in the sense that the bishops wished to speak 
directly to those whom Christ commissioned the church to serve:  not only those “who 
invoke the name of Christ, but the whole of humanity.”7  The opening lines of Gaudium 
et spes fairly summarize its nisus:  “The joys and the hopes, the griefs and the anxieties of 
the [people] of this age, especially those who are poor or in any way afflicted, these are 
the joys and hopes, the griefs and anxieties of the followers of Christ.  Indeed, nothing 
genuinely human fails to raise an echo in their hearts.”8  The passage indicates the 
pastoral intention of the constitution, conceived not so much as an exhortation to those 
outside the formal church but as an empathetic evaluation of the existential situation of 
the modern person, Christian or otherwise.  The idea of a “pastoral” intention 
                                                
 5 William Thorn, “Models of Church and Communication,” in Paul A. Soukup, ed., op. cit., p. 95. 
 
 6 Matthew 21:10-11. 
 
 7 Gaudium et spes, op. cit., art. 2. 
 
 8 Ibid., art. 1. 
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meant that [the document] was rooted in doctrinal principles but extended its 
analysis to contingent issues in the sociopolitical order.  Second, the methodology 
of Gaudium et spes required that the first step of theological reflection be an 
assessment of the empirical situation the church sought to address.  Then the 
assessment of this data “in the light of the gospel” followed.9 
 
The council acknowledged that many people were “shaken”10 by the “dramatic 
situation”11 of the world in the mid-1960’s.  Gaudium et spes endeavored to reassure 
them “that beneath all changes there are many realities which do not change and which 
have their ultimate foundation in Christ.”12  Indeed, a profound christological element 
pervades the constitution, and the text explicitly subordinates its teachings to the paschal 
mystery.13 
 The constitution envisions the world as essentially a place of encounter between 
God and humanity.  God meets us first in history and calls us to salvation precisely in the 
“joys and griefs” that accompany the challenges of each age.  This principle, that God 
encounters us historically, is founded on the doctrine of the blessedness of the created 
order and more especially in the belief that God condescended to become part of history 
in Jesus Christ, who is "the image of the invisible God" (Col. 1:15) and himself “the 
perfect man”14: 
Since human nature as he assumed it was not annulled, by that very fact it has 
been raised up to a divine dignity in our respect too.  For by his incarnation the 
                                                
 9 J. Bryan Hehir, “Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World,” in Richard 
McBrien, gen. ed., The Harper Collins Encyclopedia of Catholicism.  New York:  Harper Collins, 1995, p. 
964. 
 
 10 Gaudium et spes, ibid., art. 7. 
 
 11 Ibid., art. 10. 
 
 12 Ibid. 
 
 13 Ibid., art. 22. 
 
 14 Ibid. 
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Son of God has united himself in some fashion with every [person].  He worked 
with human hands, he thought with a human mind, acted by human choice and 
loved with a human heart.  Born of the Virgin Mary, he has truly been made one 
of us, like us in all things except sin.15 
 
The constitution’s leitmotif—the dignity of the human being—is substantiated wholly on 
this basic mystery of faith.  God’s taking on history means in part that what matters for 
human beings matters for God.  Consequently, belief in the incarnation means that what 
mattered to Jesus, God’s only Son, as expressed in his life, death, and resurrection must 
become the mission of the church.  In its attempt to heal whatever divides culture from 
the gospel, the council draws out the implication that what matters for the whole of 
humanity, as defined by revelation, must matter for the church.  The Christian community 
must be bold enough to make the first move toward solidarity with the modern world 
precisely as a people that should have at its heart an unwavering commitment to serving 
the world in imitation of Christ who “entered this world to give witness to the truth, to 
rescue and not to sit in judgment, to serve and not to be served.”16  Gaudium et spes 
recommits the people of God to this “sacred obligation”17 of being “the neighbor of every 
person without exception,”18 and it does so on the revealed principle that every person is 
inalienably dignified by God with an absolute, eternal worth.  Economic disparities, 
illiteracy, psychological slavery, abject poverty, and wars of ideology are among the 
                                                
 15 Ibid. 
 
 16 Ibid., art. 3.  This line must be read within the overall context of the document’s Christology, for 
taken alone this might suggest that Gaudium et spes glosses over the reality of Christ as final arbiter of sin 
and salvation.  It says in a later article that before “the judgment seat of God each man must render an 
account of his own life, whether he has done good or evil” (ibid., art. 17).  And again, the Christian “who 
neglects his or temporal duties, neglects his duties toward his neighbor and even God, and jeopardizes his 
eternal salvation” (ibid., art. 43). 
 
 17 Ibid., art. 30. 
 
 18 Ibid., art. 27. 
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social inequities referenced in the text to which the church must attend with urgency and 
charity.  In naming these injustices the treatise does not ignore the ambivalent nature of 
the world in its sinful condition and obliges all Christians (who are not without sin) to 
respond to sin not by fleeing the world but by carrying “forward the work of Christ”19 in 
the tangle of the quotidian. 
 Gaudium et spes characterizes the split between religious faith and the activities 
of daily life as “among the more serious errors of our age.”20  It cautions against any 
sectarian attitude which reduces religion to “acts of worship alone and to the discharge of 
certain moral obligations”; conversely, it reproaches those “who imagine they can plunge 
themselves into earthly affairs in such a way as to imply that these are altogether 
divorced from the religious life.”21  With the faith that God has sanctified and redeemed 
the world through Jesus Christ, the constitution affirms the rightful “autonomy of earthly 
realities”22 (i.e., culture23) and the church’s reliance upon cultural implements to 
evangelize the world.  To help repair the breach between sacred and secular Christians 
are called on to engage culture and listen attentively to “its explanations, its longings, and 
its often dramatic characteristics”—what the text calls the “signs of the times”—with a 
                                                
 19 Ibid., art. 3. 
 
 20 Ibid., art. 43. 
 
 21 Ibid., art. 43. 
 
 22 Ibid., art. 36. 
 
 23 The term “culture” is defined in Gaudium et spes as follows:  In its “general sense” culture 
“indicates everything whereby man develops and perfects his many bodily and spiritual qualities; he strives 
by his knowledge and his labor, to bring the world itself under his control.  He renders social life more 
human both in the family and the civic community, through improvement of customs and institutions.  
Throughout the course of time he expresses, communicates and conserves in his works, great spiritual 
experiences and desires, that they might be of advantage to the progress of many, even of the whole human 
family” (ibid., art. 53). 
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generous, empathetic, and not immediately condemnatory mind.24  Confident that 
everything exists under God’s providence and still acutely aware that sin threatens 
humanity’s response to God’s loving plan, Christians should remain magnanimously 
open to and be humbly willing to learn from a world that is through grace capable of 
bearing the divine word wherever God chooses to speak it.  This is a critical implication 
of faith in God incarnate:  that the church remain ever alert to the One who encounters 
humanity in unpredictable ways and often through the unlikeliest of people. 
 Because the church does not have prefabricated answers to every complex social 
and philosophical concern, in the gospel or otherwise, the council exhorts Catholics to 
participate in authentic dialogue with the elements and experts of world culture (i.e., 
governments, the sciences, technology, the arts, etc.).25  Together, church and world can 
“shed light on the mystery of [the human being] and . . . cooperate in finding the solution 
to the outstanding problems of our time.”26  The constitution recognizes that persons and 
institutions independent of the church are capable of expressing the mystery and dignity 
of the human being, often with exceptional insight and in ways that complement church 
teaching.  It is therefore a parcel of Christian responsibility to recognize the full worth of 
these expressions and, through them, gain perspective on what it means to be in the 
world. 
 The church’s openness to the world should be a dialogical experience.   As the 
church can learn from the world, so the world can (indeed, must) learn from the church, a 
                                                
 24 Ibid., art. 4. 
 
 25 Ibid., art. 33. 
 
 26 Ibid., art. 10. 
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community that obtains only as Christ’s own body—the full and eternal form of truth, 
goodness, beauty, and love.27  This means more than a simple acknowledgment by those 
cultural institutions that owe elements of their historical existence to the church 
(universities, hospitals, the arts, etc.)  While the council fathers were generally in 
“agreement that the church was no longer in control of culture, as it has been in times 
past, at least in Western Europe,”28 still they conferred a moral responsibility upon world 
culture, that its customs remain “subordinated to the integral perfection of the human 
person, to the good of the community and of the whole society.”29  Thus, wherever social 
institutions and individuals contravene the principle of human dignity the church must 
spotlight the injustice, act for change, and aid the Spirit in freeing “humanity from the 
misery of ignorance.”30  Christian faith should never be understood as a mere tonic to 
contemporary cultural fragmentation; rather, it is its great integrator. 
 Still, the point should not be lost that the church’s listening to the many different 
voices of the times is not to be done with the immediate purpose of converting or 
condemning those that are prima facie at variance with the faith.  The modern world 
should be met generously by the church and with a mind to learn from it, particularly 
with “the hope of [a] joint witness [to] human and religious values . . . and making 
common cause on issues of justice, peace, and human solidarity.”31  Only with such 
attentive listening and cultural depth perception can the church make a comprehensive 
                                                
 27 See ibid., art. 32. 
 
 28 Tanner, The Church and the World, op. cit., p. 23. 
 
 29 Gaudium et spes, op. cit., art. 59. 
 
 30 Ibid., art. 60. 
 
 31 Thorn, “Models of Church and Communication,” op. cit., p. 99. 
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assessment of the signs of the times.  And only then can the value of cultural messages as 
possible indicators of God’s presence be named as such and integrated into the nexus of 
Christian belief and practice; or, when necessary, corrected and reoriented toward a 
charitable end; or, when warranted, formally condemned as anathema to the gospel.  In 
each case the gospel is the decisive norm.  It is the criterion, the revealed testimony by 
which cultural sources are to be evaluated. 
 Gaudium et spes is careful to show that this particular method of meeting the 
world with both a sincere heart and a critical attitude of mind is founded on the person, 
model, and work of Jesus Christ, who as “the very Word made flesh willed to share in the 
human fellowship”32 in order break human bondage to sin “so that the world might be 
fashioned anew according to God's design and reach its fulfillment.”33  The followers of 
Jesus are likewise expected to serve the world by scrutinizing cultural signs (Matthew 
16:4) in light of God’s law so as to distinguish wisdom from folly.  This mandate, that 
Christians measure atmospheric changes in the modern age with the barometer of faith, 
was idiomatic to Gaudium et spes if not the entire Second Vatican Council.  “Reading” 
these signs refers to the process of deciphering those events, persons, yearnings, and 
struggles in history “through which God continues to speak to us and summon us to 
respond for the sake of the reign of God’s love and justice throughout the whole of 
creation.”34  Here the council recovers the rich Catholic tradition of spiritual discernment 
and extends it to mean the judicious evaluation of temporal signposts for the presence or 
                                                
 32 Ibid., art. 32. 
 
 33 Ibid., art. 2. 
 
 34 McBrien, Catholicism, op. cit., p. 95. 
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“absence” of God and the path of action God is calling people to take within those 
situations.  Detecting God’s presence amid the din and complexity of human experience 
involves drawing from the gospel “moral and religious principles” that help determine the 
spiritual direction human beings are being summoned to take.  The church believes these 
revealed principles illuminate the path of humankind and assure that its way “will not be 
a dark one”35: 
With the help of the Holy Spirit, it is the task of the entire people of God, 
especially pastors and theologians, to hear, distinguish, and interpret the many 
voices of our age, and to judge them in the light of the divine word, so that 
revealed truth can always be more deeply penetrated, better understood and set 
forth to greater advantage.36 
 
 Gaudium et spes promotes the unity between Christians and the larger society by 
illustrating that faith-life and cultural-life are essentially intertwined; though distinct, they 
are never separate.  The two should mutually condition one another.  As its says, “let 
there be no false opposition between professional and social activities on the one part, 
and religious life on the other.”37  So-called secular experiences should inform the way 
the message of Christ is heard and acted upon, and vice versa.  These experiences ought 
to be a true exchange, a process of teaching and learning, enlightenment and correction, 
between faith and culture.  Most importantly, they should lead Christians to solidarity 
with the world that Christ loves and serves.  In this grand exchange, the church ultimately 
offers the world the good news that in the incarnation “the Son of God has united himself 
in some fashion with every man”; and that “only in the mystery of the incarnate Word 
                                                
 35 Gaudium et spes, op. cit., art. 33. 
 
 36 Ibid., art. 44. 
 
 37 Ibid., art. 43. 
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does the mystery of man take on light.  . . . [Christ’s] revelation of the mystery of the 
Father and his love fully reveals man to man himself and makes his supreme calling 
clear.”38  Because the gospel is addressed to all people its message holds true 
not only for Christians, but for all [people] of good will in whose hearts grace 
works in an unseen way.  For, since Christ died for all [people], and since [their] 
ultimate vocation . . .  is in fact one, and divine, we ought to believe that the Holy 
Spirit in a manner known only to God offers to everyone the possibility of being 
associated with this paschal mystery.  Such is the mystery of the [human being] . . 
..39 
 
 Again, whereas film is not referenced by name, it is here, in the constitution’s 
promotion of deeper interchange between faith and culture, that the document develops 
Vatican opinion on film.  Because film is a powerful cultural force, conclusions may be 
drawn about its relation to Christian faith.  For instance, the constitution places mass 
media within the larger context of human dignity and human communication: 
One of the salient features of the modern world is the growing interdependence of 
[people] on one another, a development promoted chiefly by modern technical 
advances.  Nevertheless . . . dialogue among [people] does not reach its perfection 
on the level of technical progress, but on the deeper level of interpersonal 
relationships.  These demand a mutual respect for the full spiritual dignity of the 
person.40 
 
It stresses that the promotion of the “genuinely human” ought to be the primary subject of 
Christian dialogue with the world and that the church should put at the world’s “disposal 
those saving resources which . . . under the guidance of the Holy Spirit [it] receives from 
[Jesus Christ].”41  This is language similar to that of earlier ecclesial documents on 
cinema.  In those texts, the church invited film purveyors into a conversation about the 
                                                
 38 Ibid., art. 22. 
 
 39 Ibid. 
 
 40 Ibid., art. 23. 
 
 41 Ibid., art. 3. 
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nature of the human being and esteemed cinema as capable of artistically illuminating the 
depths of that nature.  To help keep this representation “authentic” the church opened its 
“saving resources” to filmmakers so that they might create a more genuinely human form 
of art.42  Invoking the First Vatican Council, the document declares that the church “does 
not forbid that ‘the human arts and disciplines use their own principles and their proper 
method, each in its own domain; therefore acknowledging this just liberty,’ this Sacred 
Synod affirms the legitimate autonomy of human culture and especially of the 
sciences.”43  Gaudium et spes expands this positive estimation of film art by insisting that 
humanity “comes to a true and full humanity only through culture . . . [and] the 
cultivation of the goods and values of nature.  Wherever human life is involved . . . nature 
and culture are quite intimately connected with the other.”44  Perhaps it is more prudent to 
                                                
 42 Ibid. 
 
 43 Ibid., art. 59.  It goes on to say that because culture “flows immediately from the spiritual and 
social character of [human beings], it has constant need of a just liberty in order to develop; it needs also 
the legitimate possibility of exercising its autonomy according to its own principles.  It therefore rightly 
demands respect and enjoys a certain inviolability within the limits of the common good, as long, of course, 
as it preserves the rights of the individual and the community, whether particular or universal” (ibid.). 
 
 44 Ibid., art. 53.  This statement that humanity is fulfilled through culture is perhaps one of the less 
judiciously written passages of the constitution, since from a theological perspective it can be interpreted as 
essentially Pelagian—the view that human beings can effect their own salvation apart from supernatural 
grace.  Article 53 is one passage with which some council members took issue and it begs greater nuance.  
The framers of the constitution willfully subsumed all of their teachings under the headship of Christ as the 
paschal mystery, the event through which God reveals things accomplished, things present, and things to 
come.  From the point of view of Christian eschatology, both church and culture are preordained by God 
toward a final consummation that is as yet incomprehensible.  Thus, the church’s recourse can never be to 
the world, which remains unfinished and imperfect, but only to Christ who in his perfect humility took on 
the world and transformed it from within.  This is a point that Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger drove home in a 
2005 homily (“The Call of Justice Cannot Be Reduced to Categories of This World,” St. Peter’s Basilica, 
March 18, 2005; see:  <http://www.zenit.org/article-12866?l=english> (last accessed 2/9/10)) wherein he 
referenced Gaudium et spes several times.  His choice of passages suggests what he considers to be the 
document’s most abiding legacy:  “As Christians we must constantly be reminded that the call of justice is 
not something which can be reduced to the categories of this world.  And this is the beauty of the pastoral 
constitution Gaudium et spes evident in the very structure of the council's text; only when we Christians 
grasp our vocation, as having been created in the image of God and believing that ‘the form of this world is 
passing away ... [and] that God is preparing a new dwelling and a new earth, in which justice dwells’ 
(Gaudium et spes, ibid., art. 39), can we address the urgent social problems of our time from a truly 
Christian perspective.”  Far from “diminishing our concern to develop this earth,” he continues, “the 
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say that the church is first beholden to the grace of Jesus Christ and relies on cultural 
institutions for its self-expression and growth only insofar as the Word of God is an 
inculturated reality.  From the beginning of its history the church 
learned to express the message of Christ with the help of the ideas and 
terminology of various philosophers, and has tried to clarify it with their wisdom, 
too.  [Its] purpose has been to adapt the gospel to the grasp of all as well as to the 
needs of the learned . . ..  Indeed this accommodated preaching of the revealed 
word ought to remain the law of all evangelization.  For thus the ability to express 
Christ's message in its own way is developed in each nation, and at the same time 
there is fostered a living exchange between the church and the diverse cultures of 
people.  To promote such exchange, especially in our days, the church requires 
the special help of those who live in the world, are versed in different institutions 
and specialties, and grasp their innermost significance in the eyes of both 
believers and unbelievers.45 
 
The principle that the church “realizes that in working out her relationship with the world 
she always has great need of the ripening which comes with the experience of the 
centuries”46 marks a major step forward for a positive collaboration of church and culture 
and, by extension, theology and film.  It moves the conversation in a direction away from 
an attitude of ecclesial immutability toward a greater consciousness of the church’s 
organic, evolving structure, and its need to engage cultural forms like cinema to 
accomplish its mission of conveying revelation.  Indeed, if Jesus came to transform and 
redeem culture, and not condemn it, so must the church perceive and cultivate the seeds 
of the gospel if and when they are present in culture. 
 Gaudium et spes elaborates earlier Vatican teaching on film by explicitly inviting 
trained theologians to make meaningful connections between Christianity and culture; to 
                                                
expectation of a new earth should spur us on, for it is here that the body of a new human family grows, 
prefiguring in some way the world that is to come" (ibid.). 
 
 45 Gaudium et spes, ibid., art. 44. 
 
 46 Ibid., art. 43. 
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find new and creative ways of interpreting faith and doctrine in light of “signs of the 
times.”  Theologians are called to play a chief role in the dynamic interchange of faith 
and culture by correlating revelation with the real situations of people today: 
[Within] the requirements and methods proper to theology, [they] are invited to 
seek continually for more suitable ways of communicating doctrine to the 
[people] of their times; for the deposit of faith or the truths are one thing and the 
manner in which they are enunciated, in the same meaning and understanding, is 
another.47 
 
For Christian faith to be credible and effective amid the ambiguities of the modern age 
“sufficient use must be made not only of theological principles” but also of the cultural 
arts and sciences, “so that the faithful may be brought to a more adequate and mature life 
of faith.”48  Therefore, theologians who teach 
in seminaries and universities [should] strive to collaborate with [those] versed in 
the other sciences through a sharing of their resources and points of view.  
Theological inquiry should pursue a profound understanding of revealed truth; at 
the same time it should not neglect close contact with its own time that it may be 
able to help these [people] skilled in various disciplines to attain to a better 
understanding of the faith.49 
 
 To conclude, Gaudium et spes marked a turning point in the way the Catholic 
church thought about its relationship to the world.  It offered believers an approach to 
seeing the intrinsic unity between their faith and the larger secular world in which they 
live.  This emphasis invited the church to renew its faith—truly, its massive hope—that 
the Holy Spirit is guiding the world in all its aspects toward the Father of Jesus Christ.50 
                                                
 47 Ibid., art. 62. 
 
 48 Ibid. 
 
 49 Ibid. 
 
 50 Gaudium et spes amplifies a teaching from Miranda prorsus:  “But if the expression, the 
independence of temporal affairs, is taken to mean that created things do not depend on God, and that 
[human beings] can use them without any reference to their Creator, anyone who acknowledges God will 
see how false such a meaning is.  For without the Creator the creature would disappear.  For their part, 
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The implication:  Authentic practice of Christian faith can never be divorced from the 
people Christ came to serve.  This is the theology behind the pastoral imperative that 
Christians be fundamentally united to the world according to the principles of the gospel.  
And whereas the text admits to the complexities involved in relating Christianity and 
culture (while united, the two are not altogether harmonious), it does hold that the 
struggles involved in relating the them do not necessarily harm the life of faith.  Rather, 
tensions and differences “can stimulate the mind to a deeper and more accurate 
understanding of the faith.”51  The document calls for a lively interplay between church 
and world so that multiple cultural resources can be brought to bear upon problems of 
special urgency that affect both.  Mutual enrichment between theology and other 
disciplines is nothing new in the history of the church and yet at the time of the Second 
Vatican Council much of Catholic theology had become divorced from everything but 
itself.  Gaudium et spes continues to provide foundation and facility for theologians 
committed to making connections between faith and cultural elements.  It teaches that 
they “will be able to present to our contemporaries the doctrine of the church concerning 
God, [human beings] and the world, in a manner more adapted to them so that they may 
receive it more willingly.”52  Again, a practical implication of deep dialogue between 
church and world has to do with the way teachers and pastors connect to their students 
and congregations.  Church leaders need to connect the gospel’s appeal to everyday life 
with the appeal that the torrents of everyday life make to the gospel. 
                                                
however, all believers of whatever religion always hear [God’s] revealing voice in the discourse of 
creatures.  When God is forgotten, however, the creature itself grows unintelligible” (Gaudium et spes, 
ibid., art. 36). 
 
 51 Ibid. 
 
 52 Ibid. 
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Dei verbum (1965)53 
 One question unaddressed in the Vatican documents on cinema has to do with 
how the sacred word of God can be conveyed through a non-Christian, non-traditional 
medium such as film.  While this question is not the immediate concern of the 
dissertation, it is a legitimate concern within the overall conversation between Catholic 
theology and film.  This portion of the chapter looks at how the Second Vatican Council 
addressed the crucial theological question of the nature of revelation.  The question of 
how God’s word is communicated to human beings in the first place logically precedes 
that of how the church hands on what it has seen and heard.  While The Dogmatic 
Constitution on Divine Revelation does not formally address film or mass media, its 
instruction on the handing on of revelation has important implications for assimilating 
Vatican opinion on cinema, specifically its underlying theology. 
 The comparative brevity of Dei verbum belies its theological density.  To do it 
fuller justice would demand an interpretive commitment to its sources, method, and 
implications quite beyond the scope of this study.  The following analysis is delimited by 
five characteristics of Christian revelation described therein—points that have bearing on 
the question of film as a possible mode for conveying the message of revelation.54 
 (1) Revelation is the gift of God’s self.  The basic structure of Dei verbum 
differentiates the revealed word of God from how that word is transmitted.  It states what 
                                                
 53 See Dei verbum: 
<http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-ii_const_19651118_dei-
verbum_en.html> (last accessed 2/9/10). 
 
 54 It is difficult to distinguish each feature with complete accuracy.  Many of the constitution’s 
themes interrelate and overlap or are otherwise indefinitely presented.  Several of the themes 
communicated in Dei verbum will be recapitulated in chapter five of this dissertation, which concerns in 
part Karl Rahner’s theology of revelation. 
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might seem an obvious point, yet is the essential theological feature of the doctrine:  
namely, that revelation comes to us only as a free divine initiative—as grace.  Revelation 
is first and foremost the personal act of God’s self-manifestation to the world.  God in 
“goodness and wisdom chose to reveal [Godself] and to make known the hidden purpose 
of [God’s] will”55 and saw to it that what was “revealed for the salvation of all nations 
would abide perpetually in its full integrity and be handed on to all generations.”56  
Furthermore, the divine plan of revelation is “realized by deeds and words having an 
inner unity:  the deeds wrought by God in the history of salvation manifest and confirm 
the teaching and realities signified by the words, while the words proclaim the deeds and 
clarify the mystery contained in them.”57 
 (2) God’s Word is mediated through created reality.  Creation originates in God’s 
Verbum.  When God speaks, the world comes to be:  “God, who through the Word 
creates all things and keeps them in existence, gives [human beings] an enduring witness 
to [God’s self] in created realities.”58  Dei verbum outlines a narrative of revelation, a 
kind of biblical digest, as it leads readers through God’s communication first to creation 
itself, then to the first parents, and then to the ancestors and prophets of Israel.59  After 
speaking in these “many and varied ways,” God “sent his Son, the eternal Word, who 
enlightens all [people], so that he might dwell among [them] and tell them of the 
                                                
 55 Dei verbum, ibid., art. 2. 
 
 56 Ibid., art. 7. 
 
 57 Ibid., art. 2. 
 
 58 Ibid., art. 3. 
 
 59 This article of the document is concerned chiefly with bearing witness to the story of salvation 
history as thematized in scripture.  It does not explicitly attend to the unity of grace and revelation in the 
single history of salvation, as does Karl Rahner’s theology (covered, again, in chapter five of the 
dissertation). 
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innermost being of God (see John 1:1-18).  Jesus Christ, therefore, the Word made flesh, 
was sent as ‘a man to men.’”60  In the incarnation, the fullness of God’s being was 
mediated to the world as one of us:  “To see Jesus is to see his Father (John 14:9).  For 
this reason Jesus perfected revelation by fulfilling it through his whole work of making 
himself present and manifesting himself.”61  Christ reveals the mystery of God and is 
indistinguishable from that mystery since “the deepest truth about God and the salvation 
of [humankind] shines out for our sake in Christ, who is both the mediator and the 
fullness of all revelation.”62  The invisible God is rendered visible through the flesh of the 
one who made his dwelling in the economy of the world and communicated the news of 
salvation in human words and tangible signs.  In his life, death, and resurrection, Christ 
mediates salvation through concrete acts of obedience to God (faith), anticipation of God 
(hope), and love for God and neighbor (charity).  He calls all the Father’s children to 
respond to revelation in kind—in their own flesh, in their own time.  Thus, revelation is 
imparted personally and historically.  To employ a term not in Dei verbum, yet that is de 
facto operative therein, the second noted feature of revelation is that it comes to us 
sacramentally because it is mediated through symbols, actions, and relationships. 
 (3) Jesus Christ, the incarnation of God’s Word, is the fullness of revelation.  The 
words, deeds, signs, and wonders of Jesus’ life that culminated in his death and 
resurrection are the perfection and fulfillment of revelation for all time.  Revelation 
therefore “happened” at a particular time in a particular place and the church proclaims it 
                                                
 60 Ibid., art. 4. 
 
 61 Ibid. 
 
 62 Ibid., art. 2. 
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to be a complete and peerless event:  This “new and definitive covenant, will never pass 
away and we now await no further new public revelation before the glorious 
manifestation of our Lord Jesus Christ.”63  Though revelation is “closed,” it is ongoing.  
This is the eschatological dimension of revelation, viz., that in the abiding presence of 
Jesus’ paschal mystery, the people of God await the glorious return of Christ promised to 
his beloved, when he will deliver a final judgment, and hand over the Kingdom to his 
Father in the Spirit of love.  Until then, the church lives in the intervening time as a 
pilgrim people awaiting Christ with a “joyful hope.”  In this advental time of preparation 
and sacrifice, the Holy Spirit breathes life into the church, inspiring Christians to live and 
proclaim Jesus’ gospel.  The Spirit assists evangelization by 
moving the heart and turning it to God, opening the eyes of the mind and giving 
“joy and ease to everyone in assenting to the truth and believing it.”  To bring 
about an even deeper understanding of revelation the same Holy Spirit constantly 
brings faith to completion by [the Spirit’s] gifts.64 
 
 (4) Revelation is mediated through the Church, its Scripture and Tradition.  From 
its foundations, the church has been charged with the task of handing on God’s revelation 
from age to age.  Christianity believes that Jesus alone “has the words of eternal life.  
This mystery had not been manifested to other generations as it was now revealed to his 
holy apostles and prophets in the Holy Spirit, so that they might preach the gospel, stir up 
faith in Jesus, Christ and Lord, and gather together the church.”65  Scripture is the 
privileged witness to the revelation of God whose fullness is the person of Jesus Christ.  
With authority from the Father, Christ commissioned the apostles to be humble and 
                                                
 63 Ibid., art. 4. 
 
 64 Ibid., art. 5. 
 
 65 Ibid., art. 17. 
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courageous bearers of his word.  Through the Spirit they received the Pentecostal zeal to 
broadcast this message to the ends of the earth.  This same authority they conferred onto 
others who continued the mission of worship, evangelization, and service through liturgy, 
the writing of scripture, and the saintly execution of Christ’s command to be faithful in 
love to God and neighbor: 
And so the apostolic preaching, which is expressed in a special way in the 
inspired books, was to be preserved by an unending succession of preachers until 
the end of time.  Therefore the apostles, handing on what they themselves had 
received, warn the faithful to hold fast to the traditions which they have learned 
either by word of mouth or by letter.66 
 
Revelation, then, is expressed in scripture and tradition and handed down over the ages 
through apostolic succession and arbitrated by the magisterium to assure the authenticity 
of its transmission.67  Because of this episcopal hierarchy, the church has the confidence 
that the faith it assents to today is no less than the faith of the apostles—a single faith 
based in the one truth—Christ himself.  Christ’s word reaches us today through this 
process of mediation; and it is believed the Holy Spirit safeguards the church’s 
interpretation of revelation so that it reaches people with clarity and certainty: 
[The] task of authentically interpreting the word of God, whether written or 
handed on, has been entrusted exclusively to the living teaching office of the 
church, whose authority is exercised in the name of Jesus Christ.  This teaching 
office is not above the word of God, but serves it, teaching only what has been 
handed on, listening to it devoutly, guarding it scrupulously and explaining it 
faithfully in accord with a divine commission and with the help of the Holy Spirit, 
                                                
 66 Ibid., art. 8. 
 
 67 Dei verbum moved the discourse about revelation away from an inordinate attention to 
propositional truths that the church has in its “deposit” (which it then must guard against dilution) to an 
understanding of revelation as first and foremost the offering of the wonderful mystery of God’s personal 
being.  This allowed for a far freer yet nonetheless profound understanding of the role of the church in 
interpreting and transmitting Christian faith.  Revelation is not simply a parcel of content to be passed 
down from one generation to another.  Revelation is God’s loving and trustworthy offer of relationship with 
the world.  Tradition is the dynamic and symbolic chronicle of that relationship.  To use a simple analogy, 
tradition is not passing down an heirloom to your child:  it is having a child in the first place. 
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it draws from this one deposit of faith everything which it presents for belief as 
divinely revealed.68 
 
This statement conveys the important point that while Christians are covenantal partners 
with God, the church is not itself generative of revelation; rather, its fundamental purpose 
is to live, preach, and responsibly interpret Jesus’ word for every culture.  Again, while 
revelation might be closed, its comprehension and handing on by the church remains 
incomplete. 
 (5) The church interprets revelation.  Because God’s Word comes to us in the 
particular words and actions of people living in specific times and places, there is an 
ongoing need to translate that message for others living in different times and locales.  A 
significant portion of Dei verbum outlines general rules for the interpretation of scripture.  
Prescinding from a deep examination of these rubrics, it is important to note the general 
importance the council assigns the art/science of biblical hermeneutics.  This practice is 
indispensable from the Catholic vantage point articulated so far, since the church needs to 
see clearly what God wanted to communicate to us [and] should carefully 
investigate what meaning the sacred writers really intended, and what God wanted 
to manifest by means of their words.  To search out the intention of the sacred 
writers, attention should be given, among other things, to "literary forms."  For 
truth is set forth and expressed differently in texts which are variously historical, 
prophetic, poetic, or of other forms of discourse.  The interpreter must investigate 
what meaning the sacred writer intended to express and actually expressed in 
particular circumstances by using contemporary literary forms in accordance with 
the situation of his own time and culture.69 
 
Revelation is thus transmitted and interpreted within a historical context.  Again, the 
notion of mediation is implied:  As the Father adapted the transcendent Word to the 
human condition, and as the Son revealed the mystery of the Father in the flesh according 
                                                
 68 Ibid., art. 10. 
 
 69 Ibid., art. 12. 
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to (or in violation of) the norms and conventions of his time and culture, and as the 
apostles communicated the gospel “to all nations,” so too must the church interpret this 
single message of salvation faithfully for peoples and cultures.70  Interpretation of God’s 
word thus presupposes prayerful reflection.  There is need for 
growth in the understanding of the realities and the words which have been 
handed down.  This happens through the contemplation and study made by 
believers, who treasure these things in their hearts through a penetrating 
understanding of the spiritual realities which they experience, and through the 
preaching of those who have received through episcopal succession the sure gift 
of truth.71 
 
 Dei verbum here echoes the injunction in Gaudium et spes that the task of the 
whole people of God is to scrutinize the “signs of the times” and “interpret them in the 
light of the gospel in language intelligible to each generation . . ..”72  This scrutiny 
consists of a perennial process of discernment by which the church looks deeply at the 
events, needs, and longings of each age in order to discover genuine signs of the presence 
or purpose of God.  To preach the gospel effectively, the church must understand the 
world in which it lives and be able to respond to the questions people ask about “this 
present life and the life to come, and about the relationship of the one to the other.”73  
This task requires the use of any and all resources at the church’s disposal that are 
effectual toward this end.  This returns us to the dialogical model in Gaudium et spes 
whereby church and culture are conceived as deeply involved with each other.  Where 
Gaudium et spes spoke of Christianity’s indebtedness to culture for its divergent modes 
                                                
 70 Ibid., arts. 12-13. 
 
 71 Ibid., art. 8. 
 
 72 Ibid., art. 4. 
 
 73 Ibid. 
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of proclamation.  Dei verbum establishes the legitimacy of the correlation of church and 
culture by anchoring the possibility of their communion to the doctrine that God has 
blessed the world by entering fully into it.  Thus, the incarnation of the Son of God into 
the secular is the foundation for the church’s injunction to discern cultural signs for their 
consonance with gospel truth.74 
 To conclude, while the constitution does not offer a specific theological model for 
how the arts might operate as vehicles for handing on the message of Christian revelation 
or, as suggested in earlier statements, leading people to discern the presence of God in 
their lives, we can extrapolate from its principles that film is a means by which the 
church can scrutinize the signs of the times so that its preaching can remain effective, 
accessible, and invigorating: 
The primary goal of the liturgical homily is not to repeat or explain the biblical 
text but to spark the imagination of listeners so that they will read the signs of the 
times in light of the alternative world of the gospel.  In Dei verbum, the Bible is 
compared to ‘a mirror, in which the church during its pilgrim journey here on 
earth, contemplates God’ (art. 7).  The vocation of the preacher is to hold up that 
mirror in an imaginative way so that, despite our sinful lives and our anguished 
world, we can see ourselves as graced and interpret our times as Good News.75 
 
This hermeneutic of preaching can be applied to theology since each must interpret 
revelation as expressed in scripture and tradition in language that meets the needs and 
                                                
 74 Avery Dulles, S.J., opines that Dei verbum “did not spell out the concept of revelation 
underlying documents such as Gaudium et spes, but it if fair to say that these documents ‘rest upon a more 
developed notion of revelation that [sic] has yet surfaced,’”74  (Avery Dulles, Revelation Theology.  New 
York:  Seabury Press, 1969, p. 158).  Certainly, Dei verbum is not an elaborate theological monograph; nor 
does it relate its theology of revelation to any Christian anthropology or a broader history of religions.  A 
“more developed” understanding of revelation, Dulles might counsel, would consider the source and 
content of revelation side by side with the spiritual conditions necessary (in the human subject to whom 
revelation is addressed) for an accurate hearing of and response to God’s word.  The text does not present a 
Christian anthropology—that is, an explanation of how human beings are structured in order to be open and 
receptive to revelation. 
 
 75 Waznak, “Preaching the Gospel in a Video Culture,” op. cit., p. 136. 
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challenges of contemporary believers.76  Whereas preaching and theology are distinct 
enterprises in the church, they are radically related.  The object of both “is an unveiling of 
meaning.  The preacher [or theologian] is not primarily a teacher, but a ‘mediator of 
meaning’ who attests to the present moment as revelatory of God.”77  Film assists 
theology by artistically representing the “present moment” as it is lived out by people 
from culture to culture.  Effective preaching and theology presuppose an in-depth 
knowledge of the present human situation since, together, they must serve the church by 
bringing Christian teaching into closer proximity to the lived lives of believers.  Both 
preacher and theologian represent the world in which they live “by voicing its concerns, 
by naming its demons, and thus enabling it to gain some understanding and control of the 
evil which afflicts it.”78  At the same time, they represent the church and its divine 
message—yet “another word, a word of healing and pardon, of acceptance and love.”79 
 
Communio et progressio (1971)80 
 At the end of Inter mirifica the council fathers mandated that the church take up 
an official and more extensive study of mass media with aid from an international panel 
                                                
 76 This distinction is mentioned since the primary interest of the dissertation is the relationship 
between theology and film, not, strictly, “homily and film.”  The principles Waznak lays out for preaching 
are interchangeable with theology since the two are really opposite sides of the same coin.  More will be 
said about this in chapter four which discusses the concept of “mystagogy,” and in chapter five which 
explains Karl Rahner’s conviction that all preaching is necessarily theological and the most effective forms 
of theology will always be profoundly kerygmatic. 
 
 77 Waznak, ibid., p. 135. 
 
 78 Ibid. 
 
 79 Ibid. 
 
 80 See Communio et Progressio: 
<http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/pontifical_councils/pccs/documents/rc_pc_pccs_doc_23051971_com
munio_en.html> (last accessed 2/9/10). 
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of communication experts.  Eight years later, the result of that study, Communio et 
progressio (Pastoral Instruction on the Media of Social Communication), was issued.  
Advances in technology and the proliferation of film, radio, newspapers, and television in 
the years between the two documents prompted the magisterium to admit that, more than 
ever before, the way people “live and think” was being “profoundly affected” by these 
media.81  It decided to revisit some of the ideas formulated in Inter mirifica and to 
consider them in light of the changing social and technological landscape, the theological 
outcomes of Vatican II, as well as the communication models entrenched in many of its 
documents.82  Communio et progressio recounts a number of the teachings of Inter 
mirifica (e.g., that media are gifts of God intended to unify people, deepen social 
consciousness, lead to responsibility and cooperation, etc.) with the difference being a 
more thorough demonstration of the train of intelligence linking these themes and its 
placement of them directly under the headship of Christian first principles.  Communio et 
progressio is helpful to the dissertation because it is one of the few magisterial 
documents to have a section (albeit small) devoted entirely to cinema.  And whereas a 
number of scholars have explicated its theory of communication or used it as a 
touchstone for their own theories, few have looked at it from the perspective of our 
investigation and linked it to the line of Vatican teaching on film.  The present analysis 
will draw from these studies to flesh out more hidden points in the document; although, 
to be sure, the immediate concern is not with Catholic theories of communication, which 
are many and varied, or of developing a theology of communication in relation to film.  
                                                
 81 Communio et Progressio, ibid., art. 1. 
 
 82 Inter mirifica was promulgated early by the council; thus, it did not reflect the communication 
theology espoused by later documents. 
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Since the primary motivation is theology and film, the inquiry shall be into the Christian 
doctrines that form the foundations for the church’s engagement with communication 
resources and technologies. 
 As shown in Gaudium et spes, Vatican II essentially decreed that the church has 
an obligation to actively engage contemporary culture.  Communio et progressio renews 
that commitment by calling “for use of the communications media to engage the world in 
dialogue, to participate in the formation of public opinion, and to explain the church to 
the community.”83  The first line of the document indicates that the “unity and 
advancement” of humanity should be the chief aim of all the means of social 
communication. 
[Communio et progressio] treats communication media first in their role of 
creating and shaping public opinion.  Here they establish a “great roundtable” for 
humanity and offer the possibility of an end to the isolation of individuals and 
nations.  Because of the importance of social communication, the document 
declares that people have a right to information, a right to inform, and a right to 
access the channels of information.  From these rights flow protections against 
propaganda, manipulation, and deception in public affairs.84 
If the goals of the mass media are those of unity and advancement of people living in 
society, then these aims “and all things leading to them flow from God’s creation and the 
model of God’s love.  Vatican opinion about modern communication calls people 
                                                
 83 Thorn, “Models of Church and Communication,” op. cit., p. 89. 
 
 84 Ibid.  Pope Benedict XVI raises the point that thinking of the forms of mass communication as a 
“great roundtable” can tend to flatten and trivialize any substantive conversation about truth and the 
promotion of peace:  “While the various instruments of social communication facilitate the exchange of 
information, ideas, and mutual understanding among groups, they are also tainted by ambiguity.  Alongside 
the provision of a ‘great round table’ for dialogue, certain tendencies within the media engender a kind of 
monoculture that dims creative genius, deflates the subtlety of complex thought and undervalues the 
specificity of cultural practices and the particularity of religious belief. These are distortions that occur 
when the media industry becomes self-serving or solely profit-driven, losing the sense of accountability to 
the common good.”  From the text, “The Media:  A Network for Communication, Communion, and 
Cooperation,” Benedict XVI’s message for the 40th World Communications Day, February 2006. 
See:  <http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/messages/communications/documents/hf_ben-
xvi_mes_20060124_40th-world-communications-day_en.html> (last accessed 2/9/10). 
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everywhere to live up to the example and gift of that love of God.”85  The doctrines of 
Providence, Trinity, and the Incarnation form the bedrock for the document’s further 
hewing a Catholic theory of communication.  From this perspective, social 
communications arise only because of their integral bond to “the central mystery of the 
eternal communion between the Father, Son and Holy Spirit who live a single divine 
life.”86  Knowledge of this bond gives the church an understanding of the proper use of 
all media, which knowledge it then shares with the world.  Through the blessing of media 
forms, God intends to bring people together to “share their knowledge and unify their 
creative work”; indeed, they are given “a share in [God’s] creative power,” and 
summoned to cooperate with each other “in building the earthly city” through the agency 
of the communication arts extended to them as gifts.87  Since Christ commissions the 
church to give people “the message of salvation in a language they can understand” and 
to concern itself with the concerns of all humanity,88 there is need for various means of 
social communication.  These help the church accomplish three goals:  to reveal itself 
(i.e., the message of the gospel) to the modern world; to foster dialogue within the 
church; to make contemporary opinions and attitudes clear to the church. 
 In the Incarnation, the church finds the supreme example of communication.  
Jesus Christ is the “perfect communicator”—the model for all forms of human 
interaction: 
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[Jesus] utterly identified himself with those who were to receive his 
communication and he gave his message not only in words but in the whole 
manner of his life.  He spoke from within, that is to say, from out of the press of 
his people.  He preached the divine message without fear or compromise.  He 
adjusted to his people's way of talking and to their patterns of thought.  And he 
spoke out of the predicament of their time.89 
 
There is an emphasis here on communication as “more than the expression of ideas and 
the indication of emotion.  At its most profound level it is the giving of self in love.  
Christ's communication was, in fact, spirit and life.”90  All means of human 
communication are by grace designed as paths to greater communion among human 
beings and their creator.  Thus, media should permit people 
to know themselves better and to understand one another more easily.  By this, 
[they] are led to a mutual understanding and shared ambition.  And this, in turn, 
inclines them to justice and peace, to good will and active charity, to mutual help, 
to love and, in the end, to communion.  The tools of communication, then, 
provide some of the most effective means for the cultivation of that charity among 
[people] which is at once the cause and the expression of fellowship.91 
 
This signals a change in the orientation of the church’s rhetoric about film, since earlier 
statements on film tended to address moral issues and the effects of cinema on audiences.  
Film, here understood as a medium of real communication, should lead to communion 
and, ultimately, charity, among people. 
 Still, this positive vision of cinema and other means of communication is 
tempered by the church’s recognition of the way human beings really use them.  Too 
often the media have been used “to contradict or corrupt the fundamental values of 
human life.  The Christian considers these evils evidence of [humanity’s] need to be 
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redeemed and freed from that sin . . ..”92  The text cites the Genesis story of the tower at 
Babel.  The folly shown there rendered people incapable of communicating with one 
another.  And while God’s love for humanity never ceased, sin persisted in the world.93  
This situation gives rise to a host of problematic questions: 
How in the face of competition to capture a large popular audience are the media 
to be prevented from appealing to and inflaming the less admirable tendencies in 
human nature?  How can one avoid the concentration of the power to 
communicate in too few hands so that any real dialogue is killed?  How can one 
avoid allowing communications made indirectly and through machinery to 
weaken direct human contact—especially when these communications take the 
form of pictures and images?  When the media invite [people] to escape into 
fantasy, what can be done to bring them back to present reality?  How can one 
stop the media encouraging mental idleness and passivity?  And how can one be 
certain that the incessant appeal to emotion does not sap reason?94 
 
These questions hark back to those raised in previous Vatican statements on cinema and 
its concern for the moral wellbeing of society in relation to such a powerful medium as 
film.  Here, however, they are reformulated to meet the demands of the time.  For its part, 
the Catholic Church is called to dialogue about these serious issues with professionals 
within the communication industry “of every religious persuasion,” to provide them with 
“spiritual help to meet the needs of their important and difficult role,”95 and to collaborate 
on efforts “to solve the problems inherent in their task and do what is best for the benefit” 
of humanity.96  A good portion of the document presents concrete responses to some of 
these issues, including the rights to free speech and information; the accountability of 
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those involved in local and global communication; the question of leisure; responsibilities 
of the national governments for societal relations; and the particularities of the respective 
media arts.  Obligations are laid out for Catholics in particular.  Because they are through 
revelation informed of the media’s transcendental orientation, Catholics must take upon 
themselves the task of offering the world examples of communication that lead to “true 
communion”: 
If Catholics are to be of service to the means of social communication and to act 
so that these may serve humanity's ends, it goes without saying that it is in the 
spiritual sphere that the church can best help.  The church hopes that, as a result of 
[its] spiritual contribution, the basic nature of social communication will be more 
clearly appreciated.  The church hopes, too, that the dignity of the human person, 
both communicator and recipient, will be better understood and respected.97 
 
 The document’s section on cinema repeats themes the church’s teaching on 
motion pictures up to that point with little expansion on previous themes.  It does offer a 
renewed appreciation of the integrity of film as an art and of filmmakers as artists, who 
“have to face many difficulties in the course of their creative work.”  Catholics are 
encouraged “to engage in dialogue with them.”  Together, their “shared belief in the good 
that the cinema can do for [human beings], these contacts will bear witness to the nobility 
of the vocation of those involved in film production.”98  It reemphasizes the power of 
film on culture, knowledge, and leisure, and claims that film is “a very effective means” 
for expressing the interpretation of human life.99  Many classic films, it continues, have 
“compellingly treated subjects that concern human progress or spiritual values” in 
addition to explicitly religious topics, which fact “not only proves that the cinema is a 
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proper vehicle for such noble themes,” it is likewise a “strong encouragement to produce 
films of this kind.”100 
 To finish, it is worth considering briefly the document Aetatis novae,101 which 
was promulgated in 1992 by the president of the Pontifical Council for Social 
Communications, then-Archbishop John Foley, on the occasion of the twentieth 
anniversary of Communio et progressio.  It revisits the same kinds of questions about 
media that the earlier text contemplates but from the perspective of all the “new 
languages” resulting from the “rapid evolution” of technology two decades hence.  It 
takes with even greater seriousness the pastoral implications resulting from the 
availability and power that the digital age has over world culture: 
As media become ever more intertwined with people's daily lives, they influence 
how people understand the meaning of life itself.  Indeed, the power of media 
extends to defining not only what people will think but even what they will think 
about.  Reality, for many, is what the media recognize as real; what media do not 
acknowledge seems of little importance.102 
 
The above declaration is even more pertinent now that one can access virtually any 
image, movie, message, or sound anywhere at anytime.  Further, Aetatis novae 
recapitulates the continuing need to discern the signs of the times with the encouragement 
and wisdom of the Holy Spirit: 
As the Spirit helped the prophets of old to see the divine plan in the signs of their 
times, so today the Spirit helps the church interpret the signs of our times and 
carry out its prophetic tasks, among which the study, evaluation, and right use of 
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communications technology and the media of social communications are now 
fundamental.103 
 
And it reminds the church of its theological frame of reference with respect to any new 
technology: 
Human history and all human relationships exist within the framework established 
by this self-communication of God in Christ.  History itself is ordered toward 
becoming a kind of word of God, and it is part of the human vocation to 
contribute to bringing this about by living out the ongoing, unlimited 
communication of God's reconciling love in creative new ways.104 
 
Again, the teleology of human communication is accentuated.  But what is novel about 
this document’s vision is its concern that the church establish a more thoroughgoing 
understanding of the theoretical preconditions for human communication.  As it says, the 
dialogue between the church and the world means that the church must be “actively 
concerned with the secular media” and that this interface “requires the development of an 
anthropology and a theology of communication—not least, so that theology itself may be 
more communicative, more successful in disclosing gospel values and applying them to 
the contemporary realities of the human condition.”105  This directive gives further 
impetus to the dissertation and its investigation of connections between Catholic theology 
and film.  Looking ahead to the second chapter, which analyzes the work of professional 
theologians and film scholars, it is worth bearing in mind whether their theories include 
anthropologies that help elucidate the reality and significance of film. 
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Letter to Artists (1999)106 
 In composing his Letter to Artists, Pope John Paul II drew upon his own 
experiences as a poet and playwright.  A highly personal piece, the letter fuses his faith to 
his love of culture—a letter written by an artist for artists on the nature of art:  “I feel 
closely linked by experiences reaching far back in time and which have indelibly marked 
my life.”107  Letter to Artists builds on the “fruitful dialogue between the church and 
artists which has gone on unbroken through two thousand years of history,” a dialogue 
“rooted in the very essence of both religious experience and artistic creativity.”108  The 
pope invites artists into a renewed alliance with Christianity in order that through this 
partnership humanity can be better served and culture renewed by God who is the “sole 
creator of all things.”109  The letter integrates several theoretical features distinguished in 
previous statements related to church and culture and applies them directly to art. 
 John Paul II develops his exhortation to artists using perspectives from theology, 
philosophy, aesthetics, and ethics.  Two fundamental questions guide the discourse:  
Does the church need art? and Does art need the church?  In both cases, John Paul II 
answers positively; however, there is the sense in the text that he knows the latter is the 
more controversial claim; his answer, in other words, is not submitted casually.  His 
responses to the questions hold importance for our study since they help shape Vatican 
opinion on art and, by extension, its position on cinema.  Specific films are not mentioned 
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in the discourse, nor are other individual works of art; but the pope does list filmmakers 
among those artists (poets, architects, musicians, etc.) whose imaginations have been 
“fired” by the realities the church holds to be true, good, and beautiful.110 
 The theological dimension is evident in the structure of the pope’s letter, which is 
distinctly Trinitarian.  It begins with a reflection on God, who as creator fashions human 
beings “in his image” and who calls on them “to share in his creative power.”111  
According to John Paul II, artists participate in the very nature of God when they produce 
works of imagination and beauty:  “None can sense more deeply than you artists, 
ingenious creators of beauty that you are, something of the pathos with which God at the 
dawn of creation looked upon the work of his hands.”112  The centerpiece of the letter 
relates art and beauty to the mystery of God taking human form in Jesus Christ who is at 
once the “icon of the unseen God”113 and “the central point of reference for an 
understanding of the enigma of human existence, the created world and God.”114  From 
the epiphany of the “God who is Mystery” has come “a flowering of beauty which has 
drawn its sap precisely from the mystery of the Incarnation.”115  The letter ends with a 
meditation on the Pentecostal hymn, “Veni, Creator Spiritus,” whereby the pope remarks 
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that the divine Spirit who “breathes out” the creative power into human hearts and minds 
“with a kind of inner illumination” is the source of all enlightenment and the “starting-
point of every true work of art.”116  The letter’s intentional structuring reflects his belief 
that the Trinitarian design of creation is the very condition for art. 
 A significant portion of the letter is a historical digest of the relationship between 
the church and art and how each contributed to the development of the other.  The 
evolution of Christian art in antiquity grew out of the necessity for self-definition and 
religious identification rather than leisure. 
Art of Christian inspiration began therefore in a minor key, strictly tied to the 
need for believers to contrive scripture-based signs to express both the mysteries 
of faith and a “symbolic code” by which they could distinguish and identify 
themselves, especially in the difficult times of persecution.117 
 
He recalls some of the first symbols used by the church:  “The fish, the loaves, the 
shepherd:  in evoking the mystery, they became almost imperceptibly the first traces of a 
new art.”118  Needs such as the design of liturgical space necessitated new art forms.  As 
the ritual life of the church began to take a consistent form it became essential to instruct 
believers in its rubrics—its words, symbols, sounds, and gestures.119  Art has always held 
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pedagogical importance for the church, as “the need to contemplate the mystery and to 
present it explicitly to the simple people led to the early forms of painting and 
sculpture.”120  And as Christianity grew, so did the arts; both were engaged in centuries 
of mutual development.  Many new genres appeared:  Gregorian chant; the Byzantine 
tradition of icons; sacred poetry; monastery and abbey construction; the blend of arts that 
make up medieval cathedrals; musical compositions of the Mass; and the numerous 
masterpieces with scriptural tableaux.  The intentionality behind these forms went beyond 
the needs of ecclesial definition and catechesis:  sacred art aimed to inspire wisdom and 
holiness, both in its production and admiration.  Referencing Gaudium et spes, John Paul 
II says that thanks “to the help of artists ‘the knowledge of God can be better revealed 
and the preaching of the gospel can become clearer to the human mind.’”121 
 In addition to explicitly religious artwork, Letter to Artists accords high value to 
so-called “secular” art, or what the text describes as an impulse toward non-religious 
humanism in the arts.  Alongside the Christian humanism that gave rise to many great 
works of art throughout history is “another kind of humanism, marked by the absence of 
God and often by opposition to God, has gradually asserted itself.  Such an atmosphere 
has sometimes led to a separation of the world of art and the world of faith, at least in the 
sense that many artists have a diminished interest in religious themes.”122  However, the 
works of these artists are “not at all a danger for Christian faith, centered on the mystery 
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of the Incarnation and therefore of God’s valuing of the human being.”123  Again echoing 
Gaudium et spes, the Holy Father considers art to be an important linchpin between 
religion and culture.  Not only is art a bridge between faith and culture, it can lead to a 
contemplative experience if it aims at disclosing the mystery that permeates all creation: 
You know, however, that the church has not ceased to nurture great appreciation 
for the value of art as such.  Even beyond its typically religious expressions, true 
art has a close affinity with the world of faith, so that, even in situations where 
culture and the church are far apart, art remains a kind of bridge to religious 
experience.  In so far as it seeks the beautiful, fruit of an imagination which rises 
above the everyday, art is by its nature a kind of appeal to the mystery.  Even 
when they explore the darkest depths of the soul or the most unsettling aspects of 
evil, artists give voice in a way to the universal desire for redemption.124 
 
 In an earlier pontifical communiqué specifically on cinema, John Paul II wrote 
that film is “an authentic vehicle of culture for the integral growth of each person and of 
society as a whole.”125  There are human and religious values present 
not only in films that make direct reference to the tradition of Christianity but also 
in films of different cultures and religions.  This confirms the importance of the 
cinema as a vehicle for cultural exchange and as an invitation to openness and 
reflection in dealing with realities foreign to our upbringing and mentality.126 
 
He returns to a point made in earlier statements concerning film’s power and 
psychological influence and connects it to the fundamental task of all Christians:  “the 
proclamation of the gospel, the good news of Jesus, ‘the Savior of all,’ to the people of 
their time.”127  He writes that film is “a form of communication that is based not so much 
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on words as on concrete events, expressed in images which impact greatly on the viewers 
and on their subconscious.”128  From this he concludes that “cinema, with its vast 
possibilities, could become a powerful means of evangelization.”129  John Paul II follows 
this up in a message he gave to a conference on cinema on a separate occasion, stressing 
the need for the church, artists, and all society to recognize together the power cinema 
has 
to bring distant people together, to reconcile enemies, to promote a more 
respectful and fruitful dialogue between different cultures, by showing the way to 
a credible and lasting solidarity, the essential premise for a world of peace.  We 
know how much man also needs peace to be a true artist, to create true cinema!130 
 
 The church, he suggests in Letter to Artists, values not only the works artists 
produce (ends) but also the dedication behind and responsibility to their vocation 
(means).  By developing talent and technique, artists work in the service of beauty.  
Simultaneously, artists serve humanity and contribute “to the life and renewal of a 
people—for art is never a solitary activity.  It is in every aspect a relational event, just as 
there can never be a church of one.131  When artists are not driven “by the search for 
empty glory or the craving for cheap popularity” and when they are “obedient to their 
inspiration in creating works both worthwhile and beautiful, they not only enrich the 
cultural heritage of each nation and of all humanity, but they also render an exceptional 
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social service in favor of the common good.”132  Seen from a broader perspective, the 
history of art “is not only a story of works produced but also a story of men and 
women.”133  This sentiment can be expanded to include the manner in which men and 
women receive and interpret art reveals as much about the spiritual/moral dimensions of 
art’s patrons as it does artists themselves.  Indeed, all men and women “are entrusted with 
the task of crafting their own life:  in a certain sense, they are to make of it a work of art, 
a masterpiece.”134  Not only professional artists but all people are called through their 
existential situation, their work and relationships, toward human authenticity—to live 
ever more fully in God’s image by remaining worthy of divine likeness in their capacity 
as artists. 
 As civilization and society needs art for its self-expression and self-definition, so 
the church, as God’s people and a portion of history and the larger society, needs art—
both religious and secular—for its own self-expression.  And, of course, “self-
expression” applied to the church means nothing less than its mission to communicate the 
message of revelation entrusted to it by God in Christ.  Given this, what is it that art 
uniquely has that the church needs to fulfill this mission? 
Art must make perceptible, and as far as possible attractive, the world of the 
spirit, of the invisible, of God.  It must therefore translate into meaningful terms 
that which is in itself ineffable.  Art has a unique capacity to take one or other 
facet of the message and translate it into colors, shapes and sounds which nourish 
the intuition of those who look or listen.  It does so without emptying the message 
itself of its transcendent value and its aura of mystery.135 
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 Given what has been laid out so far, John Paul II concludes that “the church needs 
art.”136  He then turns to the more controversial question, “Does art need the church?”  
What is it that the church uniquely has that artists need?  What is intriguing here is the 
fact that the pope writes in the form of a question, one he hopes does not come off as 
provocation.137  Since the letter is an appeal to artists he extends an invitation rather than 
a verdict.  Indeed, there is no definitive pronouncement that “art needs the church.”  And 
while he submits reasons as to why the church might be essential to artists, he leaves it up 
to them to make that judgment.  This gesture is fundamentally grounded in the teaching 
of Gaudium et spes which encouraged the church to maintain a bearing of magnanimity 
in its critical correspondence with culture. 
 He answers the question of whether art needs the church in two stages, the first of 
which presents a kind of anthropology of the artist.  Artists, he writes, are 
constantly in search of the hidden meaning of things, and their torment is to 
succeed in expressing the world of the ineffable.  How then can we fail to see 
what a great source of inspiration is offered by that kind of homeland of the soul 
that is religion?  Is it not perhaps within the realm of religion that the most vital 
personal questions are posed, and answers both concrete and definitive are 
sought?138 
 
If it is the aim of artists to express something of the mystery of life then they must remain 
open to and in touch with those individuals, communities, and institutions that have deep 
insight into the nature of transcendence.  Art loses something of its very reason for being 
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when it cuts itself off from religion, which is such a wellspring of responses to the most 
fundamental of human questions.139  The pope believes that artists reflect God’s nature as 
Creator since they disclose some amount of their own being through their handiwork.  
From the many available forms, artists choose as their craft the optimum method to 
communicate who they uniquely are and the vision they hold of reality. 
 Art and morality thus meet in the character of the artist.  The act of creating art 
facilitates in the formation of an artist’s intellect, emotions, and personality and is thereby 
revelatory of his or her inner life: 
In producing a work, artists express themselves to the point where their work 
becomes a unique disclosure of their own being, of what they are and of how they 
are what they are.  And there are endless examples of this in human history.  In 
shaping a masterpiece, the artist not only summons his work into being, but also 
in some way reveals his own personality by means of it.  For him art offers both a 
new dimension and an exceptional mode of expression for his spiritual growth. 
Through his works, the artist speaks to others and communicates with them.140 
 
This “new dimension,” the letter suggests, consists “in the potential of the fine arts to 
transport us from the mundane to the transcendent, from visible realities to invisible, yet 
deeper, realities.”141  Every work of art in some way reveals its maker; art thus expresses 
the transcendent insofar as it “will always convey some meaning or trace of a 
personality.”142 
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 Still, the pressing question remains as to why “the artistic task of expressing the 
transcendent require[s] the incarnation?”143  In the second stage of his argument, and 
without denying that artists have “found inspiration in other religious contexts,”144 the 
Holy Father offers what he perceives to be the unique contribution of the Catholic Church 
to the world of art: 
[B]ecause of its central doctrine of the Incarnation of the Word of God, 
Christianity offers artists a horizon especially rich in inspiration.  What an 
impoverishment it would be for art to abandon the inexhaustible mine of the 
gospel! …The close alliance that has always existed between the gospel and art 
means that you are invited to use your creative intuition to enter into the heart of 
the mystery of the Incarnate God and at the same time into the mystery of [human 
beings].145 
 
Moreover, Christianity and especially Catholicism 
 
provides an especially fruitful source of inspiration to the artist because 
Christianity proclaims the Incarnation, that Jesus Christ is God become man for 
love of human beings.  Therefore, art needs the church because the goal of the 
artist can best be fulfilled in the context of the life and doctrines of the church.146 
 
Jesus Christ “not only reveals his Father to man but also ‘fully reveals man to himself.’  
Hence, any authentic attempt to give aesthetic expression to the mystery of man will find 
both inspiration and fulfillment in Jesus Christ.”147  The Holy Father asserts that the 
classic philosophical categories of goodness, beauty, and truth find their fulfillment in the 
Incarnation.  No longer are these mere intellectual concepts:  they have become 
enfleshed, tangible realities in Christ and transformed through his dying and rising 
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beyond what the philosophers could ever have anticipated.  The Son of God “has 
introduced into human history all the evangelical wealth of the true and the good, and 
with this he has also unveiled a new dimension of beauty.”148  While this “new 
dimension” remains unspecified, when considered against the letter’s inherent 
Christology and its appeal to artists to offer “service which contributes in its way to the 
life and renewal of a people,”149 it can be deduced that it refers to the paschal dimension 
of beauty ushered in by Jesus Christ.150  What appears to be an unsightly curse (Passio) is 
true blessedness and the fullness of beauty (Pascha) offered to all creation.  Christ’s 
passover heralds a new knowledge:  that a gilded world cannot reflect the divine 
initiative—only a humble, contrite world can.  The scorned and abandoned, the weak and 
the wrecked, can with certitude be called eternally beautiful by way of Jesus’ cross and 
resurrection.  Art that is reflective of this paschal dimension of beauty is not only of great 
interest to the church, the work remains dependent on God’s revealing and the church’s 
proclaiming the purest form of beauty. 
 It is important to notice that it is on the same premise—the Incarnation—that John 
Paul II bases his answers to the letter’s twin questions concerning the interrelationship 
between church and art.  Indeed, the ultimate ground for his belief that the church is 
essential for the arts is based on the earlier premise that Christ is “the icon of the unseen 
God.”  He sees an analogous link between objects of art and the incarnate Word of God: 
                                                
 148 Letter to Artists, ibid., par. 5. 
 
 149 Ibid., par. 4. 
 
 150 From a Christian point of view, the metaphoric “death” that occurs when artists abandon 
themselves to their craft and all that it demands for the renewal of others, they partake in Christ’s action for 
others and thereby fulfill their vocation. 
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[J]ust as the church needs Jesus Christ to make visible his unseen Father, so too 
she needs literary and figurative works, music, and architecture to raise our hearts 
and minds to the Father revealed by Jesus Christ.  The incarnate Word serves as 
the model of corporeal representations of transcendent realities and thus secures 
the place of the fine arts within the practice of the church.151 
 
Art needs the church because art is concrete and when it pursues what is true, of necessity 
it has to rely on the Incarnation.  That is to say, art must not “cut itself off from the full 
truth about man, which is found in Christian revelation.”152  When art is properly ordered 
“to our ultimate end and joined to Christ's sacrifice on the cross, it can serve to sanctify 
both ourselves and others. In this way our work, done well and with the right intention, 
becomes a vehicle of growth in moral and spiritual goodness.”153 
 To conclude, as we come to the end of the second chapter of this dissertation and 
its assimilation of Catholic Church teaching on cinema, it is possible to appreciate how 
important Letter to Artists is for this study.  It affirms and nuances much that has already 
been stated in Vatican documents concerning film but it also takes the discourse to a new 
level.154  John Paul II treats film as more than an electronic form of communication.  He 
confirms the teaching of Vigilanti cura that film is a form of art and then spells out the 
implications of this judgment.  When film is genuinely artistic, it “goes beyond what the 
senses perceive,” reaches “beneath reality's surface [and] strives to interpret its hidden 
mystery.”155  Cinema is thus a “vehicle” to faith since every authentic “art form in its 
                                                
 151 Freddoso, “The Church and Art,” op. cit., p. 218. 
 
 152 Ibid., p. 219. 
 
 153 Ibid., p. 217. 
 
 154 Perhaps it is because of his background as an artist that he is uniquely able to take the 
conversation to a new level.  John Paul II demonstrates a great affinity for art and seems to hold less of a of 
concern with scandal at it. 
 
 155 Letter to Artists, op. cit., par. 6. 
 110 
own way is a path to the inmost reality of [human beings] and of the world.  It is 
therefore a wholly valid approach to the realm of faith, which gives human experience its 
ultimate meaning.”156  Indeed, the Holy Father helps us to see that in all artistic 
endeavors, in creating and delighting in art, we grow in the image of God.  And when art 
given and received is lifted up in adoration of the ultimate source of beauty, of which art 
is a mere reflection, then our efforts are united to that source and the relationship between 
artist and Creator is deepened.  The physical object of art remains a symbol of this 
spiritual relationship: 
All artists experience the unbridgeable gap which lies between the work of their 
hands, however successful it may be, and the dazzling perfection of the beauty 
glimpsed in the ardor of the creative moment:  what they manage to express in 
their painting, their sculpting, their creating is no more than a glimmer of the 
splendor which flared for a moment before the eyes of their spirit.  Believers find 
nothing strange in this:  they know that they have had a momentary glimpse of the 
abyss of light which has its original wellspring in God.157 
 
Pope John Paul II remained a strong advocate of film throughout his pontificate.  
He hosted several international conferences on cinema as a resource for spiritual 
reflection; oversaw the Pontifical Council for Social Communication’s release in 1995 of 
a list of forty-five films deemed religiously, artistically and morally laudable158; and 
actively supported the World Catholic Association for Social Communication (SIGNIS).  
Although his letter is not descriptive of film, its attributes, or its contribution to art 
                                                
 
 156 Ibid. 
 
 157 Ibid. 
 
 158 Examples of films on the list range from the explicitly Christian (The Gospel According to St. 
Matthew, dir. Pier Pasolini), to the secular (2001:  A Space Odyssey, dir. Stanley Kubrick) and humanistic 
(Dersu Uzala, dir. Akira Kurosawa).  While the list was a welcome complement to all of the Vatican’s 
positive and theoretical pronouncements on cinema seriously, questions about the list remain outstanding:  
Why forty-five?  Why these forty-five?   What criteria were used for selection and evaluation?  Why were 
reviews of the films not part of the inventory?  What of the thousands of other films that might possibly be 
considered valuable to Catholics? 
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history, much of what it says specifically about other forms of art is applicable to film—
as, for instance, in its description of a cathedral:  “In the play of light and shadow, in 
forms at times massive, at times delicate, structural considerations certainly come into 
play, but so too do the tensions peculiar to the experience of God, the mystery both 
‘awesome’ and ‘alluring.’”159  This excerpt, which clearly references Rudolph Otto’s 
famous definition of the experience of “the holy,”160 while ostensibly descriptive of the 
splendors of cathedral architecture, if placed in another context might very well describe 
the artistic characteristics of cinema. 
Since this dissertation is concerned specifically with the relationship between 
Catholic theology and film, it is worth noting that the letter cites M. D. Chenu, O.P.’s 
teaching that the work of theologians would be incomplete if they failed “to give due 
attention to works of art, both literary and figurative, which are in their own way ‘not 
only aesthetic representations, but genuine “sources” of theology.’”161  This dictum 
anticipates the upcoming chapter in which we look carefully at this possibility through 
the writings of Catholic theologians and film scholars. 
 
Conclusion 
 This chapter attempted to further articulate the Vatican’s approach to film by 
analyzing documents pertinent to an understanding of the placement of film in a Catholic 
context.  Whereas Rome’s approach to film was fairly straightforward in its “first stage,” 
                                                
 159 Letter to Artists, ibid., par. 8. 
 
 160 In his volume, The Idea of the Holy, Rudolph Otto (1868-1937) designates “the holy” as 
“totally other” (Ganz Andere).  He describes experience of the holy as mysterium tremendum et fascinans:  
the mystery which produces in humans feelings of fear and fascination. 
 
 161 Ibid., par. 11. 
 
 112 
its “second stage” of development is more difficult to grasp.  This elusiveness is due in 
part to the fact that no document handles cinema as its main subject; nor does any text 
build explicitly on the foundational literature surveyed in the first chapter.  Instead, film 
is considered under the broader headings of media, culture, social communication, and 
art.  Looking at film under such large-scale rubrics increased our sense of the theoretical 
complexities involved in interpreting the relationship between Catholic theology and 
cinema. 
 A hypothesis asserted at the beginning of the dissertation stated that Vatican 
opinion on cinema remains insufficient at the levels of both formal clarity (theory) and 
direct critical reflection (praxis).  This we have found to be true.  Theoretically, while 
recommendations were made for more substantial engagement between Catholic 
theology and film, the official teaching comes up short in presenting models of how this 
might be accomplished.  Deficiencies were noted at the practical level, too.  For instance, 
none of the pontifical documents on cinema reflect directly on the concrete material of 
film or expressly relate Christian doctrines to the content of actual film stories.  Whereas 
general principles for Catholic engagement with cinema were laid down in these texts, 
none presented specific examples of movies the magisterial authors considered valuable 
(or reprehensible) when crafting these principles.  This is a significant weakness since it 
means that the church’s official teaching on “film” is just that:  discourse on a broadly-
conceived notion of “film” that is largely abstracted from real film referents.  Such 
inattention to actual films keeps the magisterial discourse at a theoretical level, offering 
more of a justification of cinema’s importance for the church (and vice versa) than a 
practical application of how Catholic faith and film actually relate.  If a sharper picture of 
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the placement and function of film within a Catholic theological framework is to emerge 
then at some point film must be viewed as it really exists.  The remainder of the 
dissertation attempts to mitigate these limitations. 
 To draw out some implications of this chapter for our thesis, we might borrow 
language from John Paul II’s Letter to Artists to say that, according to the magisterium, 
the “church needs film” and “film needs the church.”  For its part, the church has the duty 
to employ every effective means to bear witness to the truth of God in Jesus and to 
communicate his gospel in each age in vibrant, compelling ways.  Its mission is not only 
to preach the gospel, but to critically engage and reflect on the world to which the gospel 
is delivered so that Christian teaching can be related to human experience.  In light of this 
mission to proclaim the path of salvation in and through culture, the church can turn to 
cinema for its unique ability to illuminate the mystery, dignity, questions, and struggles 
of the human being to whom salvation is offered.  In turning to film, the preaching of the 
church can become clearer as it matches message to the language and environs of the 
listener.  A barometer of culture, cinema is a tremendous source for theological 
reflection, since the church is called to scrutinize the signs of the times in the light of the 
gospel and to discern what in culture bespeaks God’s presence and what does not.162  The 
church needs film because, as an art, it is concrete; and, as a popular art, it is accessible to 
many.  Film can express the transcendental dimensions of human beings by illustrating 
what they hold to be good, true, and beautiful; what they wonder at; what they utterly 
abhor; and what gives them joy.  While film is a form of art independent of the church for 
its existence, application, and cultural relevance, it nonetheless needs the church.  As 
                                                
 162 Gaudium et spes, op cit., art. 4. 
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John Paul II writes, when art pursues what is true, and good, and beautiful, it is really 
pursuing Christ, the Logos of God.  Therefore, art needs the Christian church because the 
church has, in the criterion of Christ, the preeminent revealed means of discerning what 
in human experience is really true, beautiful, and holy. 
 The dissertation’s first chapter pointed out certain characteristics of the Vatican’s 
approach to film that, if left unmitigated, would in time limit the church’s vision of 
cinema and the possibilities it held for the church.  This included Rome’s heteronomous 
rhetoric toward and dichotomous vision of film and its propensity for a morals-only 
hermeneutic with regard to motion picture content.  In the light of this chapter, 
particularly the Letter to Artists, some of these problems can be attributed to the church’s 
understanding of the function of art.  Looking back at Rome’s “first stage,” it is possible 
to see that, when film was approached in a utilitarian way, the church looked solely at the 
effects of film; however, when the notion was pursued that art speaks for itself, then the 
church could accept the transformative power of art not just as impetus for moral action, 
but toward beauty.  While the Vatican has always judged cinema to be a legitimate art 
form, the documents prior to Letter to Artists did not reflect appreciably on this 
dimension and focused more upon its function as a means of social communication.  John 
Paul II’s letter opened ecclesiastical conversation about cinema in a direction beyond 
communication theory.  Thus, with this chapter we have a better sense what the church 
means that film is a form of art.163 
 Certainly, the notion of film as a mode of communication should not be 
overlooked, for such a viewpoint and can lead to important theological conclusions, such 
                                                
 163 Still, since John Paul II wrote of “art” as a whole, the particularities of the cinematic medium 
were not examined. 
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as those made by Pope Benedict XVI in his address on the church’s annual World 
Communications Day: 
The desire for connectedness and the instinct for communication that are so 
obvious in contemporary culture are best understood as modern manifestations of 
the basic and enduring propensity of humans to reach beyond themselves and to 
seek communion with others.  In reality, when we open ourselves to others, we 
are fulfilling our deepest need and becoming more fully human.  Loving is, in 
fact, what we are designed for by our Creator.164 
 
 There remains the unresolved concern that Vatican literature on film does not go 
far enough in developing theological foundations for its approach to cinema or in spelling 
out the theological implications of its teaching.  As noted, this shortcoming is, in part, 
one reason for this dissertation, which attempts at some level to mitigate this deficiency.  
The next chapter builds toward this goal by looking closely at essays from Catholic 
theologians and film experts to see how professionals in the field have negotiated the 
relationship between theology and film and whether these writers pursue the question of 
the conditions of possibility of their interplay.  
 It is worth finishing with a remark that summarizes nicely the need for Catholics 
to understand and pursue the Vatican’s approach to cinema as expressed in the 
documents we have studied in these first two chapters of the dissertation: 
Through such publications the church has promoted critical awareness and critical 
engagement with media.  The church consistently calls the means of social 
communications “gifts of God.”  However, in church documents such affirmative 
statements are always followed by a firm “but.”  The church knows that the media 
are a garden and a minefield, too.  At the end of the day, the church respects 
storytelling and creativity, and the intelligence of people to discern, choose, and 
to make meaning about the media they consume.  These documents can educate 
                                                
 164 Pope Benedict XVI, “New Technologies, New Relationships, Promoting a Culture of Respect, 
Dialogue and Friendship,” the Holy Father’s Message for the 43rd World Day of Communications, May 
24, 2009, par. 4.  See:  
<http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/messages/communications/documents/hf_ben-
xvi_mes_20090124_43rd-world-communications-day_en.html> (last accessed 2/9/10). 
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and form the storytellers of tomorrow who are in our pews, living rooms and 
classrooms today, as well as their teachers and parents.  They also advise 
advocacy but not boycotts.  The church, at its heart, knows that how one teachers 
is what one teaches.165 
 
 
                                                
 165 Rose Pacette, “Is Hollywood Anti-Catholic?”  National Catholic Reporter, May 13, 2009.  See:  
<http://ncronline.org/news/hollywood-anti-catholic> (last accessed 2/9/10). 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
Introduction 
 
 The last two chapters gathered together the various strands of Vatican teaching on 
cinema and inspected them against the larger background of the church’s relationship to 
the secular world.  From the beginning of its teaching on cinema, the magisterium has 
consistently approached film as a highly influential element in modern culture that 
deserves serious attention.  An attitude of cautious optimism prevailed in the earliest 
teaching as “mother church” struggled to balance her mission to protect her children and 
come to terms with a powerful new form of entertainment, art, and industry.  Overall, 
Rome maintained a positive and constructive attitude toward cinema and strongly 
encouraged Catholics, particularly those in teaching roles as pastors, catechists, and 
theologians, to see film as a form of art worthy of both respect and critical engagement 
for the many possibilities it holds for evangelization and Christian development. 
 The investigation found that whereas the Vatican over the course of its teaching 
on cinema has made certain theological judgments about film (e.g., that it is a 
providential gift that, like all of God’s blessings, ought to be oriented toward the 
propagation of Christ’s kingdom) it has not presented a thorough study of film.  Even 
when all of the magisterium’s documents related to cinema are evaluated as a whole, the 
Catholic church does not have as part of its official doctrine anything that amounts to a 
comprehensive “theology of film.”  The Vatican effectively invited other in the church, 
and theologians in particular, to begin the job of exploring film’s deeper significance for 
Christian faith and the implications Christianity holds for film interpretation.  Yet in the 
years immediately following Vatican II, it appears that few Catholic theologians took up 
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this task in any significant way.  Indeed, individual theologians came quite “late to the 
scene” compared to the magisterium’s efforts to build bridges between Christian faith and 
film.  However, beginning in the early-1970s and reaching something of a critical mass in 
the late 1990s, a number of theologians (Catholic and Protestant) broke new ground, 
inaugurating what is now an area of study in its own right—“theology and film.”  
Because of these efforts there is now an increased recognition among many theologians 
“that films can explore with great depth, power, and artistry moral dilemmas and 
theological questions.”1 
 This chapter looks closely at seminal essays by several Roman Catholic 
theologians and film experts that span the course of the last fifty years.  There is a 
threefold intention:  (1) to provide some sense of the historical and conceptual 
developments in the area of theology and film; (2) to determine what elements stand out 
as characteristically “Catholic” in the interpretive approaches of key shapers of the field; 
and (3) to convey a sense of the variety of Catholic theoretical approaches to film so as to 
illustrate that there is no particular “fixed” method of working with film from a Catholic 
perspective.  Each writer represented here identifies unique points of intersection between 
theology and cinema and insists on the importance for theology to connect directly to 
particular films—something the magisterium did not do—so as to avoid overly 
theoretical interpretations.  To be sure, the chapter is not intended to be a comprehensive 
survey of all the relevant literature pertaining to Catholic theological engagement with 
film.  If this were an exhaustive study of Catholic styles of film analysis there are several 
                                                
 1 Jolyon Mitchell, “Theology and Film,” op. cit., p. 743. 
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other authors whose work would need to be included (e.g., Lloyd Baugh, Richard 
Leonard, Peter Malone, John May, Rose Pacette, etc.). 
 The chapter begins with an essay by French film theorist and critic André Bazin.  
Though he was not a trained theologian, his review of the film Heaven Over the Marshes 
was one of the first publications to connect film and theology and to suggest that Catholic 
theology is an essential hermeneutic for film evaluation.  Neil Hurley, S.J. was the first 
American Catholic theologian—indeed, one of the first theologians ever—to attempt an 
extended study relating theology and cinema.  His volume Theology Through Film, 
published in 1970, essentially instituted “theology and film” as a legitimate area within 
theological studies.  Hurley constructs what he calls a “cinematic theology,” an approach 
that treats films as indispensable theological texts.  Irish theologian Michael Paul 
Gallagher, S.J. retrieves the Catholic practice of discernment of spirits for his 
interpretation of film.  His essay, “Theology, Discernment and Cinema,” applies the 
discernment tradition as a way of discriminating genuine religious impulses in film from 
those that are illusory.  Especially important for this dissertation is the fact that 
Gallagher’s article represents one of the first theological studies of film to integrate some 
of Karl Rahner’s positions theology, the arts, and mystagogy.  Joseph Marty’s essay 
“Toward a Theological Interpretation and Reading of Film:  Incarnation of the Word of 
God—Relation, Image, Word,” insists that Christianity cannot cease to evangelize culture 
and so it must root all possible dialogue about the film image in the doctrine of the 
Incarnation.  Just as the chapter begins with a film scholar (Bazin), so it is fitting to end 
with one.  Richard Blake, S.J. comes at the problem of relating Catholic theology and 
film from his perspective as a film studies expert.  Through an examination of a selection 
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of Blake’s publications on Catholicism and film criticism, the attempt is made to uncover 
and explain his two-fold interest:  legitimizing theological interpretations of cinema on 
the one hand, and “protecting” the film image from theological eisegesis on the other. 
 This chapter follows closely after the dissertation’s exposition of the Vatican’s 
opinion on cinema, allowing for trends, expansions, and possible variations between the 
church’s official position and the methods of individual scholars to emerge.  This will 
help uncover elements within the overall Catholic conversation about theology and film 
that require even further investigation and/or expansion. 
 
André Bazin2 
 André Bazin (1918-1958) was a prominent French cinema theorist and critic who 
in 1951 helped to found the highly influential journal Les Cahiers du Cinema.  Along 
with those critics-cum-directors associated with Cahiers, such as Francois Truffaut and 
Jean-Luc Godard, Bazin put the discipline of film criticism on the world map.  As one 
biographer puts it, Bazin’s “‘impact on film art, as theorist and critic, is widely 
considered to be greater than that of any single director, actor, or producer in the history 
of the cinema.  He is credited with almost single-handedly establishing the study of film 
as an accepted intellectual pursuit,’ as well as with being the spiritual father of the French 
New Wave.”3 
                                                
 2 This section of the chapter considers an essay by André Bazin, “Cinema and Theology:  The 
Case of Heaven Over the Marshes.”  A translation of this article by Bert Cardullo can be found in the 
electronic journal, Journal of Religion and Film, Vol. 6, No. 2 (October 2002).  See:  
<http://www.unomaha.edu/jrf/heaven.htm> (last accessed 2/11/10).  All references to this article will be 
noted according to paragraph numbers on the webpage. 
 
 3 Bert Cardullo, “Introduction” in André Bazin, Bazin at Work:  Major Essays and Reviews from 
the Forties and Fifties.  New York:  Routledge, 1997, p. x. 
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 Bazin was a chief proponent of the auteur theory of film, an approach that 
considers a filmmaker to be the singular “author” of a particular work of art.4  The auteur 
school teaches that “film is a work of art, and since a work of art is stamped with the 
personality of its creator, it is the director, more than anyone else, who gives the film its 
distinctive quality.”5  Directors like D.W. Griffith, Sergei Eisenstein, Akira Kurosawa, 
Alfred Hitchcock, and Stanley Kubrick are regarded as auteurs, owing to their control 
over every detail of a project—including scripting, photography, editing, and scoring. 
 Bazin was a Roman Catholic.  In his 1951 essay “Cinema and Theology:  The 
Case of Heaven Over the Marshes,” Bazin asserts that many of the religious films made 
in the first fifty-five years of motion picture history failed to inspire as compellingly as 
Heaven Over the Marshes (1949, dir. Augusto Genina).  To understand why, he reflects 
upon the overall content and style of such religious films.  While he did not intend the 
essay to be a theological monograph, his review of the movie Heaven Over the Marshes 
represents one of the earliest attempts to bring the two worlds of film and theology—
specifically Catholic theology—together.  As one writer suggests, Bazin’s essay reveals 
that “he was also the most religious of film critics and theorists.  He is fundamentally 
holistic in his Catholicism, however, not remotely doctrinal.”6 
                                                
 4 The auteur theory has its critics.  Some suggest that its main weakness consists in the fact that 
film is a composite art (a fusion of theater, photography, music, etc.), and therefore one that relies on the 
collaboration and vision of many people.  “At its most extreme, auteur theory neglects the contributions of 
actors, screenwriters, cinematographers, production designers, and others. . . . Since 1970, critical 
approaches such as structuralism, semiology, and Marxism have deemphasized the ‘author’ in favor of 
analysis of the film ‘text,’” (Ephraim Katz, The Film Encyclopedia, Fourth Edition.  New York:  Harper 
Collins, 2001, p.66). 
 
 5 Katz, ibid. 
 
 6 Cardullo, “Introduction,” op. cit. 
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 Bazin categorizes what accounted popularly as a “religious” film in 1951 as one 
of three types:  i) a biblical story; ii) a hagiography; or iii) one concerning the life of a 
church religious—usually a priest or nun.  Yet, he remained unsatisfied with this simple 
classification and his essay attempts to expand the notion of what constitutes a religious 
film; or, better, what constitutes a film that has genuine religious significance.  Of 
particular interest is his judgment that what makes for a “religious” film may not involve 
overtly religious symbolism.  For Bazin, explicit religious references may in fact be quite 
ineffectual at awakening authentic religious consciousness; indeed, his essay is 
essentially a gloss on this notion. 
 With reference to the many movies made about Jesus and the apostles in the early 
years of cinema, Bazin writes that the “cinema has always been interested in God.”7  It is 
important to keep in mind that Bazin was writing for an early-1950s audience 
accustomed to the religious styles and sensibilities of the time.  This was the era of David 
and Bathsheba (1951, dir. Henry King), Song of Bernadette (1943, dir. Henry King), and 
Going My Way (1944, dir. Leo McCarey), movies that catered to large audiences looking 
for spiritual succor in a world ravaged by war.  And though film has “always been 
interested in God” the products of this interest, suggests Bazin, did not live up to the 
loftiness of the subject matter:  the “history of religious themes on the screen sufficiently 
reveals the temptations one must resist in order to meet simultaneously the requirements 
of cinematic art and of truly religious experience.”8  He suggests that the presence on 
screen of a religious person, a sacred rite or symbol, or the simple injection of a pious 
                                                
 7 Bazin, “Cinema and Theology:  The Case of Heaven Over the Marshes,” ibid., par. 2. 
 
 8 Ibid. 
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message, does not necessarily make a film religiously meaningful or for that matter 
theologically sound.  Nor is good cinema made sheerly by virtue of their presence. 
 Many of the religious films of this era (not necessarily those just mentioned) 
inclined toward sentimentality and bathos.  Especially in Catholic circles, there was a 
tendency to sanctify any film that followed the life of a saint or cleric.  Many of these 
films were plainly mawkish, but audiences had few options beyond them.  Contributing 
to this ethos was the fact that Catholics (and others) had limited means for keeping a 
critically distant eye on such films.  Film criticism had only recently been inaugurated 
and the only source for film “reviews” was the Legion of Decency.  Bazin cautions 
against sentimental excess claiming that the “affinities which have made for the success 
of countless films are also the source of the religious insignificance of most of them”9; 
and he insinuates that Catholics with an interest in both good cinema and good theology 
should be concerned that much of what is put forward by the industry under the rubric 
“religious” is often symbolically overwrought and categorically kitsch.10 
 The seeming inability of Hollywood and others to produce intelligent, relevant 
religious films raised two important questions for Bazin:  (1) Just what constitutes a 
“religious” movie?; and (2) Is the medium of the cinema a sufficient vehicle for 
communicating genuine religious experience?  It is important to note that he does not 
answer them abstractly.  Instead, he turns directly to Heaven Over the Marshes and 
considers the questions from within the narrative and style of the film. 
                                                
 9 Ibid. 
 
 10 At one point, Bazin wryly quips that “our children will probably one day see a Golgotha in 3-D” 
(ibid., par. 5). 
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 The movie follows the real-life story of Maria Goretti, an Italian peasant girl who 
in 1902 at the age of twelve was the victim of an attempted rape.  After resisting her 
attacker, Goretti was stabbed fourteen times.  She survived only two days.  On her 
deathbed, she forgave her attacker and asked God to forgive him as well.  Goretti was 
canonized in 1950 by Pope Pius XII—with her murderer present, no less. 
 Bazin places the biopic under the heading of “hagiography.”  But what about this 
film does he think transcends the hagiographic status quo and offers a more authentic 
instance of a religious movie?  Bazin calls Heaven Over the Marshes a “theological” film 
and it is important to understand what he means by this.  He was convinced that theology 
really only exists, as it were, on the ground; theology is an existential reality, played out 
by real people in real situations.  He credits the film’s director, Augusto Genina, for 
choosing such a commonplace story to illustrate what it means to be a saint.11  There are 
no spectacular miracles; no mystical raptures; no celluloid theophanies.  The story’s 
ordinariness is reflected in the film’s remarkably simple style, which is 
devoid of extraordinary events; hers is the life of a daughter of a poor family of 
farmhands in the Pontine marshes near Rome at the turn of the century.  No 
visions, no voices, no signs from heaven . . ..  All that we have here is the 
senseless crushing of a poor child’s life—there are no unusual, mitigating 
circumstances.  There is not a single aspect of the crime that doesn’t have a 
natural explanation.  The resistance of the girl is perhaps nothing but an 
exaggerated physiological response to the violation of her sense of decency, the 
reflex action of a frightened little animal.12 
 
 Writing his essay within a year of Goretti’s canonization, Bazin remarks that “at 
least in France, this saint’s life has disappointed the Christians,” apparently because her 
                                                
 11 Bazin is not suggesting that the rape and murder of Goretti constitutes an “ordinary” experience.  
He simply wants to accentuate the point that the religious value of the film is not equated with “spectacle.” 
 
 12 Bazin, “Cinema and Theology:  The Case of Heaven Over the Marshes,” ibid., par. 7. 
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piety did not involve extraordinary, spectacular events.  He commends Genina for having 
made a hagiography “that doesn’t prove anything, above all not the sainthood of the saint.  
Herein lies not only the film’s artistic distinction but also its religious one.”13  The 
director did not simply eschew the use of religious symbolism, ornamentation and 
sentiment—motifs normally used by filmmakers to communicate a supernatural aspect in 
a film hagiography; rather he 
set out to achieve much more than this:  his goal was to create a phenomenology 
of sainthood.  Genina’s mise en scène is a systematic refusal not only to treat 
sainthood as anything but a fact, an event occurring in the world . . . the 
ambiguous manifestation of a spiritual reality that is absolutely impossible to 
prove.  The apologetic nature of most hagiographies supposes, by contrast, that 
sainthood is conferred a priori.  . . .Yet, good logic dictates, as does good 
theology, that a saint becomes a saint only after the fact:  when he is canonized; 
during his lifetime, he is simply Monsieur Vincent.14 
 
 Apropos of Bazin’s Catholic instinct, here he makes an important theological 
point about the doctrine of sainthood, namely that because all persons are by grace 
potentially saints we must be attentive to this possibility both in our own lives and in the 
lives of others.  A saint “does not exist as a saint in the present:  he is simply a being who 
becomes one and who, moreover, risks eternal damnation until his death.”15  The ordinary 
story of Goretti is a cinematic model of this doctrine.  Quoting Genina, Bazin writes, 
“This is Maria Goretti, watch her live and die.  On the other hand, you know she is a 
saint.  Let those who have eyes to see, read by transparence the evidence of grace in her 
life, just as you must do at every moment in the events of your own lives.”16  Genina’s 
                                                
 13 Ibid., par. 8. 
 
 14 Ibid., par. 9. 
 
 15 Ibid. 
 
 16 Ibid., par. 10.  Audiences “know she is a saint” presumably because she was canonized and are 
aware of this as the events in her life unfold.  But they are perhaps surprised that the extraordinariness of 
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(and Bazin’s) point is that the signs that God sends to his people are not always 
“supernatural” in the paranormal or extramundane sense.  Sainthood “isn’t signified by 
anything extraordinary, either on the physical or the psychological level.  Divine grace 
doesn’t manifest itself in nature as the product of a tangible causality; at most, it reveals 
itself through some ambiguous signs that can all be explained in quite natural terms.”17  
This is what makes Heaven Over the Marshes so theologically significant for Bazin.  It is 
a “rarity:  a good Catholic film,”18 for its singular ability to communicate that the 
experience of grace is to be found in ordinary human experience.  This is why he thinks 
the film “will be disconcerting to viewers who are used to an apologetics that confuses 
rhetoric with art and sentiment with grace.”19 
The article concludes with a line that opens for us two important and related 
questions about the possibilities for cinema and for the way theology relates to it:  1) 
whether it is possible for cinema to convey “religious experience”; and 2) whether film 
itself can be regarded as an authentic mode of theology:  Bazin writes, “I would consider 
Heaven Over the Marshes the first theological film to assert—through the very nature of 
its characters, story, and event—the total transcendence of grace, which occurs at the 
expense of apologetics.”20  What Bazin states here corresponds to his general theory that 
film ought to be shot and edited in a “realist” (or, truly, “neorealist”) style.  For him, the 
                                                
Goretti’s story (as Genina portrays it) is found in her devotion to God and heroic act of forgiveness and that 
the film does not chronicle her sanctity in dazzling spectacle. 
 
 17 Ibid., par. 14. 
 
 18 Ibid., par. 8. 
 
 19 Ibid., par. 10. 
 
 20 Ibid., par. 14. 
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less conspicuous the filmmaker and the filmmaking process, the better for capturing 
“objective” reality in the mise-en-scène and disclosing the natural world as the locus of 
God’s activity.  “Real life,” according to Bazin, should not be manipulated by film.  He 
thus favored minimal camera movements and continuity in editing.  Expressionist 
ventures in montage, lighting, and camera angle, he believed, stole away from natural 
beauty and forced a director’s interpretation of reality onto the spectator, instead of 
allowing the spectator to take in and interpret a filmic slice of unadulterated real life.  For 
him, cinema “was not an art at all, at least not in the first place an art.  Its home, he 
argued, lies not in the heavens of aesthetics but solidly, even clumsily, on this earth to 
whose material surface it is bound.”  Bazin held that “the aesthetic core of cinema was 
comprised of an innately sacramental dimension, wherein the movie camera, through 
photographing the world, bears witness to the miracle of God’s creation.”21  This 
“sacramental vision,” which is often referred to as a defining characteristic of Catholic 
Christianity, suggests that “the physical can be an important, and even necessary, 
gateway to the spiritual . . ..”22  Bazin brings this sensibility to his interpretation of film, 
which he believes to be “‘preordained to bear endless witness to the beauty of the 
cosmos,’” and that the “filmmaker who preferred montage and editing to the realist style 
was . . . “committing ‘a minor heresy—since it arrogated the power of God, who alone is 
entitled to confer meaning on the universe.’”23  Indeed, to Bazin, film is “obligated to 
                                                
 21 Christopher Deacy and Gaye Williams Ortiz, Theology and Film:  Challenging the 
Sacred/Secular Divide.  Malden:  Blackwell, 2008, p. 42. 
 
 22 Ibid., pp. 44-45. 
 
 23 Ibid. 
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God, to honor God’s universe by rendering its reality and, by means of its reality, its 
mystery.”24 
Whereas Bazin’s perspective that only a realist cinema can evoke a sense of 
transcendence might be challenged by Catholic theologians and film theorists,25 it is 
possible, from the viewpoint of theology, to flesh out the finer points of his theory, since 
what he says corresponds closely with the Catholic teaching that the transcendent God is 
experienced only in the “categorical” order; that is, in created reality and in the ordinary, 
often unspectacular flow of daily living.26  While God transcends the created order, 
God’s presence permanently pervades and sustains material reality to the point of 
entering into creation and becoming flesh in Jesus Christ.  This belief informs Bazin’s 
vision of the function and style of filmmaking.  For him, a director must practice a kind 
of restraint by remaining close to the real-life dynamics of person, community, and 
setting.  In this sense, although “the austereness of the Protestant sensibility is not 
indispensable to the making of a good Catholic film, it can nevertheless be a real 
advantage.”27  In remaining more true-to-life, filmmakers create more religiously relevant 
movies and do much to prevent a misbalance of the immanent and transcendent.  At “the 
heart of Bazin's strictures on cinematic realism lies the conviction that the movie camera, 
                                                
 24 Cardullo, “Abstract” to “Cinema and Theology:  The Case of Heaven Over the Marshes,” op. 
cit. 
 
 25 Cf. Richard Blake’s analysis of Catholic directors in the last section of this chapter. 
 
 26 Cf. the fifth chapter of this dissertation for a discussion of the terms “transcendental” and 
“categorical” and their relationship, as understood by Karl Rahner. 
 
 27 Bazin, “Cinema and Theology:  The Case of Heaven Over the Marshes,” ibid., par. 2. 
 
 129 
by the simple act of photographing the world, testifies to the miracle of God's creation.”28  
Indeed, spiritual “sensitivity and its enablement through cinema are central to Bazin’s 
view of film as obligated to God, to honor God’s universe by rendering its reality and, by 
means of its reality, its mystery.”29  This does not diminish the importance of the 
directorial “craft,” yet because life is already theologically imbued, a filmmaker should 
restrain from manufacturing a religious message.  For Bazin, the medium is the message: 
Bazin recognised that film art always condenses, shapes and orders the reality it 
records, but what he looked for in filmmakers was a kind of spiritual disposition 
towards reality—an intention to serve it by a scrupulous effacement of means and 
a corresponding unwillingness to do violence to it through ideological abstraction 
or self-aggrandizing technique.30 
 
In sum, Bazin’s insights have been helpful for considering existing Catholic 
approaches to film.  His article:  (1) represents an early model of theology and cinema in 
dialogue, one that is unique in that it initiates from within the milieu of film criticism and 
not academic theology or the magisterium; (2) demonstrates the importance for theology 
to connect directly with a film and not to abstract too far from the narrative, characters 
and symbols that are the real communicators of a possible theological message; and (3) 
provides greater rationale for what constitutes religious experience in film and, thus, what 
makes for a theologically relevant film—giving excellent justification for widening the 
scope of the kinds of movies worthy of theology’s attention. 
 
                                                
 28 Peter Matthews, “The Innovators 1950-1960:  Divining the Real.”  Article for the British Film 
Institute’s website.  See:  <http://www.bfi.org.uk/sightandsound/feature/176/> (last accessed 2/11/10). 
 
 29 Cardullo, “Abstract,” op. cit. 
 
 30 Matthews, “The Innovators 1950-1960:  Divining the Real,” op. cit. 
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Neil Hurley, S.J. 
 Neil Hurley’s volume Theology Through Film was published first in 1970, and 
then re-published in 1975 under a different title, Toward a Film Humanism.31  It is rightly 
hailed as a tour de force, one that inaugurated “theology and film” as a valid, needed field 
of research.  In it, Hurley unabashedly treats film as a theological text and considers them 
indispensable to Christian theology.32  He asserts that film images “can no longer . . . be 
ignored, especially as a significant mode of religious awareness, though they are 
obviously different from traditional prayer, liturgy, and acts of piety.  Those who profess 
to be dedicated to religious education and theology should acknowledge the universality 
of the motion picture experience as one of the foundation stones” of world culture.33  A 
“wedding of the two is overdue,” he continues, “although, happily, the matchmakers are 
growing in number.”34 
It is important to understand the book for what it truly is and not overextend its 
value as an expressly theological text.  Hurley acknowledges as much when he writes in 
the introduction that in the book might be found only the “dim outlines of a cinematic 
                                                
 31 Neil Hurley, S.J.  Toward a Film Humanism.  New York:  Dell, 1975.  In reading through 
Hurley’s book one is struck by his vast comprehension of a formidable repertoire of world cinema.  His 
recollection of specific scenes and themes particular to each of the high quality films he references is 
impressive considering the book was written in a pre-video age and without the indices on film readily 
available today. 
 
 32 Consider, for instance, the following lines:  “The Pawnbroker is as central a contribution to a 
behavioral theology as could be hoped for” (p. 129); “For Christians who have faith in the communion of 
the saints . . . La Strada is the most sublime expression of this belief” (p. 150); La Dolce Vita is a 
“theological masterwork of the screen” (p. 135). 
 
 33 Hurley, Toward a Film Humanism, ibid., p. x.  This idea accords with what Gaudium et spes 
stated regarding Catholic theology’s need to engage culture as a matrix of meaning. 
 
 34 Ibid. 
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theology,”35 which is likely why the title was changed.  He calls the text a “primer, not a 
rigorously logical system of doctrine that one finds in the classic works of theology.”36  
Nor is Hurley interested in directly pursuing the theoretical preconditions of an alliance 
between such different fields as film and theology.  Toward a Film Humanism essentially 
takes for granted that such an alliance is already legitimate within the Catholic tradition, 
perhaps based on the Vatican’s doctrine of film, though Hurley does not state this.  The 
methodology of the text is therefore more thematic than systematic.  For instance, a 
number of traditional theological topics are brought into conversation through specific 
films, as the original title indicates.  Chapter headings include, “A Cinematic Theology of 
Freedom,” “Toward a Cinematic Theology of Sex,” “Death on Camera,” and “The 
Screen Theology of Sacrificial Love”; yet the chapters do not define the Christian 
doctrines of freedom, sexuality, death, or charity that undergird Hurley’s reflections on 
these themes—again, as he readily admits.  Thus, the book is more a richly textured, 
interdisciplinary reflection on world cinema along adumbrated Catholic theological lines 
that integrates perspectives from anthropology, literature, pop-culture, and behavioral 
psychology. 
 The book follows its own logic, which makes finding and following the 
theoretical thread he uses to weave together these subjects a bit demanding.  If the 
volume has any one, consistent theme that conceptually integrates its many ideas it is 
transcendence.  For Hurley, transcendence is the key for understanding the human being 
                                                
 35 Ibid., p. 8.  Hurley’s sequel book was entitled The Reel Revolution: A Film Primer on 
Liberation (Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 1978).  While it expanded on the theme of “film humanism,“ The 
Reel Revolution does not take these “dim outlines” and build them into a comprehensive system.  It is thus 
of less interest to us at this juncture.  See John May, New Image of Religious Film.  Franklin:  Sheed and 
Ward, 1997, p. 25-26. 
 
 36 Hurley, Toward a Film Humanism, ibid., p. 11. 
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and therefore everything that is theologically, scientifically, and artistically related to the 
human person.  He “presupposes religious transcendence in some form as a constant” in 
the history of humanity and culture.  It is a “restless onward dynamism” that moves 
human beings toward truth “which is the heart of human cognition and love and thus of 
the religious act.”37  Transcendence is “openness to values [and to] spiritual powers of 
perception regarding the hidden but not indecipherable meaning” of all reality.38  Both 
“motion pictures and theology work with transcendence,” he asserts, “with the difference 
that the latter is an elite enterprise and the former oriented to the masses.”39  Film, as 
transcendentally oriented, opens people’s imaginations “so that in their screen 
experiences and, hopefully, in real life, they will recognize the grand religious themes of 
the human spirit.”40  Theology and cinema represent different expressions of and 
responses to what Hurley terms the “transcendental “impulses” that are “rooted in the 
human spirit.  These include conscience, guilt, death, redemptive love, and freedom.41  
Such interior drives “give witness to the deepest aspirations of the human spirit and the 
larger scheme of truth after which it thirsts.”42  Because these are universal realities 
“treated in every culture, every religion, and every period of history, even if under 
distinctive images,”43 their presence in cinema is “capable of creating intercultural and 
                                                
 37 Hurley, ibid., p. 8. 
 
 38 Ibid., p.116. 
 
 39 Ibid., p. x. 
 
 40 Ibid., 177. 
 
 41 Ibid. 
 
 42 Ibid., p. 192. 
 
 43 Ibid., pp. 3-4. 
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interfaith bonds among peoples of the world.”44  Film offers theologians “an exhilarating 
opportunity to compare their messages with those expounded by others,” and vice 
versa.45  And whereas the hermeneutical instruments by which cinema and theology each 
interprets such transcendental impulses may be prima facie incongruous, Hurley contends 
that the two enterprises should not be perceived to be essentially at variance.  Therefore, 
just as Bazin advocated from the side of film scholarship that a dialogical rather than 
partisan relationship ought to exist between theology and film, so Hurley advocates the 
same from the side of professional theology. 
Hurley unites transcendence to the Christian doctrines of freedom and grace to 
explain his perspective on film.  He writes that any “discussion of transcendence must 
touch on the question of the conditions whereby [human beings exercise their] powers of 
autodetermination.”46  Freedom, he asserts, is the reason why human beings are “more 
than the sum total of influences that converge on [them] in time and space.”47  Freedom is 
“the condition sine qua non for history, politics, and art.”48  As for grace, its “avenues” 
are many,49 and it “seems to hide itself in deeds.”50  Hurley attempts to “identify signs of 
grace on the screen”51 by looking closely at the “deeds” to which film gives expression.  
                                                
 44 Ibid., pp. 5-6. 
 
 45 Ibid., p. 12. 
 
 46 Ibid., p. 45. 
 
 47 Ibid. 
 
 48 Ibid. 
 
 49 Ibid., p. 130. 
 
 50 Ibid., p. 139. 
 
 51 Jolyon Mitchell, “Theology and Film,” in David F. Ford, ed., The Modern Theologians (Third 
Edition).  Malden:  Blackwell, 2005, p. 744. 
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Concealed as it is within acts of freedom, grace is a universal presence, since the 
“anonymous believer . . . is obviously drawing motivation from some transcendental 
source that even [he or she] cannot explain, a source that is open to all people.”52  
Because grace is manifested “anonymously” through “transcendental impulses,” what 
film uniquely offers theology on this count is a “catalog of concrete instances” where 
grace “occurs”—hidden, as it were, in the thoughts and activities of human beings.53  In 
an important insight that echoes André Bazin’s interpretation of the film Heaven Over the 
Marshes, Hurley asserts that if “we wish to put down a basic principle for a cinematic 
theology of grace, it is that the good flourishes on what to the worldly minded people is 
arid, unpromising soil.”54  Because one of the crucial tasks and challenges of 
contemporary theology is that it speak existentially rather than simply theoretically about 
the experience of God, Hurley contends that film (its stories and distinctive techniques 
for telling them) helps theology accomplish its task by offering specific instances where 
grace is experienced, if not explicitly named. 
In this sense, Hurley’s method is at once pedagogical and pre-evangelical.  Film is 
presented as critical to the schooling of the contemporary Christian not so much in the 
doctrines of the faith but in expressing the human condition that longs for the realities 
and relationships toward which those doctrines point.  For Hurley, 
[Film is] a kind of natural theology or “humanism” that proposes values according 
to which we can live.  They are not a substitution for Christian values, but rather a 
                                                
 
 52 Ibid., p. 27. 
 
 53 See note 55. 
 
 54 Ibid., p. 139. 
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preparation for them; Christian beliefs and values can complete the process of 
moral development begun by humanism.55 
 
At the time Hurley’s book was published, few theologians and pastors were engaging 
film in their scholarship, teaching, and preaching.  Thus, his valuing of the film image as 
an approach to religious edification and his assertion that movie stories constitute a “new 
mythology” must have seemed bold.56  He writes that “religious educators and 
theologians would do well to study just how universally decisive in the lives of young 
people are [certain] films.”57  In a clearly dated, yet still relevant, line, Hurley remarks 
that “James Dean is inside the skin of youth in a way that Paul Tillich, Karl Rahner, 
Martin Buber, and other great theologians are not.”58  Young people in particular “are 
certain to learn more about the complexities of our emerging world civilization through 
the image than through literature about ethics, philosophy, religion, and theology.”59  
This gives further weight to the need for his own study and, as we saw in Chapter 1, to 
the need for the church to develop approaches to film for its theology and preaching. 
                                                
 55 John Lyden, Film as Religion:  Myths, Morals, and Rituals.  New York:  NYU Press, 2003, p. 
23.  The quotation represents Lyden’s summary of Hurley’s approach which Lyden calls a “synthetic” one, 
characteristic of classical Catholicism.  It “looks for a generalized sort of religiosity in all cultures and 
religions.  . . . As a part of culture, films can express [the] ‘humanistic’ form of general revelation, even if 
they do not speak of specifically Christian themes” (ibid.)  For more on this, see the summary at the end of 
this chapter. 
 
 56 Ibid., p. 192. 
 
 57 Ibid., p. 12. 
 
 58 Ibid., p. x. 
 
 59 Ibid., p. 11.  Because this is an even truer assertion today in a culture where the “image” has 
become equal to if not overtaken the “word” in terms of human communication, an important dimension in 
any pedagogy of the image needs to be training in the skill of the reception and critical assessment of it.  
The previous chapter discussed the Catholic church’s early advocacy of this approach.  This is a massive 
question, one obviously beyond the range of consideration in this dissertation.  However, there is a sense in 
which our project taken as a whole is a method of “receiving and assessing” the film image from within a 
Roman Catholic optic.  It is thus one of a host of interpretive theories of cinema.  This idea will be 
developed throughout the study. 
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Hurley’s method of using transcendence as a link between theology and film must 
not be overestimated.  As noted, he discloses from the beginning that his is not a project 
in systematic theology; nor is it an attempt to construct a comprehensive theology of film. 
Toward a Film Humanism is a more suggestive than probative study, at least in terms of 
its theological claims.  Indeed, Hurley’s fairly thin descriptions of “transcendence,” 
“grace” and “anonymous belief” suggest that he presumes his readers are familiar with 
these words and so does not need to commit a substantial portion of his text to their 
elucidation.  Still, the theological density of such terms necessitates their clarification 
even at a basic level, especially in a study that applies them to an area with limited 
historical interaction with theology.  At the very least, Hurley’s work would have 
benefitted from a discussion of the basic contours of the Catholic theological notion of 
transcendence on which his ideas are largely based.60 
 A criticism of Hurley’s volume comes from Richard Gilbert, who takes issue with 
Hurley’s sense of aesthetics.  Gilbert claims that Hurley approaches movies with too 
much “theological baggage.”  According to Gilbert, the 
theological dialectic is powerless to describe the artistic dialectic.  By imposing 
predetermined standards such as “transcendence” on movies from the outside, as 
it were, there is danger of losing the film as a work of the imagination.  Unlike 
theology, cinema is an art of movement in space as well as in time, in color as 
well as in thought, in performance as well as in direction.  Ultimately a film is 
what it is, not what we make it by translating it into another medium.61   
 
                                                
 60 Clearly, Hurley’s theological framework depends on the thought of fellow Jesuit, Karl Rahner.  
It is remarkable that he does not disclose this fact or refer his readers to literature that explains the concepts 
he borrows.  Rahner elucidates the doctrines of grace, freedom, transcendence, and anonymous Christianity 
but Hurley does not clarify his use of these terms using Rahner’s reflections.  Rahner’s theology is the 
subject of chapter five of this dissertation, where these characteristic teachings of Rahner will receive 
extended attention. 
 
 61 Richard Gilbert, book review of Theology Through Film in Theology Today, Vol. 28, No. 1, 
April 1971, Princeton, N.J. 
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Gilbert is correct to point out that a difference exists between a work or art and 
conceptual theology.  They are, indeed, two different “mediums” with two different 
“languages.”  He is also right to say that a film, as an object of art, “is what it is” and 
therefore eludes any description.  However, the review fails to take seriously that art, as a 
form of self-expression, is already interpretation.  As a medium, it mediates meaning, 
often in a non-conceptual fashion, but in a language nonetheless.  An object of art also 
mediates a relationship by brokering a bond between artist and recipient.  As a form of 
communication, art requires some form of translation—first by the artist (through the 
medium), then by the recipient (as when someone answers the question, What did you 
think of the movie?).  Whereas Gilbert faults Hurley for imposing a fixed set of 
theological concepts onto film, and thus reducing film to concepts, Gilbert himself is at 
fault for reducing theology to concepts alone.  What he refuses to acknowledge is that 
theology is itself a form of imagination.  Hurley does not translate the films he discusses 
into theological categories:  he uses theological categories as a mode of interpreting and 
better understanding film.  He is not reducing images to concepts:  he is interpreting film 
from a theological point of view.  In doing this, Hurley accords honor to the image 
because he recognizes its capacity to “speak” on a variety of levels and an understanding 
of each level increases the value of the image.  This is why he approaches film from the 
perspectives of psychology and sociology and not only from theology.  Gilbert appears to 
suggest that any interpretation of film, theological or otherwise, is made in vain because 
film operates at a different level than conceptual language.  But his criticism collapses on 
itself when he states that film “is an art of movement in space as well as in time, in color 
as well as in thought, in performance as well as in direction.”  Is this not a conceptual 
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interpretation of film?  Does this description of the art not attempt to “translate” film?  
Gilbert would have art simply end in silence.  Finally, the above criticism seems to be 
based on the theological (likely Protestant) notion that a separation exists between the 
orders of transcendence and immanence—between grace and nature.62 
 Still, Gilbert’s comment illustrates just how complex the engagement can be 
between the related but nonetheless different worlds and languages of theology and film.  
Perhaps we might agree with a point that appears to undergird his comment:  namely, that 
any notion of theology appropriating cinema on theology’s terms alone and for its own 
purposes will be rejected by many as impertinent to the autonomy of film.  Early in the 
dissertation it was shown that the magisterium recognizes the sovereignty of film as an 
art independent of the church for its existence and reception.  Yet because art requires 
interpretation, and because people ask theological questions, theological approaches to 
film interpretation are legitimate and absolutely necessary.  The remainder of this chapter 
discusses this dynamic further in the work of other theologians. 
 Because this dissertation represents an attempt to strengthen the lines between 
theology and cinema by considering the very prospect of their connectivity, we will need 
to develop a greater theoretical accounting for Hurley’s presupposition that the two are 
relatable in the first place and do so without dismissing differences between them.  His 
notion that film offers paradigms of transcendence represents a fairly common and 
questionable trend in the way theologians and others in the church engage film.  In this 
perspective, film is ancillary to theology, for it is seen as providing theology with 
                                                
 62 For the moment, it is necessary to prescind from an explanation of what this means since it 
involves defining these terms with precision and from within a larger theological framework.  These terms 
will be made clear in chapter five of this dissertation. 
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“illustrations” of its universal claims.  As will be shown, this perspective is open to 
criticism because it does not fully appreciate that film can be theological in itself. 
Finally, we can only remain grateful to Neil Hurley as a pacesetter in the area of 
theology and film.  Whereas almost forty years later his belief that film holds tremendous 
possibilities for the work of theologians, preachers, and religious educators and those 
whom they serve might seem less revolutionary, still, he was one of the first to wed 
“theology” and “film” and it is owing to his ideas that this discipline has become a 
permanent location on the pastoral and academic map.  He was pioneering, if not 
altogether expository, in his conviction that film can help reinforce and deepen Christian 
faith.  In this way, he accomplished what the Second Vatican Council encouraged 
Catholic theologians to do:  to open channels of dialogue between church and culture in 
its many forms.  Hurley’s text critically engages film and also clearly reflects the delight 
he takes in movies.  His approach to film is demonstrative of the kind of magnanimity the 
Vatican encouraged Catholics to take in their necessary in their engagements with 
culture.63 
 
Michael Paul Gallagher, S.J. 
Irish Jesuit Michael Paul Gallagher’s essay, “Theology, Discernment and 
Cinema,”64 is a compact response to two related questions:  First, how to know when the 
                                                
 63 A nice feature of Toward a Film Humanism is an index of about seventy movies to which he 
attributes multiple theological valences (p. 177).  One can only wish a new edition of the text would update 
this listing to include the last forty years of cinema. 
 
 64 Michael Paul Gallagher, S.J., “Theology, Discernment and Cinema,” in John May, ed., New 
Image of Religious Film.  Franklin, Wisconsin:  Sheed and Ward, 1997.  Gallagher’s essay played an early 
role in confirming the legitimacy of this dissertation’s main thesis; for he, too, intuits that Rahner’s 
conception of mystagogy illumines the connection between theology and film. 
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“religious element in film demonstrates itself?”65; and second, how to identify that it is a 
genuine expression of religious experience and not just sentimentality, melodrama, 
religious tourism, or propaganda?  A film, he says, “may induce a certain satisfaction, 
even a felt enlargement of heart, but this yardstick of feeling is not in itself a valid 
criterion of authenticity.”66  This satisfaction is not limited to the visceral plane, for a film 
in all its complexity and clever posturing might encourage a kind of gnosticism, whereby 
some audience members “get it” and others do not.  Also, he indirectly gets at the 
problem of reviewers who mantle a film as “spiritual,” with or without the knowledge of 
just how fuzzy an appellation that has become.  For Gallagher, the critical theological 
task is to distinguish between films of an authentic religious nature and those that are 
dangerously illusory.  It is a question that can be posed both to movies with overt 
religious content as well as those of a more tacit nature, the latter being his own interest.  
The task is one of obvious concern to theologians of film; yet, according to Gallagher, it 
is equally a valid problem for a secularist critic. 
Before mapping out his response, it is worth considering how he contextualizes 
the question.  He begins with the observation that “religious films” today take a different 
form from those sixty years ago.  The mid-twentieth century films of Fellini and 
Bergman, let alone the biblical epics and hagiographic pictures of that era, contained 
openly religious dialogue and images.  More recently, however, attention has shifted in 
the direction of what he names an “anonymous religiousness.”  This term suggests that 
                                                
 65 Gallagher, p. 151. 
 
 66 Ibid., p. 153. 
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any “film which evokes fundamental questions cannot but be religious.”67  Gallagher 
knows his is no new observation.  As has been shown, André Bazin had the foresight in 
1951 that religious concerns often worked better in film when incognito.  Still, Gallagher 
wants to know more exactly what gave rise to this shift in paradigm from explicit to 
implicit religiousness in cinema.  Both Bazin and, as we shall see, Richard Blake, claim it 
had to do with the limited imagination of certain filmmakers and the perennial problem of 
expressing the numinous.  Too often, cinematic “religious experience” came off as pure 
Hollywood camp.68  As audiences grew more sophisticated in reading media images and 
as international cinema grew more available, other possibilities opened for the filmic 
expression of religious and spiritual concerns. 
Gallagher puts forward another, related, reason for the shift.  The “transition from 
the comparative clarities of the ‘modern’ to the fragmentation of the ‘postmodern,’”69 
characterized by a distrust of ideology and a general suspicion of organized religion and 
its traditional rubrics, has given rise to a preference for the ambiguous, the complex, and 
the existential in both philosophy and aesthetics.  Seen from a theological perspective, 
the disillusion with rationality that marks postmodernity links up with a new 
“primacy of experience in the search for God” and in this way a new post-atheist 
mood can be interpreted as an “excellent preparation for Mystery.”  In spite of all 
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its possible ambiguities, this less explicit, shy spirituality seems more in tune with 
the fragmented lifestyle that dominates the urbanized and developed world.70 
 
While an aesthetic predilection for the subtle and indirect is nothing new, it is the artistic 
intention behind such a sensibility within a postmodern milieu that particularly interests 
Gallagher.  On the one hand, it could “be a sign of a new if hesitant openness to religious 
horizons … [whereby] basic human hungers reemerge from suppression and seek some 
nourishment.”  On the other hand, it could “be symptomatic of a certain preference for 
vagueness, an avoidance of definite commitment, and even a distortion of the religious 
impulse into narcissistic self-satisfaction.”71  The problem of distinguishing whether a 
film is of the first or second order (or somewhere in-between) is a concern for 
theologians and film critics alike, since each has a stake in how films with possible 
religious leanings, however implicit, are deciphered.  When it comes to film 
interpretation, both theologian and film critic will bring to the theater a certain set of 
exegetical talents and personal sensibilities.  Writing as a Catholic theologian, Gallagher 
proposes the ancient Christian practice of “spiritual discernment” as a method for 
negotiating where a particular film stands on the continuum between true religious 
impulse and ersatz religiosity.  The tradition of discernment, though historically a 
Catholic practice, can really help anyone in the authentication of religious film.  Both 
believer and unbeliever, he suggests, can benefit from an interpretive method that 
discriminates genuine religiousness in film from the saccharine variety. 
 Rooting his explanation of discernment in the New Testament and the Spiritual 
Exercises of St. Ignatius of Loyola, Gallagher defines the tradition as “another and more 
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specifically Christian mode of hermeneutics:  it involves interpreting signs of the Spirit in 
human experience.”72  Discernment is a process by which a person negotiates the course 
or direction of his or her heart and mind in the face of an experience or set of 
experiences.  Discernment is about judgment based on wisdom; it is most often the 
conscious process by which one makes a liminal decision.  It begins easily enough with 
questions like, what are my feelings about this experience?  What thoughts does it elicit?  
Where am I being led by this experience?  Are my normal inclinations confirmed to be 
genuine or are they being reoriented?  Spiritual discernment clarifies and expands these 
questions since it “specializes in unmasking illusion and [offers] skills for a deeper 
wisdom of judging reality.”73  The “unmasking of illusion” happens when obstacles 
blocking the ability to make an honest judgment are dislodged in order “to move towards 
a positive option for the good, ultimately of God’s will.”74  However, Gallagher does not 
explain any more precisely how such obstacles are removed other than that it “involves 
the practical skill of sifting the genuine from the deceptive in spiritual experiences.”75  
Discernment becomes a Christian religious exercise when it recognizes “the genuine call 
of the Spirit within one’s human freedom,”76 to reject false values and turn to God in love 
and trust, and, even more, to recognize Christ’s presence in reality. 
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 Within a Christian context, discernment was historically and remains today a skill 
in pastoral counseling and spiritual direction.  Gallagher retrieves this tradition as a 
method of film interpretation, a method he claims to be “eminently translatable for the 
world of cinema” for opening up new meanings in the films we experience.77  Its 
application to a film can help raise a host of questions that might not otherwise be asked 
of it.  And this can aid an understanding of whether or not a film presents a model of 
genuine religiousness.  To make this method more concrete, let us consider the kinds of 
questions Gallagher says the discernment tradition asks of film: 
Does this movie open or close the hearts of its audience to compassion?  Does it 
seduce people into a vague “self-trip” of nice feelings (the solipsistic spiritual 
trap), or does it point them to an encounter with mystery?  Does it serve the spirit 
of poverty that knows its own vulnerability and honestly tries not to hide it, or 
does it foster infantile fantasies of various kinds—power, pleasure, unhistoric 
play?  Is it faithful to the spirit of incarnation, which means a reverence for the 
holy in the human?  What quality of looking and receiving is evoked—voyeuristic 
or stunned, humble silence?78 
 
 Discernment is an interior journey that has external consequences—not only good 
intentions.  Movies that draw out of audiences little more than momentary good-
heartedness are not to be rejected outright, Gallagher implies; but neither should they be 
facilely categorized as spiritual or religious.  On the contrary, when a film impels its 
viewers to re-commit to act on behalf of others out of true love, and not out of a 
superficial altruism, then an authentic religious element has been expressed.  When a film 
provokes cathartic release that leads to a renewal of faith in self and in others and thus 
puts one on the threshold of a fuller conversion to God, then an authentic religious 
element has been expressed.  When a film opens up to a “wavelength of humility and 
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wonder … [and] we as an audience are where Virgil leads or leaves Dante—on the 
threshold of a listening that might make faith glimpsable,”79 then an authentic religious 
element has been expressed.  Gallagher uses the gospel line, “by their fruits you will 
know them,” (Mt. 7:20) to describe the intention behind discernment:  “If all the fruits are 
good and lasting, this offers the best available confirmation that the roots are in God.”80  
Film, he suggests, is not direct evangelization, but when it functions transcendentally, 
that is, when it serves to open viewers beyond self-constructed spiritual enclosures, it 
indirectly prepares “the path for faith.  Baptist-like, it can arouse a potential receptivity 
for an encounter with greater mystery.”81 
 Gallagher asserts that “theologians especially should be familiar with film’s 
capacity to evoke wonder as an apt tool of pre-evangelization.”82   And he turns to the 
thought of Karl Rahner and his ideas on poetry and the arts as an example of a theologian 
who reflects on the possibility of the arts as preparative for the gospel.  Though Rahner 
did not write about film, according to Gallagher, his writings on poetry and the arts hold 
great significance for understanding film’s relationship to Catholic theology.  Gallagher 
quotes Rahner as saying that today “a ‘poetic theology’ is needed and that it should be a 
‘mystagogical theology’ in the sense of encouraging people to discern the presence of the 
Spirit in their secular and artistic experiences.”83  In “Rahner’s view there is a preparation 
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that a person ‘must undergo to be or become a Christian, which turns out to be a receptive 
capacity for the poetic word.’  He sees this whole wavelength as being able to ‘reach the 
heart, the center,’ where mystery becomes incarnate.”84  In this sense, Gallagher’s 
Catholic thesis would suggest that film can be judged as authentically religious only 
when it prepares us to meet Jesus Christ. 
 
Joseph Marty 
 The previous commentator, Michael Paul Gallagher, contended that because film 
has a tremendous capacity to sincerely and honestly present matters of ultimate human 
concern it holds great interest for theology.  Subjects like betrayal and devotion, marriage 
and child-rearing, addiction and healing—the stuff of life that plays out in the 
commonplace—may appear on screen without religious trappings, yet demonstrate 
religiousness because they expose us to the mysterious depths of living in the world and 
thereby “reach a level of spiritual authenticity … mainly due to their indirection.  Deep 
issues are delicately touched upon in an incarnate way . . ..”85  Gallagher, however, does 
not expand on this notion of “incarnation” and its link between Christianity and film.  In 
the same volume, French theologian and film expert, Joseph Marty, treats of the 
relationship in his essay “Toward a Theological Interpretation and Reading of Film:  
Incarnation of the Word of God—Relation, Image, Word.”  Like Gallagher, Marty holds 
the conviction that “the religious belongs to humanity and not only to Christianity,”86 and 
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that the transcendental “openings” film images effect in us are legitimately religious 
when they consummate in deeper commitment to others, “to the totally Other, and ought 
not to develop into a world itself.”87  Whereas Gallagher emphasized film as a means of 
anonymous preparation for the reception of the gospel, Marty stresses the need for 
Christianity to evangelize culture, cinema included.  His concern lies in the problem of 
where the anonymous religious impulses stirred by film are directed, for a “religious 
initiative can open toward God, but not necessarily the one that Jesus Christ reveals as his 
Father.”88  If an approach to film is to be made from an expressly Christian perspective, 
then more specificity needs to be given to how a film relates to and even participates in 
the person and reality of Jesus Christ, the one whom the church believes and proclaims to 
be God incarnate.  Marty asserts that Christ is the ultimate condition for the possibility of 
any relationship between film and theology because, as he says, “only ‘Jesus is the visible 
image of the invisible God’ (Col. 1:15) and that it is by the mystery of his incarnation . . . 
that [we] can envision the reality of cinema and the religious world.”89  What has Christ 
to do with film?  Simply put, Christ, as Word and Image par excellence, makes all the 
difference for language and culture and, thus, for film.  We will here trace the 
anthropological method at the “crossroads of these two complex theological areas”90 by 
which Marty arrives at this conclusion. 
 His anthropology of the “image” connects cinema to the roots of language, 
communication, and culture.  The image, as “the indispensable reflection of something 
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else, always leads back to that referent, even if it is hidden—because the human being, 
child or adult, wants everything immediately”; that is, without mediation.91  It is a part of 
human nature to want the true presence of the other and not only a reflection.  Yet the 
reality is that all things come to us in a mediated way and “there is no human life or faith 
without images because they are a fundamental reality of all language and culture.”92  
Marty writes that it is only by 
means of language that there is a humanity, and language come also from non-
immediacy, from the absence that creates desire.  The word brings things alive, 
permitting the separated beings to bind together and face the lack.  But the word 
binds at a distance; it creates closeness without fusion.93 
 
 Still, enthusiasm for the image cannot neglect the classic Hellenistic caveats 
issued against taking the image as “more important than reality to the point that the 
artificial and the apparent are preferred to the thing itself.”94  This is when the image slips 
“toward [a] fundamentalism in which the mediation of the letter is taken for the spirit of 
the text,”95 and becomes a world unto itself.  In cinema, which overlays moving images 
with sound, “the illusion is immense.”96  There is the “risk of a mediation that does its job 
so well that it can make us forget the representation . . . [and] the image becomes more 
important than reality to the point that the artificial and the apparent are preferred to the 
thing itself . . ..”97  A treason of the image ensues when it is taken as  “only a double and 
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not the presence.”98  Marty maintains that Christianity constitutes victory over the treason 
of images, a claim we will take up shortly. 
 The arts are “bearers of transcendence,”99 he writes, and “cinema can make a type 
of transcendence sensible.  It is a call toward something more”100 that 
awakens homo religiosus [and] enlivens human dimensions that are somewhat 
underdeveloped in our scientific, technological and . . . rationalized cultures:  the 
symbolic and the poetic, sensibility and emotion.  . . . It brings back to life the 
sense of mystery by making us love what is not immediately perceivable . . . [and] 
provokes an awakening that puts us in a state of admiration and contemplation 
before scenes we marvel at.101 
 
The stories and characters on the screen remind us a lot of ourselves.  We have a 
vicarious connection to their thoughts and emotions, struggles and successes; and we can 
even come to love or hate them.  While we remain aware (but easily forget) that they are 
in fact “images” and not “real,” still there is no denying that the reactions they stir, the 
tears they trigger and the discoveries they elicit in us, are quite real and thoroughly 
visceral.  This harks back to Michael Paul Gallagher’s thesis that film functions pre-
evangelically.  When film reaches us at such depths there is “something that resembles a 
first religious step . . . [that] may be blasphemous, contentious, provocative, pantheist, 
deist, mythic or revolutionary.”102  Experience of such depths of meaning elicit a genuine 
human religious sentiment and signal the transcendental thrust in all of us.  From the 
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angle of Catholic faith, it is permissible, then, to accept “secular” film images as 
illuminative of the depths of life because they open us toward (if not entirely unite us 
with) the one who is liberator of images—Jesus Christ.  This is also to rediscover with 
humility “the fact that the Catholic church is not the only repository of the religious and 
the sacred.”  And this fact is nothing new since, in “order to evangelize, the church has 
sometimes grafted itself onto previous image systems, either suppressing them or turning 
them to its own uses.”103 
 However, in a clear reference to Rudolf Otto’s famous definition of the “holy,” 
Marty states that the “experience of the religious provokes simultaneously attraction and 
repulsion, fascination, and fear.  But Christianity comes to convert it, to ‘evangelize’ it, to 
make of it one of the places of encounter with Jesus Christ and his Father.”104  He asserts 
that the “religious,” the “sacred” and the “holy” take on different meanings after the 
event of the Incarnation.  Through the knowledge of faith in God’s incarnation, so-called 
“religious” experience (e.g., in Otto’s sense of the holy as mysterium tremendum et 
fascinans) is no longer opposed to “secular” experience.  The demarcations “sacred” and 
“profane” no longer apply to a world sanctified by God’s presence in the incarnation.  
And while these polarities remain at times helpful designations, “with Jesus Christ, the 
incarnation shocks and transfigures these frontiers.  God is with us at every moment and 
in every place.”105  There are no particular districts—material or spiritual—that can be 
named “sacred” or “religious” opposite “profane” sectors.  All dimensions of life, 
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especially the broken and sinful, have been offered consecration through the complete 
communication of God’s word as Christ.106 
 As has been shown, Bazin, Gallagher, and Marty are in agreement that film has a 
transcendental capacity to open people to hearing God’s word and to, with the help of 
theological discernment, ready them for a relationship with Jesus Christ.  Yet Marty 
provides a needed corrective to this idea because there is no mechanism within film that 
assures the direction that such transcendental openness might lead its viewers.  If a 
religious motivation—however genuine—obtains in a movie, who is to say that it is 
especially Christian, or Jewish, or Buddhist or something else entirely?  As Marty says, 
there are in the world and in film “so many loves, gods, idols, stars, gurus or masters who 
are ‘seductive’ or ‘captivating . . ..’”107  To conflate and confuse “God” with so many of 
these images is nothing less than idolatry, an assignment of something this-wordly to 
something utterly beyond comprehension in word or image.  Indeed, a religious film can 
“be ‘captivating’ to the point of making us ‘captives’” because it may open us up to what 
is utterly false, a charade—shadows on a cave wall.  Yet, with the revelation of God in 
the person of Jesus Christ the earth is no longer a plane of shadows and fear to which we 
are shackled, for it has been illuminated by a true and everlasting light.  Philosophy alone 
cannot promise that the world is no longer enclosed by death and the treason of images.  
Jesus Christ’s death and resurrection assures victory over images that enslave: 
The God of the Trinity . . . undoes bonds, including the cunning and seemingly 
innocent ones that attract us to images. . . . [God comes] to shatter the mirrors that 
lose us in labyrinths of the image, to destroy imaginary things that do not refer to 
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us to the real, to break the mediations that do not open onto an elsewhere, to tear 
down the representations that make present only themselves and nothing else.108 
 
 In sum, Marty roots his theology of film in the normative significance of the 
mystery of the incarnation, which “establishes through faith a relationship between the 
seen and the unseen.  Films that open us up to mystery, however dimply, are liberating 
like the word (Word) of God . . ..”109  He insists that cinematic images and 
representations are indispensible but are not reality.  A Catholic theology of film must 
therefore announce “a good news for the happiness of [humankind] and its liberation 
from everything that enslaves it, including the religious and the image.”110 
 
Richard Blake, S.J. 
 Richard Blake is a historian and professor of film as well as the chief film critic 
for the Jesuit periodical America.  His research focuses primarily on American film but 
extends to aspects of European cinema.  Blake’s bailiwick is the intersection of religion 
and film, specifically Catholicism and film, and his teachings hold great importance for a 
dissertation concerned with the questions and implications of their relationship. 
 Like Bazin, Blake writes about these problems from the side of film scholarship, 
not academic theology.  He is also just as forthcoming about his Catholic approach to 
film criticism and it is clear that a deeply incarnational view directs his analysis of 
movies.  We will here consider his articles “From Peepshow to Prayer:  Toward a 
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Spirituality of the Movies,”111 “The Beginning of a Beautiful Friendship”112 and 
“Uncovering the Sacred:  Substance and Style in the American Film”113 as well as parts 
of his book Afterimage:  The Indelible Catholic Imagination of Six American 
Filmmakers.114  Taken together, these writings offer a number of practical solutions to the 
problems that beset the connectivity of theology and film. 
 Blake contends that a symbiotic relationship should exist between theology and 
film because, quoting Bazin, they have a “natural affinity.”  The problem is that 
theologians, and other religious groups untrained in film criticism, too often foist dubious 
meanings and messages onto films for their own catechetical purposes.115  As any 
professional would be, Blake is wary of those who compromise the integrity of his craft.  
A particularly thorny issue for him is the appropriation of film to support ideological 
agenda beyond what is communicated in a film.  He points out that some theologians, 
catechists, and preachers over the years have too easily manipulated film, bending its 
messages to conform to their own schematic.  They “began lifting material from films for 
their own purposes as eagerly as film makers had been swiping material from the 
Bible.”116  Whereas the intent behind their interpretations might seem commendable, 
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given that they are “using feature films to edify and inspire their congregations,”117 or to 
illustrate a theological or moral doctrine, it is precisely this “use” of film for extrinsic 
purposes that is problematic for Blake.  In the church and the academy “film has been 
and continues to be victimized by benevolent amateurs,” he asserts.118  For example, a 
catechist might use a movie to teach a moral lesson, or make a biblical parallel.  This 
often necessary kind of teaching is benign in itself, but can tempt the uninitiated to read a 
religious meaning into the text of a film that might not be there.  Another example might 
be a theologian who appeals to a film as a kind of “prooftext” which illustrates a certain 
faith claim.  Though well-intentioned, this usage suggests the theologian actually has a 
low esteem of film vis-à-vis Christian faith and theology, in the sense that the function of 
film is to exemplify some heady, speculative bit of “theologese.”  Film art is thus 
rendered subclass, ancillary to theology, and not considered to be a possible theological 
medium in its own right.119  Blake suggests sardonically that religious subsuming of film 
is a kind of tyrannical act; for rather than allowing an individual film to communicate its 
particular vision of life—a vision which may or may not be explicitly religious—it at 
once imposes a framework of meaning on all films, essentially handicapping other 
interpretive theories by virtue of its ideological dominance.  Taking this into account, it 
should not be surprising that film scholars are generally suspicious of religious 
interpretive frameworks. 
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 At the same time, Blake is aggrieved at the ambivalence prevalent among fellow 
film exegetes regarding religious and theological interpretations of film.120  He argues 
that theological interpretive frameworks are essential to film analysis and ought to be 
accepted in the academic world just as readily as Marxist, feminist, psychoanalytical, 
queer-theorist, or ethnographical analytical methods.  Certain movies require that they be 
read through a religious lens, be it Catholic, Lutheran, Jewish, or otherwise.  He therefore 
proposes that theology be considered yet one more legitimate style of film interpretation, 
a critical tool to be employed alongside the mainstream methodologies seldom 
challenged in the academy.  When applied in concert, these approaches can help reveal 
multiple dimensions concealed within the layers of a film text.  It is appropriate and 
necessary at times to bring a theological mind to bear on films in order to “uncover the 
sacred element” in them. 
 These two positions, that on the one hand religious and theological mindsets 
ought not be imposed on a film, and on the other hand that those same frameworks are 
often necessary for film analysis, at first glance appear antithetical—an “antagonism 
between methods of faith and methods of reason.”121  Rather than treat it as an 
interpretive breach, Blake’s dialectical ingenuity is to demonstrate that theologians and 
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film scholars each have something to offer the other when it comes to understanding the 
many dimensions of a movie. 
 Before considering how Blake arbitrates this situation, let us first risk to simplify 
the hermeneutics behind the problem.  Film is an art and as art it is received by a public.  
Since “public” means many perspectives, one of the risks a film artist takes in creating is 
that some audiences will misunderstand or misinterpret a film’s “message.”  The risk 
might also prove worthwhile since audiences are likewise capable of “getting” the 
message.  This message might be (and most often is) multi-faceted, one that can neither 
be interpreted completely in words, nor merely “felt.”  Indeed, the form of the medium is 
the message.  As art, film often requires multiple viewings or “readings” that open to 
different and ever new perspectives.  There may also be interpretations made of a film 
that its creator(s) could never have imagined.122  Part of the beauty of film art is the risk 
and uncertainty involved in creating it, receiving it, and understanding it.123 
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 Hermeneutics is an ongoing game because art forever transcends the meanings 
that it generates.  This is precisely what is meant when a work of art is called a “classic,” 
for no one interpretation or set of interpretations ever suffices.124  Ars longa, indeed.  
Blake writes that “as we embark in the enterprise of film history and criticism today, we 
must be aware that in good post-modern fashion, many perspectives, many uses and 
many audiences must enter into any analysis of film,”125 for any “work of art with any 
depth provides enough complexity to admit many interpretations.”126 
 When it comes to the art of film, Blake notes that, by their lights, film scholars 
and critics are the arbiters of this dialectic.  He ironically refers to them as a priestly 
class, performing their sacerdotal duty of unlatching film’s semiotic locks, for which only 
they hold the keys.  Here, of course, Blake (a Jesuit priest and film expert) waxes self-
deprecatingly.  Obviously, film scholars more than theologians have a trained ability to 
negotiate these questions.  Yet because film generates divergent meanings for experts and 
non-experts alike, a film’s hidden riches cannot be mined by only a few highly-trained 
cineastes.  Blake advocates a more pragmatic approach, one that takes seriously the need 
to rightly perceive the signals a film communicates, but one that does not get forever 
tangled in theoretical intricacies that diminish the accessibility of film reviews. 
                                                
faithful to the final product, the object of art—the film itself.  Context, while important, is not the 
immediate concern. 
 
 124 Here Blake is basing this idea of “the classic” on the thought of Catholic theologian David 
Tracy. 
 
 125 Blake, “Uncovering the Sacred,” ibid., p. 17. 
 
 126 Idem., “From Peepshow to Prayer,” ibid., par. 40.  Still, while variant interpretations remain 
important, Blake is wary of an “anything goes” attitude.  As will be shown, he insists on the need for any 
interpretation to remain rooted in the text of the film itself, and not in the designs of the interpreter. 
 
 158 
 Since no one theory can claim exclusive interpretive rights to a film, it is more 
advantageous to have an ongoing conversation among many voices.  Today, it is de 
rigueur that a critic be self-conscious and forthright about his or her hermeneutical 
approach since every reviewer has a particular subjective frame of reference.  It is also 
more than good manners to be appreciative of other perspectives, be they (again) Marxist, 
feminist, psychoanalytical, queer-theorist, or ethnographical.  Each of these groups 
evaluates film differently and in so doing “risks distorting the text to suit a particular 
agenda . . . [yet] each has a contribution to make.”127  Blake admits this evaluation is 
nothing new in a postmodern climate.  What is strange, however, is that within this ethos 
of so-called tolerance religious and especially Catholic theological methods are not 
granted the same rights and privileges accorded to other hermeneutical modi operandi.  
He writes, “I would like to think religious critics, especially those of a Catholic 
background, also have a place in the critical literature.  Why not view a film as a religious 
critic or more particularly, a Catholic critic?”128 
 Blake acknowledges the cool reception that his Catholic point of view gets in 
academic circles.  Among his own class, “professional critics, film scholars and 
reviewers as a group look on religious concerns with bemusement at best [and] contempt 
at worst . . ..”129  This “proposal to add one more tool for critical analysis seems harmless 
enough,”130 yet religious and theological approaches to film analysis are largely 
eschewed by secularist critics who consider them outmoded or untrendy if not entirely 
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inimical to real cinematic evaluation.131  Whereas religious critics might perceive a film 
to have theological undercurrents, dogmatic secularists will consider these an illusory 
undertow.132 
 In response to this impasse, Blake offers something of an apologia for a Catholic 
theological interpretation of film, a form of interpretation that, by virtue of its being true 
to its religious sensibility, does not compromise but rather develops the still-adolescent 
art/science of film criticism.  He maintains that “looking at the substance of [a film] with 
a self-consciously Christian and Catholic optic will invariably add to an appreciation of 
[it] without having to read extraneous meanings into the text.”133 
 In the history of cinema, the works of many filmmakers have religious frames of 
reference and any competent assessment of them must take these into serious 
consideration.  Blake’s own Catholic framework has helped him discern themes and 
symbols intrinsic to certain films, yet that remain undisclosed or ignored by theorists 
unfamiliar with or unsympathetic to matters Catholic and theological.  For instance, only 
a handful of the films by Catholic-raised directors like Frederico Fellini (Italian), Alfred 
Hitchcock (Irish) and Martin Scorsese (Italian-American) are laden with Catholic 
trappings.  Beyond these, Blake is able to decipher resonances of sacramentality, 
mediation, and communion—features commonly associated with a “Catholic 
imagination”—even, and perhaps especially, in those films that appear to be the most 
                                                
 131 Blake likewise notes that explicitly religious movies are often labeled by some critics as 
“sentimental, pious and anachronistic” (“From Peepshow to Prayer,” ibid., par. 13).  This recalls Bazin’s 
similar comments on the problems of filming “the religious.” 
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secular.134  He knows that many of these directors are “lapsed” Catholics, or altogether 
rejective of their religious faith, but asserts that a residual Catholic sensibility (what he 
names an “afterimage”) subconsciously informs what sorts of subjects they film and how 
they film them.  Even when religious imagery is absent, the “principle of intertextuality 
makes the theological effort worthwhile.”135  For later in a director’s life, 
perhaps long after a formal separation from the church, the artist’s explorations of 
ritual, death, love and community continue to be colored by these earliest 
perceptions, which have in turn been shaped by a specific religious tradition.136 
 
This principle works not only for Catholic directors but can be applied when interpreting 
the films of others, like Ingmar Bergman’s “Swedish Lutheran” cinema and Woody 
Allen’s “Manhattan Jewish” cinema.  We recall André Bazin’s triptych of traditionally 
“religious” movies:  biblical, hagiographical, and clerical.  He emphasized the need to 
move beyond this simple classification to see that religiously significant films may in fact 
appear entirely secular.  Films of this sort move “beyond manifestly religious content 
(images, concepts, and words) to something a bit more subtle [and] more rewarding for 
an exploration of a much wider range of contemporary films.”137  The theologians of film 
surveyed earlier in this chapter maintained a similar position.  And the Catholic 
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 135 Blake, “Uncovering the Sacred,” ibid., p. 12. 
 
 136 Idem., Afterimage, ibid., p. 3.  Blake gives nuance to this approach which considers the 
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 137 Idem., “From Peepshow to Prayer,” ibid., par. 28. 
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Magisterium at the very least suggested as much.138  Blake affirms that films involving 
“neither religious figures, nor religious language … invite an exploration of religious 
questions exclusively through parallels and analogies.”139  What he names the 
“theological films” of Bergman and Fellini, for instance, 
often featured perfectly secular, contemporary figures, but the scripts explicitly 
teased out the religious implications of their lives in some quite traditional 
theological terms like faith, redemptive love, sin and atonement. …While the 
identifiably religious figures address traditional theological questions in 
recognizable religious language, the secular protagonists resort to symbolic, 
analogical or metaphorical language to grapple with their religious questions.140 
 
Many secularist film scholars might demur on this argument on the grounds that love, 
redemption, and faith are realities not exclusive to religious people.  The presence of 
these themes in a film, therefore, does not necessarily grant clearance for a religious 
evaluation.  Blake would agree, for example, that charity, mercy, and trust are universal 
human realities that transcend any particular religious description; yet, it is precisely their 
universality and ambiguity that invites theology into the conversation as yet one more 
interpreter of them.  Interpretive work, however, “becomes more demanding as we move 
away from specifically religious content.  Frequently, we find ourselves dealing with 
analogies and metaphors, and this is dangerous territory.  Eisegesis, or reading meanings 
into texts, simply because we want to find them there, has often enough compromised the 
credibility” of film scholarship.141  For instance, a theologian will wish not to bracket his 
or her faith commitment when reviewing a film, yet might lack the semiological skill set 
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needed to interpret the film with accuracy.  Or, conversely, a film critic, who has a hunch 
that a film without explicit religious language/symbols might in fact have deep religious 
significance, may lack the specialized language and hermeneutical virtuosity needed to 
probe such meanings.  These well-intentioned reviewers may read a meaning into a film 
that is simply not there or otherwise miss a meaning actually embedded in the film text.  
In either case, the potential of misinterpreting the artistic designs of the filmmaker is 
great.  “The search for allusions, analogies and visual metaphors … [can] lead enthusiasts 
to capricious couplings that exist merely in the mind of the beholder and [add] little to the 
understanding of a film.”142 
 And so we return to the original question of how theology and film ought to 
engage each other.  How can theologians at once avoid misreading and distorting a film 
and retain their own subjectivity and religious investment in it?  Blake comes at the 
problem of theological eisegesis, of “baptizing a film as unconsciously Christian,”143 
from the viewpoint of film scholarship and offers four principles or correctives that 
should guide theological criticism of film.  We might summarize Blake’s method in terms 
of a specific consideration:  (1) the artist; (2) the artifact; (3) the audience; and (4) the art 
form.144 
 The first corrective is to know something of the biography of the filmmaker.  It is 
the wont of auteur theorists to investigate a director’s personal and artistic history, the 
social and cultural currents that impinge upon that artist’s worldview, and the thematic 
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patterns and recurring symbols in a filmmaker’s oeuvre.  Auteur theory adds a crucial 
interpretive layer when approaching film from within a theological purview since, among 
other things, it may help answer whether a filmmaker intended that his or her work carry 
religious significance.  A director’s ethnographical, educational, and (if any) religious 
background might shed light on this question.  Nevertheless, a filmmaker’s life story 
remains only one of many investigative strata and its importance for film criticism should 
not be overestimated.  According to Blake’s “afterimage” thesis, it may be the case that a 
film artist unintentionally and even unconsciously included religiously-charged themes 
and symbols into a movie.  It may not matter at all whether a director did or did not 
intend religious overtones since, as noted above, the risk and beauty of art is that 
audiences will ultimately read what they want in a film narrative. 
 This leads to the second corrective, which is to focus on a film’s internal 
evidence.  “In a search for the religious imagination, it is more important to look at the 
films than listen to the director, even though the artist can obviously provide helpful clues 
for addressing the films.”145  In order to diminish eisegetical tendencies, of utmost 
importance for the interpreter is the artifact.  A reviewer should keep closely to the text of 
a film, because what is sure, complete and public is the final product—the material of the 
film itself, and not its manifold influences.  Among other analytical methods, a film’s 
internal evidence can be studied by way of mise en scène, the editorial syntax of image 
and sound, and intertextuality.  Film scholars are trained in these techniques and they do 
much to offset the problem of injecting significance into the film. 
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 Blake confesses, however, that as much as film criticism attempts to prevent 
eisegesis, “reading meaning into” a film text is to a large degree inevitable.  After all, we 
do see what we want to see.  Nonetheless, in terms of theological analysis Blake hopes 
this second corrective—to pay close attention to and make judgments firmly on what is 
embedded in the film text—will foster a trend away from the sort of facile reading and 
symbol hunting that he believes has plagued much of theology’s interaction with film.  
“Sometimes, as Freud said, a cigar is only a cigar.”146  Not every loaf of bread paired 
with a bottle of Chianti is a hidden Eucharist, says Blake.147  Not every woman holding 
the body of a man in her arms is a Pietà.  Not every change of season from winter to 
spring means death and resurrection.  And yet, table fellowship, physical tenderness, and 
the redemption that can follow a massive tragedy are realities not foreign to the faith of 
Christians. 
 This leads to the third corrective, which is to observe how film is received by 
different audiences.  The more objective considerations of artist and artifact must be 
balanced by an assessment of the subjective responses a film elicits.  A number of 
considerations might be made including the physical, psychological, and even economic 
effects a film makes on an audience and on society as a whole both in the short and long 
term.  For his part, Blake contends that the visceral reaction of particular groups can 
indicate a film’s overall meaning and appeal.  For example, Catholic audiences more than 
others may be more alert to certain types of religious imagery present in a film and 
Catholic theologians may know much about the historical sources and meanings of these 
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symbols.  Rather than dismiss these responses as one-sided and injurious to strict film 
analysis, Blake recognizes their value for film scholarship and compares them to the 
needed sensibilities of other interpretive frames of reference.  “We may bring a valid 
sensitivity to the text and thus make a contribution to a critical appreciation of the film, 
much like a woman responding to a female character.  She is simply alert to things that a 
man might miss.”148  This further solidifies Blake’s thesis that theology should be 
employed as a legitimate interpretive model of film, since it has the right navigational 
system to pick up signals that someone untrained in the field would either miss, be 
incompetent to interpret or, for ideological reasons, be resolutely opposed.  When 
religious and theological themes are present in a film, however secularized they may 
appear, they must be named as such and capably investigated.  If ignored, film critics risk 
under-interpreting or even thoroughly misinterpreting a film.149 
 The final corrective is consideration of the nature of film as an artistic medium.  
Earlier in the dissertation, we noted Catholic theologians’ late and tentative acceptance of 
film as a legitimate place for theological inquiry.  Blake observes that post-
Enlightenment skepticism of religion has affected a prejudice among film scholars 
against religious and theological modes of film analysis.  Perhaps this two-way suspicion 
is owing to the fact that theologians and film scholars alike have been “very uneasy at the 
prospect of turning their attention to uncovering the sacred in something as worldly as the 
                                                
 148 Ibid., par. 39. 
 
 149 To drive home the point even further, if Catholics expect to receive a hearing from others, they 
must first demonstrate a genuine openness to how those with different frames of reference interpret film 
(hence, the need for “dialogue” between church and culture).  They should likewise not be surprised if 
these differing perspectives yield divergent verdicts.  This may hold great promise in the field of 
comparative theology for assessing how others come to conclusions about film that are not in exact 
correspondence with a Catholic reading.  And to say this is not to suggest that all Catholics will wind up 
hermeneutically in the same place. 
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film.”150  But why this unease?  Blake asserts that there is “a consensus of opinion since it 
mechanically reproduces physical objects set before the camera’s lens, that film is much 
less successful in capturing spiritual realities than other media, like literature, painting or 
music, each of which involves an apparently more aggressive intervention of the artist 
and thus a more intimate, spiritual relationship between artisan and audience.”151  Blake 
labors to overturn this opinion, which has intensified to the point that the “element of the 
sacred” has gone largely unnoticed in cinema.152  He claims that “by moving beyond 
content to the nature of the medium itself one can discover an avenue toward an 
awareness of the Divine.”153  Although we will have more to say about it later, a Catholic 
perspective sees “material objects as sacramentals, as having a meaning that approaches 
the symbolic.  Catholics appreciate in a visceral, sensual way that God is there, 
immanent, deep down in things; that God is present and active in the material order he 
has created.”154  Blake’s own Catholic imagination informs his seeing film as uniquely 
capable of incarnating the human spirit.  The medium is inimitable because unlike other 
forms of art, cinema adds the 
missing dimension of time and thus pushes the artifact [of film] even closer to 
physical realities.  Objects grow and move and change right before our gaze.  Yes, 
it is still an artifact, still under the direction of a filmmaker who chooses lights 
and settings, and even more edits the film into a series of connections with other 
realities.  The moving images can even tell a story.  Those real faces of real actors 
function amid shifting visual habitats.  They can speak and sing; the faces become 
transformed from laughter to tears as we watch.  More than any other medium, the 
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film creates art that cuts very close to the shifting, transient skin of the real 
material world as it exists in daily experience.  We become so engrossed in the 
spectacle that we think we are watching reality and forget that we are watching a 
film, an artifact.155 
 
One might read a little into what Blake is suggesting and consider the possibility that, in 
coming into such close proximity to real people expressing real emotion, a relationship is 
forged between the viewed and the viewer and that audiences in this sense experience a 
real love for (or aversion to) a film’s characters.  “That uniquely intimate relationship 
between medium and object brings the observer and observed into an privileged unity 
that invites contemplation.”156  This act of beholding the world with such immediacy, and 
with the added emotional dimensions produced by sound and editing, approaches the 
possibility that “film viewing may lead the imagination down a path that approaches 
prayer.”157  How?  Because film “forces us to look not at itself, but through the film to the 
marvels of the material universe that it presents for our gaze.”158  Blake suggests 
that the camera takes on an artistic equivalent of agape.  It looks upon material 
objects and sees within them the sacred and in the photographic image enshrines 
their value.  It does not create ontological value, as Divine Love does, by loving 
the object into existence, but the camera does endow the most mundane objects 
with sacramental value by recognizing and enshrining that value in a publicly 
accessible artifact.159 
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This “unity of lens and object” that takes on sacramental value in minimizing the distance 
between the seen and the unseen holds “enormous implications for a theological 
inquiry.”160 
 Blake’s approach to film criticism is therefore distinguished by a Catholic 
imagination and his belief that if you really look at a movie, “you will see the face of 
God.”161  Because he is a writer who measures his words very carefully, we know that he 
does not make that statement facilely.  So, what can he mean?  To make his point, Blake 
turns to the Christian doctrine that the canonical texts of the bible were “inspired” by God 
and therefore hold a privileged position in the church apart from other writings.  Drawing 
an analogy between the artistic imagination and the theological concept of “inspiration,” 
as it is applied to the writing and codification of scripture, he wonders 
if “inspiration” in an analogous sense might be extended to other attempts of the 
human imagination to approach God through different media.  Surely, when a 
great composer or artist approaches religious subject matter, we can speak of the 
work as being inspirational in some sense and consequently as an additional 
vehicle of God’s self-revelation.  We can speak at least in some metaphorical 
sense of God’s inspiring Michelangelo or Bach to use their own respective media, 
like the ceiling of the Sistine Chapel or the Mass in B Minor to reveal and 
communicate some insight into God’s own infinitely complex mystery.  Of 
course, at this point I would suggest that film is but another venue for the ongoing 
project of God’s self-disclosure and the human response in trying to reduce 
mystery to more comprehensible dimensions.162 
 
Blake is not suggesting that film artists impart God’s word through their medium in the 
same way the medium of the gospels impart God’s word.  Strictly speaking, from a 
Christian theological perspective, only God reveals God, and God chose to speak through 
the words of the biblical authors.  Anything else is interpretation of God’s self-revelation 
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which, at its highest level, involves the personal response to revelation in an act of faith 
in Jesus Christ.  However, in a comparable way, “inspired” film can be understood as a 
response to revelation when it lead the human person to contemplate the mystery of God.  
In film, therefore, we metaphorically witness the “face of God” in the faces and images 
on screen that imitate reality—reality that is already incarnated by Christ’s presence.  
This returns us to Joseph Marty’s point that, because of the Incarnation—the liberation of 
the “treason of images”—the church remains confident in the goodness of images as able 
to point beyond themselves to the mystery of God.  And because we cannot put limits on 
how God chooses to meet us personally in our lives, there remains the possibility that 
God encounters us in our artistic experiences.  Wisdom is needed, therefore, to discern 
whether film prepares us for this encounter and whether our contemplation is directed 
genuinely toward God, or is misguided (Michael Gallagher’s point).  This point allows us 
to see how Blake minimizes the distance between film and theology; for if theology at a 
basic level is understood as the interpretation of the encounter with God, then our 
experience of film is an important mode of theology.  In point of fact, he hopes that 
systematic theologians and church historians might join the conversation and help film 
scholars “view the confluence of their work as part of the larger scheme of revelation.”163  
 This, finally, returns us to Blake’s original premise that “the religious imagination 
is something worth uncovering and discussing in order to gain a fuller understanding of 
cinema.”164  He has demonstrated that while a theologian must exercise extreme “caution 
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before pushing [film] story over into the realm of religious parable,”165 it is at the same 
time appropriate to bring a theological mind to bear on film in order to disclose its sacred 
elements and, in so doing, “add to a more comprehensive critical appreciation of the 
texture of the film.”166  This practice, however, is not limited to theologians.  In applying 
their own interpretive skills to film, film critics, too, will disclose the sacred element 
within film.  Just as biblical scholars “have to understand [their] medium in all its 
complexity and then seek distinctions between truth and error, wisdom and nonsense . . . 
[so does] the same obligation [rest] heavily on film critics and scholars.”167  Blake invites 
all of these parties into a Casablancan “beautiful friendship” of collaboration and mutual 
formation. 
 
Conclusion 
Over the course of a half-century the margins of two vast fields—theology and 
film—have met and slowly merged into one another, forming something of an in-
between, third field.  Their cross-fertilization has taken root and shows signs of growing 
deeper and ever more lush.  While it is unclear the shape the field will take in the future, 
the varieties it will yield, and what effect it will have on the pre-existing tracts, one thing 
is certain:  the landscape has been unalterably transformed and, owing to the labor of a 
dedicated few, such as those represented in this chapter, its potential for a rich harvest is 
great. 
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The last three chapters of the dissertation have highlighted some of the ways 
Catholic Christianity in particular helped cultivate field of theology and film.  Both the 
Roman magisterium and a growing contingent of Catholic theologians and film scholars 
have acknowledged the tremendous promise film holds for theology and for Christian 
formation and action.  Together, the texts we studied laid down a number of foundations 
that help root theology’s relationship to film in church doctrine, Christian spirituality, and 
aesthetics.  Something of a grammar for a Catholic theology of film emerges in these 
pioneering writings, a grammar that will likely remain seminal for future scholarship in 
this area.  Because it is an evolving syntax a number of questions remain about how film 
ought to be construed within a Catholic theological framework. 
 The experts profiled in the current chapter did not find it necessary to relate their 
approaches directly to the Vatican’s teaching on cinema, yet they share the church’s 
conviction that a more dynamic symbiotic relationship ought to exist between Catholic 
theology and film.  They agree that approaching the task of film interpretation from the 
standpoint of theology is legitimate if only for the simple reason that people ask 
theological questions.  Like other interpretive frameworks, Catholic theology comprises a 
distinctive set of norms by which film can be evaluated.  It is thus a necessary analytical 
lens, since through it people can see things in film that other perspectives might miss.168  
Catholic authors have refashioned distinctive tools in the tradition, such as spiritual 
discernment, the notion of transcendence, theology of the image, and the principle of 
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sacramentality, into methods of film criticism.  Certain teachings stood out as particularly 
important for the study.  For instance, Bazin believed that the very nature of cinema is to 
honor God by honoring the reality and mystery of human experience.  Hurley emphasized 
that film’s ability to express the transcendental thrust of human experience is something 
that theologians, trained to perceive the presence of grace in human life (and name it as 
such), ought to be equipped to interpret.  Gallagher claimed that religious impulses in 
film, when rightly discerned, can prepare people for the reception of the Christian 
message.  Marty asserted that any Catholic theological interpretation of film necessarily 
operates evangelically, since the criterion for perceiving what is true and lasting (i.e., not 
idolatrous or rival to Christian faith) in the film image is Christ himself, who is the 
“image of the invisible God” (Col. 1:15).  Finally, Blake insisted that Catholic theological 
perspectives are crucial for film interpretation; but if they are to maintain legitimacy in 
the world of film criticism such approaches must take every necessary step to avoid 
theological eisegesis. 
 Having now analyzed Vatican teaching on cinema in the initial chapters and the 
interpretive methods of individual scholars in this chapter, we are now in a better position 
to see the shortcomings in the literature and to propose how the remainder of this 
dissertation will attempt to mitigate these limitations and provide sturdier theological 
footing for Catholic approaches overall.  In the introduction to our study it was asserted 
that existing theological approaches to film do not seem to attend adequately to the 
question of how these two ostensibly divergent areas naturally incline toward one 
another.  This was found to be the case in the documents of the magisterium as well as in 
the writings of individual scholars; both groups seem to presume that such a relationship 
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is already warranted and begin their reflections accordingly.  Thus, only limited attempts 
were made to pursue the question of how Catholic theology and film can be integrated in 
the first place.  In short, these writings beg more substantial reflection on the 
transcendental question pertinent to Catholic systematic theology concerning the a priori 
conditions of possibility for a correlation between theology and film.  Greater wisdom 
concerning what the two have in common and what, indeed, differentiates them, will lead 
to a more meaningful and lasting exchange between the two. 
Part of this a priori theoretical concern must involve responding to the question of 
normativity.  What Christian norm acts as a controlling hermeneutical principle of 
discernment when theology is done in conjunction with a non-traditional source such as 
film?  What justification is there in the church’s theological tradition for turning to such a 
secular source for Christian reflection?  We recall that the Catholic magisterium did not 
insist a film be explicitly religious for it to be a source for theological reflection and aid 
to Christian formation.169  Gaudium et spes taught that the secular world and its cultural 
expressions ought to be met generously and critically by the church.  However, no formal 
church document provided ample justification for the turn to secular film as a theological 
source.  Thus, the onus probandi was on the individual scholars and theologians of this 
chapter to clarify the question of normativity in doing theology through an outside 
secular medium like film.  Some attempts at articulating Catholic normativity were made 
in this chapter.  For instance, Michael Gallagher and Joseph Marty grounded their 
                                                
 169 Indeed, both Bazin and Blake stressed that the inherent difficulty of expressing the numinous 
can lead to problematic tendencies in the production quality of explicitly religious films (sentimentality, 
overdramatization, exaggerated style). 
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theologies of film in the doctrine of the incarnation:  the decisive norm that, for them, is 
the rule by which secular sources are judged to be true and correct. 
 This dissertation has insinuated that a more comprehensive, systematic 
presentation of the relationship of Catholic theology and the art of film is needed, one 
that has at its center a unifying method broad enough to integrate important elements of 
the existing strands of Catholic teaching on film into a larger theological framework and 
specific enough to move the discourse into new territory.  The main thesis of the 
dissertation identifies the Christian tradition of mystagogy to be a promising tool to 
facilitate this integration.  Mystagogy, the subject of the next chapter, was an ancient 
theological method by which church leaders would turn to non-Christian sources as a 
means of disclosing the meanings of Christian doctrine and practice.  In putting forward 
the thesis that film is a locus mystagogicus, we are suggesting, only at a very basic level 
at this point, that (a) film can be a matter for mystagogical reflection; (b) the tradition of 
mystagogy provides principles for justifying theology’s contemporary turn to secular film 
as a theological source; and (c) the tradition holds tools that can facilitate the process of 
discerning authentic religious themes within secular film.  As the project moves ahead in 
its quest to strengthen the correlation between Catholic theology and film, the following 
passage might act as a guide.  It is a succinct way of expressing what is at stake in 
bringing theology and film into closer and mutually critical correspondence: 
Theological and spiritual traditions have something to offer the film world insofar 
as they are concerned with the quest for deeper meaning, truth, and wisdom about 
human life, history and destiny.  On the other hand, there is no doubt that many 
films, past and present, can provide a stimulus and a challenge to theological 
disciplines and to theologians to lean more about “the human journey” and the 
individual or collective struggle for survival—phenomena that are mirrored in so 
many films.170 
                                                
 170 Ambrose Eichenbacher, “Approaches to Film Criticism,” in ibid., p. 9. 
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EXCURSUS 
Other Catholic Approaches to Film 
 In the first two chapters, we looked at how the magisterium has developed the 
relationship between church and cinema.  In this last chapter, we profiled several 
university theologians and film scholars who have developed theoretical Roman 
Catholic-based approaches to film interpretation.  We believe it is worth taking a moment 
to consider intersections between theology and film made in other sectors of the Catholic 
church.  This will provide further context for our conversation as well as demonstrate the 
broadness of “theology”:  i.e., that “Rome” and the “academy” are not the exclusive, nor 
necessarily the most significant, places where theology and film have come together. 
 The Daughters of St. Paul is a religious order whose mission is to announce the 
message of Jesus Christ through the means of electronic media.  Rose Pacette, FSP, is 
director of the Pauline Center for Media Studies in Culver, CA, an institute administered 
by the order primarily to educate Catholic teachers and ministers in media literacy.  For 
more than two decades, Pacette has been involved in bridging the worlds of faith and film 
in a number of ways.  She has a series of books called Lights, Camera, Faith!, which 
follow the church’s three lectionary cycles and places weekly readings into dialogue with 
motion pictures so that the message of Jesus can be related directly to contemporary 
experience.  She speaks regularly at media conferences throughout America and has a 
blog which tracks the many connections being made between Catholicism and film.171  
As a high-ranking member of SIGNIS, Pacette has sat on judging panels at some of the 
world’s most prestigious film festivals. 
                                                
 171 See:  <http://sisterrose.wordpress.com> (last accessed 2/11/10). 
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 Barbara Nicolosi is the director of a program in Hollywood that mentors Christian 
screenwriters and others who work in film media and the mainstream entertainment 
industry.  The program is called “Act One:  Writing for Hollywood” and is sponsored in 
part by the Catholic Communication Campaign.  Formerly of the Daughters of St. Paul, 
Nicolosi believes it important and, what is more, possible for Catholics to bring their faith 
to bear on the construction of good cinema.  She laments that in the film industry there 
are few talented writers who not only have some theological training but who desire to 
evangelize via film and television—“the most potent and influential global pulpits 
available to disseminate the Catholic imagination.”172  She says that while there have 
been 
isolated instances of film projects that represent a Catholic worldview, the sad 
reality is that we do not have any filmmakers who have done with cinema what 
Flannery O’Connor and Graham Greene did in literature, or Fra Angelico in 
painting, or Bach in sacred music—that is, it is difficult to come up with a single 
filmmaker who, being what I call a “happy Catholic,” has consistently sought to 
make an appeal for Jesus and the Gospel through mastery of the craft of film.173 
 
Her organization is dedicated to redressing this situation by training Christians in the 
media who wish to lead people to the gospel in film that may or may not have explicitly 
Christian content, but that has a Christian character: 
When it comes to "Christian movies," I think we should be doing one tenth of 
what we do for ourselves and nine tenths for secular people as seeds to try and get 
them questioning.  Unfortunately, the opposite ratio is true.  Probably nine out of 
ten Christian artists are working just for Christians, and maybe one in ten are 
                                                
 172 Barbara R. Nicolosi, “Cinema:  The Power of Visual Imagery Why There Isn’t a Catholic 
Cinema; and What Can Happy Catholics Contribute to the Entertainment Industry?” in Kenneth 
Whitehead, ed., The Catholic Imagination:  Proceedings from the Twenty-Fourth Annual Convention of the 
Fellowship of Catholic Scholars.  South Bend:  St. Augustine’s Press, 2003, p. 103. 
 
 173 Ibid. 
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working for the mainstream.174 
 
Nicolosi rejects, however, what might be considered by some to be a possible solution to 
this problem, namely a virtual incursion by Catholics into enemy territory by way of 
mass production of wholesome movies that families can watch.  “Instead,” she says, 
“what is needed is for the church to recognize and respect the power of the cinematic art 
form, to embrace it, and to send a whole new generation of young artists into the 
entertainment industry so that, in seeing the good that they do, the culture will give glory 
to God.”175 
In 1995, the theology faculty at the University of Fribourg (Switzerland) 
conferred an honorary doctorate upon German film director Wim Wenders.  A decade 
later, the Pontifical Council for Social Communications, the Catholic church’s highest 
office on issues related to cinema, awarded Wenders the Bresson Prize, named after the 
French Catholic filmmaker Robert Bresson (Au Hasard Balthasar, Pickpocket).  
Instituted in 2000 to show the support of the church for outstanding works in cinema, the 
prize is awarded annually “to an artist whose work ‘promotes a truly humane culture’ and 
advances appreciation for the life of the spirit.”176  President of the Council, then-
Archbishop John Foley, said in bestowing the award that Wenders’s films contain “many 
meditative moments of high spirituality on the meaning of life, evil, death, and the 
                                                
 174 Mark Moring, “Grooming Hollywood’s New Talent,” Christianity Today, March 21, 2006.  
See:  <http://www.christianitytoday.com/movies/interviews/2006/barbaranicolosi.html> (last accessed 
2/11/10). 
 
 175 Ibid., p. 104. 
 
 176 See:  <http://www.cwnews.com/news/viewstory.cfm?recnum=46313> (last accessed 2/11/10).  
Past recipients include Giuseppe Tornatore (Italy), Manoel de Oliveira (Portugal), Theo Angelopoulos 
(Greece), Krzysztof Zanussi (Poland), Jerzy Stuhr (Poland), and Zhang Yuan (China). 
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beyond,” and that the director has demonstrated that film is a “source of reflection.”177  In 
its gesture the Catholic hierarchy “decided (agreeing with some critics) that films like 
Wings of Desire (1987), Paris, Texas (1984), The American Friend (1977), Kings of the 
Road (1976) and Alice in the Cities (1974), movies that deal with alienation, 
disengagement and a lack of identity, represented a spiritual quest.”178  Having charted 
the evolution of ecclesiastical teaching and Catholic scholarship on cinema in the last 
three chapters of the dissertation, we can better appreciate the gestures of the University 
of Fribourg and the Vatican in acknowledging the artistic and theological contributions of 
Wenders.  These attest to just how far the church has come in its relationship to cinema 
and just how expressive cinema can be of contemporary human experiences that are of 
deep importance to Christian faith.  This example is one practical indicator of where two 
principal groups within the Catholic church—the academy and the magisterium—have 
stood vis-à-vis filmmaking. 
 
                                                
 177 See the news brief “German Film Director Gets Award From Vatican Official,” from 
September 10, 2004 at <www.zenit.org> (last accessed 2/11/10). 
 
 178 Vicki Goldberg, “Wim Wenders and the Landscape of Desire.”  New York Times, Nov. 30, 
2003. 
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CHAPTER 4 
Introduction 
 This chapter proposes the adoption of the underutilized and promising interpretive 
tool of mystagogy (Gk., µυσταγωγια = mystes “initiated person” + agogos “leading”) as 
a means for more firmly fusing Catholic theology and film.  Because mystagogy is a 
relatively unfamiliar term, even in theological circles,1 the present chapter attempts to 
explicate mystagogy and its meaning(s) in Christian history to better illustrate why it has 
been chosen as the controlling concept for the dissertation’s main thesis and as 
background for understanding the aim and methodology of Karl Rahner’s fundamental 
theology, to be covered in the fifth chapter. 
 While other Greek words have been received rather easily into the Christian 
matrix, mystagogy has not.  Yet it is “not more difficult, nor more Greek, than Eucharist, 
kerygma . . . ecclesiology, theology or pedagogy.  It is an old word, coming from pre-
Christian religions, borrowed from them by the early church, then forgotten for 
centuries”2 until the Second Vatican Council mandated the reinstatement of an adult 
catechumenate.  The Catholic church instituted the Rite of Christian Initiation for Adults 
(R.C.I.A.), a restoration of the ancient Christian liturgical process by which a person 
officially enters the church through the sacraments of baptism, confirmation, and 
Eucharist.  Mystagogy is the final phase of this formal initiation rite, a time when the 
                                                
 1 There is a value to mystagogy’s relative obscurity as it is appropriated to support this 
dissertation’s main idea, for it is not laden with a cumulative load of interpretive positions that would need 
significant sifting before it could be legitimately applied as a helpful link between theology and film.  This 
should not suggest that scholarly perspectives on the tradition do not vary; nor does it suggest that 
mystagogy has a single, definitive meaning.  “Mystagogy” is not a catch-all.  It is a precise term; yet, as 
will be justified, it is broad enough to be adapted for the purposes of the dissertation. 
 
 2 David Regan, Experience the Mystery:  Pastoral Possibilities for Christian Mystagogy.  
Collegeville:  Liturgical Press, 1994, p. 1. 
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newly baptized are taught the deeper meanings of the sacraments, less by instruction than 
by way of remembering and interpreting the experience of initiation.  Mystagogy is a 
process that introduces people to “the depths of the Mystery of Christ”3 as experienced in 
the sacraments.  Its method of sacramental interpretation is meant to initiate a faith 
community more penetratingly into the inexhaustible, personal, and holy experience of 
God’s Mystery.  Its intention is to illuminate, not mystify; to lead people into a 
profounder sense of the depths of their relationship to God.  Its relative obscurity 
therefore should not suggest the tradition is “mysterious” in the sense of something being 
obfuscated.  The word itself “easily evokes negative reactions from those who feel that 
anything which has to do with ‘mystery,’ ‘mysterious,’ or ‘mystic’ is necessarily out of 
touch with the real world in which normal people have lived their lives.”4 On the 
contrary, any perceived esotericism about the term is a result of a misunderstanding or 
misappropriation of the tradition. 
 This chapter attempts to illustrate that the method of mystagogy is a tremendous 
counterpoint to (a) notions that experience of God is reserved only for the extraordinarily 
pious, or engenders detachment from the concerns of daily life; and (b) a corrective to 
trends in theology that privilege reason over emotion and orthodoxy over orthopraxis.  If 
a truly integrated “religious experience neglects no facet of this world”5 that aids deeper 
initiation into the life of God, then theology needs to continually develop methods by 
which people can learn to make deeper and more relevant connections between Christian 
                                                
 3 Ibid., p. 116. 
 
 4 Ibid., p. 35. 
 
 5 Ibid., p. 144. 
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faith and the concerns of daily life that are drawn from their concrete experience and in 
language that makes a difference. 
 Today’s church faces a world disillusioned by institutional religion.  Religious 
experience, however it may be defined, is interpreted by many to be something private in 
nature and better left undisturbed by religion itself.  Further, the church includes a 
membership often disenchanted with a faith that appears archaic mainly because 
meaningful connections are not drawn between the gospel and the experience of 
contemporary life.  In fact, this situation is nothing new; for in every age the church 
struggles to provide “an experience of Jesus Christ in his Paschal Mystery [and] to help 
Christians live that Mystery and dedicate themselves to building the Kingdom.”6  It is 
incumbent upon theologians to interpret the Christian message that this Mystery was 
made flesh in Jesus Christ and communicate in a manner that serves the religious 
formation of the baptized.  To help the current situation, the chapter suggests that 
theology today return to the mystagogy of the fathers as an effective model for 
interpreting the faith.  The fathers broke the bonds of a “narrowly doctrinal view of 
Christian belief . . . [and paid] due respect to experience . . ..”7  In so doing, they 
accorded a greater respect for the integrity and relevancy of doctrine and overcame any 
perceived disconnect between belief and life.  As shown through their homilies, they 
were master integrators of scripture, doctrine, worship, and experience and thus 
consummate translators of the message of the gospel and life of the church.  This chapter 
strives to make the case that the mystagogical style of theological interpretation 
                                                
 6 Ibid., p. 145. 
 
 7 Ibid., p. 146. 
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underscores the deep unity that exists between the content of faith and the content of 
daily living and can serve as a paradigm for how theology approaches film. 
 The discussion will proceed according to the following questions:  (1) What 
further meaning does the term “mystagogy” suggest and how did it obtain and function in 
a Christian milieu?  (2) What was the hermeneutical method of mystagogy?  (3) What did 
mystagogy interpret?  (4) How were mystagogy and theology related in the early church?  
(5) Finally, what conditions exist within the tradition that facilitate the possibility of 
adapting mystagogy beyond a liturgical and catechetical environment?  To be sure, any 
one of these questions is complex enough to warrant extended consideration, in each case 
beyond the ambit of the present study.  Here, the focus is narrowed to achieve a solid 
working knowledge of mystagogy so that it can be applied more accurately to the 
substance of the dissertation’s thesis.  In other words, the chapter attempts to give a fuller 
understanding of the notion of mystagogy by way of a substantial if not comprehensive 
grounding in the liturgical, theological, and aesthetic elements that form this rich and 
fairly unknown Christian tradition. 
 
Pagan Roots and Adoption into Christianity 
 The term “mystagogy” is of Greek provenance and scholars distinguish a number 
of senses of the word.8  One finds it variously translated as “indoctrination” or 
“induction” into, “instruction” in, and “revelation” or “interpretation” of mystery.  More 
                                                
 8 References to these etymological studies can be found in Enrico Mazza, Mystagogy:  A Theology 
of Liturgy in the Patristic Age.  New York:  Pueblo, 1989, see p. 1 and p. 182, n.1. 
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sensual renderings include “savoring” or “tasting” of mystery.9  Originally, it meant “to 
teach a doctrine” and therefore “to initiate into the mysteries.”10  The “earliest allusion in 
early Greek refers to someone, a mystagogue, who initiates neophytes into the Eleusinian 
mysteries [i.e., the cult of the goddesses Demeter and Persephone].  Mystagogy later 
became associated with the teaching of mysteries found in secret religions.”11  Mystery 
religions, such as the Mithraic or Dionysian cults, abounded in Greco-Roman antiquity 
and were “secret” in part because their mystical rites were not sponsored by the state.  
These religions, called “mysteries,”12 were generally “agricultural in origin, arising from 
seasonal cults to ensure fertility of crops.  . . . [These] were secret cults into which a 
candidate had to be initiated—almost like secret societies.  The constitutive features of a 
mystery society were common meals, common dances and ceremonies.”13  Initiates 
would “re-enact events in the lives of the gods through ritualistic feasts and orgies, 
receiving in essence a share in the lives of the gods through the highly sensual and 
psychic ceremonies.”14  Thus, these mysteries were, at one level, a way people believed 
they consorted with the gods and solidified the cult.  However, there was a deeper level 
                                                
 9 J. Steven Covington, “The Old Is New Again:  RCIA and the Ancient Practice of Mystagogy,” in 
This Rock:  The Magazine of Catholic Apologetics and Evangelization, Vol. 10, No. 3, March 1999, at 
<http://www.catholic.com/thisrock/1999/9903fea1.asp> (last accessed 2/20/10). 
 
 10 Mazza, Mystagogy:  A Theology of Liturgy in the Patristic Age, op. cit., p. 1. 
 
 11 Jeffrey Baerwald, “Mystagogy” in Peter Fink, S.J., ed., The New Dictionary of Sacramental 
Worship. Collegeville:  Liturgical Press, 1990, p. 881.  A detailed description of Eleusinian ceremonial rites 
can be found in Edward Yarnold, S.J., The Awe-Inspiring Rites of Initiation:  The Origins of the R.C.I.A.  
Collegeville:  Liturgical Press, 2001, pp. 61-65. 
 
 12 In Christianity, the Greek word mysterion (mystery), which was used originally to describe the 
rites of baptism, confirmation, and Eucharist.  In the western church the Latin word sacramentum was used 
for the rites, not “the mysteries.” 
 
 13 Regan, Experience the Mystery, op. cit., p. 12. 
 
 14 Covington, “The Old Is New Again,” op. cit. 
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of meaning which “was not expressed in words, but transmitted by the rites themselves to 
those who were capable of appreciating it.  There was no formal theology . . . but it was 
the religious experience which made the initiation memorable and gave the cults their 
grip.”15 
Mystagogy is linked etymologically to the Greek verb myein meaning “to shut the 
eyes” and relating to the fact that “only those already initiated were permitted to witness 
secret rites.”16  Because the mystery cults “involved an experience and not a doctrine 
[participants] had little to tell to someone who had not undergone the experience.”17  
Members were forbidden to speak to outsiders about what was witnessed in these 
ceremonies because their beliefs and practices often subverted those of official state 
religions.  Enrico Mazza claims that in every instance mystagogy had a “sacral 
context.”18  However, David Regan avers that the word and practice extended into the 
secular sphere of ancient Greece, which fact “made it easier for the church fathers to 
borrow it” since it was not altogether a pagan religious practice.19 
 Mystagogy became an explicit Christian reality as early as the second century, 
although its ecclesial heritage goes 
back even to the time of Christ.  In the apostolic era, as the infant church 
struggled to digest its still-fresh experience of Christ, early converts could know 
the still-developing Christian theology concerning creation, death, resurrection, 
                                                
 15 Regan, op. cit., p. 13. 
 
 16 “Mystery,” in Robert Barnhart, ed., Chambers Dictionary of Etymology.  New York:  H.W. 
Wilson Co., 1988, p. 690. 
 
 17 Regan, op. cit., p. 12. 
 
 18 Mazza, op. cit., p. 1. 
 
 19 Regan, op. cit., p. 11.  In this extended sense, “someone who introduced a friend into the sacred 
precincts of the Greek family could be called a mystagogue; and the word mystagogy could be used of 
someone being initiated into the business of tax-farming” (Ibid.). 
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and eternal life only by participating in the experiences of baptism, Eucharist, and 
charitable ministry.20 
 
As the church expanded its mission to the nations and adapted itself so that the Christian 
faith could be more accurately and meaningfully communicated, it acquired certain 
characteristics of those cultures.  Mystagogy was one such acquisition.  The nascent 
church borrowed from the mystery religions the “language and experiential approach of 
initiation” for those wishing to convert to Christian belief.21  The Christian borrowing of 
Greek mystagogy involved substantial transformation.  Indeed, like so many 
inculturations in the early church, once grafted onto the Christian stock it turned into 
something so qualitatively other than its pagan counterpart that comparisons can only be 
made at a superficial level.  Its liturgical manifestation “did not go beyond language and 
external forms . . ..”22  Perhaps more importantly, the Christian “practice of initiation can 
be traced back to Judaism rather than to the traditional cults of Greece, Rome, and further 
East.”  Thus, there was already precedence in the tradition for mystagogy. 
 
Christian Initiation Rites 
 Entrance into the Christian church did not consist of a single initiation ceremony, 
but was rather an intense process of prayerful discernment and intense examination, 
involving candidate and community, that could take a number of years.23 Liturgical 
scholars know very little about the precise content and organization of the initiatory 
                                                
 20 Covington, op. cit. 
 
 21 Regan, op. cit., p. 14. 
 
 22 Ibid. 
 
 23 Paul Bradshaw, “Christian Initiation,” in Peter Fink, S.J., ed., The New Dictionary of 
Sacramental Worship. Collegeville:  Liturgical Press, 1990, p. 193. 
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process in the earliest years of the church, although the records suggest that by the fourth 
century “there was an established pattern, which was more or less universal.”24  Edward 
Yarnold’s reconstruction of the primitive church’s initiation procedure helps to 
contextualize mystagogy and understand its original form and function. 
 The first period (Precatechumenate) was a time of inquiry, evangelization, and 
acceptance of candidates by the community into the order of catechumens.  It is difficult 
to determine how long this initial stage lasted since much depended on the readiness of 
the individual candidate to choose a Christian life and for the believing community to 
consent to this desire through an examination of the moral and spiritual character of the 
candidate. 
 The second period (Catechumenate) consisted of initiation of a candidate into the 
order of catechumens (Gk. katekhoumenos, “being instructed”) followed by rigorous 
instruction in scripture, doctrine, and prayer.  It was a time concerned mainly with 
“communicating the central truths of the early Christian faith, creation, sin, and 
redemption, grounded in the understanding that the events of the OT prefigure those of 
the NT, and characterized by a strong emphasis on ethical teaching.”25  Although this 
phase was markedly notional, given that central theological concepts were being taught, 
the catechesis was meant to awaken and nourish faith and not simply provide information 
about Christianity.  Catechumens also participated in a limited way in the worship life of 
the church.  For instance, they were allowed to partake in what is today called the 
“Liturgy of the Word,” the first portion of the Mass that concerns the reading and 
                                                
 24 Baerwald, op. cit., p. 881. The structure of today’s R.C.I.A. represents an adaptation of this 
ancient pattern. 
 
 25 Ibid., p. 883. 
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preaching of scripture.  After the homily, catechumens were dismissed for prayer and 
instruction apart from the formal worship.26  Prior to their own initiation catechumens 
were prohibited from partaking in or even witnessing the Eucharistic rite.  Nor were they 
allowed to be present at a baptism before their own. 
The entire process of Christian initiation was shrouded in a veil of intentional 
secrecy called the disciplina arcana, a practice that produced some controversy.  There 
were some who interpreted it as surreptitious and accused Christians of practicing a 
secret religion like the idolatrous mystery cults of Greece and Rome.27  Such accusations 
were common and inevitable as Christianity inculturated itself over the centuries, 
borrowing and recasting local and at times pagan religious ideas and practices.  The point 
to be made here is that the fathers “were not so much concerned with the initiation 
sacraments as mysterious; rather with the mystery that the initiated experienced in the 
sacraments.”28  The disciplina arcana and the secrecy surrounding the initiation rites was 
not simply a form of esotericism for its own sake; rather, it was necessary for preparation.  
                                                
 26 The now outmoded term “Mass of the Catechumens” comes from this practice of dismissing the 
catechumens or “hearers” prior to the celebration of the Eucharist (i.e., “Mass of the Faithful”).  Today, 
based on the reforms of the Second Vatican Council, the former is named “Liturgy of the Word,” and the 
latter “Liturgy of the Eucharist.” 
 
 27 The controversy about the secrecy surrounding the initiation rites, and Christianity in general, 
stems back to Origen (c. 185—c. 254) who answered “the accusation of his opponent, Celsus, that 
Christianity is a religion of secrecy like the pagan mystery religions:  Christian doctrine is not secret, he 
asserts, though he has to concede that some things are not for outsiders” (Yarnold, ibid., p. 56).  Although 
the “Christian practice of secrecy goes back to the gospels it seems likely that in the fourth century the 
desire to rival the pagan mystery religions led to an elaboration of the practice of secrecy.  Chrysostom’s 
phrase ‘the holy and awesome rites of initiation’ seems to be worded in language borrowed from the Greek 
mysteries” (Ibid., p. 57).  No doubt the element of secrecy led some to approach the church out of sheer 
curiosity.  Leaders like Cyril of Jerusalem set out “to convert that curiosity into something more religious” 
(ibid). 
 
 28 Baerwald, op. cit., p. 882, emphasis given. 
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Its secrecy was meant to instill in catechumens a sense of watchfulness and enthusiastic 
anticipation for their sacramental union with God. 
 The third period (Enlightenment or Election) was a time of intense self-reflection 
on the part of catechumens, of “spiritual preparation rather than instruction.”29  A variety 
of religious acts at this stage contributed toward the moral purification and spiritual 
illumination of catechumens.  These included scrutinies of conscience, confession of sins, 
penance, fasting, exorcisms, and recitations of the creed and the Our Father.  The third 
period culminated in the denouement of the catechumenal journey:  full sacramental 
initiation into the community of faith on the vigil of Easter.  Yarnold sets the scene: 
The ceremonies took place at night, some of them in the dark, after weeks of 
intense preparation; they were wrapped in secrecy, and the candidate knew little 
about them until just before, or even after, he had received them.  Everything was 
calculated to inspire religious awe, to make these rites the occasion of a profound 
and life-long conversion.30 
 
Given all the preparatory measures, the fact that catechumens had no first hand 
knowledge of the rites prior to their own induction, and, most importantly, the solemnity 
of the occasion, there was an extraordinary air of expectancy the catechumens 
experienced prior to the ceremony.  While the structure of the initiation rites varied from 
church to church, reflecting local customs and styles, a consistent pattern emerged in the 
execution of the sacraments of baptism, confirmation (anointing), and Eucharist.  
Elements of this pattern included: 
the renunciation of Satan, the proclamation of the Apostle’s Creed, prebaptismal 
anointings, the bath of new birth with a Trinitarian profession of faith, bestowal of 
                                                
 29 Yarnold, op. cit., p. 9. 
 
 30 Ibid., p. ix. 
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white garments, and anointing and imposition of hands.  Following these 
initiatory rites the newly baptized were welcomed at the eucharistic table.31 
 
After years of formal preparation, the experiences of being immersed in water, draped in 
fresh white garments, anointed with oil, embraced in the kiss of peace, and fed the food 
of salvation must have had a tremendous cathartic effect on the converted.  The sequence 
“seems to [have been] calculated explicitly to stir up emotions of spiritual exaltation and 
awe”32; it was an ordering of events that outwardly signified the interior, ontological 
changes effected by the Holy Spirit.  This “dynamic process that [led] from death to 
life”33 was both a purgative and an illuminative experience and surely induced an intense 
emotive release in the initiand—a catharsis that at once symbolically and really affirmed 
new life in Christ. 
 
Mystagogia 
 The ceremony’s visceral impact and spiritual profundity rendered catechumens 
somewhat dumbfounded.  Whereas prior to their initiation catechumens were made 
notionally aware that through the sacraments their lives would become united to Christ’s 
life, death, and resurrection, now it was true:  they were saved from sin, made to be new 
beings in Christ.  Neophytes came away from this unparalleled experience astonished 
and, naturally, with many questions.  The intensity of the initiatory experience coupled 
with the fact that they had never before participated in or even witnessed the sacraments 
gave rise to the need for a formal interpretation of the experience.  The church felt that 
                                                
 31 “Rite of Christian Initiation of Adults,” in Richard McBrien, gen. ed., Encyclopedia of 
Catholicism.  New York:  HarperCollins, 1995, p. 1120. 
 
 32 Yarnold, op. cit., p. 60. 
 
 33 Baerwald, op. cit., p. 882. 
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neophytes needed a sapient guide to help them gain insight into the ritual elements of 
Holy Saturday night in a way that would sustain the enthusiasm and sense of privilege 
wrought by their covenantal “amen” to the Lord.  It was prudential, therefore, that the 
church provide a post-baptismal forum to help neophytes “process” their induction 
experience and lead them to a greater understanding of its significance. 
The fourth and final period of Christian initiation (Mystagogy) was reserved for 
this purpose.34  During the week following their baptism, neophytes would gather around 
the local bishop to hear a series of sermons designed to interpret the “spiritual and 
theological significance of the various signs, symbols, and gestures”35 of the 
sacraments.36  The mystagogic homilies of Cyril of Jerusalem, John Chrysostom, 
Ambrose of Milan, and Theodore of Mopsuestia were idiosyncratic, yet they shared a 
general purpose:  to help neophytes “gain knowledge (gnosis) of the Mystery through 
contemplating it . . . where it is to be found:  in creation; in Scripture; in the liturgy, as 
mediated by symbols.”37  Their homilies helped the newly baptized relive the moments of 
initiation in order to draw them deeper “into the mysteries [=sacraments], moving them to 
enter spiritually and intellectually into the rites in which they [had] previously 
                                                
 34 To be sure, mystagogy was not a time to “debrief” initiates or furnish them with additional 
conceptual explicanda of the ceremony.  The primary aim was to interpret the experience of initiation in a 
manner that intensified its significance. 
 
 35 Baerwald, ibid., p. 881. 
 
 36 Sacramental interpretation was not original to the fathers, for the church had “always had 
explanations of its liturgical celebrations” (Mazza, op. cit., p. x).  Even before the Christian use of the term 
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of Peter “has a largely mystagogic outlook.  It builds on the experience of baptism into Christ’s death and 
resurrection, an experience considered as recent, and tries to help those who have come from afar to feel at 
home in the Christian community” (Regan, op. cit., p. 15).  However, only at the end of the fourth century 
did explanations of the Easter rite “take on the truly distinctive form of mystagogical catechesis.” (Mazza, 
op. cit., p. x). 
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participated but may have understood only in terms of sense-perception.”38  Following 
the rationale that “one learns more easily if one has seen before learning,”39 the church 
felt that catechumens needed to experience the sacraments first before receiving 
instruction about them.40  For it is 
next to impossible to discourse effectively about an experience of great moment 
and intensity with someone who has never really had such an experience.  One 
cannot speak tellingly of love to the unloving.  Those who do love, moreover, 
speak not in analytical or discursive terms but in the language of poetry, music, 
and symbol.41 
 
The emphasis of mystagogy was on experience more than theory, observation more than 
speculation, feeling more than reason.  The mystagogical sermons were evocative 
invitations for neophytes to internalize the meaning of the rites through a rhetorical 
process of leading back (to the experience of initiation), a leading into (the Mystery of 
God communicated through the sacraments), and a leading forth (to continually ratify 
their baptismal faith in the throes of the everyday).  This emphasis of mystagogy—the 
symbolic and existential—was founded on the deepest meaning of the sacraments:  Jesus’ 
own life, death, and resurrection.  Thus, mystagogy carried with it an eschatological 
dimension: 
Christ our Lord established these awesome mysteries for us.  We look forward to 
their perfect fulfillment in the world to come, but we have already laid hold of 
                                                
 38 Craig Satterlee, Ambrose of Milan’s Method of Mystagogical Preaching.  Collegeville:  The 
Liturgical Press, 2002, p. 2.  Any thoroughgoing study of patristic mystagogy would need to attend 
carefully to the method of each of the fathers.  It is enough for our purposes here to take a broad view of 
mystagogy in order to gain a sense of its general form and purpose in the ancient church. 
 
 39 Yarnold, op. cit., p. 100, n. 2, emphasis mine. This sense was not universal.  Unlike Cyril and 
Ambrose, Theodore and John Chrysostom explained baptism in advance.  However, “in all four sets of 
sermons the instruction on the Eucharist is held back until after the neophyte’s baptism and first 
communion” (Ibid., p. 167). 
 
 40 Ibid., p. 57. 
 
 41 Aidan Kavanaugh, The Shape of Baptism:  The Rite of Christian Initiation of Adults.  
Collegeville:  Pueblo, 1978, p. 143. 
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them by faith, so that even in this world we can struggle not to abandon any part 
of our faith in them.  Accordingly we need this sacramental liturgy to strengthen 
our faith in the revelation we have received; the liturgy leads us on to what is to 
come, for we know that it contains, as it were, an image of the mysterious 
administration of Christ our Lord, and affords us a shadowy vision of what took 
place.42 
 
This fourth phase of initiation was purposely distinct in tone and content than that 
of the previous stages.  Pre-baptismal instruction was necessarily conceptual given its 
focus on “the communication of the foundational creedal tenets of the Christian faith.”43  
Mystagogy was less didactic, less fixated on doctrinal matters, and concentrated more on 
impressing in a “poetic and lyrical”44 way the experience of “the economy of salvation 
that [was] offered to the neophyte”45 in baptism.  The content, tenor, and style of 
mystagogical preaching was 
marked by a rhetorical ornamentation and theological splendor that is unparalleled 
by contemporary standards.  The patristic mystagogues are given to images, 
metaphors, and stories that reveal the significance and deeper meaning of the 
baptismal symbols.46 
 
Yet, as profound as these homilies were, it was not their eloquence alone that illuminated 
the minds and hearts of communicants.  The sacraments themselves were the “prime 
factors in this illumination . . . the supreme words, speaking more loudly than any 
homily.  Initiation [was] initiation into the truths of faith, through the sacraments and not 
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initiation to the sacraments.”47  For the fathers, the sanctifying presence of the Holy Spirit 
communicated through the sacraments consisted of the true elucidation of mystery qua 
mystery.  Additionally, the neophytes were not simply awestruck spectators acted upon, 
as it were, by Spirit and saint.  The baptized shared in the mystagogical process first and 
foremost through their free and radical faith in Jesus Christ.  Just as the rites 
themselves—and not only the masterful sermons of the fathers—were the illuminating 
influence of mystagogical instruction, so faith was understood as the primary means into 
the mystery and into the community formed in the love of Mystery: 
For patristic theology in general, faith makes us enter into a mystery . . . into a 
design of love which God has conceived from the beginning, and which is being 
worked out over the centuries. The first characteristic of initiation is that it 
introduces into a mystery of God’s love in Christ.  The second characteristic is 
that this initiation is always, at the same time, initiation into a community.  
Patristic mystagogy applied to both aspects—mystery and community—of this 
initiation process as a whole.  Similarly, the neophyte had at one and the same 
time a religious experience of the Mystery of Christ and of insertion into the 
Christian community.48 
 
 Mystagogy was a “special method of developing an understanding of the 
mystery,”49 one that incorporated “sensual, evocative symbolism capable of reinforcing 
the mystery of the experience”50 of initiation.  The constituent elements of initiation, 
including material elements (water, oil, light, space, bread, wine), gestures (stripping of 
garments, embrace of peace), and verbal expressions (creed, consecration), needed to be 
interpreted in order to show that “behind the visible and tangible rites deeper and 
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invisible effects are operative.”51  While more will be said later about the mechanics of 
this method, mystagogy consisted of a rhetorical movement from the visible elements and 
gestures of the sacraments to “the invisible reality of Christ”:  the mystery “underlying 
the sacramental material and rite . . ..” 52  The mystagogical homilies were Christ-
centered and thus thoroughly incarnational, that is “meaningless apart from the sense of a 
unified vision of the mystery of God’s intervention in human history”53 and meaningful 
only in so far as the newly baptized acquired “a more profound experience of the paschal 
mystery” of Jesus Christ on both an “intellectual level [and] also on the level of lived 
personal experience.”54 
 Whereas the mystagogical method of each of the fathers may have differed from 
that of the others, they shared a common purpose:  “to give the baptized the 
understanding and motivation that [would] enable them to live the life of Christ that [had] 
been bestowed in them in the liturgical celebration.”55  The fathers built upon the 
experience of being purified in the rejuvenating waters of baptism by illustrating ways to 
“examine everything with the eyes and mind of Christ.  [Mystagogy] was more than just 
the experience of God in the events that surrounded the Easter vigil; it was a process that 
started with conversion and culminated in a life consecrated to the missionary service of 
Christ.”56  In this way, mystagogy was meant to sustain the local church community as a 
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 52 Ibid., pp. 16-17. 
 
 53 Ibid., p. 24. 
 
 54 Saterlee, op. cit., p. 6. 
 
 55 Mazza, op. cit., p. 165. 
 
 56 Covington, ibid. 
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whole in the life-long process toward Christian perfection.  While addressed directly to 
the newly baptized, mystagogy was open to all; indeed, Christians “of longer standing 
liked to join [them] to hear the mystagogic sermons.”57  Cyril of Jerusalem remarked that 
“these daily instructions on the mysteries, and these teachings which proclaim new 
tidings, are useful to us all, but especially to you who have been granted new life from 
old age to rebirth.”58  The struggle to live the gospel—first under the threat of Roman 
persecution then later owing to “the pernicious laxity of faith fostered by a comfortable 
lifestyle in prosperous Byzantium”59—was felt by the fathers, who intended mystagogy 
“as a pastoral practice for the recuperation of those of the baptized who had grown 
disillusioned and indifferent—towards the church if not towards Christ.”60  Thus, the 
annual period of mystagogy was an opportunity to renew the faith commitment of all 
church members and to seek the return of the estranged. 
 
Mystagogy as Theology 
 Enrico Mazza distinguishes two basic forms of mystagogy in the early church:  
homilies addressed to catechumens or neophytes; and commentaries on the liturgy “with 
a strong emphasis on [its] spiritual meaning.”61  The first form is simply “one of the 
many ways by which a homilist adapts himself to an audience that is not yet capable of a 
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deeper understanding of the mystery and therefore requires a very lively kind of 
instruction, one without much theological meat in it lest this uselessly burden the 
hearers.”62  Mystagogy of this type is designed for the newly baptized and adopts a 
narrative style to describe the initiation rite, most often in its relation to figures in bible 
stories.  Though based in doctrine, its concern is not with systematically elucidating 
specific points of doctrine.  The second form of mystagogy is designed for the more 
spiritually proficient, namely those capable of understanding interpretations of liturgical 
symbols that express (in word or matter) certain spiritual truths.  Mystagogy of this sort 
places strong emphasis on the spiritual meaning of liturgy by attempting to give “divine 
and spiritual realities (which in themselves are inexpressible) . . . a kind of material 
consistency and thereby the concreteness of what is visible and tangible.”63 
 Mazza believes these meanings, even when taken together, limit the reach and 
richness of mystagogy.  His study demonstrates that the mystagogy of the fathers had a 
broader scope than what is suggested by these two forms.  For, in these modes, 
mystagogy owes its existence to the specific needs of particular groups of Christians 
(viz., novices and contemplatives) rather than to 
the very nature of the object being explained, namely, the liturgical celebration.  
Mystagogy would then have its origin not in the church as such and be her 
understanding and explanation of the mystery, but rather in the special experience 
of limited groups . . ..  It would, therefore, not be the way of interpreting the 
liturgical celebration, but simply one particular way arising from the limited 
situation of some.64 
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In short, mystagogy was much more than a type of pedagogy that might be easily 
replaced with another form.  Rather, it was a special method of developing an 
understanding of the mystery (=liturgy), one that illuminated the ontological content of 
the sacraments and thus their christic nature.  Mystagogy intended to lead people 
searchingly into the mystery of Christ because his very mystery is mediated through the 
sacraments.  Mazza claims that mystagogy “is not to be regarded as belonging solely to 
the sphere of catechesis or spiritual theology, but is rather a true and proper theology:  a 
liturgical theology.”65  He contextualizes this assertion by suggesting that there was no 
“standard way of doing theology”66 in the patristic period.  Theology developed 
situationally, from out of particular pastoral and/or apologetic needs.  The pastoral need 
for mystagogy led the fathers to develop through their homilies what are demonstrably 
the first forms of sacramental theology.  Certainly, these are not academic treatises that 
hammer out comprehensive theoretical accounts of the sacraments.  Yet mystagogy was 
in fact a means of “doing theology.”  As Mazza contends, mystagogy ought properly to 
be spoken of as mystagogical theology.67 
 Whereas the practice of mystagogy was universal by the fourth century, there was 
no strict set of rubrics that local church leaders were expected to follow.  This gave the 
fathers a good deal of latitude in composing their homilies.  Even as a phase within the 
relatively fixed canon of liturgical initiation there remained a flexibility about 
mystagogy:  it could be adapted to the needs of a particular church community and was 
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fluid enough to allow for the charism of the preacher to be expressed.  Still, the intention 
which informs all mystagogy—immersion into the mystery of Christ—constitutes its 
unique methodology which, according to Mazza, “never changes.”68  In turning to 
consider this method and specific instances of its application in the homilies of the 
fathers, it will become clear that, given the variety of mystagogical writings and the styles 
of their authors, the institution of “mystagogy” is perhaps best understood as consisting 
of a variety of mystagogical theologies. 
 
Typology 
 So far mystagogy has been discussed along theoretical lines.  But how was it 
actualized?  What constituted the material of mystagogy?  Undergirding “the notion of 
mystagogy as theology was the fact that each of the mystagogical fathers relied heavily 
on biblical ‘typology’ when explaining the sacramental mysteries to the Christian 
neophytes.”69  At the risk of oversimplifying a rather complex hermeneutical issue, 
typology was the unifying if not uniformly applied method that the fathers employed as a 
means of discerning God’s plan for the salvation of humanity as revealed in scripture.  
Typology constitutes a style of interpretation which maintains that the texts of the Old 
Testament prefigure events in the life of Jesus Christ and the early church.  The fathers 
interpreted the persons, events, and symbols of the Old Testament stories as “types”—
i.e., figures and examples—of what is communicated in the person, words, and actions of 
Jesus Christ.  Conversely, the New Testament illuminates what is concealed in the Old 
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Testament.  Typology presupposes that because the record of salvation is revealed in the 
narrative sweep of scripture the Bible operates as an integrated whole, with each 
testament making “the other relevant to the progression of God’s salvific order.”70  
Typology demonstrates that behind “the writer’s words and intended meaning [are] . . . 
deeper reaches of meaning intended by the Holy Spirit . . ..”71 
Typological method was not original to the fourth century mystagogues, it simply 
continued the form of scriptural interpretation already present in the gospels; for the 
evangelists interpreted the great actions of God on behalf of Israel as prefiguring the 
definitive salvific event of Jesus Christ.72  So, for instance, “Moses was a prophetic figure 
and lawgiver, like Jesus; the sacrifice of his firstborn son, Isaac, by the patriarch 
Abraham was more than a hint of what God the Father would do in sacrificing his Son, 
Jesus; Jonah in the whale’s belly for three days is like the Son of Man who spent three 
days in the tomb . . ..”73  Cyril of Jerusalem connected the waters poured out at baptism to 
the waters of “creation, the Exodus and passage through the Red Sea . . . culminating in 
the Lord’s baptism as a harbinger of his resurrection from the dead, his descent into the 
‘nether world’ and ascension into heaven.”74  Mystagogical typology connected God’s 
mysterious plan for humanity to sacramental action.  Creation, as illustrated in the Old 
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Testament “was united through the revelation of the New Testament with salvation, 
which was made available to all mankind through the sacramental rites of the church.”75 
 Let us consider some material instances of typology to gain a better sense of 
mystagogy’s method.  The fathers drew symbols and metaphors for their mystagogy from 
three sources:  scripture, daily life in the ancient world, and from pagan mythology.  We 
will look at examples from each of these sources and offer a brief commentary on their 
mystagogical contents.  We begin with an excerpt from Ambrose’s De Sacramentis 
which interprets the Exodus story as prefiguring Christian baptism: 
Moses took his rod and led the Hebrews, by night in a column of fire, by day in a 
column of cloud.  What is this fire except truth, which gives clear and visible 
light?  What is this column of light except Christ the Lord . . . [and] the column of 
cloud the Holy Spirit.  The people were in the sea and the column of light went 
before them; then came the column of cloud; the shadow, as it were, of the Holy 
Spirit.  You see then that we have in the water and the Holy Spirit the type of 
baptism.76 
 
This passage communicates a number of interrelated points.  The first thing to notice is 
the close connection Ambrose makes between the Old and New Testaments and the 
liturgical rite.  The signs and events of Exodus 13 prefigure the symbols of the baptismal 
rite (water, fire, possibly incense).  This implies that from a Christian perspective the 
Israelites’ passage from the throes of Egyptian bondage (a type of death) through the 
waters to freedom (a type of resurrection) take their fullest meaning from the event of 
Christ’s Passover from death to new life.  The saving waters of the Red Sea are shown to 
be the same life-giving waters poured out on catechumens at baptism; the light that 
guided the Hebrew people’s desert journey comes from the same source as the 
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candlelight which illuminated the darkened space of the Easter vigil sanctuary.  The 
second thing to notice is the existential and emotive dimension.  Ambrose thrusts his 
audience directly into the narrative of salvation history, heightening their consciousness 
of just how ancient the mystery is into which they have been immersed. Ambrose’s 
intensely imaginative mystagogy emphasizes that “God’s salvation is mediated to us 
through the history of the world,”77 in particular through the paschal mystery of the Son 
of God and the sacraments of the Church.  Knowledge of the historical and theological 
sweep that Christ’s death and resurrection encompass evoked in neophytes a sense of 
their own cooperative role in the story, a story that continues to unfold and is now 
inclusive of their lives.  This undoubtedly stirred in the baptized attitudes of awe, 
privilege, and responsibility. 
 Now, if this modest analysis of the passage is in any way accurate, we can along 
with Mazza conclude that “this is nothing but theology; [and that] it is no longer possible 
to distinguish between a mystagogy of baptism and a theology of baptism.  The text of 
Ambrose makes it clear that theology is directly produced by the consistent typological 
application of Old Testament passages to the Christian sacraments.”78  This further 
substantiates Mazza’s claim that mystagogy is always mystagogical theology. 
 In another instance of Ambrose’s mystagogical exposition of the baptismal rite, 
he rhetorically leads his audience back to the night of their initiation: 
You came into the baptistery, you saw the water, you saw the bishop, you saw the 
levite . . ..  You saw all you could see with the eyes of the body, all that is open to 
human sight.  You saw what is seen, but not what is done.  What is unseen is 
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much greater that what is seen:  “because the things that are seen are transient, but 
the things that are unseen are eternal.”79 
 
Here Ambrose moves from the signs that are still freshly present in the minds of his 
listeners to a spiritual perception of the realities behind those symbols, leading them from 
the appearance (“what is seen”) to the effect (“what is done”) of the singular mystery of 
baptism, namely the saving efficacy of the invisible presence of the Holy Spirit. 
 A second example demonstrates that Greco-Roman daily life was a common 
locus from which the Fathers could draw patristic typology.  If one traces Christian 
mystagogy back to its ultimate origin, it is Jesus since the “formation given by Jesus to 
his disciples was the true mystagogy.”80  Initiation placed catechumens in the same 
company as the apostles whom Jesus commissioned to be his gospel in the world.  John 
Chrysostom did not wait until after the sacramental initiation on Easter to preach his 
mystagogical sermons because he believed that baptism, confirmation, and Eucharist 
were themselves the mystagogy.  Because the sacraments communicate the supreme 
mystery, who is Christ, the rites—not the homilies—initiate one into the mystery of God 
because they effect an ontological change in the baptized, a true conversion. 
Chrysostom’s pre-Easter sermons served to “enhance this role of the sacraments as 
themselves the mystagogy.”81  He did not comment on the sacraments so much as offer 
lessons in the Christian life.  It would appear that one of Chrysostom’s chief concerns 
was to show that the sacraments were nothing to be taken lightly.  Initiation into the 
Mystery of God is ongoing throughout the life of the baptized and often comes at a great 
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cost.  Chrysostom encouraged his whole church community (and not only catechumens) 
with practical ways that such daily initiation actually happened.  He was renowned for 
“his emphasis on the pious and practical application of theological affirmations.  [His] 
sermons . . . underline the perspective of the heavenly kingdom, which is in turn reflected 
in human art and culture.”82  In this way Chrysostom was quite comfortable using 
metaphoric language drawn from the life of the culture around him.  Take, for instance, 
his rather dramatic interpretation of the anointing rite: 
Now the bishop knows that the Enemy is enraged and is sharpening his teeth 
going around like a roaring lion, seeing that the former victims of his tyranny 
have suddenly defected.  Renouncing him, they have changed their allegiance and 
publicly enlisted with Christ.  It is for this reason that the bishop anoints you on 
your forehead and marks you with the seal, to make the devil turn away his eyes. . 
. . From that day onward you will confront him in battle, and this is why the 
bishop anoints you as athletes of Christ before leading you into the spiritual 
arena.83 
 
In this passage, the saint readies his audience for holy war with Satan, who is compared 
to a raging beast searching for its next kill.  The oil the catechumens will receive at the 
anointing rite is emblematic of their new and eternal allegiance to Jesus—alignment with 
whom frustrates the diabolical attacker.  Chrysostom then intimates that chrismation is 
like the practice of rubbing down athletes prior to a match; in this case as preparation for 
metaphysical battle with the devil.84  Whereas these metaphors are somewhat mixed and 
inconsistent, there is a connection:  in the ancient world, anointing with oil was a sign of 
blessing and preparation for entry into a new and strenuous life.  For the Christian, it a 
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symbol of initiation into the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus Christ.  The images 
would have been familiar to anyone in Greek society.  Chrysostom surely knew his 
audience would perceive the subtext of Christian martyrdom by lions, an image that 
further illustrated the cost of discipleship.  The rites, after all, represented “a much 
broader struggle, one of spiritual, or cosmic, proportions.”85 
 A third example shows that the church fathers looked even to pagan mythology 
for their typological interpretation of sacramental action.  Homer’s epic poems Iliad and 
Odyssey and their tales of war and wandering were esteemed throughout Mediterrania.  
The most popular Homerian myth was indisputably that of Odysseus and the Sirens.86  
The story was no less familiar to the fathers who saw embedded in the text a “profoundly 
meaningful system of symbolism” and values.87  References to the story can be found in 
the writings of Clement of Alexandria, Ambrose of Milan, Gregory of Nyssa, Methodius, 
Origen, Jerome, and Tertullian, among others.  Their appropriation of the story represents 
an intuition early in Christian history that the secular arts can help prepare a path to the 
faithful hearing of God’s word: 
Sailing by the island of the Sirens on his way home to Ithaca, Odysseus tied 
himself to the mast of his ship so he could hear their seductive singing . . . without 
succumbing to their temptation and destroying himself on their rocky shores.  So 
too could the mature Christian make his way through the sensual and intellectual 
enticements of the secular world and pagan culture, having full knowledge of 
them while tying himself to the cross—the mast of the Church—for spiritual 
security.88 
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The “myth became for the Christian an expression of the belief he so passionately held, 
the belief that while he was on his journey to the port of eternity, he was in the throes of a 
decision, the issues of which were life and death.  True, he sailed in the good ship of the 
church, but a ‘shipwreck of the faith’ was still possible, for the all-knowing Sirens still 
threatened.”89  The hero Odysseus “tied of his own free choice to the mast . . . is the 
exemplar of the spiritually mature Christian who concerns himself with the doctrines of 
the heretics without endangering his soul, hearing but not following.”90  The fathers 
interpreted this secular work for those who had freely “fastened” themselves to the cross 
of Jesus through baptism.  Their typological rendering of the story taught that “what is 
concealed in the mystery of baptism and what takes place there under mystical forms, 
will at the end of days become the final reality and then will be fully revealed whether 
our voyage in the ship of the church spelt death or life, victory or ruin.”91 
 In Protrepticus (Exhortation to the Greeks), Clement of Alexandria’s weds the 
Siren myth to his overall theological project of demonstrating that Greek thought was a 
foretaste of the truest philosophy, viz., the gospel of Jesus Christ.  Clement desired that 
cultured “persons under instruction for baptism . . . [should] feel that they would be at 
home in the Church.  He wanted to show that one could be an educated and intelligent 
believer without abandoning the apostolic rule of faith and life.”92  His mystagogy thus 
offered novices a way of assimilating aspects of their culture into a Christian frame of 
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reference.  Clement insists that those who instruct catechumens should integrate into their 
teaching culturally-celebrated stories and familiar ideas and make “a kind of beggar’s 
collection—and that on as liberal a scale as he can—of helpful thoughts (from the 
wisdom of the Greeks).  All that we must guard against is that we should dally there and 
go no further instead of returning home again to the true philosophy.”93  Clement’s 
mystagogical interpretation of the Siren myth equips his audience with a two-directional 
interpretive method.  On the one hand, his mystagogy appropriates a work of great 
literary art as a source through which he might teach Christian faith (often vis-à-vis 
idolatry) and correct what he considered reprehensible behavior in Greek society.  On the 
other hand, Clement gives his assembly of cultured Christians the means of interpreting 
on a larger scale the Homerian narrative they knew so well:  the wine-dark sea, the ship, 
the voyage, the Siren’s song, Scylla and Charybdis, the “mystical mast”94—all of these 
familiar symbols were charged with a new, eschatological meaning when understood 
within the framework of the Christian story.  For Clement, the Odyssey was the par 
excellence allegory of the Christian journey: 
Thy helmsman will be God’s Logos and the Holy Pneuma will waft thee into the 
port of the heavens.  Then wilt thou behold my God, wilt be initiated into the holy 
mysteries and wilt be suffered to enjoy that which is hidden in heaven, that which 
has been prepared for me, which neither ear hath heard nor the heart of man 
conceived.95 
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 As shown in the foregoing examples of biblical typology, the church fathers 
turned with relative ease to the culture of their time to help explain the convictions of 
Christian faith, its symbols and practices.  Indeed, emergent Christianity as a whole 
borrowed frequently, deeply, and critically from Hellenistic culture, philosophy, and 
mythology for its self-definition.  To the fathers, being Christian was not about 
abandoning or condemning the world, but of embracing it in its fullness—made manifest 
in the Incarnation.  This belief inculcated a generous attitude toward secular society and 
gave them a barometer by which to measure what was true, good, and lasting in popular 
culture as well as what was fallible and incomplete. 
 Yet the question remains as to why the church would need to turn to any other 
source other than the symbols and convictions of the Judeo-Christian tradition itself for 
catechesis on the faith.  For a religion that claims it has by grace received and through 
faith believed that in Jesus of Nazareth the definitive revelation of God had been 
enfleshed for the sake of all creation, why would any other sources other than scripture 
and church tradition have intramural value?  What was the force within Christianity itself 
that justified what might be described as the fathers’ magnanimity toward secular 
society?  What principle legitimized the use of local legend and practice as a prime 
source for mystagogy?  Surely, to answer this question would be to shed light on a 
significant presupposition not only behind mystagogy but behind the whole of 
Christianity and its ongoing dialogue with culture. 
 Hugo Rahner speaks to this question specifically in relation to the Christianity of 
the Greek fathers.  He names the magnanimous impulse in their writings a form of 
“Christian humanism”—that “wonderfully bold and widely ranging gesture of the 
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Hellenic Christian, that gesture whereby he fetches everything home to Christ, the spring 
of water and the stars, his sea and his swift ships, Homer and Plato and the mystical 
numbers of the Pythagoreans.  All was but a preparation” for the gospel.96  In particular, 
the proto-Christian myth of Odysseus rested  
on an intimation, even though dim and fleeting, of that truth that is the foundation 
of Christian humanism, the humanism that is proof against all illusion; the truth is 
this:  God has willed it that heaven is not to be the only thing that man should 
enjoy.  Earth also, transfigured but still delectably tangible, earth with all its 
loveliness is also there, here and now, for his delight . . ..”97 
 
The fathers’ openness to the customs and institutions of the time was nothing less than a 
faith affirmation that creation and culture are divine gifts and that the world is blessed 
because of God’s universal presence deep within the created order.  This orientation, 
which H. Rahner names “Christian humanism,” gave credence to their appeal to Greek 
modes of understanding the world which in turn helped patristic mystagogues show that 
Christian faith was not something foreign or irrelevant to the way of life of their 
audiences.  In short, what might be called a “mystagogical consciousness” is one that 
promotes inculturation, for 
the people to be initiated must have contact with Christ and his Mystery in 
cultural terms which they can understand and appreciate.  Their experience must 
be a real one that touches their lives.  Mystagogy is the initiating, done by the 
Spirit, in the church, through the instrumentality of rites and with the help of 
mystagogues.  This means that the language of the Bible, the experience of 
Christian witness and the help of the mystagogue must be accessible to that 
people.  This rendering accessible of the Christian message and of Christ living in 
his church, for each era and in each cultural area, is the work of inculturation.98 
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The precise nature of the relationship between Christianity and culture and the related 
question of inculturation is a massive issue, one at the heart of theology, a science tasked 
with interpreting expressions of faith—expressions that are inexorably cultural.  While 
the problem of theology and its inculturation is not the primary concern of the 
dissertation, it shall be taken up to some degree in the next chapter in relation to Karl 
Rahner’s mystagogical theology and only after sufficient prolegomena. 
 
Liturgical Mystagogy Today 
 To round out the chapter’s discussion of patristic mystagogy a quick word should 
be said about mystagogy and its place in the liturgical life of the Catholic church today.  
The chapter began with a quote stating that the practice of mystagogy was abandoned for 
almost fourteen hundred years only to be revived again in 1974.  What happened that it 
became virtually forgotten until its reinstallation as part of the liturgical reforms of 
Vatican II?  Scholars note both historical and theological reasons for the near demise of 
formal ecclesial initiation rites, including the institution of mystagogy.  Briefly, the rites 
began to wane in the late fifth century owing to a number of factors, foremost of which 
was the declaration of Roman emperor Flavius Theodosius in 391 banning pagan worship 
practices—after which people became Christian in droves, less for pious reasons than for 
maintaining socio-political acceptability.  Furthermore, the fourth and fifth centuries 
saw an increase in the number of converts after Christianity became the official 
religion of the empire.  This resulted in a shortened initiation process, relaxed 
requirements, and unverified conversions.  With the universal acceptance of infant 
baptism during the fifth century and indiscriminate baptisms of conquered 
“barbarians,” the adult catechumenate became nearly defunct. 99 
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Mystagogy’s obsolescence was due 
not only to the move to an intellectual theology, but also to the atomizing of the 
view of faith consequent on this.  Only when each aspect of Christian tradition 
was recovered—respect for religious experience as of theological value and a 
unified view of faith centered on the Mystery of Christ—could mystagogy 
reappear as a realistic pastoral practice.100 
 
 As noted earlier in the chapter, in 1974 the Catholic church issued the Rite of 
Christian Initiation for Adults (R.C.I.A.) as the official process for entrance into the 
community of faith.  The R.C.I.A. was modeled upon the church’s primitive initiation 
procedure with certain adaptations made to accommodate contemporary needs.101  The 
R.C.I.A. restored “a vision of Christian community embraced by the early church, the 
vision of a people with conversion as its primary focus, the faith community as its 
context, and discipleship as its goal.”102  Consistent with the patristic notion of 
mystagogy as the perpetual initiation into the depths of Christ’s mystery, the R.C.I.A. 
recognizes that the “whole community needs to be renewed.”103  Initiation is a 
gradual process that takes place within the community of the faithful.  By joining 
the catechumens in reflecting on the value of the Paschal Mystery and by 
renewing their own conversion, the faithful provide an example that will help the 
catechumens to obey the Holy Spirit more generously.104 
 
 Today, mystagogy is the last formal stage of the R.C.I.A., a period of instruction 
following the formation and initiation of catechumens into the church that spans up to 
fifty days and which involves the newly baptized, their sponsors, and (ideally) the entire 
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parish community.  The official text of the R.C.I.A. states that mystagogy is a “time for 
deepening the Christian experience, for spiritual growth, and for entering more fully into 
the life and unity of the community.  . . . [As] the term ‘mystagogy’ suggests, [neophytes 
are] introduced into a fuller and more effective understanding of mysteries through the 
Gospel message they have learned and above all through their experience of the 
sacraments they have received.”105  Mystagogy explains “how the new Christian is to live 
the new life into which he or she has been initiated,”106 empowering them “to draw from 
their sacramental experience a new sense of the faith, the church, and the world,”107 so 
that they may begin to see “the connections between their lives, liturgy, and the Christian 
tradition.”108 
 However, while sincere efforts have been made to bring to the fore the importance 
of an ongoing mystagogy for all the baptized—efforts reflected, for instance, in the texts 
referenced in this chapter—mystagogy remains a fairly marginalized concept and practice 
in the church today.  Here three reasons might be suggested as to why Catholics remain 
unfamiliar with the term and function of mystagogy.  First, while conversions to the faith 
are common enough, the average parish will not name its post-catechumenate instruction 
“mystagogy” as such, perhaps out of fear of confusion over its verbal opacity.  Second, 
there is widespread inconsistency in implementing programs of post-baptismal catechesis 
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at the local church level.  Some parishes take great pains to do it well; others might not 
have the pastoral resources or personnel to make it very effective; still others simply have 
very few converts from year to year.  Probably the greatest obstacle to effective 
mystagogy is the (misguided) notion that the initiation rite constitutes something of a 
graduation exercise:  there is no need to continue with instruction after the 
“commencement” at the Easter Vigil Mass.  In this case, the onus is on the neophytes and 
their sponsors to commit to the full program of initiation, mystagogy included.  And 
third, in the realm of academic theology, although important studies have been published 
about mystagogy the tradition never became a mainstream topic in systematics and it 
remains a fairly minor, though clearly important, area in patrology and liturgical 
theology.  Thus, despite the clarion call by some for a renewal of mystagogy and an 
expansion of its meaning, in name and application it gets little exposure in the Church 
today. 
 
Conclusion 
 The first three chapters of this dissertation were concerned with the question of 
how the Catholic church, and Catholic theology in particular, has made sense of film in 
relation to itself.  It was concluded that while the merits of the existing attempts to link 
Catholic faith and film are many, a more comprehensive theological study of their 
relationship needs to be made.  This dissertation has proposed that “mystagogy” holds 
great promise among the possible interpretive concepts available to theology for 
understanding the role of film vis-à-vis Christian faith.  To show the strength of this 
proposal it was necessary to first lay hold of the meaning of mystagogy in Christian 
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history from antiquity to the present.  To this end, the present chapter has attempted an 
accurate précis of the concept and practice of mystagogy, including its:  (a) placement in 
the ancient Christian initiation rites; (b) homiletic form; (c) poetic and interpretive 
character (typological methodology); and (d) pastoral and theological nature.  The 
progenitors of mystagogy were pastors who saw in their flock living evidence that 
initiation into the economy of salvation through communion with Jesus Christ and the 
church had engendered deep emotions, wonderment, and many questions.  They 
recognized the need for a post-baptismal forum where the experience of initiation could 
be explained in such a way that sustained the sense of awe inspired by the rites 
(mysteria).  Such a form of instruction would complement the more conceptual type of 
catechesis they underwent prior to their initiation.  Christian mystagogy developed as a 
form of homiletic instruction that intended to lead converts toward an increased affective 
rather than strictly intellectual understanding of their baptism.  The objective of 
mystagogical catechesis was to magnify the feelings of amazement, privilege, and 
reverence stirred in neophytes by the power of grace communicated to them through the 
rites and to lead them to feel intensely Christ’s extravagant love for them: 
Now by means of these commemorations and signs that have been performed, we 
all approach the risen Christ with great delight.  We embrace him as joyfully as 
we can, for we see him risen from the dead and hope ourselves to attain to a share 
in the resurrection.  In the symbols that have been enacted . . . he appears and 
comes close to us, he is entire in each part and close to each of us to seize and 
embrace him with all our might and show him whatever love we choose to give . . 
..109 
 
The fathers’ mystagogical homilies disclosed the meanings of the sacraments primarily 
by way of typology, a method that compared sacramental elements to stories, characters, 
and metaphors found in both religious and secular writings.  As master students of the 
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gospels and the holy texts of Judaism, and versed in Greek and Roman oratory and 
mythology, patristic bishops knew the power of the poetic integration of word and image.  
They were trained in rhetoric, not logic.  What mattered to them was not clever 
argumentation; rather, it was the emotive capacity the poetic word had to set aflame the 
hearts of listeners and lead them to really experience the divine mystery into which their 
lives were now immersed.  Bishops had to draw deeply from their poetic sensibilities to 
find language and images appropriate enough to cast light on the limitless depths to 
which the sacraments give access and to accommodate their sermons to the circumstances 
and abilities of local church audiences.  Because stories communicate ideas and emotions 
in ways that a strict apologetics cannot, the catechetical strategy of mystagogy was a 
critical use of both ecclesial and extra-ecclesial narratives and experiences to help 
interpret Christian narrative and experience analogically.  What justified the fathers’ 
borrowing from non-Christian sources to teach the gospel was finally their belief that in 
the Incarnation, God was forever united to the world and to God’s creatures.  The divine 
plan of redemption had been disclosed in creation and history through the advent of 
God’s Logos in the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus.  Thus, the Incarnation was the 
ultimate criterion for the inculturation of Christian belief and the doctrinal precondition 
for the fathers’ critical search for intimations of ultimate truth in the philosophy and 
poetry of their age.  God had entered the world so completely that any barrier between 
sacred and secular was forever vanquished.  Their faith that God (Mystery) was enfleshed 
in Jesus of Nazareth permitted the bishops to scan creation and human history for 
intimations of the truth of life that they believed was manifested fully in God’s 
incarnation.110  And the gospel was the hermeneutical canon, the normative justifying 
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source of discernment, for their evaluation of which secular sources were in continuity 
with Christ’s message and which were not.  Mystagogy was a specialized theological 
method, one that introduced communicants to the depths of the mystery of Christ not by 
intellectual speculation but by interpreting the visible symbols of the sacraments in a way 
that disclosed their hidden meanings and in so doing aroused in communicants feelings of 
the numinous and inspired commitment to discipleship and service.  Thus, mystagogy 
materialized through a poetic catechesis—a compelling integration of rhetoric and 
theology.  It followed the logic that instead of “starting from doctrine, one may start from 
experience.  Instead of beginning outside the Mystery, with the likelihood of never really 
penetrating it in a salvific way, one can start from inside the Mystery, through 
experience.  As Cyril of Jerusalem said in his first mystagogical homily, ‘seeing is far 
more persuasive than hearing.’”111 
 Theologians of every age are challenged to interpret the Christian message for the 
people and culture in which they live and of disclosing in turn how the gospel itself—
which is to say the person and message of Jesus Christ—interprets the people and culture 
of every age.  In antiquity, great apologetic efforts were taken by the fathers to make 
Christian teaching intelligible, credible, and accessible to those they were evangelizing 
and to interlocutors who exacted a defense of the faith.  As an institution of Christian 
initiation, mystagogy developed within this matrix.  The next chapter looks to see how 
the matrix of contemporary transcendental theology can serve to develop mystagogy for 
today’s church. 
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CHAPTER 5 
Introduction 
With this chapter we come to heart of the dissertation as a project in systematic 
theology, one that will explore in particular how the theology of Karl Rahner (1904 – 
1984) contributes important resources for a Roman Catholic interpretation of film.  
However, before introducing these resources and then applying them to the question of 
the relationship between theology and film, it is worth taking stock of what has been 
accomplished so far and what contribution the present chapter hopes to make to the 
conversation. 
So far the dissertation has analyzed elements of the fresh “field” of academic 
research—“theology and film”—that has been shaped by a community of scholars, all 
from different places and perspectives.  As with any new and unfolding tract of 
theological study, maintenance and upgrading are required if its fruits are to remain 
wholesome and its perimeter to expand.  The first three chapters provided a topography 
of this field’s current features and contours—a “lay of the land,” as it were—first by 
tracing the genealogy of ecclesiastical teaching about film and then analyzing pioneering 
Catholic monographs that explore film from specific theological perspectives.  As 
demonstrated, these Roman Catholic-based approaches held a largely positive estimation 
of the cinema, commending it for its artistry and encouraging the church to engage it 
critically, for the sake of evangelism, theology, and pastoral practice.  Overall, the 
magisterium and the individual Catholic authors agreed that while theology and film are 
formally distinct enterprises, they are relatable, mutually informative, and their 
relationship is crucial for today’s church.  The initial chapters of the dissertation 
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contextualized our project and highlighted important existing theories about Catholic 
theology and film. 
They also provided starting points for further development of the area.  For 
instance, the exposition uncovered a major shortcoming in existing Catholic teaching on 
the cinema.  Although these writings are linked by virtue of their Catholic identity, the 
particular significance of that identity went largely unspecified in the texts themselves, 
leaving the common thread connecting them implicit and Catholic teaching about film on 
the whole disjointed.  Much of the literature operates on the presupposition that a 
relationship or “dialogue” between theology and a non-Christian source like film is 
already justifiable according to principles in the Catholic tradition.  However true this 
presupposition might be, from the perspective of systematic theology it needs exposition 
so as to make clear the foundations within the tradition that justify theology’s turn to 
film.  A preliminary step is therefore needed, one which attends to the theoretical 
conditions of possibility for any relationship between theology and film.  This fifth 
chapter represents one attempt to find within the Catholic theological tradition the 
resources for building a more theoretically comprehensive model of exchange between 
theology and film.  At the very minimum, what is needed is an approach that is (i) rooted 
in tradition and the teachings of the Vatican on film; (ii) broad enough to encompass 
elements of existing Catholic approaches; (iii) able to identify the diagnostic character of 
“Catholic” interpretations of film; and (iv) demonstrative of the a priori conditions for 
the possibility of correlation between theology and film.  With Rahner as our guide the 
chapter attempts to disclose theological sources that authenticate engagement between 
theology and cinema so that we may reflect more consistently and meaningfully on 
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particular films from the standpoint of Christian principles.  Thus, it is hoped that the 
criteria established herein will provide theoretical support to the magisterium’s 
pronouncements and to other existing Catholic approaches to cinema.  It is further hoped 
that the chapter helps bring to the fore a greater sense of the importance film holds for 
theology, catechesis, preaching, and other pastoral initiatives. 
Based on Rahner’s recovery and adaptation of mystagogy for contemporary 
theology and spirituality, the chapter presents the thesis that film is a locus mystagogicus.  
As will be explicated, the thesis suggests that film has the great potential to be both a 
source for theology’s critical engagement and a mode of theology in itself.  The model of 
film as a locus of mystagogy has two interrelated ideas.  First, film is a medium of art 
and culture, independent of the church, that theology can approach in order to aid its 
inherent mystagogical task of relating experience and Christian doctrine.  Film is a point 
of reference, a cultural topos, artistically descriptive of the anthropology presupposed by 
doctrine, that theology can engage as part of its mission to lead people into a greater 
perception of their experience of God.  According to Rahner, theology must present 
church teaching in a way that organically relates it to common human experiences by 
demonstrating points of contact between the two.  Toward this end, theology can turn to 
movies, not merely as object lessons for its own principles, but as unique expressions— 
conveyed, as they are, more in narrative and image than concept and word—of the human 
quest for knowledge, love, and meaning.  In accordance with the directives of the Second 
Vatican Council, theology needs to actively engage the world into which the gospel has 
been delivered.  Since film discloses particular interpretations of the world and 
broadcasts these to countless people, it is a crucial channel for theology’s engagement; it 
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demands an at once generous and critical hearing.  If theology is to awaken and aid the 
process of the deepening of faith, it must do so with a concrete knowledge of the world in 
which its addressees are immersed.  Toward this end it has a two-fold responsibility:  “to 
learn better to read the world along with the gospel—to hear more clearly the questions 
the world is asking and to provoke the world to ask new questions.  This is the essence of 
Christian theology, not merely the study of scripture text but of worldly context.  
Theology always demands an intimate familiarity with both.”1  Thus, the first idea of the 
thesis is that film enlarges theology’s sensibilities and capabilities. 
Second, if theology, as Rahner argues, is understood to be “the total and conscious 
self-expression of the human being, insofar as this self-expression arises out of God’s 
self-communication to us through grace,”2 then film, as one form of human self-
expression, can constitute a legitimate mode of theology.  Specifically, film operates as a 
mode of “mystagogical theology” when it initiates people into the mystery element of 
their lives in ways that theology operating at a conceptual level cannot.3  Our direct 
cinematic experiences, even prior to explicit reflection and analysis, can serve to open us 
to mystery.  When film leads people to a greater awareness of the religious dimension 
present in their concrete experiences it operates mystagogically and can serve to place us 
on the threshold of a genuine act of faith in God.  Discernment is needed here, however, 
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since what constitutes film’s “openness to mystery” and its possible disclosure of genuine 
“religious experience” needs explication, and film itself cannot be expected to provide 
such an interpretation.  In turning to cinema, theologians must become mystagogues and 
learn to read its symbols in film in light of Christian symbols.  Within the illuminating 
light of the gospel, theologians should be capable of perceiving genuine religious 
phenomena in film, a dimension that often remains latent even to filmmakers.  
Theological engagement of film, however, is not an end in itself:  For the theologian-
cum-mystagogue, disclosing the religious dimension in film serves as a path to faith.  
Thus, the second idea of the thesis is that theology enlarges film’s capabilities. 
If film stands today as an irreplaceable examiner of life and death, a 
nonconceptual, compelling, and sensuous form of human self-expression capable of 
revealing the (often implicit) desire for faith in human experience, then it is a medium 
that theology cannot fail to reference for its own life.  If theology’s mission is to serve the 
preaching of the church and the spirituality of believers, then when believers (and non-
believers) find their own search for knowledge and love reflected in cinema, then it is a 
text that theology cannot afford to neglect.  The question this poses for systematic 
theology concerns the preconditions of theology’s engagement with film.  How can a 
secular form of aesthetic experience be a source for theological inquiry?  To answer this 
particular query, we must consider it in terms of a wider concern:  On what doctrinal 
grounds is theology, whose object is God as God is revealed to us, justified in turning to a 
non-Christian source such as film for sustained reflection?  This chapter finds the means 
for answering this question in Karl Rahner’s insistence that theology turn to human 
experience as a primary theological source.  If, again, theology is the total and conscious 
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self-expression of the human person that originates in God’s own self-communication as 
grace, then what needs clarification is just how film “arises” out of grace (at least 
potentially) and can be a source for theological engagement as well as constitute a 
legitimate mode of theology in itself.  Thus, the aim of this chapter is to provide ample 
justification for theology’s turn to film as a potential means to faith—that is, a source for 
and of mystagogy. 
Using mystagogy as the interpretive key to understanding the ultimate aim of 
Rahner’s thought, this chapter attempts to establish the theoretical warrants for the claim 
that film is a legitimate and crucial locus mystagogicus upon the interrelated aspects of 
his fundamental theology.  For Rahner, fundamental theology studies that basic principle 
which gives rise to Christianity and therefore to all forms of theology:  the revelation of 
God “who communicates and discloses himself is the foundation and principle and 
likewise the all-embracing truth which takes in all elements of revelation and hence all 
theological disciplines.”4  Fundamental theology’s foremost concern is revelation “as the 
origin and heuristic principle and overriding unity” of theology.5  It asks:  What is 
revelation and how does it appear?  How is it communicated and how can it be 
understood?  What are its structures and categories? 
In Rahner’s view, fundamental theology must maintain its traditional apologetic 
dimension in its effort to explain the foundational themes of Christianity (revelation, 
Jesus Christ, faith, church).  However, it cannot begin with an exposition of these 
doctrines.  It must posit the reasonableness of belief in God and the credibility of faith in 
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Christ by beginning with an investigation of the transcendental and historical conditions 
of human life that make openness to revelation and reception of the divine word of God 
in faith possible:  the revelation that doctrine interprets and expresses.  Fundamental 
theology “may be described as a transcendental theology, inasmuch as it considers the 
nature and event of revelation as such, prior to all special theology or branches of 
theology.”6 
Rahner’s theology commences with an inquiry into the structures of human 
experience that render people open to and capable of receiving divine revelation.  His 
interest is in how revelation, “which as God’s word is beyond space and time, can take 
place in space and time; how revelation, which does not stem from the mind and words of 
men, can still be word and event for men and their minds and their capacities as being of 
this world and of history.”7  Grounded in the fact of revelation, Rahner’s fundamental 
theology, therefore, turns to anthropology, to human experience, as a primary theological 
source. 
This chapter builds upon this principle by suggesting that film, a secular artistic 
vehicle of self-expression and reflection on human experience, is a legitimate and fecund 
locus mystagogicus for leading people to a greater depth of faith.  The chapter will follow 
the transcendental method and concepts (anthropology, transcendence, grace, revelation, 
supernatural existential, symbol) by which Rahner articulates his fundamental theology 
of the religious experience of God.8  Rahner’s approach leads us to see that theology and 
                                                
 6 Ibid. 
 
 7 Ibid., p. 370. 
 
 8 It is, of course, impossible within the parameters of a single dissertation chapter to do full justice 
to these themes as Rahner relates them.  We must be content to give a condensed, yet still precise, 
expression to the main theoretical lines of these subjects.  It may be helpful to present from the start a 
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film, while distinct, are already related and can be mutually illuminating.  It is his notion 
of mystagogy and its role in fundamental theology that will provide the dynamic link in 
construing theology’s relationship to film and vice versa. 
Rahner may at first appear to be an odd choice as a resource for our thesis.  He 
never wrote about film directly, nor is he renowned for his aesthetic writings.9  
Furthermore, specifying what Rahner means by mystagogy with precision is not a simple 
assignment.  Indeed, the rationale for synthesizing sources on early mystagogy and laying 
down its key historical and theological foundations in the fourth chapter of the 
dissertation was to provide background and context for this chapter’s investigation of 
mystagogy as Rahner interprets and adapts the tradition in relation to theology and the 
arts.10  Yet mystagogy was not a topic about which Rahner developed a full-fledged 
theory or even a single, normative definition.  He did not establish his notion of 
mystagogy explicitly on its Christian prototype, and so he never needed to explain the 
                                                
feeling for Rahner’s approach to doing fundamental theology.  As he says, the “standard fundamental 
theology . . . attempts with the help of metaphysics and history to provide a rational foundation for faith.  In 
other words, it too begins with aspects of human life.  What is distinctive about my own contribution can 
only be found in the attempt to tie fundamental and dogmatic theology closer together.  What I try to do is 
rethink the human starting point in regard to the individual questions of dogmatic theology.  This is 
possible because all dimensions of human life already stand under the dispensation of divine grace.  A 
theology that begins with the human person would only represent a false inculturation of the Christian 
message if it were no longer able to affirm the absolute God and his irrevocable turning to us in Jesus 
Christ, crucified and risen.  Because this fundamental message of Christianity can be understood by all the 
culture of the world, there is no reason why a pluriform inculturation of the gospel would undermine the 
unity of Christian faith and of the Church.  This is true even when it is recognized that pluralism in 
theology and preaching will have to become far more marked than it is at the moment if the message is to 
be understood by all peoples” (Karl Rahner, Faith in a Wintry Season:  Conversations and Interviews with 
Karl Rahner in the Last Years of His Life.  New York:  Crossroad, 1991, p. 79). 
 
 9 Though it should be noted that in the past decade his aesthetic writings have received greater 
scholarly appreciation. 
 
 10 Aiden Nichols gives further rationale for the need for our analysis of mystagogy in chapter 
three.  He writes that whereas theologians have the task “to repossess the inheritance of the past in a 
distinctively modern way and [reorganize] it on a basis that seems to us intellectually satisfying and 
pastorally helpful, we cannot do this without a rich and detailed knowledge of the inheritance” (Aidan 
Nichols, The Shape of Catholic Theology.  Collegeville:  Liturgical Press, 1991, pp. 198-199). 
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continuities and differences between the ancient form and his own extrapolation.11  Nor 
do his reflections on mystagogy refer directly to the Catholic church’s reinstallation of 
the tradition as part of the R.C.I.A.  Yet what Rahner does write on the subject suggests 
that it is not merely one of the myriad theological matters upon which he reflects:  it is 
the hidden agenda behind all of his theological musings.  Rahner’s mystagogy is a blend 
of continuity and innovation and it represents a significant evolution in its meaning and 
intention for contemporary theology. 
It is clear from Rahner’s writings and interviews that his primary concern as a 
theologian, pastor, and poet is to open people to the revealed reality that their lives are 
saturated with the mystery of God’s forgiving and saving grace even amid the clamor, 
monotony, and anxiety that often characterize our age.  This is nothing less than a 
mystagogical sensibility, one discernable even in his most scientifically rigorous 
reflections.  He affirmed this appraisal of his theological orientation even while admitting 
that mystagogy remained an underdeveloped facet of his thought.12  In the places Rahner 
uses the term it appears that he assumes readers are familiar with at least the basic 
contours of his overall theology and can deduce his extrapolation of ancient Christian 
mystagogy.  That is to say, he relates mystagogy through and not in addition to the 
categories of his fundamental theology by which he outlines the logic of Christianity, 
                                                
 11 Similarities and differences between historical mystagogy and Rahner’s more speculative 
interpretation will be noted along the way in this chapter.  However, it should be clarified from the 
beginning that the chapter is not a comparative study of these understandings. 
 
 12 See Karl Rahner, “Introduction,” in James Bacik, Apologetics and the Eclipse of Mystery.  Notre 
Dame:  University of Notre Dame Press, 1980, pp. ix-x.  This work, which represents the most 
comprehensive account of Rahner’s mystagogy, is one we shall reference frequently throughout our study.  
Hereafter, reference to this text will be abbreviated Apologetics. 
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gives a reasonable basis for religious belief, and demonstrates how the doctrines of faith 
are inherently interconnected. 
The chapter discusses Rahner’s conception of the nature and purpose of theology, 
including the cultural situation to which his retrieval of mystagogy attempts to respond 
and to which, as our argument suggests, film can serve to complement.  Here we will 
present an overview of Rahner’s theological anthropology and the method by which he 
analyzes the content of Christian faith in light of the a priori transcendental structures of 
human experience, structures that by grace incline people toward divine revelation and 
prepare them for the knowledge of and assent to the truths of faith.13  In short, the chapter 
lays down the theoretical foundations for Rahner’s mystagogy, and, in so doing, defines 
with more precision the theological presuppositions underlying the Catholic literature on 
film studied earlier. 
This then paves the way for a mystagogical practicum in the sixth and final 
chapter of the dissertation, which elucidates Rahner’s reflections on poetry and the arts in 
conjunction with two films.14  His writings on theological aesthetics demonstrate that for 
him the arts hold tremendous potential as mystagogical loci.  As will be shown, Rahner’s 
teaching on transcendence is the conceptual link between these two chapters, since 
human transcendentality is the condition for the underlying unity he intuits between 
theology and the arts.  Thus, our film analyses will constitute one way in which theology 
                                                
 13 Karl Rahner, “Transcendental Theology,” in Sacramentum Mundi Vol. 6.  New York:  Herder 
and Herder, 1970, p. 287. 
 
 14 I am grateful for the work of theologian Gesa Thiessen whose research into the relationship 
between theology and art has helped frame the approach this dissertation is taking toward cinema.  Personal 
correspondence with Dr. Thiessen in the early stage of research for this dissertation helped confirm that my 
initial thoughts about Rahner’s “aesthetics” were sound regarding his importance for relating theology and 
film.  Her essay on Rahner’s aesthetics in the Cambridge Companion to Karl Rahner summarizes this 
importance. 
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can become mystagogical.  Again, while Rahner never wrote directly on the topic of 
cinema, the insights he develops in his essays on poetry and the arts, when understood 
within the wider framework of his systematic theology, are transferable to film, mutatis 
mutandis, and support the thesis that film is a locus of mystagogy. 
Finally, myriad attempts have been made to comprehend the integrated elements 
that make up the whole of Rahner’s theology.15  These testify to the intricacy of Rahner’s 
thought, his intensity as a theologian, and to his sensitivity as a pastor and writer.  They 
also indicate the multi-faceted richness of his writings:  after all, so many people seem to 
want to learn from him, including those critical of his viewpoints.  It should be clarified 
from the start that the chapter does not attempt a comprehensive analysis of Rahner’s 
fundamental theology, which is nevertheless an impossibility within the parameters of a 
single dissertation chapter.  The chapter relies on Rahner’s own literature as well as on 
the interpretive work done already on many fronts by his students.  It is not our intention 
to add to the galaxy of interpretive literature on Rahner.16  Here, we are attempting to 
construct an argument, namely that film is a source for and of a specific form of theology 
                                                
 15 The following sources include helpful bibliographies of Rahner’s writings and secondary works 
translated into English:  James Bacik, Apologetics and the Eclipse of Mystery:  Mystagogy According to 
Karl Rahner.  Notre Dame:  Ind.,:  University of Notre Dame Press, 1980, pp. 81-96; Geoffrey Kelly, ed., 
Karl Rahner:  Theologian of the Graced Search for Meaning.  Minneapolis:  Augsburg Press, 1992, pp. 
350-358; Declan Marmion and Mary Hines, eds.  The Cambridge Companion to Karl Rahner.  New York:  
Cambridge UP, 2005, (see recommended reading lists at the end of each chapter).  C. J. Pedley, “An 
English Bibliographical Aid to Karl Rahner,” The Heythrop Journal 25, no. 3, July 1984, pp. 319-65. 
 
 16 The countless interpretations of Rahnerian theology available today begs the question of 
whether anything more and original can be said about it.  Whereas explications and evaluations of the 
major themes of his theology made by the brightest of his first and second generation students provided 
deep insight into his thought, what one finds more often today are studies (such as this dissertation) that are 
practical applications of Rahner’s ideas to specific scholarly problems and pastoral situations.  These 
tertiary studies can be said to continue the task of interpreting Rahner’s theology as they add at times fresh 
variations on conventional themes.  Thus, the task of interpreting and applying Rahner’s theology to the 
questions of the church today remains incomplete.  See James Bacik, “Is Rahner Obsolete?  What his 
Critics Get Wrong,” in Commonweal, Jan. 28, 2005, p. 19. 
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called mystagogy, and we are turning to Rahner because we feel he has very useful tools 
that can assist in setting down foundations for Catholic interpretations of film.  The idea 
here is to connect certain elements in his thought that substantiate the thesis that film is a 
locus mystagogicus.17 
It should also be made clear that the chapter is not meant to be a comprehensive 
commentary on Rahner’s mystagogy.  That project (happily, for us) has already been 
done, or at least proficiently started, by James Bacik in his volume Apologetics and the 
Eclipse of Mystery:  Mystagogy According to Karl Rahner.  Bacik’s pioneering and 
insightful study, to which Rahner gave his imprimatur, gets closer than anyone to a 
thoroughgoing interpretation of Rahner’s mystagogy.  It should come as no surprise that 
we will follow Bacik as an important guide throughout the chapter.  For all of its 
comprehensive scope, however, Bacik’s analysis abbreviates elements that influenced 
Rahner’s mystagogy.  For instance, he forgoes discussion of the significance Ignatian 
spirituality has on Rahner’s mystagogy and takes little account of Rahner’s own homilies 
and mystical writings.  More importantly for our purposes is the fact that Bacik only hints 
at the mystagogical role Rahner believed the arts play in and for theology.18  The next 
chapter attempts in part to remedy this latter omission. 
Because Rahner taught his students to “be fearless in seeking truth from any 
human quarter,”19 he “would be both complimented and complemented were his students 
                                                
17 Limitations of this theory as well as certain criticisms of Rahner’s theology will to a certain 
extent be vetted in the next chapter. 
 
 18 Bacik’s later text, Catholic Spirituality:  Its History and Challenges (Mahwah, NJ:  Paulist, 
2002) takes into greater account Rahner’s homilies and writings on spirituality vis-à-vis his mystagogy. 
 
 19 Andrew Tallon, “Editor’s Introduction,” in Karl Rahner, Hearer’s of the Word (trans. Joseph 
Donceel).  New York:  Continuum, 1994, p. xix. 
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to do as he himself did, as he showed the way, by trying in every imaginable, 
conceivable, and responsible way to continue and expand his dialogue with contemporary 
philosophy, theology, and science.”20  If we add “dialogue with the arts” to this list, then 
the aim of this chapter and the next is to take up Rahner’s challenge by gaining 
perspective on the relationship he solders between theology and the arts and drawing out 
the implications of their communion for a more comprehensive Catholic approach to 
film.  In arguing the theory that film is a crucial cultural source for and of mystagogy and 
a vibrant dialogue partner with theology as a whole, this penultimate chapter provides a 
firmer theoretical basis for a Roman Catholic-based interpretation of film.  It overcomes 
some of the lacunae in existing Catholic literature on film and provides a necessary 
foundation for Rahner’s teaching on theology and the arts as well as the film analyses in 
the final chapter. 
 
Recovery and Adaptation of Mystagogy 
 To understand what of early Christian mystagogy Rahner retrieves and what 
modifications he makes to it for modern theology and church life, it is necessary to return 
briefly to our discussion of the early practice and fill out more of how the fathers justified 
their turn to Greek cultural sources both in their mystagogical sermons and in their 
theologies overall.  We recall that Christian mystagogia (“immersion into the mysteries”) 
was a practice associated primarily with the ancient custom of local bishops spending 
Easter week with new converts in order to explain the details of their initiation experience 
and thereby illuminate the depths of the truths professed at baptism.  This form of 
                                                
 20  Ibid., p. xvii. 
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preaching, called “mystagogical catechesis,” consisted of a series of homilies whereby 
the church fathers disclosed the hidden meanings of sacramental symbols and actions by 
correlating them with familiar biblical and pagan literary stories and characters.  Their 
mystagogical sermons disclosed God’s loving plan of salvation in evocative, lyrical ways 
rather than through concepts or discursive reasoning.  The fact that patristic mystagogy 
tended to be more emotive than analytic underscores the value the fathers placed on 
experience and imagination in educating converts about the multiple meanings of 
Christian symbols and helping them “savor” the mystery of Christ’s love communicated 
to them in baptism. 
The previous chapter spoke of the “magnanimity” of the fathers in their turning to 
Greek culture for elements used to teach Christian faith.  With regard to mystagogy, we 
analyzed several instances when the fathers turned to Greek philosophy and poetry as 
points of reference for the inculturation of the gospel—sources that could augment the 
church’s own self-interpretation.  Yet on what theological basis did they justify 
appropriation of the “wisdom of the infidels”?  What precedent in the history of the 
covenantal tradition did they draw upon to warrant the use of outside references?  
Whereas the fathers did not develop any comprehensive theory justifying their turn to 
pagan sources, there are some hints in the literature as to the perspectives they held. 
Two main positions emerge with respect to how the fathers interpreted the 
relationship of the church to classical culture.  On the one hand, there was absolute 
rejection.  The so-called wisdom of Greek philosophy was in certain fathers’ minds 
specious because it did not issue from divine revelation.  Mixing truth (gospel) with error 
(philosophy) would lead to the contamination of faith and corruption of the soul.  
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Tertullian (c. 160 – c. 240), a proponent of this view, believed that in Christ the very 
wisdom of God had been communicated and entrusted to the church.  His oft-quoted 
questions indicate his repudiation of non-Christian sources:  “What indeed has Athens to 
do with Jerusalem?  What concord is there between the Academy and the Church?  What 
between heretics and Christians.”21  Thus, from this perspective, the church has no further 
need of any knowledge, particularly the kind that comes from reason alone and not the 
divine Word. 
On the other hand, there were advocates of what might be called the cautious 
discernment of Greek sources.  Knowledge of classical Greek culture gave the fathers a 
language and a logic by which they could present the teachings of Christianity in ways 
that made sense to the Hellenistic mind.  Mystagogues of this order of thinking 
appropriated cultural elements familiar to their audiences to develop analogies (“types”) 
linking the established with the new.  Well-known symbols from daily life were linked 
interpretatively to the symbols of the “new” faith in Jesus Christ to show that Christian 
faith was not altogether foreign or irrelevant to the way of life of their audiences and, 
more importantly, to illustrate how the revealed, enfleshed truth of Christianity surpasses 
all attempts at human knowledge.  Jesus’ own recourse to (and scrutiny of) the culture of 
his time gave justification to this approach of cautious discernment, as did the authors of 
scripture who recorded the faith of the nascent church through symbols drawn from 
Greek society. 
Another way of justifying the use of non-Christian sources is articulated by 
Origen (c. 185 – c. 254) in his Letter to Gregory: 
                                                
 21 Tertullian, The Prescription Against Heretics, Chap. VII, in Alexander Roberts and James 
Donaldson, eds., Ante-Nicene Fathers, Vol. 3.  Peabody, MA:  Hendrickson, 1994, p. 246. 
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I have desired that with all the power of your innate ability you would apply 
yourself, ultimately, to Christianity.  I have, for this reason, prayed that you would 
accept effectively those things from the philosophy of the Greeks that can serve as 
a general education or introduction to Christianity and those things from geometry 
and astronomy that are useful for the interpretation of the Holy Scriptures.  . . . 
And indeed Scripture hints at this principle in Exodus, where, with God himself 
the person speaking, the children of Israel are told to ask their neighbors and 
cohabitants for vessels of silver and gold for clothing (Ex. 11:2 and 12:35).  
Having in this way despoiled the Egyptians, they may find material among the 
things they have received for the preparation of divine worship.22 
 
Origen presents this analogy from the Old Testament as grounds for the use of secular 
ideas and for what he felt was the proper Christian attitude toward Greek philosophy:  
“Just as the Hebrew people took property of the Egyptians with them in the exodus, so 
God's people are always allowed to use the ‘spoils of the Egyptians’ in borrowing truth 
from pagan sources where it may be useful in explicating the meaning of Scripture and 
communicating the gospel to pagan inquirers.”23 
 Justin Martyr (c. 100 – 165) looks at the problem of the inculturation of the gospel 
via retrieval of Greek wisdom from the perspective of Logos theology.24  In certain 
schools of Greek philosophy it was believed that the divine logos pervades the created 
order, particularly the minds of human beings.  The task of philosophy is to help develop 
people’s intrinsic logos (reason) and thereby assist them in cultivating their connection 
with the divine.  Building on the Logos theology of John, Justin Martyr appropriates the 
expression logos spermatikos in his apologetic works and identifies Christ with the Greek 
philosophical concept of logos.  He argues that by virtue of their ability to reason all 
human beings share in the divine reason.  For him, the “generative seeds” of the Logos 
                                                
 22 Joseph W. Trigg, Origen.  London:  Routledge, 1998, p. 211. 
 
 23 Roger Olson, The Story of Christian Theology:  Twenty Centuries of Tradition and Reform.  
Downers Grove, IL:  InterVarsity Press, 1999, p. 103. 
 
 24 The idea of the Logos, of course, comes from Greek philosophy. 
 
 232 
had been “dropped” everywhere by the Spirit of God, even prior to the incarnation.  He 
believed that the seed had found fertile ground in the Hebrew prophets and certain of the 
Greek philosophers and grew into forms of inspired wisdom.  Whereas the church has the 
full knowledge of Christ, “others enjoy the presence of the Logos at least in fragmentary 
ways.  Thus, Justin interprets Greek history as a prelude and preliminary to Christ and 
Christianity.”25  In this sense, Plato’s teachings 
are not contrary to Christ’s but they are not in all respects identical with them.  . . . 
All those writers were able, through the seed of the Logos implanted in them, to 
see reality [at least] darkly.  For it is one thing to have the seed of a thing and to 
imitate it up to one’s capacity; far different is the thing itself, shared and imitated 
in virtue of its own grace.26 
 
Several other fathers besides Justin, men like Clement of Alexandria, Gregory of Nyssa, 
Augustine, and Leo the Great, also believed that God had planted these seeds to ready the 
world for the incarnation of the Word.  They sought to identify such intimations of the 
Word—fragments, as it were, of meaning and truth—and judge their value against the 
norms of Christian revelation.  They argued 
persuasively that there are semina verbi in the Hellenistic culture, and they took it 
in hand to identify them.  From there they moved on to the all-important work of 
both analyzing the degree to which these semina verbi required purification in the 
light of the gospel . . ..27 
 
 The church fathers believed there were limits to where such indications of God’s 
wisdom could be perceived.  Whereas they discerned the semina verbi in elements of 
Greek philosophy and poetry, as evidenced by their many references to Plato and Homer, 
                                                
 25 Gerald O’Collins and Mario Farrugia, Catholicism:  The Story of Catholic Christianity.  New 
York:  Oxford UP, 2003, p. 19. 
 
 26 From Justin, Second Apology, 13, quoted in ibid. 
 
 27 David R. Foster and Joseph W. Koterski, eds., The Two Wings of Catholic Thought:  Essays on 
Fides et Ratio.  Washington, D.C.:  CUA Press, 2003, p. 99. 
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to their minds no element of pagan religion could reflect the wisdom of God.  To them, 
worship of false gods precluded the Spirit’s scattering of seed.  In the same vein, not all 
Greek philosophy and poetry imparted the truth of God, and the fathers roundly attacked 
those ideas perceived, through the lens of the gospel, as folly.  Still, with faith that Christ, 
the Logos-made-flesh, had redeemed the world through his death and resurrection, the 
fathers felt vindicated in laying claim to all truth, even in seed form.  Old Testament and 
Greek philosophical symbols could therefore be safely appropriated for their theological 
tracts and mystagogical sermons—seeds that would find their full flowering only in the 
incarnation of truth, Jesus Christ.  Thus, intimations of the Spirit’s presence in these non-
Christian sources could legitimately be called a path to faith. 
 In turning now to see why and how Karl Rahner recovered the tradition of 
mystagogy for contemporary theology and then building our thesis upon that model, we 
will need to bear in mind this question of the justification of secular, non-Christian 
sources.  Like the church fathers before him, Rahner’s mystagogy also involves a turn to 
the “secular” world and to non-Christian sources.  For him, common human experience is 
a theological source since it is the locus for the offer of God’s grace and therefore the 
place where theology must discern God’s mysterious presence.  Since it is upon Rahner’s 
mystagogy that our thesis is founded, part of the investigative agenda for our systematic 
study into the theoretical conditions that make possible the engagement of theology and 
film will be an inquiry into how he justifies the “turn to the subject.”  This will provide 
rational grounds for our own turn to a secular source—film—and lead the way to the 
discernment of film in the final chapter. 
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 We recall that the formal practice of mystagogy fell into virtual obsolescence 
when the adult catechumenate disappeared, only to be reinstituted after the Second 
Vatican Council, healing a 1,500-year-long rupture and helping to reunite spirituality, 
theology, worship, and pastoral action.28  Mystagogy was recovered by the church in 
three forms:  (a) mystagogy as part of liturgical renewal (the R.C.I.A.); (b) the mystagogy 
of experience as a pastoral response for Christians living in an increasingly secular world; 
(c) and the mystagogy of mysticism or spiritual theology.29 Rahner’s contribution is 
primarily in the second area.  Indeed, it was Rahner who, “in the years immediately 
following on Vatican II, first gave currency to the revived notion of mystagogy (albeit 
timidly as some would have it).”30  Rahner’s mystagogy is in part a response to what he 
                                                
 28 David Regan, Experience the Mystery, Pastoral Possibilities for Christian Mystagogy.  London:  
Geoffrey Chapman, 1994, p. 6.  Since the Second Vatican Council, the church has used Justin Martyr’s 
language of logos spermatikos with regard to non-Christian religions to indicate that the Catholic church 
must respect whatever is “true and holy” in these traditions.  The notion of “preparation has been much 
used by the magisterium after Vatican II, indicating the semina Verbi, sown by the Spirit in the rites, 
thought and cultures, which are meant (so the magisterium has held) to mature in Christ (Redemptoris 
missio, #29).  In the past, it was with considerably hasty readiness that ‘errors and falsehoods’ were seen in 
other religious traditions (i.e. in non-Christian religions).  Now theological discernment seeks with 
reverence, attentiveness and a more irenic spirit to discover those things which ‘the Spirit sows in the non-
Christian religions’—seeds implanted by the Holy Spirit which Pope John Paul II says, take on ‘the role of 
preparatio evangelica’” (Catalino G. Arévalo, S.J., “Discussion on Trinitarian Theology,” presentation 
given to the Vatican Congregation for the Clergy, Manila, Philippines, January 29, 2002.  See:  
<http://www.clerus.org/clerus/dati/2002-01/29-999999/02TriING.html> (last accessed 2/16/10)).  Our 
concern in this chapter is not so much with how the seeds of the Word can be discerned in the religions of 
the world, but rather with the justification Rahner gives for contemporary theology’s turn to common 
human experience.  This, in fact, is the starting point for Rahner’s discussion of his theory of the 
“anonymous Christian” and the possibility of salvation outside explicit Christianity. 
 
 29 David Regan, ibid., p. 28.  Regan’s categories should not be interpreted as hard and fast 
designations.  While distinctions among them can be made, these forms of mystagogy are interconnected 
by virtue of the fact that an integrated Christian life involves elements of each.  Regan opines that it “does 
seem that Rahner lost heart in the future of his revival of the notion and language of mystagogy:  his later 
works do not reveal any stress on the expression” (ibid., p. 38, n.17).  While it is true that Rahner did not 
develop his notion of mystagogy in any systematic way and it remains on the conceptual periphery of his 
thought, we are justified in taking some exception with Regan’s assessment since, as this chapter expounds, 
it is for the sake of mystagogy that Rahner became a public theologian and his entire methodology of 
leading people to Christian faith.  Moreover, in one of his late essays, “Theology and the Arts” (1982), 
Rahner links theology and the arts through the concept of mystagogy.  Regan does not reference this article 
in his volume (published in 1994). 
 
 30 Ibid., p. 33. 
 235 
believed was a “crisis” afflicting the church.  He admits that today theology faces a 
difficult, if not historically unique, situation where the seeming absence, silence, and 
distance of God is more apparent than ever before and where religious “faith” is often 
considered archaic, incredible, and irrelevant.  This situation requires that theology think 
hard about its fundamental responsibilities and modes of operation.  And given the fact 
that Catholic Christianity has a mandate to engage the world, theology cannot simply 
circle its wagons and ignore the situation.31  Nor can it cave in altogether and allow 
culture alone to determine the issues it must address and the methods by which it must 
address them.  Rahner is convinced the Christian church has in its tradition the wisdom 
and resources needed to help overcome this crisis.  He therefore rereads the tradition with 
this contemporary problem in mind and reintroduces mystagogy into Catholic theology 
and spirituality in a way that maintains elements of patristic mystagogy but also broadens 
its scope beyond what the fathers had envisioned. 
 It is clear that Rahner’s sense of mystagogy has its roots deep in the tradition of 
the fathers, men “very conscious of the ecclesial, political or social position of their 
hearers.”32  Like them, Rahner takes stock of the ecclesial situation of his own time and 
sees “modern Christians, long baptized, and [others] doubting, grieving, seeking”33 and 
living in environments often hostile to religious faith.  He admits that the church finds 
itself in a “deep crisis because of the rethinking required in order to attune itself to the 
historical situation and the needs of the hour.”34  Mystagogy constitutes a response to the 
                                                
 31 Cf. our analysis of Gaudium et spes in chapter two of the dissertation. 
 
 32 David Regan, ibid., p. 33. 
 
 33 Ibid. 
 
 34 Ibid. 
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pastoral challenges of men and women living in a markedly secular society.  When 
Rahner proposes a new style of mystagogy he 
emphasizes the problem of discovering the Mystery in the changed circumstances 
of [modern life].  He saw that the crisis which led to the search for such a new 
mystagogy was bound up in the need for aggiornamento or renewal in the church, 
a church which was failing to provide pastoral care relevant to the needs of 
contemporary men and women.35 
 
Whereas early mystagogy articulated the mystery dimension of the sacraments, Rahner 
understands mystagogy to be that element in theology that seeks to disclose the mystery 
dimension implicit in all human experience so that Christian doctrines can be related to 
genuine human concerns.  Rahner’s notion of mystagogy as the interpretation of mystery 
is linked to his famous dictum that the “devout Christian of the future will either be a 
‘mystic,’ one who has ‘experienced’ something, or he will cease to be anything at all.”36  
He means that Christians today will either have “a genuine experience of God emerging 
from the very heart of existence,” 37 or they will cease to have any meaningful faith.  To 
this end, the task of theology is to equip people with tools to help them correctly discern 
the genuine experience of God from within their ordinary lives.  Knowledge of what 
consists of an experience of God increases people’s consciousness that they are oriented 
toward Holy Mystery and prepares them for the gospel annunciation that this mystery is 
enfleshed in the person and message of Jesus Christ.  A heightened awareness of the 
                                                
 
 35 Ibid., p. 86. 
 
 36 Karl Rahner, “Christian Living Formerly and Today,” in Theological Investigations, Vol. 7.  
New York:  Seabury, 1973, p. 15.  The chapter will in its course expand on the seminal idea of 
“experience” in Rahner and its connection to mystagogy. 
 
 37 Idem., Practice of Faith:  A Handbook of Contemporary Spirituality.  New York:  Crossroad, 
1986, p. 22. 
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transcendental experiences that open up to this mystery can serve to plunge people deeper 
into this experience and lead them to believe in its blessedness. 
 For Rahner, mystagogy, or the mystagogical task of theology, involves first 
awakening people to the ever-present but often undisclosed sense of mystery in everyday 
life as a foundation for their appropriation of the gospel.38  Mystagogy is a dimension of 
theology, one that attempts to “sharpen people’s perception of the mystery that surrounds 
them, to encourage a type of meditative thinking . . . and to put people on alert for the 
echoes of the infinite in their ordinary experience.”39  Theology’s mystagogical 
responsibility is to equip people with the resources needed to interpret their deeper 
experiences with as much accuracy as possible so as to lead them to find in experience 
and relationships the intimations of an all-encompassing, loving mystery—a mystery to 
which the church gives explicit testimony in doctrine and doxology.  Mystagogy serves 
as a prerequisite for the reception and understanding of Christian teaching and is thus a 
path to a more profound experience of faith. 
 Rahner’s emphasis on mystagogy as an interpretive process that initiates people 
into a deeper awareness of God’s mysterious presence has kinship with the mystagogy of 
the church fathers.  Like his forbears, Rahner presupposes mystagogy to be an ongoing 
process in the lives of Christians and does not only serve a provisional liturgical 
function.40  Therefore, his retrieval is less a departure from the patristic understanding 
                                                
 38 See James Bacik, Apologetics, ibid., p. xiv. 
 
 39 Ibid., p. 18. 
 
 40 Recall that while patristic mystagogy was directed to neophytes, it was intended to promote the 
growth in faith of the entire community. 
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than an extension of its meaning to meet the needs of contemporary believers.  For 
Rahner, 
personal experience of the transcendental dimension of life is a necessity if the 
individual is to be a Christian in that world.  For this personal experience a wise 
and skilled guide is necessary.  Rahner spells out a spirituality for contemporary 
men and women of the First World . . ..  Well versed in patristic lore, and perhaps 
precisely because of his familiarity with the Fathers, Rahner can transpose the 
early Christian practice of mystagogy into a modern key to make it relevant to the 
pastoral needs of his country and his time.41 
 
 Lest we misinterpret Rahner’s transposition of mystagogy from a liturgical matrix 
to his own Catholic systematic theology, it is important to indicate why such a move is 
justifiable.  There are at least two reasons.  First is the precedent of flexibility in the 
tradition itself.  Although mystagogy was a universal liturgical rubric, it remained highly 
versatile given that many strands (Christian, Jewish, Greek) came together to form the 
tradition in the first place and owing to the fact that each “mystagogue” brought unique 
interpretive talents to bear on his catechesis.  Second, Rahner’s theology remains 
primarily at the service of the preaching of the gospel.42  In his view, theology and 
preaching and thus mystagogy and liturgy are inseparable.  He does not simply extract 
mystagogy from one sphere and insert it into another.  Mystagogy for Rahner is the 
pastoral-theological effort to initiate persons more deeply into the mystery that pervades 
                                                
 41 David Regan, ibid., p. 33. 
 
 42 Regan offers further justification for Rahner’s appropriation of mystagogy as it flows out of and 
evolves the patristic notion.  He writes that its “wider human, extra-Christian origins entitle us to be freer in 
our use of the categories of mystagogy than if it had been an exclusively Christian creation.  What the 
Fathers did for pastoral motives, in borrowing an experience-oriented approach to religious initiation, 
employed by the traditional religions of their time, we may do today when human and religious initiation 
are once more valued.  Mystagogy was not a Christian invention but a borrowing from the worldwide, 
human practice of initiation.  We are not limited to the particular style of borrowing done by our fourth-
century predecessors in the art of Christian initiation” (from Regan’s Experience the Mystery:  Pastoral 
Possibilities for Mystagogy, ibid., p. 4).  Rahner’s retrieval of mystagogy is in line with what he does 
throughout his theology.  For him, theology “must be so presented that it encourages a genuine dialogue 
between the best of traditional thought and the exigencies of today” (from Paul Imhof and Hubert 
Biallowons, eds., Karl Rahner in Dialogue.  New York:  Crossroad, 1986, p. 22). 
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their daily lives and so lead them to see that they are encountering the very mystery of 
God to which Christian doctrine and worship attest.  Indeed, if mystagogy involves 
making explicit one’s immersion into Mystery, then mystagogy is never far away from 
liturgy in Rahner’s theology, for “God remains the holy One who is really accessible only 
in worship.”43 
 Mystagogy is in part a process of engendering in people a desire to understand the 
intrinsic connection between what occurs in their daily lives and the revelation of God to 
which Christianity bears explicit witness.  To this end it must 
make use of evocative language in order to disclose mystery effectively.  It is a 
matter, not of indoctrination based on the model of filling an empty container, but 
of trying to describe the experience of mystery in the hope that the listeners will 
then discover it in themselves.44 
 
Rahner explains that what the church holds as its fundamental beliefs can never be 
communicated merely by a conceptual indoctrination from without, but is and can 
basically be experienced through the supernatural grace of God as a reality in us.  
That does not mean that the linguistic representation and interpretation of the 
religious experience is not something that has to occur within the church under 
the supervision of her magisterium.45 
 
Conceptual theology, understood as discursive reflection on the teachings of the church, 
is essential to the task of leading people to Christ via interpretation of revelation.  Indeed, 
theology is “perfectly justified in taking a deep breath and proceeding patiently through 
the long and arduous reflections of conceptual theology which cannot be expected to lead 
                                                
 43 A detailed study of the connection between Rahner’s mystagogy and his theological reflections 
on worship and the sacraments has yet to be written.  However, in his volume The Liturgy of the World:  
Karl Rahner’s Theology of Worship, Michael Skelley references Rahner’s insistence that people must 
undergo a mystagogy of discovering the transcendental experience of God in their daily lives as preparation 
for knowledge of what happens in the liturgy.  See Michael Skelley, The Liturgy of the World:  Karl 
Rahner’s Theology of Worship.  Collegeville:  Liturgical Press, 1991, esp. pp. 74-84. 
 
 44 James Bacik, Apologetics, ibid., p. 40. 
 
 45 Karl Rahner, Karl Rahner in Dialogue, ibid, p. 328. 
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immediately to some kind of religious or mystical experience.”46  We cannot “deny the 
power of abstract conceptual thought about God to be deeply beautiful in its own way.  
When it genuinely mediates personal insight, it can be attractive, elevating, personal, and 
spiritually engaged—as anyone knows who has been drawn into wonder and prayer by 
‘abstract’ theology.”47 
 However, theology cannot privilege speculative language alone if it wishes to 
speak existentially and in concrete ways about the human encounter with God and relate 
the gospel to the deepest aspects of people’s lives.  Rahner believes that “an awakening, a 
mystagogy into this original, grace-filled religious experience is today of fundamental 
importance.”48  He asserts that one of the 
consequences and deficiencies of a rationalistic theology working exclusively 
with “scientific” methods is that theology has lost so much of its poetry.  
Moreover, theology faces a task especially today which is not new, but has been 
greatly neglected in recent centuries, namely, that it be in some way a 
“mystagogical” theology.  By this I mean that it must not speak only in abstract 
concepts about theological questions, but must also introduce people to a real and 
original experience of the reality being talked about in these concepts.49 
 
 It is here that Rahner makes explicit the connection he sees between art and 
mystagogy.  He commends the arts for their unique capacity to give careful and vivid 
expression to the religious experience of the human person, to those depth dimensions of 
human life that point beyond themselves to the absolute mystery of God.  Rahner looks at 
the possibilities the arts afford theology in its attempt to overcome the contemporary 
                                                
 46 Idem., “Theology and the Arts,” in Thought, vol. 57, no. 224, 1982, p. 26. 
 
 47 Richard Viladesau, Theological Aesthetics:  God in Imagination, Beauty, and Art.  New York:  
Oxford UP, 1999, p. 14. 
 
 48 Karl Rahner, Karl Rahner in Dialogue, ibid, p. 328. 
 
 49 Ibid. 
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crisis in the church regarding the disconnect between doctrine and experience.  Today, 
theology faces a task 
which is not new, but has been greatly neglected in recent centuries, namely that it 
be in some way a “mystagogical” theology.  By this I mean that it must not speak 
only in abstract concepts about theological questions, but must also introduce 
people to a real and original experience of the reality being talked about in these 
concepts.  To this extent what I have called “poetic theology” could be understood 
as one of the ways, although not the only way, of doing this kind of mystagogical 
theology.50 
 
Immersion in the arts can serve to “awaken” and thus initiate us into a deeper, more 
conscious perception of the “mystery dimension” of the everyday in ways that theology 
operating on a purely theoretical level cannot.  Indeed, because theology “must be 
subjective insofar as it has to speak of faith, hope, and love and about our personal 
relationship with God,” it must be able to “describe, evoke, and introduce one 
mystagogically to this personal and spiritual relationship.”51  Thus, theology facilitated 
by the arts constitutes a mode of mystagogy. 
 The thesis that film is a locus mystagogicus suggests in part that film can facilitate 
the disclosure of mystery.  When film mediates (thematizes or makes explicit) the human 
transcendental experience of mystery, it can serve to tune people into that wavelength of 
mystery that is always present in their lives and yet which too often remains implicit, 
eclipsed, or wholly ignored.  In a form that combines image, sound, movement, and 
montage, film is capable of “describing” the religious experience of mystery by 
imaginatively capturing the depth experiences of everyday living, which according to 
Rahner constitutes the locus of God’s abiding presence in human life.  Like theology, 
                                                
 50 Idem., “Theology and the Arts,” ibid., p. 26. 
 
 51 Ibid. 
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film operates mystagogically when it points away from itself by leading audiences into 
awareness of the “more” into which our lives are immersed but that too often remains 
eclipsed by the pressures and distractions of the day.  Film is therefore a mode of 
mystagogy in so far as it is capable of expressing the spiritual orientation of human 
beings and reflecting the religious dimension of mystery in life which all people share 
and yet to which many remain closed.  The thesis suggests that theology needs the art of 
film in part because there are people who are “more in touch with their deepest 
experience and have a greater ability to verbalize it:  the poet and the mystic, for 
example.  Others are in close existential contact with the mystery of life but have very 
little ability to either reflect on it or verbalize it.”52 
 When theology interprets film, it operates in a mystagogical capacity by revealing 
those dimensions of human life expressed in film that render us receptive to the 
experience of God.  Since effective mystagogy enables people to “interpret correctly their 
deeper experiences, to move from a vague awareness of the mystery dimension of their 
lives to a greater conceptual clarity, to find a proper symbolization of their genuine 
religious experience,”53 Christian theology is a necessary partner to film because, as the 
“science of mystery,”54 it has the tools to discern and make explicit the religious 
dimension of film that audiences and even filmmakers often overlook.  Cinema needs the 
specialized language of theology to thematize and clarify the possible transcendental 
elements present in a film.  Theology becomes mystagogical in part when it demonstrates 
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 53 Ibid., p. xiv. 
 
 54 Karl Rahner, “Reflections on Methodology in Theology,” Theological Investigations, Vol. 11.  
New York:  Seabury, 1974, p. 102. 
 
 243 
how it is that a particular film disposes us to the active presence of God in our lives and 
prepares us for a deeper (i.e., more explicit) initiation into the experience of God in the 
act of faith. 
 From the perspective of Christian theology, film itself is not enough to bring 
people to the threshold of faith.  Film needs the implements of theology to help uncover 
the religious experience of transcendence toward and into this nameless, mysterious 
“more.”  Mystery needs explication, not in the sense of direct analysis, which as we will 
see, is quite impossible, but rather in the sense of an amplification of its essence—as the 
at once inscrutable, knowable, and personal mystery of God.  Together, film and theology 
can prepare people for a more genuine reception of God’s revealed word in their own 
lives by disclosing the hidden depths of life that are never exhausted by empirical 
analysis.  In collaboration with film scholars, theologians can develop the skills to 
interpret film in a way that facilitates the process of “awakening” needed to bring people 
to the threshold of faith.  The depths that are there need to be spotlighted and reflected 
upon, which meditation can lead us to the ultimate mystery that our lives are enfolded in 
the grace of God.55 
 Film becomes a mode of mystagogical theology when it prepares us for a greater, 
more sublime message than film itself could ever reveal.  Theologians can turn to film as 
an aesthetic praeparatio evangelica—a “preliminary step before speaking of God and 
Christian doctrines”56—one that trains our sensibilities for an even deeper contemplation 
of the mystery of God in faith and worship.  Rahner believes that people require not only 
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 56 James Bacik, Apologetics, ibid., p. 19. 
 
 244 
an intellectual preparation to perceive and receive the word of God; their sensibilities 
must also be trained.  Not only must we be prepared to “hear” God’s word but we must 
be trained in the “‘sacred, human, and Christian art to learn to see’ with loving eyes if we 
confess Christ not only as the Word but also as the image of God.”57  For Rahner, the arts 
are irreplaceable modes of self-expression “which cannot be completely translated into 
verbal statements”58and which train us in what he calls the “unity of sensibility,” i.e., 
development and intensification of the faculties that render us responsive to the presence 
of the living God in all of our experiences.59 
 An important qualification to the thesis needs to be made.  Throughout the 
dissertation we have been speaking of “theology” and “film” as two enterprises that are 
distinct in nature and yet relatable on many levels.  We have already analyzed a number 
of ways they can be connected, with this current chapter explicating a Rahnerian 
approach to their relationship, a method that encompasses, nuances, and supports many 
of the other Catholic approaches.  Whereas the immediate focus of this study concerns 
the similarities and not the differences between theology and film, a crucial distinction 
remains:  Theology is a science, with a particular mission that it receives from the church 
of Jesus Christ; film is an artistic medium, one that has what might be deemed a neutral 
nature.  In this sense, the two do not share an equal valence.  If the source of Christian 
theology, as Rahner contends, is an encounter with Jesus Christ, a response in faith to the 
event of God’s revelation in the incarnation and to the mandate of Jesus Christ to “make 
                                                
 57 Gesa Thiessen, “Karl Rahner:  Toward a Theological Aesthetics,” in CCKR, ibid., p. 228. 
 
 58 Karl Rahner, “Theology and the Arts,” ibid., p. 24. 
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disciples of all nations,” then film cannot immediately be expected to share this mission 
since it does not arise (again, explicitly) from out of the person and message of Jesus.  In 
this understanding, film does not have as its categorical mission the leading of people to 
faith in Christ as does theology.   
Real theology has as its basis an undistorted hearing of God’s word with a view to 
salvation, ultimately in the service of salvation itself.  . . . Since the word of God 
to which theology listens is the word which engages the whole man, judging and 
redeeming him, theology can never be purely “theoretical” science, one that is 
existentially uninvolved.  To be worthy of its “object” and thus become scientific, 
theology must be meditative and kerygmatic theology.  . . . By reason of its 
reference to faith itself, theology is a practical science in the sense that it is 
oriented to the realization of hope and love in which an aspect of knowledge is 
provided that is not possible elsewhere.60 
 
While the same definition cannot be facilely appropriated to film, it should not suggest 
that film cannot be an explicit form of religious or theological expression that 
intentionally interprets the gospel and thus shares in theology’s mission to lead people to 
faith by faith.  Indeed, film might lead to doxology; and can even be doxological in itself.  
Certainly there are filmmakers who profess explicit faith in Jesus through their medium.61  
Yet, whereas in the much longer histories of music, poetry, and painting, there are 
numerous examples of “Christ proclaimed,” de facto this has been rarely done in film.62  
The approach to film interpretation for which we are in this chapter laying the theoretical 
groundwork is one that discerns film theologically for its intimations of grace, a 
                                                
 60 Karl Rahner and Herbert Vorgrimler, “Theology” in Dictionary of Theology.  New York:  
Crossroad, 1985, pp. 498-499. 
 
 61 Still, even in these cases, there is need for a theological interpretation of the film’s symbols of 
religious expression. 
 
 62 This returns us to our discussion of film scholar André Bazin and the question of whether the 
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we will take note of Rahner’s perspective on this question. 
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possibility only when theology analyzes film in accordance with the norms of revelation 
as disclosed in the gospel and dogmatic tradition. 
 Furthermore, the thesis that film is a locus mystagogicus, should not indicate that 
film itself can initiate us into the religious experience of mystery.  While film can 
profoundly reveal (i.e. interpret, express, disclose, etc.) something of the human 
orientation to mystery and thus what Rahner calls religious experience, it is not a source 
of revelation in the strict sense—for only God reveals God.  Indeed, neither theology nor 
the arts initiate us into an experience that is something totally new or alien from our 
ordinary life, which according to Rahner is always already immersed in the experience of 
God.  As he says, “theological concepts do not make the reality itself present to man from 
outside of him, but they are rather the expression of what has already been experienced 
and lived through more originally in the depths of existence.”63  However, this statement 
must be understood within a broader context where faith is understood to be a 
supernatural gift from God and is therefore “religious experience.”  Theology is the 
science that “reflects on the act and content of faith in the light of faith.”64  In other 
words, the “science of faith actually becomes part of the faith (of which critical 
responsibility is a moment).”65  Thus, the qualification we wish to make is that, whereas 
film potentially proceeds from faith in Christ and reflects in its own way on the act and 
content of faith, theology does this explicitly as part of its mission.  When film does 
indeed issue from faith, and when it reflects upon the act and content of faith, however 
                                                
 63 Karl Rahner, Foundations of Christian Faith.  New York:  Crossroad, 1986, p. 17.  Hereafter, 
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 64 Idem., “Theology,” in Sacramentum Mundi, Vol. 6.  New York:  Herder and Herder, 1970, p. 
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implicitly (or in Rahner’s language, “anonymously”), it is still informed by and subject to 
the same explicit norms as theology.  In the cases of both theology and film, we will 
know “by their fruits” whether they proceed authentically from genuine faith.  Indeed, 
theologians are just as capable as filmmakers of sowing semina perditionis through their 
work.  Therefore, both require discernment according to the norms of God’s revealed 
word. 
In this section, we have introduced Rahner’s retrieval of the mystagogy of the 
fathers (an action of ressourcement) and begun to discuss the adaptations he makes to it 
in relation to the needs of the church and contemporary theology (an action of 
aggiornamento).  The remainder of the chapter will more substantially explore the 
relationship of Rahner’s mystagogy to his theological method as a ground and support for 
our thesis that movies are legitimate theological sources, and that they can “find a place” 
in Catholic theology as loci mystagogici.  As with any source, one must ask whether it 
can be trusted and verified.  We have discussed in some measure earlier in the 
dissertation how film can be a source of for theology.  But on what grounds can it be 
called a legitimate theological source since it does not (necessarily) issue from explicit 
Christian faith?  Already we have looked at the justification the fathers gave for their turn 
to Greek intellectual and cultural sources.  What is Rahner’s justification for his 
insistence that theology turn to the arts?  What is the normative authority to which 
Rahner appeals for Christianity’s movement outside itself to secular sources for 
theological reflection?  Essentially, this is the question at the heart of this chapter:  What 
theological grounds does Rahner give for his turn to human experience as a locus for 
reflection?  This is the more fundamental question since the condition for the possibility 
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of theology’s turn to film as a locus of and for mystagogy depends on its ability to turn to 
human experience in general.  As we move ahead through the chapter, we will find that, 
because Rahner discovers rationale within revelation itself for the turn to common human 
experience as a theological source, his mystagogy is a significant modification—indeed, 
an evolution—of the mystagogy of the fathers. 
 
Motivations toward Methodology 
Early in Foundations of Christian Faith, Rahner asserts that there is really only 
one question underlying all of his theological investigations:  Whether God 
wanted to be merely the eternally distant one, or whether beyond that he wanted 
to be the innermost center of our existence in free grace and in self-
communication.  But our whole existence, borne by this question, calls for the 
affirmation of this second possibility as actually realized.  It calls out to this 
mystery, which remains a mystery.  But it is not so distant from this mystery that 
this mystery is nothing but a sacrificium intellectus.66 
 
In the volume The Practice of Faith, Rahner puts the same question in a more poetic 
way:  The “question becomes inescapable whether the night surrounding us is the absurd 
void of death engulfing us, or the blessed holy night which is already illumined from 
within and gives promise of everlasting day.”67  In these passages Rahner presupposes 
that human life is circumscribed by mystery and that this mystery is something with 
which everyone must reckon.  However, what he does not take for granted is that this 
mysterious presence is simultaneously a call to personal relationship with one who knows 
us and loves us, and who can be known and loved in return.  Therefore, the question that 
haunted Rahner most was not whether human life is bounded by an ultimate and 
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mysterious reality that Christianity designates as “God.”  The “problem,” he says, “is not 
with the existence of God, but that we can say and pray ‘You’ to this eternal, 
incomprehensible, inscrutable, nameless God.”68  When asked in an interview what had 
been his most profound religious experience, Rahner replied:  “Immersion in the 
incomprehensibility of God and the death of Christ.”  And had this been a mystical 
experience that occurred during prayer?  “’No,’ he answered quickly, firmly.  ‘In life, in 
the ordinary things.’”69 
In these exchanges, a remarkably candid Rahner gets down to what is most basic 
to his theological work and spiritual life.  Admittedly, these selections offer a 
concentrated vision of the man and his thought.  Still, a constant theme is perceptible:  the 
language Rahner uses to describe what is of foremost importance in his theology and 
spirituality—“immersion into the incomprehensible mystery of God”—unmistakably 
evokes mystagogia.  For those familiar with Rahner, the above testimonies serve as a 
reminder that mystagogy is not simply a leitmotif in this theological Meistersinger’s 
colossal oeuvre.  Mystagogy is the very reason he composes theology:  to lead people to 
reflect deeply upon the mystery of human experience so that they may perceive the 
intimations of God’s grace already there and see how this experience of God is fulfilled 
in Jesus Christ and expressed in Christianity.  To the uninitiated, however, his linguistic 
arrangements might sound discordant.  How is it, for instance, that we can experience an 
“incomprehensible” God of “mystery?”  How does this “inscrutable” God call out to us in 
mundane experiences?  How is it possible to utter a loving “Thou” before a “nameless” 
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reality?  Is it not paradoxical to say that the experience of God is altogether unfathomable 
and in the same breath insist that within this seeming obscure experience real hope in 
new life can be found?  Or again, how can one be immersed through “ordinary things” 
into a relationship with Jesus Christ, who the Christian church claims to be the very 
Logos of God, which is certainly no ordinary claim?  To be sure, these are not simply 
questions a casual reader might direct at Rahnerian patois and the apparent incongruities 
in his statements:  they are important theological themes—paradoxes, even—that he 
deliberates with great seriousness and which open up quickly and widely to more and 
greater questions. 
In this section, we wish to begin laying the groundwork for the approach Rahner 
takes toward negotiating these questions and interpreting Christian doctrine, for it is 
through his method that Rahner demonstrates the need for theology’s turn to human 
experience as a theological source.  And it is upon this justification that we can 
understand his evaluation of the arts in relation to theology.  With mystagogy as our 
angle of vision into Rahner’s thought, we will lay out the main lines of the organic 
structure of his transcendental method, the conceptual framework by which he endeavors 
to lead people into conscious realization that their lives are immersed in the Holy 
Mystery of God.  By following the logic of Rahner’s methodology, we will attempt to lay 
out the criteria whereby he arrives at a positive estimation of the arts for theology and the 
life of Christian faith. 
To come to an understanding of the mystagogic quality of his theology requires 
that we begin where he begins, even if it means that we cannot follow, at least in the 
context of a single dissertation chapter, how that essence courses through the many 
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channels of his theology.  We recall that early mystagogues tailored their preaching to the 
abilities and needs of those in their local church.  And so it is proper to ask:  to whom 
does Rahner direct his theology?70 
Rahner knows that the addressee of theology today lives in a world where 
religious faith and the life of prayer cannot be taken for granted.  Even those raised in the 
Christian faith may be disillusioned either by the culture in which the church exists or by 
the church itself or perhaps a mixture of both.  There are pious Christians who find 
elements of Christianity to be obscure or alien; as Karen Kilby explains, “something 
foreign, something that they cannot make sense of, something which they perhaps accept 
but which has little to do with them, and [who] seek to understand anew Christian 
doctrines and the Christian faith so as to overcome this felt foreignness.”71  There are 
those who live within a crisis of faith.  Such people may want to believe, and believe 
more deeply, but may not know where to begin since the doubts have accumulated to the 
extent that they seem insurmountable.  It could be that a person does not feel secure 
enough to risk a life of active, committed faith, and this for a host of reasons.  People are 
often reluctant to give themselves over to something (a cause, a relationship, a creed) 
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without sound preparation and adequate research that tells them in explicit terms that 
such a risk is worth taking.  Perhaps to them the “leap” required of faith appears more 
life-threatening than potentially life-enriching.  Rahner looks at the present situation and, 
confronting it honestly, sees a continuum of positions vis-à-vis Christian faith—ranging 
from sanctimony to hostile atheism—and knows that today’s believer, who lives 
somewhere in-between these lines, must proclaim faith in Jesus amid many voices.  His 
style of doing theology is thus in part a pastoral response to the many challenges 
secularized culture poses to Christian faith.72 
 The question of where Rahner “begins” his theology is one fraught with much 
speculation and there is no need to commence with an evaluation of those opinions.73  In 
                                                
 72 This may not be the conclusion one draws if one focuses only on the conceptual content of 
Rahner’s volume Foundations, or his philosophical-theological works Spirit in the World and Hearers of 
the Word.  A glance at the subject headings of his multi-volume collection of essays, Theological 
Investigations, and his many published homilies and books on prayer give a better sense of the man and his 
approach to doing theology.  Self-described as a theological “dilettante,” Rahner was free to explore a 
variety of issues and address situations—pastorally and, as need required, scientifically—as they arose in 
the context of church life and its dialogue with elements of culture. 
 
 73 This is not to trivialize the importance of the question since one or another response to it can 
color, enhance, or distort how his writings are interpreted.  Later in the chapter we will consider some 
important critiques of Rahner’s theology, his “starting point” being one such difficulty.  One major concern 
involves whether Rahner begins with anthropology, theology, or Christology.  Briefly, in the volume A 
World of Grace, which is really a study companion to Rahner’s Foundations, Anne Carr, a specialist in 
Rahner’s methodology, entitles her chapter “Starting with the Human,” in which she discusses Rahner’s 
approach to theology as anthropological, that he begins his deliberations on Christianity with human 
experience as a whole.  William Dych, also an expert on Rahner’s method, quotes Rahner as once saying “I 
do not have a philosophy.”  Dych writes that it is a false impression that Rahner “first worked out a 
philosophical basis, and then built his theology upon it” (William Dych, Karl Rahner.  Collegeville:  
Liturgical Press, 1992, p. 18).  The concern has to do with the fact that theology and philosophy are 
languages that speak differently from one another because their sources are different.  The source of 
theology is revelation, the word of God that comes into the world and that cannot be deduced from the 
structures of the world or the human person.  Theology appeals to revelation since the nature of theology is 
one of response to what has been heard from God.  Philosophy, on the other hand, proceeds from reason.  It 
may speak of God or the gods as the ultimate ground of being, but it does not appeal to any divine word.  
The matter becomes complex when one considers that theology also speaks in the language of reason; and 
that there is philosophical theology and even philosophy inspired by God.  As we shall see, Rahner is 
integrative in his approach and sees the two as mutually conditioning, that there is neither “pure” theology 
nor “pure” philosophy.  Certainly he is not alone in this approach as a Christian theologian, for “whereas by 
its nature philosophy claims to provide an interpretation of the totality of the real, the church’s faith 
requires it to be able to dispose of a philosophic reason which can grasp the truth about God, human nature, 
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a way, the question has already been answered by the man himself in the quotations 
above:  The source of theology is an encounter with Jesus Christ in faith.  Theology, as 
Rahner explains in one of his definitions, “consists in a process of human reflection upon 
the revelation of God in Jesus Christ and, arising from this, upon the faith of the 
church.”74  And so Rahner begins his theological explorations within the mystery of 
Christian faith.    He imagines a Christian reflecting upon the totality of his or her life 
which “opens out into the dark abysses of the wilderness which we call God” and 
standing before “the great thinkers, the saints, and finally Jesus Christ” and wanting to 
give an account to the question:  “What is a Christian, and why can one live this Christian 
existence today with intellectual honesty?”75  The point to be made is that this basic 
theological question begins with the fact of Christian existence and the proclamation of 
the church and proceeds from there.  As we will see, Rahner seeks to outline a 
justification of Christian faith, not from without but from within, in the act of faith itself.  
In this sense Rahner’s approach is aligned with Anselm’s classic notion of theology as 
faith searching for understanding (fides quaerens intellectum), where theology is 
understood in the first instance to originate in the knowledge of faith in Jesus Christ and 
in the knowledge that comes from that relationship.  Theology in the first instance is 
reflection on a relationship:  a lover who wants to know more about the beloved within 
the loving relationship itself.  The understanding (intellectum) involved “is not grasping 
an idea . . . but primarily knowledge of a person.  Christian faith and theology begin not 
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with the process of investigating and grasping something, but by being grasped by 
someone.”76  For Rahner, theology is not “reflection on doctrines in the sense of a body 
of knowledge or ideas to be mastered, but reflection on a person”; thus theology’s 
starting point, “both about God and ourselves, is Jesus of Nazareth.”77  The implications 
this position holds for Rahner’s epistemology and Christology will be discussed in due 
course.  For now we can say that Rahner’s restoration of mystagogy realigns conceptual, 
academic theology to what ought to be its primary aim, namely to serve Christian 
spirituality and its quest for an existential encounter with God in the mystery of Christ. 
Even Rahner’s most abstract theology is driven by his conviction that there is an 
intrinsic unity between spirituality and theology.  Any theology “true to its nature and 
calling would help people achieve a closer personal relationship with Christ.  The more 
scientific theology is (that is, responsive to the questions of the age while drawing on the 
Christian tradition), Rahner held, the better guidance it provides for the spiritual quest.”78  
What is more, Rahner maintains that theology “is intended to serve preaching, and 
preaching addresses people where they are, so that they will be able to bind themselves 
more intensely to God in their own concrete situations.”79  Indeed, as we saw in our 
investigation of early Christian mystagogy, it is only because there is preaching that 
theology exists, and not vice versa.  Theology would in fact “cease to exist if it severed 
its link to the preaching and the proclamation of God’s word of love.”80  To be sure, 
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 78 James Bacik, “Is Rahner Obsolete?”, ibid. 
 
 79 Karl Rahner, Faith in a Wintery Season, ibid., p. 164. 
 
 80 Harvey Egan, Karl Rahner:  Mystic of Everyday Life.  New York:  Crossroad, 1998, p. 105. 
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theology is not kerygma, per se; it remains the science of faith, meticulously and 
systematically reflecting on the experience of revelation.  Still, theology needs to be 
kerygmatic:  the “strictest theology, that most passionately devoted to reality alone and 
ever on the alert for new questions, the most scientific theology, is itself in the long run 
the most kerygmatic.”81  From out of faith, theology serves the preaching of the church 
and the faith the gospel espouses by translating the message of Christ in language and 
terms understandable in a particular culture and interpreting Christian faith in ways that 
demonstrates its credibility and meaningfulness for a given human situation.82 
Theology is a theology that can be genuinely preached only to the extent that it 
succeeds in establishing contact with the total secular self-understanding which 
man has in a particular epoch, succeeds in engaging in conversation with it, in 
catching onto it, and in allowing itself to be enriched by it in its language and 
even more so in the very matter of theology itself.83 
 
For Rahner, theology’s search for meaning in faith involves reaching toward a “renewed 
understanding” of the Christian message and situating it “within the intellectual horizon 
of people today.”84  Again, there is commonality between Rahner’s approach to doing 
theology and that of his patristic forbears whose mystagogical preaching (itself a form of 
theology) emphasized the experience of the sacramental encounter with Christ in their 
reflection in order to initiate people into knowledge of the depths of the mystery of 
Christ.  Just as the fathers drew concrete material for their preaching from culture to 
                                                
 
 81 Karl Rahner, “The Prospects for Dogmatic Theology,” in Theological Investigations, Vol. 1.  
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discern the living presence of God in the sacraments, so must theology today speak as a 
participant in culture in ways that aid participation in the life of faith.  All theology, 
therefore, presupposes inculturation, not simply to enunciate itself but to put people in 
touch with the knowledge of faith in ways that touch their lives.85  Rahner reminds the 
church that all theology ought to operate with this mystagogical orientation to aid 
believers’ discernment of the intimations of the divine mystery that envelops them at 
every moment. 
Mystagogy is one of the elements that allows Rahner to make the fresh alliance 
between speculative and pastoral thinking which is one of his contributions to 
Catholic theological renewal.  Mystagogy, as a pastoral/spiritual factor, helped 
him bridge the centuries-wide gap between abstract theology and untheological 
spirituality.86 
 
 There are multiple ways theology can disclose the religious or mystery dimension 
that penetrates human experience.  For instance, it can consult the insights of philosophy, 
which was for centuries the primary discipline that investigated and clarified the self-
understandings of human beings.  Today, theology may continue to consult philosophy 
for conceptual frameworks and language that is intellectually justifiable for discourse 
about the world today, but it must also recognize that contemporary people define 
themselves more in social and behavioral terms than they do in philosophical concepts. 
[W]e have the fact that the philosophies no longer furnish the only self-
interpretation of man that is significant for theology.  Instead, as theologians 
today we must necessarily enter into dialogue with a pluralism of historical, 
sociological, and natural sciences, a dialogue no longer mediated [and clarified] 
by philosophy.87 
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Thus, theology must also have contact with existential and imaginative expressions of 
human self-understanding in the 
various non-scientific manifestations of the life of the spirit in art, in poetry, and 
in society . . . [all representative forms] of the spirit and of human self-
understanding with which theology must have something to do.88 
 
 Implicit in this statement is a position of Rahner’s that holds particular import for 
our investigation of the significance that film (a kind of blend of verbal and non-verbal 
art) has for theology and vice versa.  It is an early indicator of the way Rahner views the 
relationship between theology and culture, the latter of which he defines as such: 
Culture may be defined as an element of tradition which helps to determine a 
person’s surroundings and which human beings themselves not only receive and 
accept, but also develop through their own creative work as something that is 
specifically human.  Such cultural work is not a luxury in which human beings 
indulge, because without it they could not even exist as natural beings.89 
 
As we shall take up in more depth later, Rahner believes that one cannot separate one’s 
faith, and hence theology, from one’s cultural, secular life.  What is not expressly clear 
here is another inherently related position of Rahner’s, namely that Christian faith 
demands that “the Christian exercise responsibility for culture even though neither 
Christianity nor church teachings designs and defines that culture today.”90  At this 
juncture in the chapter we simply want to point out that for Rahner culture (i.e. “secular 
life,” “the world”) is precisely the place where theology operates.  However, it should not 
be thought that theology is there simply to take from culture whatever implements it 
wishes to achieve its goals. Theology, which is always driven by faith and the ethical 
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responsibilities demanded by faith, must strive to preserve culture precisely by 
impregnating the elements of cultural life with Christianity’s eschatological hope.  The 
impression of such hope “for eternity is realized in the constant transformation of the 
structures of secular life,”91 which includes “criticism also of the secular structures [as] 
one of the forms of Christian hope.”92  Arguing as he does from the position of Vatican 
II, especially from out of the theological vision of culture articulated in Gaudium et spes, 
Rahner argues for a critical dialogue with culture.  While theology must remain immersed 
in the tradition of the church and privilege scripture and doctrine it must also be open to 
expressions of and insights into the human condition that come from contemporary 
culture.  Theology must correlate faith and culture in order to avoid “the acute danger that 
believers will no longer consider this secular culture as their religious responsibility 
before God, but will regard it as something that interests them as human beings, but no 
longer affects them as Christians.”93  Rahner’s method or approach to theology reflects 
this principle and is set up to engage the cultural experiences of people; for it is precisely 
there, in the mix of religion and culture, that God encounters us.  Thus, Rahner considers 
missionary activity essential—not because those who are not Christian do not already 
know in a hidden way something about the mystery of God's love in Christ—but because 
they must be awakened to what they really are in the depths of their being and 
consciousness:  people graced by God's self-communication in Christ. 
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Bipolar Structure of Theology 
 If the source of Christian theology is faith in Jesus Christ and the conviction that 
in him our experience of God is fulfilled and redeemed, then, according to Rahner, a key 
responsibility for theology is that it provide an “intellectually honest justification of 
Christian faith”94 which must include a response to the question of “why and in what 
sense may one risk life in faith in this concrete Jesus of Nazareth as the crucified and 
risen God-Man.”95  There are two moments of a single operation expressed here.  On the 
one hand, theology must articulate as clearly as possible what it is that Christians believe.  
This is the scientific or conceptual pole of theology and is traditionally associated with 
the form of theology called doctrinal or dogmatic theology.  On the other hand, theology 
must present the message of Christianity in a way that relates to the most important 
concerns of people’s lives and that leads them to assent to the truth of this message in 
faith.  This is the kerygmatic or practical pole of theology and is traditionally associated 
with fundamental theology or apologetics.  Using the medieval distinction, Rahner argues 
that the fides quae creditur (“the faith which is believed”), referring to the knowledge of 
revealed truth and the content of what is believed, should be brought into the closest 
possible unity with the fides qua creditur (“the faith by which it is believed”), referring to 
the act of faith, the existential appropriation of the content believed.96  Rahner’s 
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fundamental theology—“the science of the encounter of revelation and man”—seeks the 
integration of the two.97  The task of the scientific side of 
fundamental theology is to describe the nature of revelation and to demonstrate its 
de facto existence by pointing to the criteria of revelation and the signs of its 
credibility.  This is what gives this theological science its special character.  It 
considers the basis for the various branches of theology and its own special 
perspective:  the question of the credibility of revelation and the justification of 
faith which this contains.  It has to show the justification of faith, in the act of 
faith itself, which here above all is a faith calling for insight:  fides quaerens 
intellectum.98 
 
The kerygmatic side of fundamental theology addresses those 
outside the faith or on the threshold of faith.  Then, as the science of the encounter 
of revelation and man, it takes man as it finds him in his human nature, situation 
and existence and tries to put him in contact with revelation.  It calls his attention 
to something within him which is open to the word of God which transcends him, 
and addresses him without stemming from him, for the work of salvation offered 
him in that word of revelation.  It shows him how truly he longs to hear it, how 
safely it can fetch him home, how receptive and ready he is for it, and how much 
he depends on it.  It tries further to remove the difficulties which stand in the way 
of seeing and hearing God’s revelation.  . . . Its effort is to expound the word of 
God’s self-revelation as the answer to man, as the full and definitive disclosure, 
illumination, fulfillment and realization of man . . ..  It works on the theological 
principle of the theology of existence:  “To speak of man is to speak of God, to 
speak of God is to speak of man.”99 
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Uniting these two poles of theology means that theologians must teach the content of 
faith with a pastoral view to the self-understanding of believers who struggle to live out 
their faith and to personally articulate it (to “give an account of their hope”) often amid 
cultured as well as not-so-cultured despisers of religion. 
The point is that theology must discuss and express individual doctrines with 
constant attention to the interests, needs, and capabilities of the inquirer.  It is a 
question not merely of determining how to present effectively a fixed set of 
doctrines but of doing theology while maintaining an active empathy for the 
struggle to make faith a reality.100 
 
Rahner laments that these two aspects of what should be the single, integrated task of 
theology have grown apart over recent centuries and are too often treated as separate 
endeavors, with the fides quae seen as being the sole responsibility of university 
theologians and the fides qua being what pastors and preachers interpret at the local 
church level.  Rahner reintroduces mystagogy into Catholic theology as a way of 
mending the splintered axis connecting doctrinal and fundamental theology, reason and 
experience.  He writes that 
mystagogy remains important both in itself and for my theology because of the 
close connection between fundamental and dogmatic theology and between 
theory and practice.  It is in the light of these relationships that the centrality of 
this concept in my theology is to be seen.101 
 
A theological method that seeks the integration of fundamental and dogmatic theology 
has a mystagogical orientation insofar as its aim is to 
produce evidence for the inner credibility of the truths of revelation and to 
investigate the conditions under which these truths can be accepted by men 
existentially at any given moment of their existence.  The effort is not directed 
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towards the explication of the content of revelation in all its manifold aspects, but 
to concentrate it in the “mystery of Christ.”102 
 
While Rahner did not formally develop his conception of mystagogy or show its 
correspondence to features of mystagogy in antiquity, here one comparison can be noted.  
We recall that in the early church there was a period of time prior to sacramental 
initiation when catechumens were provided with a fairly conceptual introduction to 
Christian doctrine.  This pre-baptismal catechesis was then bookended by the period 
called mystagogia, which was catechesis in a different key.  Marked by an emphasis on 
the experience of initiation and the poetic evocation and interpretation of ritual symbols, 
mystagogy was meant to help initiates more fully understand their immersion into the 
mystery of faith at a visceral level.  The fathers believed both forms of catechesis were 
essential to the initiation into Christian faith.  Thus, Rahner’s insistence that theologians 
today strive to unite the conceptual and experiential poles of Christian faith is thoroughly 
traditional and demonstrates that his theological method has an intrinsic mystagogical 
orientation. 
 Rahner’s mystagogical approach to doing theology is, simply put, one of many 
possible paths to Christian faith, one that searches along the way for “connections of 
meaningful correspondence” between human experience and the gospel. 
To lead to faith (or rather, to its further, explicit stage), is always to assist 
understanding of what has already been experienced in the depth of human reality 
as grace (i.e., as in absolutely direct relation to God).  The connection between 
what has already been experienced (in faith or, it may be, in credulity), and what 
has to be accepted anew in explicit faith need not and cannot of course always be 
of the kind that links conclusions to premises in logical inference.  There are 
connections of meaningful correspondence.103 
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To better appreciate Rahner’s method of correspondence (or “transcendental method”), 
we might compare it to the method of “correlation” espoused by his Protestant 
contemporary, Paul Tillich.  Both men agree that theologians can offer convincing 
answers to questions generated from out of the human situation only if they have “shared 
the human predicament and struggled for the answers.”104  However, there are clear 
differences between Tillich and Rahner with respect to the method by which “situation,” 
referring to the human condition, and “answer,” referring to the teachings of Christianity, 
are related. 
Tillich says they are correlated, which means that they are two independent 
elements which are interdependent.  Thus he can write:  ‘The existential question, 
namely, man himself in the conflicts of his existential situation, is not the source 
for the revelatory answer formulated by theology.’  In other words, the situation 
produces no answers, only questions.  Natural theology can analyze the human 
situation, but can offer no theological affirmation because God is manifest only 
through himself.  Thus situation and message for Tillich are correlated as question 
and answer, and any search for the organic connections described above is 
theologically ruled out.  The situation questions; it does not disclose.  The 
fundamental reason for Tillich’s position . . . is that he does not appreciate the 
graced character of both the situation and our interpretation of it.  On the contrary, 
Rahner has come to see clearly that we live in one graced world.  This fact 
establishes a fundamental organic unity between experience and doctrine, allows 
believers to value the answers derived from human culture, and permits them to 
accept doctrine, not as an external message, but as an objective articulation of 
human experience which is always already affected by grace.105 
 
In Tillich’s view, the “answers” given in the experience of revelation are independent of 
the “questions” that arise from out of the human condition.  Rahner’s view differs from 
Tillich’s and it is through the lens of mystagogy that this difference comes into sharper 
focus.  His mystagogy, which is based on what he was convinced to be the fundamental 
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unity of experience and doctrine, is “not an attempt to unite two independent realities.  
For this reason it is less likely to appear as indoctrination.  It rather seeks to disclose the 
clues or intimations of divine grace already found in experience and to relate them to the 
meanings contained in the Christian tradition.”106  Rahner’s position is less dichotomous 
than Tillich’s (hence a “correspondence” rather than “correlation”),107 for he holds to a 
greater acceptability of secular culture on its own merits given the belief that God “is 
already and always, in the offer of his self-communication in the Holy Spirit, in man as 
the question and the answer (in one) . . ..”108  Rahner’s positive estimation (not 
unqualified acceptance) of the secular world is based in his theology of grace, a teaching 
which contends that the world stands permanently under the offer of God’s self-
communication, an offer which “is really an intrinsic, constitutive principle of man.”109  
As he writes, the “secular world, as secular, has an inner mysterious depth, in all its 
earthly mysteries from birth to death, through which, by the grace of God, it is open to 
God and his infinitely incomprehensible love even when it is not, before receiving the 
explicit message of the gospel, aware of it.”110  The more responsive theology is to the 
questions and situations of the age 
and the more in touch with the rich Christian tradition, the better guidance it will 
offer for the spiritual quest.  For Rahner, theology has an explicit correlation task.  
It must show how specific Christian doctrines can illumine and guide the human 
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adventure.  It is not simply a matter of giving Christians answers to questions 
posed by the culture . . ..  A Rahnerian style of correlation sets up a conversation 
between the Christian tradition, which both reveals and conceals the Mystery, and 
the culture, which is graced but sinful.111 
 
While Rahner’s theology of grace will require further demonstration, for now we can 
conclude that, for him, secular culture presents itself as a way of bringing the Christian 
message to the world of today.112 
 Rahner’s method of turning to human experience as a theological source lends 
itself to the task of relating Christian faith in a world many deem to be secular.  For he 
takes seriously that, because God’s mysterious offer of love communicated in grace 
abides universally, nothing in the world is entirely profane.  In grace, every person has 
been offered relationship to God.  Even if that offer is rejected, the experience, precisely 
as an abiding offer, is still present.  “What is at stake is the true secularity of the world, 
which consists of the truth that there is nothing in the world which is too ‘holy’ to be 
accessible to a worldly approach and must be reserved for religion . . ..  [Further, there] is 
nothing in the structure or order of the world which is taboo, which is to be removed from 
man’s use, as the attitude which could be called ‘sacralism’ has firmly maintained 
throughout all history of religion.”113 
 Because Rahner sees the Christian message as coming from God from within the 
human situation (i.e. in history and within particular cultures), his theological task 
involves the interpretion of revelation in correspondence with the structures of human 
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consciousness.  He develops an anthropological approach to the Christian message, 
whereby theology first considers the human transcendental capacity for receiving God’s 
divine word and then interprets Christian doctrine in a way which demonstrates its 
inherent relationship to the needs, drives, and longings of human beings.  This method 
intends in part to show the relevancy of theology as a discipline in and for the lives of 
believers by demonstrating the correspondence between Christian teaching and the 
common features of human experience.  Such an approach attempts to illustrate that 
what theologians discuss has a claim on the whole person.  Its correlation with 
features of the human as such makes clear that theology is of deep and direct 
concern to people in their day-to-day lives, that it speaks to them in a way that 
informs their total existence.  Theology is no arcane body of abstractions; instead, 
it refers to matters that the concrete self-understanding of persons cannot 
ignore.114 
 
 A fundamental principle informing correlation methodology is that doctrinal 
interpretations of Christianity’s proclamation of salvation in Jesus Christ will be 
existentially meaningful to people today and have “a claim on truth only to the extent 
they disclose and are adequate to common human experience, that is, basic structures of 
human thought and action fundamental to human life at all times and places.”115  In this 
sense, too, Rahner’s method of correlation is mystagogical to the extent that its goal is to 
lead people deeper into the mystery that envelops their lives by disclosing and clarifying 
that experience.  To Rahner’s mind theology 
must not just talk about God, but must introduce people to the experience of those 
realities from out of which talk about God emerges.  He calls this process of 
introduction “mystagogy” . . ..  It is the process of learning what faith and 
theology mean from within one’s own existence and experience, and not merely 
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by indoctrination from without.  It is only when one is in touch with the realities 
that theology is talking about that one can really see what theology means.116 
 
Transcendental Anthropology 
 At the heart of Rahner’s theology is the human person’s experience of God as a 
gracious and loving Mystery.  It is this experience that forms the very center of all human 
life and gives meaning to existence itself.  Rahner is convinced that such an experience of 
God is not going to be had anywhere apart from the events and encounters that have 
shaped us and the experience that forms our present moment.  If this is the case, that 
God’s revelation, and consequently, our knowledge of God, is not going to come to us 
from outside the concrete lives we lead from day to day, then theology, as the science 
which interprets revelation, needs to take human experience very seriously. 
 Anthropology is human being’s interpretation of itself from any number of angles 
(philosophy, art, psychology, biology).  Theology is on a certain level yet another among 
many approaches to anthropology.  However, because Christian theological anthropology 
presupposes God’s having spoken not only to but from within the history of humanity 
(Incarnation) it differs from all other anthropological approaches since it interprets the 
human being as the subject of revelation.  And if revelation is understood to be God’s 
word to humanity about God and human beings then theological anthropology initiates 
only because it is the recipient of revelation and proceeds to investigate the human being 
from out of faith in and obedience to God’s interpretive word.  Human experience 
therefore constitutes basic material for theological reflection since it is only within human 
history that revelation “happens.”  Furthermore, Rahner finds it essential that theology 
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“turn to the subject” given the problem of secularization and the crisis of faith in the 
contemporary church.  For “it is only when all the experiences that constitute the self-
understanding of the person of today are taken into account, that Christian faith-
statements will begin to make sense.”117  This crisis is the context within which Rahner 
presents his anthropological approach as a means of giving intellectual justification to the 
decision to believe the Christian faith despite the challenges of at times uncompromising 
secularism and resolute atheism.  Theology’s giving primacy to human experience as a 
point of departure for conversation about God is further justified from the standpoint of 
Christian faith.  Since God esteems human beings to the degree that their lives are the 
locus of God’s self-communication, then theology ought to analyze human experience to 
determine where the possibilities lie for such an experience of God.  Most importantly, 
Christian theology may legitimately start its investigations into faith and doctrine with the 
human person since, according to Christianity, God’s redemptive word was revealed to 
the world as a man:  “the history of salvation and revelation . . . has its irreversible climax 
in the God-Man, Jesus Christ.”118  Indeed, the significance of the Christian proclamation 
of salvation in Jesus Christ can only be adequately demonstrated when the human 
receptivity for this truth has been investigated.  Rahner finds it incredible that theology 
would not in some way include anthropology in its investigations since God comes to 
people from within their subjectivity, personal existence, and relationships.  Because 
Rahner perceives such a radical unity between human experience and the experience of 
God, he insists that it is impossible to speak of human beings without speaking of God, 
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and vice versa.119  Briefly put, because theology and anthropology flow from the 
experience of God, there “can be no theology in which anthropology need not be 
done.”120  Thus, for Rahner, Christian theological anthropology must commence with an 
exploration of the preconditions within the human being for a hearing of God’s word. 
Rahner’s approach to theological method is described as “transcendental,” an 
attempt “to bring out more clearly the role of the knowing subject in all of our objective 
knowledge, including our knowledge via faith and theology.”121  More specifically, his 
method is a “transcendental anthropology” or a “method of transcendental deduction” 
because it operates as a dialectic between the transcendental (a priori) and the historical 
(a posteriori) features of human experience.  This means that he begins his theology by 
asking the question, “what are the a priori conditions for the possibility of . . . ?” and then 
proceeds to investigate the transcendental structures in the human subject that give rise to 
or allow for a given experience to occur and for knowledge to be apprehended.  So, for 
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instance, the condition of possibility of knowledge of something is the ability to ask a 
question about that something.  The “aim of such a deduction is to arrive at a 
‘correlation,’ i.e. it is an attempt to correlate the Christian message with these 
transcendental structures of human subjectivity.”122  If theology involves more than 
making explicit and understandable the fundamental beliefs of Christianity (fides quae) 
then it must be concerned with the a priori conditions in the finite believer that make it 
possible to hear that infinite truth and assent to it in an act of faith (fides qua).  In 
theology, such a transcendental deduction seeks to identify the consistency and 
compatibility between revelation and its subjective appropriation by asking the prior 
question of what makes it possible for a human being to acquire knowledge of anything 
so that it can be determined how he or she can know something quite particular, namely 
the content of the Christian message and—even prior to that—the knowledge of God that 
comes from revelation. 
Rahner avers that if theology must “first of all speak about the person who is to be 
the hearer of the Christian message, if in this sense we are speaking about 
presuppositions, what we want to examine is the specific way in which these 
presuppositions and the Christian message are interwoven.”123  In this sense his method 
discloses the transcendental conditions or, perhaps better put, the interior disposition of 
the human person for knowledge of anything so as to uncover the possibility for 
knowledge of God, to whom the human person is radically oriented. 124 
                                                
 122 Ibid., pp. 96-97. 
 
 123 Karl Rahner, FCF, ibid., p. 24. 
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At first appearance, the transcendental approach to theological inquiry may seem 
excessively intellectual and abstracted from “real life”; or it may sound like a form of 
depth psychology that attempts to express the unconscious internal processes that 
motivate behavior.  It may be more helpful to think of Rahner’s transcendental method 
“more as a way of questioning and relating religious beliefs to basic human questions and 
experiences of life.”125  Precisely as theology, Rahner’s method presupposes that human 
beings have an interpersonal relationship with God.  Transcendental inquiry does the 
important job of rigorously investigating whether such a relationship is within the realm 
of possibility for human beings and thus of establishing foundations for understanding 
that experience.  Against the background of mystagogy, transcendental methodology is 
simply a tool to unearth some measure of the depths of mystery into which our lives are 
immersed.  To be sure, transcendental anthropology does not itself do the initiating:  as 
we shall see, it is only because the grace of God is operative at the very depths of our 
experiences that we are immersed in mystery.  Thus, Rahner’s method is established 
upon belief in God’s gracious and universal presence to all human beings. 
 
The Structure of Transcendentality 
Two key New Testament passages that Rahner references often are at the heart of 
what his theology of revelation attempts to interpret for the contemporary church: 
From one ancestor he made all nations to inhabit the whole earth, and he allotted 
the times of their existence and the boundaries of the places where they would 
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 125 Francis Fiorenza, “Method in Theology,” in CCKR, ibid., p. 77. 
 
 272 
live, so that they would search for God and perhaps grope for him and find him--
though indeed he is not far from each one of us.  For 'In him we live and move 
and have our being'   (Acts 17: 26-28a). 
 
God our Savior . . . desires everyone to be saved and to come to the knowledge of 
the truth.  For there is one God; there is also one mediator between God and 
humankind, Christ Jesus, himself human, who gave himself a ransom for all (1 
Timothy 2: 3-6a). 
 
These pose enormous questions for the theologian:  How is it that “revelation, despite its 
directly divine origin, can constitute the very core of human history?  How can revelation 
be present everywhere at all times for the salvation of all men in all ages” when, at the 
same time Christianity proclaims the miracle that “God’s grace in an event at a particular 
time and place, occurring once and for all in the flesh of Christ, in the voice of the 
prophet as he speaks, and in the letter of Scripture.”126  For Rahner, these passages reveal 
that the unity between humanity and God was made complete and final in Jesus Christ.  
Yet, in order to express the truth of this faith claim to contemporary people, Rahner 
enlists his transcendental methodology.  The beginning of a thoroughly Christian 
response to these problems is found in the questions themselves; for in the very act of 
asking of the questions, human beings are shown to be incessant and insatiable 
“questioners.”  Every question we ask and have answered immediately explodes into a 
host of unanswered queries.  We are hard-wired to ask and then ask some more; and there 
is something disquieting and yet wonderful (literally) about this process.  Our questions 
open us outward toward what seems an endless ocean of possibilities: 
In the ultimate depths of his being man knows nothing more surely than that his 
knowledge, that is, what is called knowledge in everyday parlance, is only a small 
island in a vast sea that has not been traveled.  It is a floating island, and it might 
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be more familiar to us than the sea, but ultimately it is borne by the sea and only 
because it is can we be borne by it.127 
 
But our insatiability and our opening outward presents itself in every realm of life, not 
only the desire to know.  As St. Augustine says at the start of his Confessions, our hearts, 
our deepest selves, are fundamentally “restless.”  Nothing is ever satis (“enough”) in our 
lives—until, Augustine prays, our hearts rest in the Lord.  The question Rahner asks is, 
why? 
Rahner has two famous expressions for talking about the human person:  “spirit-
in-the-world” and “hearer of the word.”  These also form the titles of two of his works in 
philosophical theology.128  An examination of these expressions yields an appreciable 
sense of Rahner’s analysis of the structure of human consciousness.  In the former work, 
Rahner writes that by “spirit I mean a power which reaches out beyond the world and 
knows the metaphysical.  World is the name of the reality which is accessible to the 
immediate experience of man.”129  Human beings are constructed as a unity of spirit and 
matter.  Precisely as spirit, we are not completely limited to our bodies or our spatial and 
temporal situation because our minds and our wills are capable of stretching out beyond 
the material world.  But we are not pure spirits, able to do what we wish, because, 
precisely as material entities, we have certain limitations.  As spiritual (transcendent) 
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beings, we are “aware that we are the subjects of a questioning that transcends the 
limitations of time and space.  We reach out for truth about the meaning of human 
existence, and in doing so find ourselves, like it or not, asking questions about God.  For 
Rahner, it is precisely our questions about God, reality, and our existence that define us a 
human persons.”130  In this context of limited-unlimitedness the human person is a 
differentiated unity:  spirit is not the same as matter, and matter not the same as spirit, but 
each depends on the other.  This situation of being finite and yet having an intrinsic 
capacity to transcend every particular being is not one of our own creation.  It comes to 
us as part of the contingency of the human situation.  This is also what Rahner means by 
the person as “spirit-in-world.”  No matter how restricted our situation, no matter how 
much of our freedom is taken away, there is always the possibility of a “more” because 
we can ask the question, why is this happening and what does it all mean.  Our openness 
in transcendence towards mystery in our acts of knowing and loving also suggests that 
nothing in the concrete world of experience can finally and satisfactorily complete us.  
Transcendental experience, which Rahner also understands to be human self-presence or 
self-awareness, “takes place” in the world—in and through knowledge and freedom.  In 
other words human spirituality as it is mediated through personal history.  This is why 
Rahner names the human being “spirit-in-world,” for it is in concrete history and 
bounded by time and matter, and not apart from it, that our spirit reaches out in radical 
openness beyond the physical and sensible toward the infinite; for it is “there” in mystery 
that transcendence leads us to search for meaning and for an answer to the question we 
are. 
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Theological reflection on this interior dynamism toward infinite mystery, which is 
for Rahner the orientation that defines human beings apart from other modes of existence, 
suggests that we have a capacity for God.  The condition of possibility for our 
relationship to God is precisely who we are and not something that we “have.”  It is not 
as if some people have a capacity for God and others do not.  Transcendental analysis of 
anthropology concludes that this is a universal orientation, but one that eludes complete 
description.  Our transcendental experiences cannot be pinned down, as it were, and 
analyzed, just as we cannot fully and finally construct a comprehensive, unequivocal 
statement about ourselves (for as soon as one states “I am this and that,” the definition is 
already transcended). 
In our insatiable questioning, even the endless sea is transcended and our spirit 
stretches out further toward the horizon.  Yet, no matter how much we rush to get to the 
horizon, it recedes ever before us,131 and our reach exceeds our grasp, as the saying goes.  
The horizon, therefore, is what limits or grounds self-transcendence; it is that which we 
cannot overcome: 
A capacity to transcend particular beings and to be open to the limitless horizon, 
therefore, is the necessary condition of the possibility of our knowledge of 
anything in our finite world.  It would be impossible for us to have any objective, 
conceptual knowledge of the finite realities of our world unless we were able to 
transcend those realities.  . . . Such transcendence would mean that we are open to 
an unlimited horizon which lies beyond everything finite.  Obviously, that horizon 
would be different from anything finite, material, or historical.  And our 
knowledge or experience of that ultimate horizon would be different from our 
knowledge or experience of anything else.132 
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The horizon for Rahner designates that presence in all human experience of something 
“more,” a source and a goal to everything we do and are.  This horizon is not some 
“thing” which we can know; it is more like a context.  It is a metaphor.  A horizon by 
definition is something that can never be reached but that is always there looming ahead 
of us.  It can never be grasped or transcended.  We might draw an analogy from film and 
compare this notion of horizon to a cinema screen.  A screen gives the backdrop to 
projected images of light.  When you watch a movie you are unaware of the screen’s 
presence, but it is the screen that “catches” the light and allows you to actually see the 
images, otherwise the light would continue on into space.  The screen “grounds” the light 
so to speak and is the condition of the possibility of our ability to see the film.  For 
Rahner the infinite horizon “grounds” all of our experience and is the backdrop which 
makes it possible for us to know anything at all.  While it is true that the movie screen is 
“invisible” to us while a movie is showing, we are still implicitly aware of its necessity. 
 We are implicitly aware of this transcendental horizon of being in every concrete 
act of intelligence (knowing) and volition (willing and loving).  It is the hidden context, 
the secret ingredient, within all of our categorical experience.  But, like the horizon, it 
cannot itself be grasped.  The horizon that forever bounds us is itself boundless.  In the 
language of Anselm, it is “that than which nothing greater can be thought.”  This implicit 
experience of a horizon or “ultimate mystery” might be experienced as calling us to itself, 
since it appears to be the source and ultimate goal of all human experience.  The horizon 
that limits our self-transcendence (not in a restrictive way, but, rather, in a way that lures 
our transcendence toward it) is qualitatively different from any particular thing, action, or 
figment of the imagination.  And yet, Rahner says, we have a dim awareness or an 
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anticipation (Vorgriff)133 of its presence, a pre-conceptual consciousness—a hunch—that 
our yearning always for “more” presupposes an infinite horizon of absolute mystery, 
which is “absolute” precisely because it is forever the incomprehensible goal of all 
knowing and loving.  In our transcendence, in the absolute orientation to mystery and 
thus the openness to all possible things, we at the same time become self-aware.  We are 
able to place our own selves into question.  The paradox is that in knowing ourselves to 
be free and responsible we are confronted with the fact that this permanent, perennial 
“state” of “reaching out in the unlimited expanse of our transcendence”134 is not a 
situation we have created.  It comes from a source beyond ourselves and so we 
experience radical limitedness in knowledge and freedom. 
 Though we may speak of it in theory, transcendence is not an experience that can 
be analyzed and defined.  It is not “the experience of some definite, particular objective 
thing which is experienced alongside other objects.  It is rather a basic mode of being 
which is prior to and permeates every objective experience.”135  To be sure, the 
transcendence of which Rahner speaks is 
not the thematically conceptualized ‘concept’ of transcendence in which 
transcendence is reflected upon objectively.  It is rather the a priori openness of 
the subject to being as such, which is present precisely when a person experiences 
himself or herself as involved in the multiplicity of cares and concerns and fears 
and hopes of the everyday world.  Real transcendence is always in the 
background, so to speak, in those origins of human life and human knowledge 
over which we have no control.136 
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Transcendental experience is not a particular type of experience; rather, it is present only 
as a “secret ingredient” or greater context, in every particular experience.  It is, however, 
something quite real, for the human person “is and remains a transcendent being, that is, 
he or she is that existent to whom the silent and uncontrollable infinity of reality is 
always present as mystery.”137  Transcendence is real enough that people can overlook, 
evade, or reject it, and this is done in any number of ways.  Essentially, evasion or 
rejection requires that a person claim (explicitly or implicitly) that the abiding mystery of 
life is something with which he or she need not reckon. 
 It is this abiding context in which we find ourselves at every moment bounded by 
an absolute and incomprehensible mystery that Rahner says we point to with the word 
“God.”  God is implicitly known as the transcendent, infinite horizon that we anticipate 
and toward which we reach out in transcendence in every experience.  The term “God” is 
what we use to describe that which is indescribable, that which cannot be transcended, 
the horizonless horizon, the absolute mystery, the unconditioned condition that makes 
possible our ability to know or do anything: 
[T]here is present in this transcendental experience an unthematic and 
anonymous, as it were, knowledge of God.  Hence the original knowledge of God 
is not the kind of knowledge in which one grasps an object which happens to 
present itself directly or indirectly from outside.  It has rather the character of a 
transcendental experience.  Insofar as this subjective, non-objective luminosity of 
the subject in its transcendence is always oriented towards the holy mystery, the 
knowledge of God is always present unthematically and without name, and not 
just when we begin to speak of it.  All talk about it, which necessarily goes on, 
always only points to this transcendental experience as such, an experience in 
which he whom we call “God” encounters man in silence, encounters him as the 
absolute and the incomprehensible, as the term of his transcendence which cannot 
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really be incorporated into any system of coordinates.  When this transcendence is 
the transcendence of love, it also experiences this term as the holy mystery.138 
 
This suggests further that all of what makes up ordinary life, our efforts at learning about 
the world, growing in self-awareness, and cultivating relationships, already “involves” 
the mysterious presence of God.  If Rahner is correct in his assertion that there is in every 
act of the human intellect and will a pre-apprehension of God as that which forms the 
transcendental condition of the possibility of knowing and loving, then everyone, 
“whether they describe themselves as agnostic or atheist or indifferent, is actually on 
some level aware of God.  Though Rahner is not interested in proving the existence of 
God, if he is right no such proof is necessary; for anyone who tries to deny the existence 
of God is in fact in contradiction”139 with his or her experience, when that experience is 
honestly appraised.  If in self-knowledge, our personal dealings with others, and our 
knowledge of the world, we experience God as the inescapable and unlimited horizon of 
our transcendence, then this experience of absolute “mystery in its incomprehensibility is 
what is self-evident in human life.  . . . [And] all other understanding, however clear it 
might appear, is grounded in this transcendence.  All clear understanding is grounded in 
the darkness of God.”140 
 Again, it is difficult to distinguish this horizon or “ultimate ground” of 
transcendence because there “is no greater reality beyond God within which God could 
be completely categorized or adequately conceptualized.”141  God is present to us in a 
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preconceptual, unthematic way, and our knowledge of God remains tacit.  It is a real and 
authentic knowledge, but not the sort that is subject to inquiry in the way one might know 
a person, thing, or idea.  Rather, it is knowledge in the sense of awareness that we are 
ecstatically oriented; we are somehow always called to go beyond ourselves.  It is less a 
“grasping” than a “being grasped.”  The fact that our transcendence is oriented toward the 
infinite horizon of mystery and that this presence provides the backdrop, as it were, for 
all knowledge and action also suggests that our original knowledge of God is present 
always already prior to our explicit naming of God.  That is to say, “one does not begin to 
relate to or to theologize about God only when God has been explicitly named . . ..”142  
And this “knowledge of God which we always have even when we are thinking of and 
concerned with anything but God, is the permanent ground from out of which that 
thematic knowledge of God emerges which we have in explicitly religious activity and in 
philosophical reflection.”143  Explicit doctrines about God are meaningful and can “really 
be understood only when all the words we use there point to the unthematic experience of 
our orientation towards the ineffable mystery.”144 
This returns us to the original question which we said haunted Rahner most:  not 
whether there is a God, but how it is possible to say “You” in faith and love to this 
incomprehensible mystery that forms and is at the center of every human being’s life.  
Rahner calls human beings “hearers of the word,” for in our transcendental experience we 
are opened up in a search for meaning toward a definitive answer to who we are and to 
                                                
 
 142 Geffrey Kelly, Karl Rahner, ibid., p. 36. 
 
 143 Karl Rahner, FCF, ibid., p. 53. 
 
 144 Ibid. 
 
 281 
what or whom we are oriented.  Rahner’s fundamental theology describes the condition 
of possibility for hearing an “unexpected word of God” to be freedom:  “We are spirit, 
hence absolute ‘upwards,’ i.e., for all being.  Thus we are also the recipients of a possible 
revelation.  But precisely because, through our mere transcendence, we are spirit, real 
infinity is never presented to us as actually reached, but always only as the greater 
beyond of our knowing, only as anticipation [Vorgriff].  Thus we stand as finite spirit 
before the personal, free, and absolute God.”145  Though we can anticipate or yearn to 
hear such a word of assurance, it is not “owed” to us by our nature.  As we shall see, if it 
comes at all, God’s word only come to us as a grace—or better, as grace itself.  Our 
spiritual antennae are poised to receive a signal of hope precisely within the world we 
inhabit, a word that can ultimately be trusted; a word that says that this mystery at the 
center of existence is not merely a vast void, an abyss into nothingness, but is in fact the 
very answer to the question we are.  As spirits in the world, whether we are conscious of 
this or not, we reach out in self-transcendence to history and search it for an event in 
which our desire for this word is in fact spoken, and spoken with clarity.  Because we 
desire “God” (unconditional Mystery), we search for some “tangible” event where we are 
promised, unconditionally, that the “darkness” which surrounds us is indeed meaningful 
and not absurd or conditional, for we do not want the word of love that we long to hear 
spoken to us to be retracted or revoked.  In this way, we are “the openness for being as 
such, we face the real possibility of a revelation, at least insofar as it is the free personal 
self-manifestation of a divine Thou.”146 
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We have shown that Rahner’s fundamental theology is an attempt to correlate the 
basic message of the Christian religion with the structures of the human experience by 
way of a transcendental analysis.  What has been outlined so far has been the logic of 
Rahner’s thought that leads up to the explicit teachings of Christian faith, a tracing of the 
presuppositions “without which the Christian message about human beings would not be 
possible.  But by itself it was not yet so specifically Christian that anyone who accepts 
these assertions as his or her own self-understanding could already be called a Christian 
on the level of an explicit and reflexive profession of faith.”147  In other words, what 
Rahner has up to this point disclosed about God as Mystery by way of his transcendental 
analysis of human experience has not really said anything beyond what philosophy can 
tell us: 
At best, it shows God is possibly the goal that all cognition and affectivity 
approach asymptotically; humans could only question whether, or hope that, their 
striving for the good and for truth would end in fulfillment rather than frustration.  
Christian faith, however, proclaims in the light of the incarnation that God is not 
merely the remote, ever-receding horizon and telos of human transcendence but is 
absolutely close, engaged in a self-communication to humans that brings them 
fulfillment in the love they seek and the forgiveness they need.  God is free self-
giving love.  This is not a metaphysically self-evident truth but the 
incomprehensible wonder revealed in Christ.148 
 
 
                                                
revelation:  “An obediential potency is a capacity which is open to fulfillment yet not frustrated or 
meaningless if the fulfillment is not granted.  Rahner considers our openness to being, our existence as 
spirit in world, as obediential potency for the self-communication of God.  This potency is not a separate 
faculty or regional section within us, like our ability to breathe, but rather our human nature as such.  If the 
divine self-communication did occur, our openness toward being would still be meaningful as the condition 
for the possibility of human knowledge and human self-disposal in freedom.  We would still have to do 
with God, though only as the distant horizon of our existence.  But because of this same openness we are 
by nature possible recipients of God’s self-communication, listeners for a possible divine word (John 
Galvin, “The Invitation to Grace,” in Leo O’Donovan, World of Grace, ibid., p.72).  Thus, the very nature 
of human being is obediential potency, the human capacity to receive the divine life. 
 
 147 Karl Rahner, FCF, ibid., p. 116. 
 
 148 Stephen J. Duffy, “Experience of Grace,” in CCKR, ibid., p. 44. 
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The Unity of Transcendentality, Grace, and Revelation 
 At the center of the Christian message is the proclamation that the word of God 
that we so long to hear in the depths of our being has indeed been spoken.  The good 
news of Christian faith is that the Mystery that is master over all that we are is in fact 
gracious, personal, and forgiving.  This mystery, which is experienced at the core of 
every human life, has manifested itself in the world absolutely and eternally in the person 
and message of Jesus Christ—the “ultimate, irrevocable self-expression of God to the 
human race in history.”149  For Rahner, the entire Christian message is centered on God’s 
free and undeserved communication of God’s entire self in Jesus Christ:  that through the 
miracle of the incarnation and in an act of faith in Christ we know that God, now become 
man, has never been nor ever will be distant and remote from our lives.  God has offered 
to all humanity the gift of being saved in Christ through faith.150   
God is revealed as communicating himself in absolute and merciful presence as 
God, that is, as the absolute mystery.  The historical mediation of this 
transcendental experience is also revealed as valid, as bringing about and 
authenticating the absolute experience of God.  The unique and final culmination 
of this history of revelation has already occurred and has revealed the absolute 
and irrevocable unity of God’s transcendental self-communication to humankind 
and of its historical mediation in the one God-man Jesus Christ, who is at once 
God himself as communicated, the human acceptance of this communication and 
the final historical manifestation of this offer and acceptance.151 
 
According to Rahner, the central mystery of Christian faith is precisely this self-
communication of God in Jesus Christ, which he identifies with the biblical term “grace.”  
He calls grace God’s self-gift, the free giving of God’s entire self to all creation and to 
                                                
 149 Idem., Faith in a Wintry Season, ibid., p. 107. 
 
 150 Cf., again, 1 Timothy 2: 3-6a. 
 
 151 Karl Rahner, “Revelation, I. Concept of Revelation, B. Theological Interpretation,” in Karl 
Rahner, ed., Sacramentum Mundi, Vol. 5, ibid., p. 349. 
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every human person, whom he names “the event of a free, unmerited and forgiving, and 
absolute self-communication of God . . ..152  With the revealed knowledge that God wills 
the salvation of all people, Rahner’s methodological approach is at once to identify the 
human person as the one created by God with the possibility of receiving the word of 
salvation in revelation and present Jesus as the historical realization and perfection of that 
possibility.  For something to be universally salvific for all of humanity, the human 
person must be a priori oriented to it; and it must be capable of affecting humanity as a 
whole.  Therefore, Rahner’s approach is to demonstrate that a correlation exists between 
the universal human experience of transcendence and the Christian belief that through 
Christ and in his Spirit God wills the salvation of all people.  His investigation leads him 
to search for the link between our anticipation or desire for God (obediential potency) and 
revelation.153  Rahner reasons that God created human beings with the intrinsic capacity 
to receive grace and discern it precisely as grace.  Indeed, this “potency” is what defines 
the human person precisely as human:  the human being is the “the event of a free, 
unmerited and forgiving, and absolute self-communication of God.”  This suggests 
that on the one hand God is present for man in his absolute transcendentality not 
only as the absolute, always distant, radically remote term and source of his 
transcendence which man always grasps only asymptotically, but also that he 
offers himself in his own reality.  . . . [When] we say that God is present for us in 
absolute self-communication, this says on the other hand that this self-
communication of God is present in the mode of closeness, and not only in the 
mode of distant presence as the term of transcendence, a closeness in which God 
                                                
 152 Idem., FCF, ibid., p. 116. 
 
 153Ibid.  Whereas Rahner uses the word “anticipated” to speak of our graced predisposition for a 
historical “speaking” of God’s word, revelation as it occurs in Jesus Christ is not something human beings 
can hypothesize or deduce, either from our interior dispensation or other historical events.  We “can and 
must accept God’s free revelation as unexpected, undue grace, as ‘history,’ not as opposed to nature but as 
standing above nature” (Karl Rahner, Hearers of the Word, ibid., p. 154).  Grace comes unpredicted as a 
“thief in the night” (1 Thess. 5:2-4). 
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does not become a categorical and individual being, but he is nevertheless really 
present as one communicating himself, and not only as the distant, 
incomprehensible and asymptotic term of our transcendence.154 
 
God’s self-communication as grace means that “what is communicated is really God in 
his own being, and in this way it is a communication for the sake of knowing and 
possessing God in immediate vision and love.”155  Grace is thus the free invitation to 
every human person to share in this mystery, which renders human life mysterious at 
every level as it opens in us an orientation to the God who is forever greater (Deus 
semper maior).  In grace, God is, as St. Augustine says, “closer to us than we are to 
ourselves.”  Indeed, “the giver in his own being is the gift, that in and through his own 
being the giver gives himself to creatures as their own fulfillment.”156  Yet, even in this 
closeness God remains absolute mystery.  “Mystery” is not merely another word for that 
which for the time being has not yet been comprehended and perceived.  Precisely as 
absolute, the Mystery is never provisional, even in the immediate vision of God in divine 
beatitude.  Thus, God “can communicate himself in his own reality to what is not divine 
without ceasing to be infinite reality and absolute mystery, and without man ceasing to be 
a finite existent different from God.  The self-communication does not cancel out or deny 
what was said earlier about the presence of God as the absolute mystery which is 
essentially incomprehensible.”157 
 Rahner’s teaching on grace—God’s love offered to all people—is rooted in the 
revelation that God wills a universal salvation, a doctrine that, for him, stands at the very 
                                                
 154 Idem., FCF, ibid., p. 119. 
 
 155 Ibid., p. 117-118. 
 
 156 Ibid., p. 120. 
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heart of the gospel.  An interpretive corollary to this doctrine is Rahner’s concept of the 
“supernatural existential.”158  Here we can only provide a rough outline of this theory, the 
logic of which begins like this: 
If God created human beings in the first place so that there would be creatures 
with whom God could share his own divine life in knowledge and love, that is, if 
God created human beings precisely for the life of grace, then the offer and the 
possibility of grace is given with human nature itself as this nature has been 
historically constituted.  Creation is intrinsically ordered to the supernatural life of 
grace as its deepest dynamism and final goal.   The offer of this grace, then, is an 
existential, an intrinsic component of human existence and part of the very 
definition of the human in its historical existence.159 
 
As we have seen, Rahner’s vision of the human person as “spirit-in-world” lies between 
the extremes of “pure” transcendence (a rejection of the world as we know it in search for 
the purely unconditioned) and “pure” immanence (the denial of any other reality other 
than the empirical).  Human transcendence should not, on the one hand, be interpreted as 
a turning away from the world and its physical reality to something purely spiritual and 
other-worldly or extraordinary.  Nor is it a complete embrace of this world, an espousal 
of the conviction that there is no reality beyond what we experience directly and can 
explain clearly in concrete, empirical terms.  Human experience of the world is at once 
direct, concrete experience and an experience of that mystery which lies beyond the 
                                                
 158 Rahner borrows from Heidegger the term “existential” to denote those permanent constituent 
elements of every human being (e.g., spirituality, materiality, freedom, limitedness, historicity, guilt).  
Michael Skelley provides an accessible background to Rahner’s concept of the supernatural existential:  
“We live in an objective situation of salvation in which we are convinced that God really wills the salvation 
of everyone, while at the same time the future salvation of any individual is still in the balance.  The 
process of salvation history has never been a matter of bringing about a will to save in God.  God has 
always willed everyone’s salvation.  The problem has been to get the human community to freely accept 
the salvation offered by God.  . . . [In faith] we can be certain that everyone is freely invited to enter into 
communion with God.  What will happen in the case of any particular individual remains uncertain, 
however, because that will depend on the individual’s free acceptance or rejection of God (Michael 
Skelley, The Liturgy of the World:  Karl Rahner’s Theology of Worship.  Collegeville:  Pueblo, 1991, p. 
61). 
 
 159 William Dych, Karl Rahner, ibid., p. 36. 
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material world and remains inscrutable.  Rahner’s analysis of human experience as being 
a unity between matter and spirit, between the categorical and the transcendental, helps to 
ground an avoidance of both extrinsicist and intrinsicist notions of grace.  His theological 
concern is to preserve—at the same time—the supernatural quality and gratuity of God’s 
self-offer and the immanent desire for grace rooted in the human heart.  Henri de Lubac 
and the “new theology” movement tried to counter the neo-Scholastic notion that grace is 
“extrinsic” to “pure nature” by insisting that grace is both a “natural desire” of human 
beings and an utterly free offer on God’s part (for friendship is never “owed”).  However, 
this proposal that grace is “natural” threatened to collapse grace into nature.  The problem 
of extrinsicism would thus only be replaced with an equally problematic intrinsicism.160  
Rahner agreed that a desire for God (whether conscious or not) is a fundamental 
orientation of every human being, but insisted that this orientation of human existence 
should be called a “supernatural existential” to indicate that grace is a “permanent 
modification of the human spirit which transforms its natural dynamism into an 
ontological drive to the God of grace and glory” and an utterly gratuitous gift of God that 
need not have been.  Because God's offer of grace produces a "supernatural existential" in 
the human soul, the idea that human beings exist with a  “pure nature” prior to grace is a 
“remainder concept” (Restbegriff) in that God could have created us for a purely natural 
end, but de facto did not.161  Our potential for grace is an “existential” in that it is a 
permanent modification of human nature; but it is “supernatural” because the desire for 
                                                
 160 Cf. Rahner’s discussion of these terms in “Revelation, I. Concept of Revelation, B. Theological 
Interpretation, in Karl Rahner, ed., Sacramentum Mundi, Vol. 5, ibid., p. 348-349. 
 
 161 Karl Rahner, “Concerning the Relationship between Grace and Nature,” in Theological 
Investigations, Vol. 1.  Baltimore:  Helicon, 1963, p. 313. 
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God need not have been a constituent element of our essence.  As an ontological 
modification of human nature, grace is completely gratuitous and transformative, creative 
of an entirely new situation for “spirit-in-world.” 
This antecedent self-communication of God which is prior to man’s freedom 
means nothing else but that the spirit’s transcendental movement in knowledge 
and love towards the absolute mystery is borne by God himself in his self-
communication in such a way that this movement has its term and its source not 
in the holy mystery as eternally distant and as a goal which can only be reached 
asymptotically, but rather in the God of absolute closeness and immediacy.162 
 
Thus, to be human is to be invited “into that interpersonal communion with God which is 
our salvation.  Even before we might be transformed by grace, we are already subject to 
the universal salvific will of God and obligated to pursue the fulfillment of our deepest 
potential:  union with God.”163 
 The implications of Rahner’s theory on the supernatural existential are wide-
ranging, touching upon almost the entirety of his systematic theology.  Through this 
teaching Rahner preserves the utter gratuity and divine character of grace and its 
permeating presence in ordinary life.  He demonstrates that grace is not extrinsic to us but 
rather something in which we are always caught up, something that shapes us from deep 
within.  This reflects Rahner’s intuition that whatever God is doing to save the world 
must somehow be there in our experience, and it must be something that is going on not 
just in explicitly religious spheres, but it must actually suffuse our experience at every 
level.  As we know and choose very particular things, at the same time we are always 
transcending those things and moving towards God.  Our religious experience is not just 
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 163 Michael Skelley, ibid., p. 62. 
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intermittently present, either in “ecstatic states” or in prayer and worship, but rather it is 
woven into the texture of all of human experience. 
 Grace is present not merely as one of many human aspects, but rather as the 
deepest and innermost truth about the human.  If grace is a supernatural existential, then 
there is no purely natural state of human existence apart from grace; God is always 
already “involved” with every human being, whether an individual acknowledges and 
accepts this or not.  Rahner affirms the intrinsic unity of grace and nature by 
conceiving of God’s gracious presence in the world through his Spirit as a 
‘supernatural existential.’  This means that God’s creative intention from the very 
beginning . . . has been not just the transcendence of matter beyond its own power 
into the human life of knowledge, freedom, and love, but also the transcendence 
of human life beyond its own power into participation in God’s own life through 
knowledge, freedom, and love.  Human beings come to be so that God can share 
his life in this way.  Hence the history of God’s self-revelation in grace does not 
float above the history of nature and man as an added embellishment, but is 
imbedded within as its deepest destiny.164 
 
Grace, the miracle of the self-communication of God’s very being, is an offer made 
universally, to all people, in all times, cultures, and religions, even to those who lived 
before Jesus Christ.  Indeed, the supernatural existential places all human beings, not 
merely those who have had historical contact with Jesus or his followers, in a “new and 
improved” condition.  God’s self-communication as “supernatural and unmerited is not 
threatened or called into question by the fact that this self-communication is present in 
every person at least in the mode of an offer.  The love of God does not become less a 
miracle by the fact that it is promised to all men . . ..165  As Rahner was fond of saying, 
                                                
 164 William Dych, Karl Rahner, ibid., p. 71. 
 
 165 Karl Rahner, FCF, ibid., p. 127.  Rahner goes on to explain that God’s grace is given “not only 
as a gift, but also as the necessary condition which makes possible an acceptance of the gift which can 
allow the gift really to be God, and can prevent the gift in its acceptance from being changed from God into 
a finite and created gift which only represents God, but is not God himself.  . . . [Thus] God’s self-
communication as offer is also the necessary condition which makes its acceptance possible” (ibid., p. 128). 
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the gratuitous offer of God’s love in grace has a history.  The supernatural, transcendental 
experience is embedded in history, a history that is identical with human history; it does 
not bestow itself intermittently at certain times and in particular places, but universally 
and intrinsically.  For every human being the supernatural existential constitutes a 
revelation of God through his self-communication in grace. 
If the transcendental and supernatural experience of God necessarily interprets 
itself historically, and therefore forms a categorical history of revelation, and if 
this is present everywhere, then this also means that such a history is always a 
history of revelation . . ..  Therefore the history of revelation . . . is found where 
this self-interpretation of God’s transcendental self-communication in history 
succeeds, and where with certainty it reaches its self-awareness and its purity in 
such a way that it correctly knows itself to be guided and directed by God, and, 
protected by God against clinging tenaciously to what is provisional and to what 
is depraved, it discovers its own true self.166 
 
According to Rahner, grace and revelation are all but inseparable.  The indwelling of the 
Holy Spirit as an intrinsic constituent of every human person’s life, this “gratuitious 
elevation of human transcendentality in its dynamism of knowledge and love, is 
synonymous with transcendental revelation [and] uncreated grace . . ..”167  Indeed, the 
“universal offer of grace entails a universal revelation.  There can be no self-
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 167 Stephen J. Duffy, “Experience of Grace,” in CCKR, ibid., p. 46.  Here Rahner makes the 
connection between transcendence and grace even more explicit:  “[I]n the actual order of reality, 
experience of transcendence (which is experience of God) is always also experience of grace, since the 
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inescapable experience of the unknown God, whether or not one has at one’s disposal theological 
expressions such as those we have just been using (Karl Rahner, “Experience of the Holy Spirit,” in 
Theological Investigations, Vol. 18.  New York:  Crossroad, p. 198). 
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communication of God without a self-revelation, and there can be no revelation in the full 
sense of the term without faith.”168  Revelation always presents two aspects: 
On the one hand, it constitutes man’s supernaturally elevated transcendence as his 
permanent though grace-given existential, always and everywhere operative, 
present even when refused.  It is the transcendental experience of the absolute and 
merciful closeness of God, even if this cannot be conceptually expressed at will 
by everyone.  On the other hand, the active revelation-event is also a historical 
mediation and conceptual objectivation of this supernaturally transcendental 
experience.  The latter takes place in history and, taken in its totality, constitutes 
the whole of history.169 
 
 Universal or transcendental revelation is given to all people in God’s self offer in 
grace.  All human beings have God’s very self as abiding grace as their innermost 
constitutive element, summoning them to respond positively in the freedom of faith to the 
offer of divine friendship.  Revelation “and our reaction to it is in fact the deepest 
dimension and ultimate meaning of the historical process.  Transcendental revelation is 
inseparable from some kind of categorical experience.  We only become aware of it as we 
engage with mind and heart, in knowledge and love, in the world.  It is for this reason 
that Rahner can say that all of human history is a form of categorical revelation.”170  As 
Rahner says, there is “never a history of transcendental revelation in isolation.  History in 
the concrete, both individually and collectively, is the history of God’s transcendental 
revelation.”171  Because revelation is always historically mediated in language, symbols, 
institutions, and relationships, there is nothing like a “pure” religious experience of God. 
Personal relationship with God in human experience is a concrete, historical possibility 
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for all people whether or not they are aware or accept in faith that they are caught up in 
salvation history.  As Rahner says, grace is “a reality which is so very much part of the 
innermost core of human existence in decision and freedom, always and above all given 
in the form of an offer that is either accepted or rejected, that the human being cannot 
step out of this transcendental peculiarity of his being at all.”172  But because God’s love 
is the permanent and abiding presence in which people “live, move, and have their 
being,” it can be overlooked, ignored, even rejected.  Although all of human history is a 
form of categorical revelation, it is forever ambiguous and mixed with sin and depravity.  
Thus, it is important to take seriously Rahner’s insistence that grace, as a supernatural 
existential, constitutes an offer of God’s love.  The world may be graced, but not 
everything is grace.  Salvation may be offered universally, but evidently it is not 
universally accepted. 
In this sense everyone, really and radically every person must be understood as 
the event of a supernatural self-communication of God, although not in the sense 
that every person necessarily accepts in freedom God’s self-communication to 
man.  Just as man’s essential being, his spiritual personhood, in spite of the fact 
that it is and remains an inescapable given for every free subject, is given to his 
freedom in such a way that the free subject can possess himself in the mode of 
“yes” or in the mode of “no,” in the mode of deliberate and obedient acceptance 
or in the mode of protest against this essential being of his which has been 
entrusted to freedom, so too the existential of man’s absolute immediacy to God 
in and through this divine self-communication as permanently offered to freedom 
can exist merely in the mode of an antecedent offer, in the mode of acceptance 
and in the mode of rejection.173 
                                                
 172 Idem., Faith in a Wintry Season, ibid., p. 21. 
 
 173 Idem., FCF, ibid., p. 128.  In another place Rahner accentuates the idea that every human 
person must reckon with his or her supernatural orientation.  While an individual may claim indifference 
toward it, the graced orientation to mystery is the ultimate responsibility:  “Even prior to justification by 
sanctifying grace, whether this is conferred sacramentally or outside the sacraments, man already stands 
under the universal, infralapsarian salvific will of God which comprises within its scope original sin and 
personal sin.  Man is redeemed, and is permanently the object of God’s saving care and offer of grace.  He 
is under an absolute obligation to attain his supernatural goal.  This situation . . . is all-inclusive and 
inescapably prior to man’s free action, which it determines.  It does not exist solely in the thoughts and 
intentions of God, but is an existential determination of man himself.  As an objective consequence of 
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Finally, the Christian teaching that grace is available to every person means that our 
supernaturally elevated transcendentality is mediated not only through individual acts of 
knowledge and love but also through the whole of culture, in social and historical 
realities.  This “realization of the human being’s essence does not take place alongside 
the events of historical life, but within this historical life.  The categorical, historical self-
interpretation of what the human being is takes place . . . in the whole human history, in 
what each person does and what he or she suffers in individual life; in what we call 
simply the history of culture, of society, of the state, of art, of religion, and of the 
external, technical economic mastery of nature.”174  Because God through his grace 
demonstrates absolute love and finally the entire welfare of every human being, that is, 
because the world is graced, Christianity cannot simply be concerned with “heavenly 
things” and “think that earthly matters do not concern them and have no bearing on their 
salvation.”  It is precisely through “earthly matters” that all people give symbolic value to 
what it is that they hold to interiorly, that to which they ultimately “give” themselves—be 
it God or mammon. 
 
The Unity of Transcendental and Categorical Experience 
 Transcendence “has a history, and that history itself is always the event of this 
transcendence.”175  Human history is the only locus of human transcendence:  the human 
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person’s subjective and unlimited capacity to reach beyond himself or herself toward the 
horizon of absolute mystery is always mediated historically in knowledge, love, and free 
self-realization.  This suggests that transcendence does not operate, as it were, alongside 
history, apart from it in some rarefied, metaphysical realm.  The “supernatural 
existential” also has a history, if it is 
in this way that the human being is a being of subjectivity, of transcendence, of 
freedom and of a mutual relationship with the holy mystery which we call God; if 
he or she is the event of God’s absolute self-communication, and if he is all of this 
always and inescapably and from the beginning; and if as such a being of 
divinized transcendence he is at the same time a historical being both individually 
and collectively, then it follows . . . that this is at once the single history of both 
salvation and revelation.176 
 
The history of the supernatural existential is thus also the history of God’s freedom; it is 
an event in which God’s freedom “can give itself or refuse to give itself.”177  This means 
the history of salvation is coexistent and coextensive with the whole of human history, 
“which is not to say identical with human history, for in this single history there is also 
guilt and the rejection of God, and hence the opposite of salvation . . ..”178  Insofar as 
there exists “a concrete dialectic in history, both individual and collective, between the 
presence of God as giving himself in an absolute self-communication, and the absence of 
God as always remaining the holy mystery, this expresses what the history of salvation 
and revelation really means.”179  There is no supernatural revelation from God that “could 
take place in any other way except in the faith of the person hearing the revelation.  To 
this extent it is clear that the history of salvation and revelation is always the already 
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existing synthesis of God’s historical activity and man’s at the same time . . ..”180  Rahner 
summarizes this dynamic: 
Corresponding to man’s essence as transcendence and history, such a history of 
salvation has essentially two moments which mutually condition each other:  it is 
the event of God’s self-communication as accepted or rejected by man’s own 
basic freedom; and this moment of God’s self-communication, which seemingly 
is merely transcendent and trans-historical because it is permanent and always 
present, belongs to this history and takes place within it.181 
 
Thus, the relationship between unlimited human freedom and God’s eternal freedom, i.e., 
the intercourse of human and divine spirit, “happens” and occurs in time and concrete 
history.  Since the experience of God’s own self-expression as grace penetrates to the 
core of our being, the interior transformation this experience makes must be made known 
exteriorly, symbolically, in our own self-expression.  It comes to appearance in the 
historical corporeality of human history and is expressed (indeed, it can only and must be 
expressed) in images and likenesses.  Our acts of knowing and loving (or their opposite) 
signal our “yes” or “no” to God’s offer of love; they communicate, thematize, narrate, 
and give form to what is happening invisibly, deep within.  Rahner perceives an absolute 
and necessary unity between transcendental experience and categorical experience:  the 
transcendental must somehow articulate itself in the categorical.  There is “an inescapable 
unity in difference between one’s original self-possession and reflection.”182  Because we 
are already immersed in the life about which we wish to know more, we always already 
have an experiential knowledge of ourselves.  We have this knowledge from within our 
own experience, not because we have learned it from an outside source.  Self-reflection 
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always takes place within the categorical; we cannot remove ourselves from existence in 
order to observe it, as it were, objectively.  Moreover, our lives and actions and 
relationships are not just source material for us to scrutinize in order to know something 
about ourselves:  the lives and actions and relationship are the knowledge, the “original” 
knowledge that is experience itself.  At the same time, because we are social beings “who 
exist with others, this knowledge wells up and reaches the level of reflection, expression, 
and communication.  To express our experiential knowledge we must objectify it, in the 
sense of embodying it in concepts and words which others can hear and understand.”183  
Simply put, it is essential to our constitution as unified material-spiritual beings that we 
communicate ourselves and not just parcels of information about who we are.  After all, 
everyone “strives to tell another, especially someone he loves, what he is suffering.”184  
To do this we must try to make explicit (thematic) our own “original” (unthematic) self-
experience.  Rahner explains: 
When I love, when I am tormented by questions, when I am sad, when I am 
faithful, when I feel longing, this [personal] reality is a unity, an original unity of 
reality and its own self-presence which is not totally mediated by the concept 
which objectifies it in scientific knowledge.185 
 
 There are thus two levels of knowledge:  (a) transcendental knowledge that comes 
with the original unity of our existential reality; and (b) conceptual knowledge, which is 
the personal objectification, the communication in language and symbol, of our original 
self-possession.  This latter form of knowledge does not “create our relationship to the 
                                                
 183 William Dych, “Theology in a New Key,” ibid., p. 4. 
 
 184 Karl Rahner, FCF, p. 16. 
 
 185 Ibid., pp. 15-16. 
 
 297 
world but rather gives expression to it.”186  However, it should not be thought that the 
second level is in tandem with the first, as if we experience something and then sometime 
“later on” we get down to the business of expressing it.  Instead, they form a singular 
unity-in-difference:  The original unity between reality and its knowledge of itself 
“always exists in man only with and in and through what we can call language, and thus 
also reflection and communicability.  At that moment when this element of reflection 
would no longer be present, this original self-possession would also cease to exist.”187  
Nevertheless, even though an element of reflection presents itself at the original level of 
knowledge, the expression or symbol of original experience can never “capture this unity 
and transpose it completely into objectifying concepts.”188  So for instance, the concepts 
of trust or grief or longing are never the same thing as the realities themselves.  That is to 
say, the “symbol expresses the symbolized, but is never identical with it.”189  There is a 
unity but not a strict identity between original knowledge and its concept.  A tension 
exists, as it were, between our transcendental experience and its expression because the 
life of the spirit is 
that realm of experience where language fails:  we have language for objects, for 
distinguishing one thing from another, for putting things in categories, but not for 
that which cannot in principle be an object, for that which is beyond categories, 
for the infinite horizon within which the distinguishing takes place.  And yet 
transcendental experience cannot simply remain inarticulate, but always seeks 
expression in the realm of the categorical.  The expression will never be wholly 
adequate, will always in some way fail, but it must always nevertheless be 
attempted.190 
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 There is also a movement in the opposite direction, where conceptual knowledge 
helps widen the scope of transcendental knowledge by returning us to it with an expanded 
consciousness.  Rahner writes of this with a mind toward the implications this 
phenomenon holds for theology: 
Only very slowly, perhaps, does a person experience clearly what he or she has 
been talking about for a long time, and was able to because they were shaped by a 
common language and instructed and indoctrinated from without.  It is precisely 
we theologians who are always in danger of talking about heaven and earth, about 
God and man with an arsenal of religious and theological concepts . . ..  We can 
acquire for ourselves in theology an extraordinarily great skill in this kind of talk, 
and perhaps not have really understood from the depths of our own existence 
what we are actually talking about.  To this extent reflection, concepts and 
language must necessarily be oriented towards this original knowledge, this 
original experience, where what is meant and the experience of what is meant are 
still one.191 
 
On this point, if we do not refer our language, symbols, and concepts back to their source 
in experiential knowledge then “they become empty abstractions”192; or, as St. Paul puts 
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it, our words become nothing but a noisy gong, a clashing cymbal.193  The tension that 
exists between these two levels of knowledge, between our original self-posession, which 
always already consists in the offer of grace, and our conceptualization of it, is a positive, 
dynamic tension because it is moving (or should move) toward a goal.  We should always 
be striving for a better, clearer, and more meaningful conceptual knowledge of what we 
have already experienced and lived through “prior” to its thematization, although never 
entirely without it.  In terms of theology, i.e., language doctrine that interprets the 
experience of revelation 
we should show again and again that all of our theological concepts do not make 
the reality itself present to people from without, but rather they are the expression 
of what has already been experienced and lived through more originally in the 
depths of existence.  We can and must do both:  try to reach greater levels of 
conceptual clarity, and try again and again to trace our theological concepts back 
to their original experience.194 
 
 
Christ the Criterion:  The Privileged Place of Christian Categorical Revelation 
 This brings us to the reality that Rahner says ultimately unites human 
transcendental and categorical experience and which, to return to an image from earlier in 
the chapter, assures us that the mysterious night surrounding us is not the absurd void of 
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death engulfing us, but rather the blessed holy night which is already illumined from 
within and gives promise of everlasting day,195 namely “the message of the unsurpassable 
and normative role of Jesus and his saving meaning for all people.”196  Christianity is a 
religion that proclaims “salvation and revelation not only for particular groups of people . 
. . but for all people until the end of history.”197  We have already said that Rahner 
understands grace to be at work in all people as the innermost ultimate dynamism of their 
spiritual existence.  In acts of authentic knowledge, love, and responsibility, people 
implicitly reach out to God who is the mystery that penetrates their lives and 
relationships.  Those who have had “the experience of responsibility, of genuine love, of 
the inability to run away from their responsibility, have basically had a religious 
experience, whether they are aware of it or not.”198  In the “stretching out” of human 
transcendence the spirit encounters absolute mystery whereby God “gifts” us in an act of 
complete self-donation.  From God’s side nothing is, as it were, held back; every human 
life is permeated by the fullness of God’s mysterious presence as an offer of a covenantal 
and everlasting relationship.  To return to an earlier concept of Rahner’s, the human spirit 
is always searching in the world for meaning, ever yearning to hear a definitive word in 
the experience of the horizon of knowledge and love that the mystery which engulfs our 
experience has not remained distant and remote but has come close.  He writes that, 
“thanks to his essence qualified by the supernatural existential, the human being is a 
being who is oriented towards a saving event which is possible to expect as an absolute 
                                                
 195 Idem., The Practice of Faith.  New York:  Crossroad, 1986, p. 81. 
 
 196 Idem., In Dialogue, ibid., p. 134. 
 
 197 Idem., FCF, p. 140. 
 
 198 Idem., In Dialogue, ibid., p. 69. 
 
 301 
and definitive saving event . . ..”199  Reflective awareness of this original revealing self-
communication of God “is not the product of mere introversion.  It occurs in concrete, 
historical, human experiences.  The human transcendental orientation “towards such a 
historical redemptive event is only explicitly reflected on when human beings meet with 
this event in history.”200  People do not “experience what love is, what responsibility is, 
by sitting and asking themselves in some psychological introspection:  Who am I really?  
They make this experience of freedom, of responsibility, of love in concrete life, in their 
concrete activity, in their concrete historical reality.”201  Rahner insists that we can 
respond to the self-revelation of God at our innermost depths only in an act of loving 
surrender, not in a vain attempt to grasp at and control a situation that is ultimately 
beyond our control.  We are, as he puts it, “burdened” with grace and responsibility for 
our free actions.  When “human beings act, when they love, when they think correctly, 
when they search, when they inquire, when they act freely and responsibly, [they] are 
ultimately intending the ineffable, unfathomable mystery that we call God.”202  When it is 
a matter of the 
total and definitive sense of human existence, and when this sense is to be the 
incomprehensible God, meaning becomes mystery, and we must surrender to it in 
mute, adoring love in order to approach it.  This utterly different, unexpected 
signification makes no sense that we can see through, grasp, and bring into 
subjection.  This sense is the mystery that closes us in its grasp.  Its beatitude is 
bestowed on us only when we affirm and love this holy mystery for its own sake 
and not ours, when we surrender, and not when we surreptitiously seek to make 
God a means for our self-affirmation.203 
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 But this presents us with the decisive question of normativity:  How does one 
know what constitutes a positive human response to the offer of grace?  If God’s offer of 
salvation is coextensive with our own lives, by what external measure can we know 
whether we have responded to grace in a genuine act of faith?  And how can one be 
assured that this response is what God intends in revelation?  As we have shown, “there 
is never transcendence which is not accompanied by some degree of reflection, however 
limited, because every transcendental experience must be mediated objectively.  But the 
mediation of this experience of transcendence does not necessarily have to be an 
explicitly religious mediation.”204  Human response to this genuine, original, and 
universal religious experience of God’s self-revelation is always expressed categorically 
in myriad personal and collective forms.  Yet, how to judge between an authentically-
conceived transcendence and the danger of a wrongly-conceived transcendence, which 
ignores the real conditions under which God reveals God’s self?  If God is experienced in 
acts of genuine knowledge, love, and responsibility, by what authority does one discern 
the authenticity of these actions?  What is the historical norm for the complete and 
definitive comprehension of the human transcendental experience? 
 Christianity posits that Jesus Christ, the God-man, is the irrevocable, 
unsurpassable, and definitive self-communication of God to the world in history as well 
as the historical perfection of the human response to the offer of God’s grace.  The 
Christian church claims that in Jesus Christ God’s revelation to the world is complete, 
final, and finally known to be available to all.  For the church, the history of revelation 
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has its absolute climax when God’s self-communication reaches its unsurpassable 
high point . . . in the incarnation of God in the created, spiritual, reality of Jesus.  . 
. . [For in him] God’s communication to humanity in grace and at the same time 
its categorical self-interpretation in the corporeal, tangible, and social dimension 
have reached their climax, have become revelation in an absolute sense.205 
 
As we have stressed throughout this chapter, the real starting point and ultimate goal of 
Rahner’s theology is Jesus Christ.  His is a theology which claims nothing less than “the 
absoluteness of Christianity, insofar as Christianity in its proper reality and center, thus in 
the redemption through Jesus Christ, recognizes the salvation of all people, and insofar as 
Christianity is the invitation to grasp explicitly in Jesus Christ this true final reality of the 
grace of eternal life.”206  For Rahner, the entire Christian message is centered on God’s 
free and undeserved communication of God’s entire self in Jesus Christ. 
Where in their history do human beings make, with the absolute certitude of faith, 
the experience that God has actually promised himself to them in his grace, and 
that this self-pledging God is irreversibly and victoriously given to humankind, 
then to this question the Christian answers:  I make this experience in Jesus 
Christ, he who is crucified and rose from the dead.  That is where I encounter the 
person in whose reality, in whose history, in whose actuality, in whose self-
interpretation is really experienced that the innermost dynamism in me is really 
authentic, that it is reliable, that it is not a mere fiction of the mind.  Therefore, in 
the concrete historical experience of Jesus Christ the innermost revelation of 
God’s grace is experienced as undeniably certain and irrevocable.207 
 
The message of Christianity can be summarized through the proclamation of Christ 
himself.  Jesus announces that 
with himself, the definitive, irrevocable address of God’s forgiving and self-
bestowing love is present—that the Kingdom of God has irrevocably come, that 
the victory of God’s forgiving love in the history of humankind is complete and 
irreversible insofar as God himself is concerned.  And in God’s definitive 
acceptance of Jesus through his resurrection, Jesus’ claim to be the vehicle of 
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God’s definitive self-communication to the world, despite its sin and finitude and 
mortality, is legitimated and sealed.208 
 
Here, Rahner emphasizes the privileged place of Christian categorical revelation in 
relation to the other religions of the world: 
It is not until the full and unsurpassable event of the historical self-objectification 
of God’s self-communication to the world in Jesus Christ do we have an event 
which . . . fundamentally and absolutely precludes any historical corruption or any 
distorted interpretation in the further history of categorical revelation and of false 
religion.209 
 
In a treatment of revelation faithful to Rahner, we read that the self-revelation of the 
living God expressed in the New Testament “is salvation-history which does not go 
beyond Jesus, because it is fulfilled in him, but continues to work for all human beings, 
whose salvation is promised in the triumph of Jesus.  Revelation is God’s word on 
history, and as faithful word, the history of God’s word among human beings.”210  From 
the perspective of explicit Christian faith, all other claims to truth must be measured 
against the full historical event of God’s revelation in Jesus Christ, for it is only in the 
crucified and risen one that we have the possibility of distinguishing “between the 
categorical history of revelation in the full sense and in its purity, and the formation of 
human substitutes for it and misinterpretations of it.”211  Therefore, Christ, who is the 
matchless, definitive word of God’s testimony to himself in the world, is the 
criterion for distinguishing in the concrete history of religion between what is a 
human misunderstanding of the transcendental experience of God, and what is the 
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legitimate interpretation of this experience.  It is only in him that such a 
discernment of spirits in an ultimate sense is possible.212 
 
Indeed, none of the existing non-Christian religions for Rahner is 
an unadulterated expression of the right relationship between God and humanity; 
each is sinfully deficient also in profound ways.  Thus they are not simply 
incomplete religions.  (It’s possible to ask whether something similar isn’t true 
with us.)  To this extent, these people are endangered in their salvation in decisive 
ways, and so I would see missionary work as always very important and 
necessary—although this would not be my final theological reason for missionary 
effort.213 
 
 Given the constraints of the dissertation, we are unable to set forth an adequate 
Christology that would disclose further the organic line by which Rahner connects his 
reflections on basic human experience with the church’s proclamation of Jesus Christ.214  
It is sufficient to say here that when the human spirit searches in history for an explicit 
word that fulfills its transcendence, it is seeking out an “absolute” answer.  When the 
spirit yearns for a personal encounter that meets and fulfills that desire for something 
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beyond itself, it is searching for an “absolute bringer of salvation.”  From the perspective 
of Christian faith, when a person encounters Jesus Christ, whom the church believes is 
Savior to all, that person at once encounters the full presence of God’s gracious word in 
the world and the fulfillment of obedience to that word in history.  In encountering Jesus, 
a person, by virtue of the supernatural existential, recognizes the one whom he or she is 
intended by grace to become.  The Christian church is the community of persons who 
have recognized and explicitly assented in faith to the truth that the Word of God has 
been made flesh in Jesus Christ and is thus the perfection of God’s self-revelation in 
history.  The church’s unique witness to this truth in word and deed is the privileged 
testimony to this historical revelatory event—the normative event by which God 
confirms the absolute goal God intends for all human beings. 
 Rahner’s theology has all along intended to demonstrate that God’s revelation in 
the world is something that human beings can anticipate but never deduce.  The inner 
thrust of transcendence anticipates, corresponds to, and is fulfilled by the history of 
salvation and revelation, but which comes to people supernaturally.  What is 
unanticipated and radically new is the manner in which God chooses to reveal God’s 
self.215  The incarnation of God’s word in Jesus Christ, is a “word of God that has already 
as a matter of course been addressed to me by what I call grace, so that by now historical 
experience and the innermost dynamism of human beings toward God meet each other 
and confirm each other.  From this unity of the historical experience of Jesus Christ and 
of the innermost experience of grace emerges then what we call God’s revelation 
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accepted in faith in the full sense of the word.”216  Christianity declares that the 
fulfillment of “the human search for meaning is the incomprehensible Mystery of God 
given to the world in the historical event of the incarnation that can never be manipulated, 
and this he remains for all eternity.”217  Of course, all of this leads to the questions of how 
one encounters Jesus Christ, both within explicit Christianity and outside it, and why this 
encounter is salvific.  Here, we are content to say that, according to the doctrine of the 
universal salvific will of God and, for Rahner, by virtue of the supernatural existential, it 
is possible to achieve salvation outside formal Christianity.  And yet, insists Rahner, the 
human person’s orientation to God is also and necessarily an orientation by and toward 
Jesus Christ—unsurpassable exemplar and criterion of the path to and of God. 
 
Conclusion 
 We are now in a position to draw out some implications of Rahner’s theology for 
clarifying our thesis that film is a locus mystagogicus.  The thesis can be better honed 
now that we have investigated Rahner’s fundamental theology, its connection to 
mystagogy, and the justification he gives for the turn to secular sources.  Here we are 
guided by the question of the difference Rahner’s thought makes in our perception of 
mystagogy and its sources and why film is essential to the mystagogical task of 
contemporary theology.  One of the leading concerns of the dissertation has been to 
establish the theoretical grounds for theology’s turn to film as a source for theological 
reflection.  While a growing number of people in the church are approaching film from 
                                                
 216 Ibid., p. 77. 
 
 217 Karl Rahner, The Love of Jesus and the Love of Neighbor, ibid., p. 55. 
 
 308 
theological angles, few have provided ample justification for Christian theology’s 
engagement of a non-Christian source as a means toward enriching the faith life of 
believers.  If theology is faith in search of understanding of how believers can know and 
live out their faith in Jesus Christ in the world, then it must furnish the faithful with the 
means of interpreting secular experiences in light of the gospel. 
 This, of course, is not a new problem in theology.  Earlier we demonstrated that 
the fathers of the church justified their turn to sources outside explicit Christianity by way 
of their conviction that the Spirit of God had planted in the world the so-called logos 
spermatikos as preparation for the incarnation of the Word in Jesus Christ.  In light of the 
gospel, early Christians could perceive intimations of God’s Verbum in certain elements 
of the pagan world around them and appropriate these elements in their theology and 
preaching.  Using Greek cultural and literary symbols in their mystagogy, the fathers 
helped believers deepen their understanding of initiation into the mystery of Christ.  To 
their minds, God’s revelation outside explicit Christianity was present in seed form—that 
is, limited and incomplete—and that possession of the gospel allowed them to discern 
between the good and bad ground on which the seed had fallen.  The seeds were 
preparatory of an unequivocal and awe-inspiring word that would come historically, in 
“the flesh of the Logos.”  The fathers’ mystagogical sermons clarified that only through 
baptism did one reap the full harvest of truth, and not only seeds. 
 Just as the patristic writers retrieved “types” of Christian symbols from sources 
outside the tradition for their sermons, this dissertation has suggested that film should be 
a material source for and of mystagogical interpretation today.  To help articulate this 
possibility in contemporary theological language, we turned to the theology of Karl 
 309 
Rahner.  He inquires into the relevancy of secular sources under the broader question of 
the relationship between Christian faith and human experience as a whole.  For Rahner, 
human experience is already a legitimate theological source because of its graced nature.  
He grounds this judgment explicitly in revelation through his teaching on the supernatural 
existential, a theological category he derives from Christian categorical revelation itself.  
Just as there are no purely spiritual and unmediated religious experiences, so there are no 
purely secular areas of life that are untouched by God’s grace.  Thus, anthropology is a 
valid entry point for theological reflection.  Theology can approach secular, and not only 
explicitly Christian, sources in culture as loci for theological inquiry and learning.  
Indeed, with the assurance of grace, theology can welcome secular culture “on its own 
merits, since ‘it results directly and authentically from the kernel of Christian revelation 
itself.’  . . . [For what] is at stake is the true secularity of the world, which consists of the 
truth that there is nothing in the world which is too ‘holy’ to be accessible to a worldly 
approach and must be reserved for religion . . ..”218 
 Rahner’s teaching that ours is a world of grace suggests that nothing is beyond the 
reach of God, that there are no wholly secular regions of activity untouched by the offer 
of God’s grace, and that “religious experience” should never be conceived as being 
consigned to a particular district in our lives.  Experience of God is made possible 
because of the gift of God’s grace offered to the transcendentality of every human being, 
inviting them into relationship with God through their concrete, historical lives.  Each life 
is always already immersed in the presence of God in grace, at least as an offer.  Human 
experience is a justifiable locus of theological investigation because it is the locus of 
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God’s offer of personal friendship.  In this understanding, all human acts of self-
expression, including the non-religious and non-Christian, are in some way symbolic of 
the acceptance or rejection of God’s offer of love and therefore legitimate sources for 
theological inquiry and even sources of theology itself. 
Rahner’s interpretation of secular culture thus shares a measure of continuity with 
the early fathers’ conception.  He “would have unhesitatingly maintained that the ‘seeds 
of the Word’ can be found” in [secular culture and other religions] and that [these], too, 
in some sense, are a ‘preparation for the Gospel.’”219  Yet his justification also expands 
the patristic perspective.  The fathers believed that certain elements of Hellenistic culture 
(philosophy and poetry) contained semina verbi and others did not (Greek 
religion/mystery cults).  The latter contained only semina perditionis.   Rahner, on the 
other hand, does not perceive that the Holy Spirit scatters seeds “here” and “there.”  By 
virtue of the supernatural existential, every human being is an “event” of grace and thus 
recipient of God’s complete offer of self-communication.  Rahner evolves patristic 
mystagogy by extending the places to which theology can legitimately turn for 
evangelization and learning.  In his view, human culture, including the religions of the 
world, contain and offer religious elements which come from God, and which are part of 
what the Holy Spirit brings about in human hearts throughout history. 
Like the early fathers, Rahner contends that revelation prior to Christ and outside 
its explicit formulation in Christianity is always limited and incomplete.  The incarnation 
and paschal mystery of Jesus Christ remain the unsurpassable expression of God’s self-
                                                
 219 Harvey Egan, “A Rahnerian Response to Dominus Jesus,” in Australian EJournal of Theology, 
January 2004, Issue 2:  <http://dlibrary.acu.edu.au/research/theology/ejournal/aejt_2/Harvey_Egan.htm> 
(last accessed 2/16/10). 
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communication in the world.  Because Christ is the absolute savior of the world, 
Christian theology can legitimately work “extramurally,” among those outside the 
church, since its task is to interpret revelation for all.  As we have ventured to show 
throughout the dissertation, Christian theology is at its most magnanimous when 
receptive to idioms besides those in its own tradition to make the practice of faith 
reasonable and meaningful to believers.  Such a gesture also suggests that theology is 
capable of new and needed discoveries as it becomes increasingly conversant with non-
Christian religion and secular culture.  For Rahner, Christianity “must continue to learn 
from its encounters with other religions—not as though it is learning something that is 
being imported into Christianity from the outside, but rather as learning to come to itself 
in a radical, decisive manner.”220  What differentiates Rahner’s position, however, is his 
openness to the possibility of salvation apart from the visible church, though never apart 
from Jesus Christ, whose salvific significance is universal.221  The self-revelation of God 
in grace is God’s complete offer of salvation to every person.  What emerges in Rahner’s 
theology is a picture of God’s revelation which is not limited by God’s own self-
                                                
 220 Karl Rahner, In Dialogue, ibid., p. 345.  Further on, Rahner explains that “experience is never 
merely a raw or secular source in relation to theology.  Christian revelation is not merely an interpretation 
of experience but is ‘already and always’ its transformation.  Wherever human experience is authentic, it is 
already anonymously Christian.  Hence, experience could be a genuine source for theologizing, an equal 
partner in the dialogue with the objective word revelation.  Each would be the corrective of the other” (ibid. 
p. 376).  This gives further weight to the point made earlier in the chapter that theology’s turn to film 
involves a dynamic of mutually critical correlation. 
 
221 To be sure, this is the Roman Catholic church’s official doctrine.  His adaptation of mystagogy 
suggests that he is evolving the Christian understanding of mystagogy beyond the notion of the early 
church fathers.  Certainly, Rahner’s emphasis on mystagogy as an interpretive process that initiates people 
deeper into the experience of mystery has kinship with the mystagogy of the church fathers.  Like his 
forbears, Rahner presupposes mystagogy to be an ongoing process in the lives of Christians and does not 
serve only a provisional liturgical function.  The difference, however, between Rahner and the fathers, is 
that for him the universal presence of God as grace (and hence salvation) is offered to all human beings as 
an invitation into an everlasting covenantal relationship.  For Rahner, since grace touches all things, there is 
nothing in the world so profane as to preclude the presence of God. 
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communication but, rather, by the limits of apprehension of the recipient of grace.  In 
positing a graced world, Rahner is not suggesting that all is grace.  Rather, because the 
Spirit of God dwells within and without human experience, Christianity and its theology 
must remain open to the possibility that, even amid sin, the Word of God speaks its truth, 
for “where sin increased, grace abounded all the more” (Rom 5:20).  Theology, therefore, 
has the mandate to turn to human experience, however secular it may appear, and to 
discern its many aspects according to the norms of the gospel.  It must do this in order to 
give a more complete witness to how the Holy Spirit is preparing the hearts of God’s 
people for explicit recognition of the truth of Jesus Christ through the assent of faith. 
This relates to Rahner’s conception of the missionary effort of the church and the 
kerygmatic aspect of mystagogy.  According to Rahner, given the New Testament 
teaching that God wills the salvation of every human being, the church “must be 
concerned about people, all people, not only about itself.  [Its] mission to all peoples does 
not mean that outside its visible confines there is no salvation.  The winning of new 
Christians is not a matter of saving people who would otherwise be lost.  Rather, it is a 
matter of winning over witnesses, who can be a sign to all of the grace of God at work 
everywhere in the world.”222  In particular, the missionary activity of theology involves 
enabling people “to make explicit and to verbalize and to institutionalize that which is 
present to them in a rudimentary way.”223  This then returns us to Rahner’s conception of 
                                                
 222 Karl Rahner, In Dialogue, ibid., p. 106.  Reflecting further on the question of the mission, 
Rahner asks:  “What must I do in my concrete situation, myself as an individual and in community with 
others, so that the Spirit of Christ in me and in us can overcome in the contemporary world the non-spirit of 
egoism and hatred—of the quest for power, of the use of violence, of skepticism about the meaning and 
value of life—and overcome the nonspirit of a false secularism, which is without the worship of God and 
without ultimate hope?  This is the mission of the church, that is, our mission, in the contemporary world” 
(ibid., p. 53). 
 
 223 Idem., Faith in a Wintry Season, ibid., p. 103. 
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mystagogy:  the awakening into the original, grace-filled religious experience of God.  
We recall that Rahner conceived of his retrieval of mystagogy in part as a pastoral 
response to people living in a secularized world.  His theology addresses believers and 
non-believers who are struggling to make sense of their lives and who, in many cases, 
implicitly believe in God but do not have the language to articulate that belief.  All they 
know is that the language of the church, as they have learned it, does not seem to help 
them in this process.  Rahner’s point is that a new approach must be taken, one that 
attempts to meet people at the level at which they operate (“in the ordinary”) and to lead 
them to greater wisdom, but in a way that does not completely discount their experiences 
of disorientation and doubt.  He is convinced that the doctrines of the church indeed 
illuminate our experiences and train us to be open to seeing the ever-greater mystery that 
surrounds and penetrates every aspect of our lives.  Rahner thus “calls for a new 
‘mystagogy’ in which the sources of religious experience within the secular culture can 
be explored.  . . . Such a mystagogy would concentrate on finding a new opening into the 
incomprehensible mystery of human existence . . ..”224  His own theological method is an 
attempt to make explicit (categorical) the mystery dimension of human experience, 
awareness of which prepares people to hear and accept the message of Jesus Christ.  The 
mystagogical aspect of theology guards against its becoming “stuck fast at the merely 
conceptual level.”  Theology must “constitute a ‘mystagogia’ leading men and women to 
the experience of grace, and should not merely speak of grace as of a material subject 
                                                
 
 224 Anne Carr, in CCKR, ibid., p. 373-4. 
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which is present in human beings’ lives solely through the conceptions which they 
formulate of it.”225 
When theology addresses itself to those outside the church or on the threshold of 
faith, its mission is to put people into contact with the revelation of God that is already 
addressed to their spirit.  It makes explicit that element of openness to God’s word that 
will settle for nothing less than God’s word.  Theology illustrates in concrete ways how it 
is that human beings long to hear this word of salvation and how they are already 
receptive to and dependent on it.  To do this, theology must retrieve its inherent 
mystagogical orientation and take every effort to remove obstacles that prevent people 
from attending to this religious experience in their lives.  As this chapter has detailed, 
Rahner’s method of transcendental anthropology is the means by which he “does” 
mystagogy.  His method intends to immerse people into the mystery of their original and 
ever-present experience of God.  Mystagogy is a path to faith in Jesus Christ that first 
involves initiating people into the human transcendental experience of mystery.  To 
Rahner’s mind the broad mystagogical task of theology is “to disclose and articulate the 
mystery dimension implicit in all human experience so that Christian doctrines can be 
related to genuine human concerns.”226  Surely this should be the task of every 
theologian, which is to say that every theologian needs also to be a mystagogue. 
Having investigated Rahner’s theological methodology and his retrieval of 
mystagogy, we can put forward here the suggestion that the mystagogical task of 
                                                
 225 Ibid., pp. 345-346. 
 
 226 James Bacik, Apologetics and the Eclipse of Mystery, ibid., p. xiii.  As Rahner says elsewhere, 
“kerygma will be more worthy of belief through the overt connection of doctrine with human experience,” 
(Karl Rahner, “Theology and Anthropology,” in Theological Investigations, Vol. 9.  New York:  Seabury, 
1977, p. 83). 
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theology is better accomplished when theologians have a developed sensitization to the 
transcendent dimension of all experience.  For, if the ultimate task of mystagogy is to 
lead people to explicit faith in Jesus Christ, then this goal is should be “facilitated by an 
anthropocentric approach in which the theologian carefully examines the structure of 
human consciousness which makes the appropriation of particular Christian truths 
possible.”227  A mystagogue who is tutored in the transcendental approach of Rahner will 
be much more “existentially attuned” to the totality of human existence and the structures 
of human consciousness.  Mystagogy done with a greater sensitization to the 
transcendental dimension can serve to help the many people today who are out of touch 
with a proper sense of mystery.  In such cases the mystagogue must provide people with 
the proper interpretive tools to help them discern the intimations of God’s presence in 
their daily lives.  Only then can the theologian match Christian doctrine with the lived 
experience of an individual or community. 
To reiterate, mystagogy is that element in theology that exposes and expresses the 
experience of the mystery of God that dwells both within and beyond us.  It seeks to 
unveil the basic religious experience of grace that so often remains implicit or suppressed 
by the exigencies of daily life so that people can see that precisely in the pressures and 
urgency of daily life God is actively, silently there.228  Only then can theology relate the 
concrete message of the church to the concrete lives of people.  It is in this sense of 
interpreting the intimations of grace in concrete ways that mystagogy is always 
                                                
 227 James Bacik, Apologetics, ibid., p. 13. 
 
 228 This of course is the beginning of Rahner’s teaching on the mysticism of daily living, a topic 
that we shall discuss more explicitly in the next chapter. 
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categorical.  Through the gift of language mystagogy discloses the experience of God’s 
holy mystery that often goes 
wholly repressed and buried by our daily routine, by all that we otherwise have to 
do with men and things.  This primal religious relationship to God can be buried 
again even through our theological, ascetic, and pious chatter.  All this proves 
indeed how much we must constantly struggle in a more genuine, more religious 
life to set free and constantly dig out this primal relationship to God.229 
 
Further, since it is exactly within their biographies that people conceptualize their 
experience of mystery, the task of mystagogy must be 
to appeal in all the various conceptual forms in which it is objectified, to this basic 
experience of grace, to bring human beings again and again to a fresh recognition 
of the fact that all this immense sum of distinct statements of the Christian faith 
basically speaking expresses nothing else than an immense truth . . . namely that 
the absolute mystery . . . has bestowed itself as itself in an act of forgiving love 
upon human beings, and is experienced in faith in that ineffable experience of 
grace as the ultimate freedom of human beings.230 
 
What is important to understand here is that all mystagogy is in fact categorical in that it 
is done by a mystagogue who uses symbols, be they conceptual or non-conceptual, to 
bring together doctrine and experience and in so doing lead people into a deeper 
articulation of the mystery dimension of human experience as a first stage toward explicit 
faith in Jesus Christ.  The theologian/mystagogue should “make use of evocative 
language in order to disclose mystery effectively”231; he or she “must take the risk of 
employing vivid, symbolic, poetic language even though it may be open to the charge of 
meaninglessness and unverifiability.”232  Now obviously, not every theologian has this 
                                                
 229 Karl Rahner, “Experiencing God,” in The Practice of Faith, ibid., p. 64. 
 
 230 Idem., “Reflections on Methodology in Theology,” in Geffrey Kelly, Karl Rahner:  Theologian 
of the Graced Search for Meaning, ibid., p. 345. 
 
 231 James Bacik, Apologetics, ibid., p. 40. 
 
 232 Ibid., p. 41. 
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capacity of using language so effectively.  Some people are clearly more in touch with 
“their deepest experience and have a greater ability to verbalize it:  the poet and the 
mystic, for example.  Others are in close existential contact with the mystery of life but 
have very little ability to either reflect on it or verbalize it.”233  Mystagogues are justified 
in turning to artists and others outside the explicit church for help and guidance in leading 
people to deepen their lived religious experience of God. 
 With this more specified conception of mystagogy, we can now see more clearly 
where we are headed in the next chapter with respect to Rahner’s “aesthetics” and the 
disclosure of mystery through film.  Only touched upon in this chapter is the question of 
where our transcendental openness to Holy Mystery in fact leads us—abandonment, 
worship, love of God and neighbor—the norm of which love and knowledge (itself 
unified) is Christ himself.  Mystagogy done transcendentally discerns in the many aspects 
of human experience, including aesthetic experience, those signs that direct people 
toward the need for Christ in their lives.  Conversely, with a more acute transcendental 
awareness, sensitive mystagogues who turn to secular culture can discern inconsistencies 
and other problems that render cultural “answers” to the deepest human questions invalid 
and thus demonstrate even further the credibility of the gospel.  Thus in the next chapter 
we shall bring this transcendental consciousness to bear on cinema, to see how it can 
serve the disposition of openness toward holy mystery.  For film reaches a kind of 
religious transcendence precisely by its awakening of the sensibility and can even prepare 
for faith by arousing a potential receptivity for an encounter with greater mystery—the 
Deus semper maior present at the center of everything we are and do. 
                                                
 233 Ibid., p. 37. 
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CHAPTER 6 
Introduction 
 This dissertation has attempted to provide stronger theological foundations for 
Catholic-based approaches to cinema.  For guidance and principles apropos of this goal 
the initial chapters turned to sources from the Roman magisterium, patristic mystagogy, 
and individual Catholic film scholars and theologians.  The previous chapter sought 
further support of this project in the ideas of Karl Rahner.  Elements of his fundamental 
theology provided further justification and encouragement for Catholic theology’s turn to 
secular sources like film for critical reflection and learning.  The current chapter looks 
directly at those writings of Rahner that make explicit his conviction that theology and 
the arts are integral to one another.  Before engaging this material, however, it is helpful 
to take stock of the placement of this inquiry within the larger framework of his thought. 
 The thrust of Rahner’s theology is the initiation of people into their foundational 
experience of sacred mystery as pedagogy for interpreting God’s revelation in Jesus 
Christ.  Rahner continually emphasized the need for theology to actively search out 
points of contact between human experience and Christian teaching in order to bring the 
two into closer proximity.  This is the mystagogical orientation of his theology:  a process 
of awakening into the unfathomable mystery at the heart of existence as a prerequisite to 
faith and the expounding its doctrines.  Mystagogy, however, should not be understood as 
only a prelude to theology, to be jettisoned once the “real business” gets started.  It is 
theology’s abiding quality, for theology must always return its thinking back to the 
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original encounter with mystery that stands as “the condition which makes possible the 
knowledge by which we conceptualize, distinguish, and define” the experience of God.1 
 Operating with this notion of mystagogy in mind, the dissertation’s main thesis, 
that film is a promising locus mystagogicus, suggests a twofold implication.  First, film is 
an important source of theology since it can reveal the religious dimension of human 
experience in concrete, imaginative forms beyond what conceptual theology can 
accomplish on its own.  Film as art potentially illuminates the mystery element 
underpinning every aspect of human life by telling particular stories in very particular 
ways.  Film serves to sharpen people’s sensibility and responsiveness to God’s universal 
offer of self, which Rahner believes is made precisely in the particular—in human history 
and individual experience.  Second, theology is a required hermeneutic for disclosing the 
religious dimension in film.  Though film art is incommensurable, it still needs to be 
interpreted by way of methods outside itself.  Theology brings to film a rich lode of 
interpretive resources that span centuries and cultures; these facilitate critical perception 
of possible religious themes in film.  When theology is done through film, it can 
creatively and effectively accomplish its task of relating church doctrine to daily life and 
helping people get in touch with the mystery dimension of human existence. 
 The present chapter is thus something of a proving ground for the theory that film 
is a reference point for mystagogy.  From the time of the gospels Christian mystagogy 
has given primacy to the symbolic and analogical.  In their mystagogical homilies the 
church fathers used poetic imagery to evoke the sacramental presence of mystery.  
Rahner insists this practice be recovered not only for liturgical pedagogy but also for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 1 Karl Rahner, “Theology and the Arts,” in Thought (no. 57), 1982, p. 21. 
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initiation into the mystery of daily living—as preparation for the explicit encounter with 
God therein.  A Catholic mystagogy that uses film as a source aims to lead people 
through film’s form, dramaturgy, images, and symbols into awareness of the sacred 
principle of human life as a preliminary step to fuller initiation into the gospel. 
 Building on the foundation blocks of last chapter, this chapter further 
substantiates this theory by drawing on principles for theological aesthetics that Rahner 
sets down in several articles on theology and the arts.  Until recently these writings have 
received minimal scholarly attention.2  The articles are thematic in nature and each is 
itself quite systematically presented.  However, one does not get the sense that Rahner 
intended them to build upon one another.  Certainly, he did not develop a highly formed 
theological aesthetics in the manner of a Hans Urs von Balthasar, John Dillenberger, or 
Richard Viladesau.3  Still, these essays form an important aspect of his fundamental 
theology—not merely an appendage—and advance his conviction that Catholic theology 
remains incomplete without the arts.  It is not the intention here to provide a 
comprehensive analysis of all of Rahner’s positions on aesthetics.  What is possible, 
however, is to use the conceptual lens of mystagogy as a point of entry for clarifying 
some of the main themes of his writings on aesthetics.  And while the term “mystagogy” 
is mentioned only a few times in these discourses, from the perspective of the dissertation 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 2 Most notably, Richard Viladesau and Gesa Thiessen have surfaced these works for theology’s 
attention.  See Richard Viladesau, Theological Aesthetics:  God in Imagination, Beauty, and Art (New 
York:  Oxford UP, 1999); and Gesa Thiessen, “Theological Aesthetics,” The Cambridge Companion to 
Karl Rahner, op. cit.  While primary sources are mainly used in the chapter, these secondary studies are 
highly valuable for interpreting an area in Rahner about which very little is written. 
 
 3 Cf. Hans Urs von Balthasar, The Glory of the Lord, 7 Vols. (Edinburgh:  T&T Clark, 1982-
1986); John Dillenberger, A Theology of Artistic Sensibilities (London:  SCM Press, 1986) and Style and 
Content in Christian Art (New York:  Crossroad, 1988); Richard Viladesau, Theology and the Arts (New 
York:  Paulist Press, 2000). 
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these discourses can be profitably read as providing further theoretical warrant for the 
turn to film as source material for theology’s mystagogical initiative.4  Indeed, mystagogy 
is what holds together many of Rahner’s insights on the arts.  Again, the previous chapter 
laid down necessary foundations for our exposition here, since Rahner’s aesthetics cannot 
be comprehended without some knowledge of the principles of his fundamental theology.  
Thus, the current chapter will help to flesh out certain theoretical aspects of Rahner’s 
transcendental method. 
 Having established the theory that film (its experience and analysis) can be an 
introduction to the mystery of God the chapter attempts something of a practicum by 
applying this mystagogical approach directly to the interpretation of Babette’s Feast 
(1987, dir. Gabriel Axel).  This film has been selected for several reasons: 
(i) It has been the subject of several excellent essays by theologians of film and 
our analysis builds upon these writings.  Yet an even deeper sense of the 
film’s theological substance can be extracted through greater critical attention 
to its structure, its verbal text, and the painterly mise en scène. 
(ii) Because the exegesis of the film follows discussion of Rahner’s reflections on 
the arts, it is important to make clear the critical consensus that Babette’s 
Feast is not merely a work of diversionary entertainment but, rather, a superb 
example of cinematic art.  This fact is attested to on many fronts, from the 
high praise it has garnered by reviewers and acclaimed filmmakers, to its 
many awards, to the scholarly works written about the film. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 4 A fuller treatment of Rahner’s aesthetics would include analysis of his insights on poetry; a sense 
of the implications of St. Ignatius’s Exercises on his aesthetics; more on his notion of “primordial words”; 
explanation of the possibility he sees for piety in the experience of art; and a deeper study of his 
interpretation of analogia entis. 
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(iii) Babette’s Feast is adapted from an eponymous short story by Isak Dinesen 
(the pen name of Karen Blixen). Whereas the present discussion does not 
include a thoroughgoing intertextual component, some reference will be made 
to this original source.  Such reference will help to contextualize the film 
analysis as well as and validate some of the judgments made throughout.  Few 
(if any) theologians who have published articles on Babette’s Feast have 
referred to the novella; they have thus missed out on an important interpretive 
dimension, namely the adaptations Axel makes to Dineson’s story.  The 
chapter demonstrates that many of the adaptations he makes are christic in 
form or quality and need to be taken into consideration in any theological 
reading.  While Christian symbolism abounds in Babette’s Feast, still it is 
generally received as a secular “food” film and not, as will be argued, a 
profound meditation on one woman’s experience of God’s goodness. 
(iv) Finally, the most practical rationale for the selection of Babette’s Feast is this 
writer’s familiarity and experience with the film.  It is a work that requires 
several viewings and even some independent research beyond the film before 
its deepest riches can be mined. 
 Examination of the film will involve two closely related steps which correspond 
to the conviction that theology and art are interdependent and that each can enlarge the 
other’s sensibilities and capabilities.  The first step is to present an aesthetic evaluation of 
Babette’s Feast.  This means allowing for the film to “speak for itself” as a work of art 
and requires that the evaluation remain focused on interpreting the signals the film 
communicates.  Such a descriptive approach intends to guard against theological 
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eisegesis without precluding the need to submit the film to a Catholic theological 
reading.5  It is precisely this perspective that remains sensitive to symbols that other 
interpretive strategies might overlook or misinterpret.  The further advantage of a 
Catholic semiotics is that it can help disclose possible religious messages latent in the 
film and aid the exegesis of symbols that others may be less equipped to assess. 
 Having described as carefully as possible what the film communicates on its own, 
and judged that it has theological meaning in its own right, the second and intrinsically 
related step is an explicitly theological evaluation of the film.  This stage takes the 
interpretation to another level in the sense that it sees the film as a touchstone for deeper 
theological engagement.  Application of theology’s hermeneutical tools—the determiners 
of gospel and tradition—can serve to discern the validity and genuineness of the 
Christian message already expressed in the film but it can also provide a reading that the 
director and his collaborators might not have anticipated.  One theological perspective 
that has received little critical attention is to see Babette’s Feast as a meditation on the 
vindication of God’s goodness in defeating personal participation in evil.  To help 
articulate this position, the film is placed into direct conversation with the thought of 
Marilyn McCord Adams on the subject of theodicy. 
 In the case of both stages of evaluation, Babette’s Feast is approached as a locus 
mystagogicus, both in itself and as a reference point for doing theology mystagogically.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 5 The analysis of Babette’s Feast applies some of the practical ideas espoused by Richard Blake on 
approaching film from a Catholic perspective.  In chapter three of this dissertation, Blake’s hermeneutical 
approach to “uncovering the sacred element” in film was examined.  He submits a baseline of criteria to 
which those interested in evaluating the religious dimension of film ought to adhere so as to obviate any 
eisegetic tendencies.  It may be helpful for the reader to return to that section to recollect Blake’s insistence 
that film analysts consider especially (i) the background of the director (artist); (ii) the film as it stands on 
its own (artifact); (iii) how the film has been received and interpreted (audience); and (iv) the uniqueness 
of film as an artistic medium (art form). 
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Thus, the intention is to provide a better sense of how the words and images of this 
impressive film are preparative of the nonpareil Word and Image of God, Jesus Christ. 
  
Karl Rahner on Theology and the Arts 
 Rahner never tired of insisting upon theology’s mystagogical task and his writings 
on poetry and the arts reveal the scope of his contention.  As the enterprise that reflects 
explicitly on the personal and spiritual relationship between human beings and God 
theology must first put people in touch with the interior depths of religious experience 
where grace itself prepares people for God’s revelation in history.  For theology to 
helpfully mediate God’s communication to human subjectivity, i.e., that it aid the graced 
assent to lived faith and the intellectual and existential appropriation of church doctrine, it 
should begin by mystagogically evoking those experiences where the catholic offer of 
grace to the whole person is most palpable.  Rahner’s position is that a theological 
concept does not immediately make present the reality to which it points but is rather “the 
expression of what has already been experienced and lived through more originally in the 
depths of existence.”6  In this sense theology accords with the workings of grace, which 
“does not only start to work for the first time, when the word of the gospel reaches man 
through the official preaching.  It precedes this word, it prepares the heart for this word 
by every experience which takes place in the life of man.  It is, in diverse ways of course, 
secretly and powerfully active in what we call human culture . . ..”7  When mystagogical 
theology operates with a transcendental orientation, it aims at initiating people into 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 6 Rahner, “Theology and the Arts,” ibid., p. 18. 
 
 7 Idem., “Poetry and the Christian,” Theological Investigations, IV.  London:  Darton, Longman & 
Todd, 1974, p. 358. 
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deeper faith by evoking their experience of grace, the permanent universal condition of 
mystery and freedom that makes possible every particular expression of knowledge and 
relationship.  Mystagogy does this by tracing, as it were, the organic line connecting 
human expressions back to their origin in grace.  Thus, mystagogy cultivates faith by 
scrutinizing culture for words/symbols that arouse religious experience and prepare 
people to appropriate the gospel in meaningful ways.8 
 Mystagogy is indispensable to the theological task of interpreting faith because, in 
delivering doctrine, theologians must at once strive to reach greater levels of conceptual 
clarity (fides quae) and retrace the pathway back to the primordial experience that 
engenders doctrine (fides qua) so as to invoke its magnificence.  The difficulty, Rahner 
asserts, is that too often theology has developed without this mystagogical initiative.  
When it no longer describes, elicits, and puts people in touch with the incomprehensible 
mystery of God encountered prior to any conceptualizing or defining the experience, 
when it “becomes ‘objective’ in a false sense, this is not good theology, but bad 
theology.”9  Again, because theology aims to mediate an existential encounter with God, 
Rahner asserts that it must recover its mystagogical method as a reductio in mysterium 
Dei, a methodological principle of his that is “based on the insistence that the concern of 
theology can be nothing but God, and that the reality of God is missed if it remains for us 
merely an idea.”10 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 8 Mystagogical discernment should also be poised to expose symbols of deceptive religiosity and 
to trace any abominations of human freedom to its origin in sin. 
 
 9 Rahner, “Theology and the Arts,” ibid., p. 26. 
 
 10 Richard Viladesau, Theological Aesthetics:  God in Imagination, Beauty, and Art.  New York:  
Oxford UP, 1999, pp. 12-13. 
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 Whereas theology that proceeds according to strict scientific methods may 
become intellectually sophisticated, an adverse consequence is that it can lose “so much 
of its poetry.”11  According to Rahner, theological rationalism is a severe deficiency in 
modern theology, for it misses the “poetic touch”12 and precludes the kinds of questions 
and experiences to which faith must attend and the means by which it attends them.  Just 
as Hans Urs von Balthasar believed the church of late lacks a kniende Theologie—a 
theology done with knees bent in praise and supplication before the Lord—Rahner 
contends that we also lack in our time a “poetic theology.” 
Theology faces a task especially today which is not new, but has been greatly 
neglected in recent centuries, namely, that it be in some way a “mystagogical” 
theology.  By this I mean that it must not speak only in abstract concepts about 
theological questions, but must also introduce people to a real and original 
experience of the reality being talked about in these concepts.  To this extent what 
I have called “poetic theology” could be understood as one of the ways, although 
not the only way, of doing this kind of mystagogical theology.13 
 
Rahner protests that modern theology is rarely practiced in this holistic sense and thinks 
the arts can help the church recover the mystagogical function prevalent in much of early 
and medieval Christian theology.14  His assertion that we are lacking a poetic theology is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 11 Rahner, “Theology and the Arts,” ibid., p. 26.  Underlying this conviction is the epistemological 
presupposition that the human intellect is to be understood more fundamentally as “the capacity for the 
incomprehensible, as the capacity to be grasped by something which ever eludes our grasp.  It must not be 
understood in the first instance as the capacity for the kind of comprehension which masters the object and 
subjects it to us” (ibid., 20).  That is to say, human reason is more precisely understood as the condition of 
possibility for encountering mystery. 
 
 12 Idem., “Art against the Horizon of Theology and Piety,” London:  Darton, Longman & Todd, 
1992, p. 164. 
 
 13 Idem., “Theology and the Arts,” p. 26. 
 
 14 In his volume Heaven in Stone and Glass:  Experiencing the Spirituality of the Great 
Cathedrals (New York:  Crossroad, 2000), Robert Barron points out that because we are heirs to 
Enlightenment consciousness, theologians have tended to develop something of a prosaic cast of mind:  we 
“like our ideas clear and distinct, and we like our words direct and unambiguous” (p. 11).  This is a liability 
for theologians, who are in the business of attending to the divine mystery that is beyond categorization and 
yet that reveals itself in nature and history.  Theologians must retrieve the mind of their medieval 
counterparts, suggests Barron, and become “comfortable with a relentlessly symbolic imagination” (p.11).  
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based in part on the opinion that a purely “abstract” theology remains just that:  
disconnected to the things of this world, to our bodies and senses—to the very materials 
through which the God of mystery calls us to covenant.  His reintroduction of mystagogy 
is in part an attempt to heal the historic rupture between the scientific and kerygmatic 
poles of theology and restore the bond they shared, for instance, in the early church’s 
catechumenal pedagogy.15  Richard Viladesau remarks that Rahner’s call for the 
restoration of the poetic dimension of theology means that not only should theology “take 
account of feeling, beauty, and art as aspects of religion and of primary religious 
language, but also that theology itself should speak ‘with feeling’ and in images, 
integrating the religious and poetic elements into its mode of discourse.”16 
 To be sure, Rahner was not out to diminish the importance of the scientific 
element in theology, the need for linguistic accuracy in the honing of doctrine, and the 
cultivation of intellectual virtue.  There is certainly something “poetic” about striving to 
find the most precise language possible to communicate Christian teaching: 
[W]e have to be reasonable and balanced about this.  There is also a kind of 
theology which is perfectly justified in taking a deep breath and proceeding 
patiently through the long and arduous reflections of conceptual theology which 
cannot be expected to lead immediately to some kind of religious or mystical 
experience.17 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
He references St. Augustine’s teaching that “the mind curiously delights in a truth that comes in an indirect 
and symbolically evocative way” (pp. 12-13). 
 
 15 Recall that pre-baptismal catechesis was discursive and conceptual and post-baptismal 
catechesis (i.e., mystagogy) was more evocative and phenomenological.  The fathers considered both 
pedagogical modes essential and essentially linked. 
 
 16 Viladesau, Theological Aesthetics, op. cit., p. 12. 
 
 17 Rahner, “Theology and the Arts,” ibid., pp. 25-26. 
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Yet the problem is that this unity has not always obtained in much of modern theological 
practice.  Only the conceptual aspect of theology has become refined, and that at the 
expense of the poetic sensibilities of the whole.  Rahner wants theology to achieve a 
greater degree of equilibrium among its pastoral, speculative, aesthetic, and doxological 
aspects—a lasting integration of fides qua and fides quae.  This entails doing necessarily 
rigorous scientific work that issues in language that is as clear and distinct as possible 
about questions of faith; and it entails finding non-conceptual, emotive, and sensuous 
ways of approaching inscrutable mystery.  When these two modes are synchronous 
theologians operate within a larger sphere, one in which they may discover highly 
creative and relevant ways of communicating Christian faith. 
 It is here that Rahner inquires more specifically into the nature of theology in 
relation to the arts.  His reflections on this relationship are founded primarily on his 
transcendental anthropology and theology of revelation.18   Rahner considers theology 
and art already linked because they both arise from out of humanity’s transcendental 
nature:  whatever is “expressed in art is a product of that transcendence by which, as 
spiritual and free beings, we strive for the totality of reality . . ..  [I]t is only because we 
are transcendental beings that art and theology can really exist.”19  More specifically, it is 
only because 
the human person is a being who by his very nature pushes beyond every given 
boundary, a being for whom every end is a new beginning, a being who 
encounters the unfathomable mystery of things, only because and insofar as the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 18 Gesa Thiessen, “Theological Aesthetics,” The Cambridge Companion to Karl Rahner, op. cit., 
p. 227. 
 
 19 Idem., “Art against the Horizon of Theology and Piety,” ibid., p. 167. 
 
	   329	  
human person is a transcendent being can there be both art and theology in their 
real senses.  Both art and theology are rooted in man’s transcendent nature.20 
 
Building on his doctrine of grace, Rahner holds that not only does grace operate in all 
people, stirring in their hearts a restless search for God, but that something of God is 
disclosed in authentic acts of transcendence.  Every positive human response to the offer 
of God’s friendship, however implicitly made, contains an inherent theological 
motivation.  Accordingly, genuine works of art represent concrete, “categorical” 
expressions of the human person’s transcendental orientation.21  Simultaneously, such 
artistic expressions are revelatory of God who is the mysterious inspiring presence behind 
them.  It is in this sense that Rahner recognizes the arts as modes of theology and thus 
intrinsic to the theological task.  For if is true that theology is “man’s reflexive self-
expression about himself in the light of divine revelation, [then] we could propose the 
thesis that theology cannot be complete until it appropriates these arts as an integral 
moment of itself and its own life, until the arts become an intrinsic moment of theology 
itself.”22  Rahner’s broadly construed vision of theology suggests that it is not solely 
propositional, that theology already transcends conceptual strictures and will necessarily 
take on diverse forms, including poetry, music, painting, sculpting, and film, among 
others. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 20 Idem., “Theology and the Arts,” ibid., p. 29. 
 
 21 The dissertation has tried to call attention to the need for Christian discernment in evaluating 
human experience.  This need is no less important in the experience of art.  A work of art may be a 
“genuine” experience of transcendence, both in its making and in its reception.  But art may also be 
“genuine” in another sense:  its execution may be technically and aesthetically brilliant, but what it 
ultimately expresses is “genuinely” demonic and idolatrous.  In these cases, the Christian perspective is still 
necessary—not only to condemn the work as anathema but to lead viewers to an alternative position from 
the one objectified. 
 
 22 Ibid., p. 24. 
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 The following passages encapsulate Rahner’s perspective that the arts are integral 
to theology as well as theologically constitutive in themselves: 
[W]hat comes to expression in a Rembrandt painting or a Bruckner symphony is 
so inspired and borne of divine revelation, by grace and by God’s self-
communication, that they communicate something about what the human really is 
in the eyes of God which cannot be completely translated into verbal theology.  If 
theology is not identified a priori with verbal theology, but is understood as 
man’s total self-expression insofar as this is borne by God’s self-communication, 
then religious phenomena in the arts are themselves a moment within theology 
taken in its totality.23 
 
[W]hy should a person not think that when he hears a Bach oratorio, he comes 
into contact in a very unique way with God’s revelation about the human not only 
by the words it employs, but by the music itself?  Why should he not think that 
what is going on there is theology?  If theology is simply and arbitrarily defined 
as being identical with verbal theology, then of course we cannot say that.  But 
then we would have to ask whether such a reduction of theology to verbal 
theology does justice to the value and uniqueness of these arts, and whether it 
does not unjustifiably limit the capacity of the arts to be used by God in his 
revelation.24 
 
Several assertions made here regarding Rahner’s valuation of the arts vis-à-vis theology 
are key to generating an understanding of film as a legitimate source for and of 
mystagogy.25  These can be thematized under the following headings:  (i) the revelatory 
nature of the arts; (ii) the theological nature of the arts; (iii) the autonomy of the arts; and 
(iv) the meaning and function of religious images. 
i. As demonstrated in the previous chapter, Rahner’s transcendental method 
translates the Roman Catholic tradition’s consistent affirmation that God encounters 
humanity in creation, history, and personal experience.  Grace prepares the human person 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 23 Ibid. 
 
 24 Ibid. 
 
 25 Here we shall limit the query to the reception of art (viewing, listening, etc.).  How to construe 
the question from the artist’s side, i.e., the production of art as a religious activity, is beyond the scope of 
this chapter. 
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for this encounter by awakening in mind and heart the sensibility needed to perceive the 
word that God speaks to all creation through Jesus Christ.  Though grace operates outside 
visible Christianity, the Spirit of God mysteriously works to conform all persons to the 
likeness of Christ.  Thus, Rahner maintains that Jesus Christ and his gospel remain the 
sole criterion for theological discernment of the religious experience of God wherever 
and however such experience is expressed.  He applies this same principle to theological 
interpretation of the arts.  The statement in the second passage above that God uses the 
arts “in his revelation” must be understood within this context.  From his perspective art 
is genuine qua art as well as theologically genuine when it makes people “aware of their 
original religious experience.”26  When art elicits religious experience it simultaneously 
reveals the presence of God’s Spirit indwelling all people as grace.  Art is revelatory of 
God insofar as it reveals the mysterious depths of human existence, for it is there that art 
“reaches the realm where true religious experience takes place.”27  Rahner submits that 
“in both hearing and seeing we can have experiences of transcendence and that these 
experiences may become genuine religious experiences of divine self-communication.”28  
When art is approached with sensitized “eyes to see” and “ears to hear” it can lead us 
transcendentally to perceive something new and different (at times in provocative ways), 
or it can bring us to a newfound awareness or appreciation of what has been true all 
along.  Artistic exposition of beauty, wonder, lament, resignation to the mystery of life, 
faithfulness, responsibility, forgiveness, righteous indignation, and joy, when done with 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 26 Rahner, “The Theology of the Meaning of Religious Images,” Theological Investigations, Vol. 
XXIII.  London:  Darton, Longman & Todd, 1992, p. 163. 
 
 27 Gesa Thiessen, “Theological Aesthetics,” op. cit., p. 228. 
 
 28 Ibid., p. 227. 
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integrity, reflects and thereby magnifies people’s understanding of the meaning of these 
experiences in their own lives.  The emotive power of art can train the emotions and 
intellect and so lead individuals into closer proximity with the heights and depths of their 
own selfhood and the transcendental context made possible only by the Spirit of God who 
dwells deep down and still yet beyond all things.  Art is mystagogical in that it can evoke 
the experience of mystery that is its inspiring source.  When this occurs art reveals the 
mystery and splendor of God.  This is the sense in which Rahner means that God uses the 
arts “for divine purposes.”29 
 It is important to understand exactly what Rahner means by the revelatory nature 
of the arts.  He is not suggesting that art made of human hands is God’s revelation itself.  
As he writes, “that something more which belongs to [art] and from which it lives cannot 
come to art from itself.  The openness to infinity which constitutes art does not itself give 
the infinite; it does not bring and contain the infinite.”30  Thus the artist who is driven 
forward by the transcendence of the spirit “has already been overpowered secretly and 
quite unknown to himself by the longing which the grace of the Holy Spirit has implanted 
in the human heart.”31  In other words, a work of art “cannot simply ‘contain’ an 
immediate and genuine religious experience, for that is quite impossible, [yet it] perhaps 
evokes in me my own experience of the religious . . . something which reflexive, purely 
conceptual and rational theology is not able to accomplish.”32  Whereas a work of art may 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 29 Rahner, “The Theology of the Meaning of Religious Images,” op. cit., p. 163. 
 
 30 Rahner, “Priest and Poet,” Theological Investigations, Vol. III.  London:  Darton, Longman & 
Todd, 1974, p. 316. 
 
 31 Ibid. 
 
 32 Idem., “Theology and the Arts,” ibid., p. 25. 
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be borne of grace and profoundly redolent of this experience, it does not itself 
manufacture the experience of grace.  To put it plainly, one may experience God in the 
experience of art, but art is not grace itself; art may be revelatory of God, but it is not 
itself God’s word.  The arts, like theological concepts, (potentially) mediate the graced 
mystery that has already been experienced in the course of human existence.  Art is a 
mode of theology because it translates or conveys God’s invitation to human subjectivity.  
And it is precisely in this sense that art constitutes a mystagogical source:  for “it 
describes and evokes directly or indirectly [the] personal spiritual relationships of persons 
with God [and] introduces them mystagogically into those relationships.”33 
ii. This leads to a second theme that can be extracted from the above quotations, one 
that has to do with the nature of theology, its articulation, and the complementarity of 
verbal and non-verbal artistic expressions.  As Rahner has put it, theology is the self-
awareness of the human person about his or her totality made possible by the illuminating 
quality of grace.  The point being made here is that because theology concerns the whole 
individual in relation to the whole of reality, theology cannot be reduced to verbal or even 
explicitly religious modes of expression, since people frequently communicate what is 
most valuable to them without words and in symbols that are not traditionally religious.  
Theology’s scope as the total self-expression of the human person necessitates the use of 
idioms that communicate the historical particularity of a person’s or a people’s religious 
experience.  Rahner admits that there is a prevailing honor accorded to verbal expressions 
in much of western theology, a pride of place which is justified since Christianity, as “the 
religion of the word proclaimed, of faith which hears and of a sacred scripture, has a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 33 Idem., “Art Against the Horizon of Theology and Piety,” ibid., p. 165. 
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special intrinsic relationship to the word and hence cannot be without such a special 
relationship to the poetic word.”34  Still, one of Rahner’s chief concerns in his treatment 
of aesthetics is a recovered sense of the theological value of non-verbal art.35  As he says, 
there are unique and irreplaceable modes of expression “which cannot be substituted for 
by words or by some form of verbal art.”36  While much of occidental theology has 
historically privileged written texts, still, a word-less work of art can nonetheless present 
itself as a highly significant theological statement when it opens people to the religious 
experience of God in a way that “reflexive, purely conceptual and rational theology is not 
able to accomplish.”37 
 Rahner distinguishes the verbal and the non-verbal in art as incommensurable; but 
he is careful not to separate the two.  To him they form a unity and he cites aesthetics 
itself—the hermeneutics of art—as one instance of their necessary integration.  Though a 
work of art is evaluated through verbal means, interpretations do not reduce non-textual 
art to words, since this might suggest that the original work is secondary to its 
interpretation and not the other way around.  Art transcends interpretation because it is 
polyvalent:  its experience elicits a surplus of significances.  A poem or painting is 
always “more” than the cumulative load of opinions it generates.  The non-verbal arts 
“can never be fully captured in words.  If one were to attempt such a translation, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 34 Idem., “Poetry and the Christian,” ibid., p. 357. 
 
 35 Rahner mentions painting, music, and sculpture in this regard.  While he does not consider the 
performing arts, architectural design, or, indeed, film, his reflections on the arts are generally applicable 
across artistic genre. 
 
 36 Rahner, “Theology and the Arts,” ibid., p. 25. 
 
 37 Ibid. 
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uniqueness and autonomy of the non-verbal arts would lose their whole raison d’être.”38  
Still, art is never independent of interpretation.  Indeed, a musical work, a painting, or a 
film is already to some degree comprehended at both visceral and intellectual levels upon 
an initial viewing.  When this original experience is contemplated, critiqued, and 
communicated, such articulation is most often done verbally.  The exegesis of art can 
elucidate the meaning of a work as viewers learn to see things perhaps even the artist did 
not anticipate.  Whereas the “message” an artist intends to send through his or her work is 
expressed first and foremost through the artistic form itself, an essential aspect of the 
work’s meaning—how it is “received”—is also conveyed through verbal reviews. 
iii. This brings us to a third theme in Rahner’s aesthetics and that is his desire to 
maintain the autonomy of art with respect to theology.  Speaking as a theologian and not 
a trained artist (although Rahner’s writings often exhibit tremendous artistry), his 
emphasis is on the need for theology to interpret the arts in a way that does honor to their 
distinctive form and that allows artists the freedom to operate independently of theology.  
Though the arts constitute, as he says, an “active element of theology,”39 they are 
nonetheless “autonomous ways of human self-expression that cannot be adequately 
translated” into theological statements.40  Theologians, therefore, should not evaluate art 
only with reference to its capacity to catechize.  And although theological interpretations 
might increase the meaningfulness and reach of a work of art, art is never an accessory to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 38 Thiessen, “Theological Aesthetics,” ibid., p. 227. 
 
 39 Rahner, “Art Against the Horizon of Theology and Piety,” ibid., p.163. 
 
 40 Idem, “Theology of the Religious Meaning of Images,” ibid., p. 162. 
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theology.  Theology may claim to study the God who is author of all things, yet it cannot 
facilely claim that all disciplines fall under its headship.  Rahner holds that art 
is not to be understood merely as an ancilla theologiae, as an aid or an illustration 
of a religious truth, but it can in itself become a source of theology, a locus 
theologicus.  Rahner reflects thereby the modern idea of imagination, i.e. the 
stress on the creative power of the human being, and thus of originality in a work 
of art.41 
 
Precisely because art comes to be from out of the transcendental reaches of the human 
imagination theology accords a dignity and autonomy to the arts as having a “special and 
irreplaceable religious significance.”42  Rahner insists that theologians keep firmly in 
mind that whereas they may have sophisticated interpretive tools which can aid in 
disclosing the religious dimension of art, it is the original piece that must first be allowed 
to “speak for itself.”  An image is not merely an illustration of the spoken word, but has 
its own independent value.  People “may naturally speak of this significance, interpret it, 
and thus once more explain the image by means of words.  Yet these words are no 
substitute for the viewing itself and as a religious activity.”43 
iv. This leads us to our final theme for inquiry in Rahner’s aesthetics, namely, the 
question of the religious meaning of images.  Of particular interest is how he determines 
the religious significance of secular art.  To understand this point it is important to bear in 
mind Rahner’s anthropological imperative that there is a radical unity between 
transcendental and categorical experience and between spirit and matter.  The path to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 41 Thiessen, “Theological Aesthetics,” idid., pp. 226-227. 
 
 42 Rahner, “The Theology of the Religious Meaning of Images,” ibid., p. 160. 
 
 43 Ibid., pp. 155-156. 
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faith and its articulation is inclusive of the entire person and is never a solely intellectual 
journey. 
Ordinary Christian anthropology is convinced that in human knowledge two 
levels must be distinguished:  sense knowledge, that is, one having a strictly 
material component, and spiritual conceptual knowledge, that is, one reaching out 
to being as such.  . . . Christian anthropology has always clearly insisted that sense 
knowledge and spiritual knowledge constitute a unity, that all spiritual 
knowledge, however sublime it may be, is initiated and filled with content by 
sense experience.44 
 
The spiritual experience of grace is a mediated reality, one that comes to people in history 
and through the senses.  Thus, it is possible to give a Christian account of the religious 
meaning of images only if this notion of “corporeality” is understood properly, for 
persons are “fully themselves only when all their sense powers work together.”45  
Possession of the gospel is equally an intellectual and sensuous experience.  As Rahner 
states, Christianity “can be present in persons fully and completely only if it has entered 
them through all the gates of their senses, and not merely through their ears, through the 
word.”46  Here Rahner notes a “certain antagonism” in the Christian tradition between the 
corporeality of religious activities on the one hand and transcendental reference to the 
nameless and invisible God on the other.  Catholic doctrine and the history of devotion 
speak “of a mystical ascent to contemplation, which is experienced as being without 
images, without object, as being engulfed in the incomprehensibility of God.  They 
emphasize that we will one day contemplate God directly, without the help of any created 
concepts or images.”47  Rahner suggests that the tradition of mysticism and apophatic 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 44 Ibid., p. 150. 
 
 45 Ibid., p. 153. 
 
 46 Ibid., pp. 153-154. 
 
 47 Ibid., p. 151. 
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theology may lead some Christians to think that images, and the possible religious 
meanings they generate, are merely provisional and that they have no eternal 
significance; or, at the very least, they are of minor importance in the doing of theology.  
Whereas he admits this historical tension (indeed, much of his own theology underscores 
God as “incomprehensible mystery”), still he rejects the notion that the body is, as it 
were, a launch pad for the soul.  The body (the senses, materiality, etc.) is not a 
“provisional instrument.”  Rahner’s theological valuing of images appeals to the 
Christian doctrine that God became man, died, and was raised bodily from the dead.  By 
emphasizing 
the resurrection of the flesh, the lasting incarnation of the eternal Logos, 
Christianity remains the religion that can conceive of human fulfillment only as 
the consummation of the whole human being, in which that being, although 
transformed in a way that we do not understand, reaches its consummation with 
all the dimensions of its reality in their unity, hence not by shedding some 
dimensions that would belong to it only in this life.  For Christianity, human 
beings take with them, in their consummation, albeit in a way that we can neither 
conceive nor imagine, their whole reality, hence also their body, their senses, their 
history.48 
Rahner extends to the arts this incarnational principle, that God taking flesh in Jesus 
Christ discloses history and matter to be bearers of divine meaning; that the seen can 
evince the unseen; and that what is known can lead to what is unknown.  He further 
supports the contention that images are not provisional or ancillary to speculative 
theology by referencing the tradition of ocular language in Christian theology:  the “eyes 
of faith”; Christ as God’s “image”; eternal happiness as beatific “vision”—the “seeing of 
the triune God face to face, not as a hearing.”49  It is therefore imperative, he asserts, that 
a Christian be trained not only to hear the word of God but to clearly “see” the world with 
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and discern experience within the illuminating light of grace.  Indeed, it “is an ‘elevated 
task’ and a ‘sacred, human and Christian art to learn to see’ with loving eyes if we 
confess Christ not only as the Word but also as the image of God.”50  Thus, Rahner 
returns to an earlier point that “word” and “image” are irreplaceable and inseparable in 
theology when he teaches that images are not mere illustrations of the spoken word but 
have their own religious significance.  Again, one “may naturally speak of this 
significance, interpret it, and thus once more explain the image by means of words.  Yet 
these words are no substitute for the viewing itself and as a religious activity.”51 
 Whatever the artistic genre (poetry, music, film, painting), determination of the 
religious meaning of the experience will, for Rahner, depend on the person and the 
overall context in which he or she experiences the work of art.  If a “religious reality is 
truly such only when it helps us to refer directly to the absolute God,”52 then even “an 
image that does not have a specifically religious theme can be a religious image, when 
viewing it helps to bring about, through a sensory experience of transcendence (if we 
may call it so), that properly religious experience of transcendence.”53  It follows that a 
picture, a poem, or an acoustical phenomenon (film is a confluence of all three) will be 
“religious or not depending on the disposition and the concrete situation of the person” 
doing the seeing or hearing.54  This requires discernment, for the question about the 
possible religious significance of secular art will depend on whether the experience can 	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 51 Rahner, “The Theology of the Religious Meaning of Images,” ibid., pp. 155. 
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be situated “into a larger context, into a larger human context so that the religious 
question does arise.”55  For it could be 
that a painting of Rembrandt’s, even if it is not religious in its thematic, objective 
content, nevertheless confronts a person in his total self in such a way as to 
awaken in him the whole question of existence.  Then it is a religious painting in 
the strict sense.  It can be religious in this sense even if it does not have an 
explicit, thematic religious content.56 
 
A work of art without explicit religious content can be discerned as having religious 
value when its viewing (seeing, listening) leads to a more profound experience of human 
transcendence, since it is precisely the religious experience of transcendence that opens 
us and prepares us for the historical manifestation of God’s eternal covenant.57  Poets and 
artists often give expression to religious statements in a different set of analogous 
symbols than those of traditional piety.58  This situation calls for theologians to carefully 
scrutinize these symbols to determine the possible religious meaning of a work of art 
since, as Rahner suggests, not every material representation of a religious symbol 
necessarily falls under the heading of true art and not all secular works of art are inimical 
to Christian faith.  Whether the authentically religious is presented unequivocally or 
anonymously in art, when it awakens in participants an encounter with ultimate mystery 
and strengthens in them a resolve to deepen relationship with the God whose grace makes 
that awakening possible, we can see why Rahner believes that theology is incomplete 
without the arts. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 55 Idem., “Theology and the Arts,” ibid., p. 27. 
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 57 Cf. chapter three of the dissertation and Michael Gallagher’s comments on the Christian 
discernment of film, which he bases on Rahner’s insights on the arts. 
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 Rahner does not simply collapse theology and art.  Whereas theology may express 
itself in highly symbolic and evocative ways, most theologians are not artists, nor are 
they always consciously creating art when “doing” theology.  Theologians must admit 
that, “on the practical level there are perhaps others who can speak to faith with feeling 
better than academic theologians, who cannot all be poets and artists.”59  Art, in seeing 
deeply into life, may be profoundly theological, but artists are not trained theologians.  
What Rahner does, however, is blur the line of distinction between the two enterprises.  
The arts provide something essential to the overall task of theology, for they put us “into 
contact in a very unique way with God’s revelation about the human.”60  In so doing they 
affirm the Christian theological claim that God is one who encounters us in history and 
speaks to us as one who has been involved in that history.  The following passage 
summarizes how Rahner conceives the arts as theological sources: 
The realm of aesthetic experience (or the aesthetic level of experience) may serve 
as a source for both historical theology and systematic theological reflection in at 
least two ways.  First, it is a locus of explicitly religious (and theological) 
experience, expression, and discourse; second, it is a locus of secular human 
experience that is either (a) “implicitly” religious or (b) susceptible to correlation 
with the sacred.  That is, the aesthetic realm provides theology with “data” 
concerning its three objects (God, religion, and theology itself), as well as with 
knowledge of the cultural matrix to which these are related in reflection.61 
 
 And this leads us full circle to the dissertation’s thesis that film is a source for and 
of mystagogy.  If the objective of a mystagogical approach to the arts is to help people 
perceive in their artistic experiences semina verbi—the intimations of grace—then what 
we have learned in Rahner’s reflections on theology and the arts is that the experience of 	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art is something of a prerequisite for Christianity.  That is to say, there is a preparation 
which a person “must undergo to be or become a Christian, which turns our to be a 
receptive capacity for the poetic word.”62  Such a preparation is the meaning and method 
of mystagogy as Rahner has recovered it from its origins in scripture and the church 
fathers.  The poetic theology that he advocates in the articles we have studied is one 
mode of mystagogy:  theology needs the arts because they disclose the permanent, 
permeating presence of the mystery toward which human beings reach out in 
transcendence; and art needs theology to render comprehensible the structures that make 
possible the human receptivity of God’s abiding word.  The dissertation’s attempt to 
bridge theology and film via an understanding of film as a locus mystagogicus draws its 
inspiration from the Catholic tradition of mystagogy with its hermeneutical and pastoral 
motivation.  The task of film mystagogy is to evoke and deepen transcendental 
experience through cinematic experiences.  This thesis affirms film’s capacity to reveal 
the human condition in ways that cannot be completely translated into verbal theological 
statements.  It presents film as a mystagogical source capable of reflecting the existential 
dimension of life and its mystery, of exciting in us a boundless sense of beauty, curiosity, 
and awe.  Film mystagogy spotlights where and how film discloses anthropology and is 
instructive in the permanent and perennial questions of life; or, in Rahnerian argot, the 
totality of the single question each human life remains until death.  The thesis also 
suggests that Catholic theology can facilitate the process of discerning authentic religious 
themes within film and of perceiving when the religious experience of God has genuinely 
expressed itself in film.  A film mystagogy is capable of extracting messages of deeper 	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meaning perhaps present in film but overlooked by others unequipped with the 
interpretive tools that theology makes available.  In particular, when a transcendental 
sensibility is brought to film analysis, the interpreter remains poised to discern whether 
and how a film’s reflection on human experience discloses the intimations of God’s 
revealing presence within that experience.  A film’s artistic examination of life can help 
persons remain attentive to “the significant ‘signals of transcendence’ in and through 
which one is summoned to appropriate a grace already given, a grace beyond anything 
particular, a grace which is really the divine ambience in which all particular experiences 
take place.  What really matter are the experiences which awaken the person to respond 
freely to God’s ever-present offer of self.”63  Such a theology correlates film narratives 
with the gospel so as to lead people through particular film experiences to a more 
meaningful embrace of their encounter with Christ in their own life story.  Film 
mystagogy’s application of the tools of Christian discernment should also perceive 
specious religious phenomena that secular approaches to film interpretation might either 
ignore or accept as religiously normative.  In each case, a film mystagogy that remains 
conscious of human transcendence serves to open a film’s deeper riches and extend its 
interpretive reach.  And in so doing it can help lead audiences to a more profound 
appropriation of the religious experience of God already at the center of their lives.  
Approaching film with sensitivity to the transcendental is a crucial interpretive 
framework for cinematic analysis that can complement other hermeneutical approaches.  
The remainder of the chapter will specify the advantages of this approach through an 
analysis of Babette’s Feast. 	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Babette’s Feast 
                 O taste and see that the Lord is good; 
             happy are those who take refuge in him. 
                Psalm 34:8 
Introduction 
Except for Babette's Feast, director Gabriel Axel (b. 1918) is relatively unknown 
outside his native Denmark, and yet his name is billed to several dozen productions made 
over the course of six decades.  He wrote the screenplay based on a short story of the 
same name by Isak Dineson (Karen Blixen), first published in 1950 in the Ladies Home 
Journal and later in the collection of her stories titled Anecdotes of Destiny.64  Babette's 
Feast was a labor of love, for it "took Axel fourteen years to fulfill his ambition to film 
[Dineson's] story.”65  It is often placed in the category of “foodie” films; yet, like many of 
them, Babette’s Feast is concerned about much more than food.66  The film has been 
studied on a number of scholarly fronts, and is a particular favorite among those making 
theological forays into film.67  It appears on the Vatican’s Film List under the category of 
“religion.” 
 The film tells the story of Babette Hersant, a Parisian gourmet chef forced to flee 
the (offscreen) violence of the Communard uprising in 1871 during which her husband 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 64 Isak Dineson, “Babette’s Feast,” in Anecdotes of Destiny and Ehrengard.  New York:  Vintage, 
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 65 Clive Marsh and Gaye Ortiz, eds., Explorations in Theology and Film. Oxford: Blackwell, 1997, 
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 67 A sample listing of available works can be found at 
<http://www.karenblixen.com/babette.html> (last accessed 12/28/09). 
 
	   345	  
and son are killed “like rats.”  Arriving fatigued and bewildered at an isolated village on 
the rugged seacoasts of 19th century Jutland, in desperation she begs two senior women 
to employ her as their servant.  Martina and Philippa are kind-hearted, poor spinsters who 
sustain a now dwindling Lutheran sect founded by their late father.68  As shown in 
flashback, both have forfeited lives of love and prestige to remain in their father’s charge:  
Philippa declined a potentially stellar career as an opera singer and life with a world-
renowned baritone who desired to be her husband and manager; and Martina’s lover, a 
nobleman and rising military leader named Lorens Löwenhielm (who will figure later in 
the story), called off the relationship because he felt foolish in the puritanical community.  
When the sisters tell Babette—a Catholic—that they have nothing to pay her, she pleads, 
offering to work for no wages.  If they cannot take her in, Babette tells them she will 
“simply die.”  Out of compassion, they employ the refugee knowing only, from a letter 
penned by her guarantor, Achille Papin (Philippa’s former lover), that she “can cook.”  
Her duties include preparing the staple repast of the women and the shut-ins they care 
for:  split cod with bread and ale gruel.  Babette also manages all the buying.  With her 
taste for quality and her business savvy, the food is better and there is more coin in the 
sister’s coffer. 
 All of this allows Martina and Philippa more time to attend to the pastoral needs 
of the septuagenarians, among whom there is much infighting due to old disputes and 
infidelities.  Babette works as their house servant without complaint or vacation for 
fourteen years.  Over the course of this time Babette has a marked effect on the 
community. 	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The parishioners meet regularly for prayer and a meal in the sisters' home.  But 
their meals are as filled with grumbling and bickering as they are with prayers and 
hymns.  They harbor resentment and grudges against each other for wrongs 
committed long ago.  Interestingly, their bickering always stops when Babette 
enters the room to serve their simple meal.  A disapproving glance or a clearing of 
the throat is enough to bring shame and silence.  Her mere presence is a rebuke to 
unworthy words or thoughts.69 
 
Often pictured forlorn in her room or on a field, Babette harbors something dark.70  The 
sisters are always respectful of her and never pry into her past for the reason she had to 
expatriate so quickly.  Neither does Babette reveal her secret:  that in Paris her talent at 
haute cuisine was sought out by nobility. 
 One day Babette wins 10,000 francs in the French lottery via a ticket that an old 
friend renews for her each year.  Martina and Philippa share her joy, but fear that now she 
will move back to a better life in Paris.  To their surprise Babette requests permission to 
prepare the memorial supper honoring the minister's one-hundredth birthday.  
Reluctantly, the sisters agree and Babette begins preparations for a multiple-course 
French dinner, the likes of which the poor parishioners could never imagine.  When the 
imported victuals arrive the sisters are horrified:  live quail, a massive turtle, alcohol.  
They are convinced that Babette, a foreigner and “Papiste,” plans to concoct a meal for a 
witches’ sabbath.  Those attending the commemoration make a secret pact that they will 
endure the dinner for Babette's sake and not mention what is being served. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 69 Edward McNulty, "Babette's Extravagant Love," in Christianity and the Arts, Vol.6, Spring 
1999, pp. 37-38. 
 
 70 In Dineson’s story, Babette is more formidable than Axel’s portrayal.  She writes of Babette’s 
“dark eyes,” “quiet countenance,” and “strong hands”; that her “steady, deep glance had magnetic qualities; 
under her eyes things moved, noiselessly, into their proper places” (Dineson, “Babette’s Feast,” op. cit., p. 
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 Twelve guests in all are invited to the extraordinary "feast" of the film's title—a 
clear reference to the twelve apostles gathered at the Last Supper.  One of them is Lorens 
Löwenhielm, Martina's shunned suitor.  Now a distinguished general in the Guard 
Hussars, he returns, perhaps expecting to show her up a little.  Though Löwenhielm has 
obtained everything that he had striven for in life he is nevertheless profoundly unhappy.  
He returns to see if he made the right choice when he originally left Martina:  to reject the 
vision he had of a purer life with her, leave such “pious melancholics,” and focus entirely 
on his career, so as to one day “cut a brilliant figure in the world of prestige.”  He 
anticipates a modest, peasant's meal which he will deign to eat.  Instead, Löwenhielm and 
the rest are treated to fare quite fit for royalty:  Potage á la Tortue (turtle soup); Blinis 
Demidorff (caviar blini); and a chef-d'œuvre of Babette’s own creation, Caille en 
Sarcophage (quail in sarcophagus).  Each course is complemented by the finest 
amontillado, champagne Veuve Clicquot, and burgundy from the famous Cistercian 
vineyard Clos de Vougeot, respectively.  Whereas the camera records their clear 
enjoyment of the food, the group keeps their promise to “cleanse their tongues of all 
taste,” and not say a word.  Since he was not in on the pact, Löwenhielm openly marvels 
at the spread.  He names each dish and freely comments on its exquisite flavor.  As a 
member of the martial upper class, he spent time in the finest restaurants in Paris.  All of 
the guests savor the same food, though he is the only one who truly knows the care, 
quality, and expense that went into every detail of the dinner.71  Indeed, the group’s 
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decision not to speak takes on a double meaning:  they simply do not know what they 
have before them.  Löwenhielm himself is equally baffled at the apparent nonchalance of 
the parishioners with respect to what is being served—as if they had been eating like this 
every week for thirty years. 
 As the feast unfolds, a clear transformation takes place.  In the book, the food and 
drink “agreed with their exalted state of mind and seemed to lift them off the ground, into 
a higher and purer sphere.”  In the film, Axel employs cinematic tools to capture this 
heightened state.  By way of “close attention to facial expression, eye-movement, and 
gesture . . . [the] film records the shift from the community's initial resolve to think 
nothing of the food . . . through their unavoidable enjoyment of food, drink, and general 
conviviality, to a newfound enjoyment of each other, via a process of healing and 
reconciliation of the wounds of scarred relationships between them.”72  The meticulously 
prepared meal consumes the vanity of some and the petty squabbles of others.73  Prior to 
the feast the monochromatic tones of the bleak Jutland landscape (exterior) and the rough 
tableware and austere furnishings (interior) symbolized something of the spiritual state of 
the parishioners:  starkly beautiful (Axel does not portray them as purely vexed), yet 
needing a quality of tenderness and the reassurance of God’s love.  Now their ashen faces 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 72 Clive Marsh, “Did You Say ‘Grace’?:  Eating in Community in Babette’s Feast,” in Clive 
Marsh and Gaye Ortiz, Explorations in Theology and Film.  Malden:  Blackwell, 1997, p. 209. 
 
 73 The film portrays the quarrels among the community with a distinct touch of humor; yet, this 
should not belie the fact that the past actions of certain members are quite grave:  stealing, slander, 
adultery.  Dineson’s story relates it as such:  “The sins of the Brothers and Sisters came, with late piercing 
repentance like a toothache, and the sins of others against them came back with bitter resentment, like a 
poisoning of the blood” (Dineson, “Babette’s Feast,” op. cit., p. 34).  More importantly, what haunts the 
community is their “worry about the possible terrible consequences through all eternity” (ibid., p. 35).  
Thus, the feast’s effectively putting to rest these past deeds and reconciling the community makes it all the 
more a “graced” event—or, as some commentators have put it, “miraculous.” 
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have mellowed and turned flush—slightly from alcohol but more fully with the joy of 
savoring the feast and a renewed communion with each other. 
 The final ten minutes of the film shows the effects of the extraordinary 
denouement:  Löwenhielm finds that joy is still possible and he and Martina depart from 
each other tenderly; the parishioners gather in a circle under the stars to sing a hymn of 
thanksgiving; the sisters are moved to tears at the sacrifice Babette has made both in 
giving the feast and generously serving them for so long; and Babette finally reveals her 
true identity as the former head chef at the Café Anglais in Paris.  She glows in the 
renewal of her power to create.  Tonight has been her finale—a kind of “last supper” for 
Babette:  for having spent the entire 10,000 francs on the feast she has intentionally ended 
her professional career.  She cannot and will not return to France.  She will stay on with 
the sisters and continue to cook simple meals for the community.  So contented, the 
melancholy she hid so well from the sisters is lifted.  There is the sense that Babette has 
finally come to terms with something . . . 
 
Aesthetic Analysis  
 Babette’s Feast is a rich and multidimensional film that may be interpreted on any 
number of levels—cultural, psychoanalytic, gastronomic.  Several features of the film 
immediately lend it to a religious interpretation, especially the density of its Christian 
imagery.74  Already scholars have analyzed its biblical parallels; its themes of sacrifice, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 74 This includes “prayer meetings, public and private; solemn religious promises; ‘Jerusalem, 
Jerusalem’ sung twice and played musically; references to the Bible and the eloquent speech of General 
Löwenhielm on the miracle of divine grace.  The density of the religious imagery is Axel’s way of creating 
a spiritually dynamic background for the event of grace and salvation represented” by the feast and its 
effects (Lloyd Baugh, Imaging the Divine.  Kansas City:  Sheed & Ward, 1997, p. 138). 
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conversion, and communion; how “grace” figures in the film75; and the eucharistic 
overtones of the meal.76  Much has been written on Babette as a “Christ-figure.”77  
Interpretations vary and each provides its own justification for judging her as a type of 
Christ.78  In general, these studies regard Babette’s relationship to the community as 
allegorical to Christ’s actions and her feast a type of agape meal.  Like the divine 
condescension, Babette enters into the community as a foreigner and empties herself 
(kenosis) for the sake of others, most especially in the memorial dinner—the participants 
of which undergo a radical conversion parallel to the Pentecostal experience of the early 
church.  The structure of the film is thought to model salvation history, with the first part 
corresponding to the Old Testament (the pastor and his small sect are likened to Israel), 
the second part corresponding to the New Testament (Babette is likened to Christ), and 
the feast standing for the heavenly banquet in the New Jerusalem.  Other writers note 
Axel’s juxtaposition of the religious sect’s pietism and “other-worldly” Protestant 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 75 Essays that assess this theme might be supplemented by an intertextual study comparing film 
and short story, as Dineson uses the word “grace” numerous times. 
 
 76 Whereas several reviewers have made the connection between the ritual of the feast and the 
Mass, no analysis has been published on the uncanny resemblance the structure of the dinner has with that 
of the Japanese tea ceremony. 
 
 77 Cf. especially Lloyd Baugh, Imaging the Divine (op. cit.); Clive Marsh, “Did You Say ‘Grace’?:  
Eating in Community in Babette’s Feast,” (op. cit.); and Bryan Stone, “The Communion of Saints:  
Babette’s Feast,” in Faith and Film:  Theological Themes at the Cinema.  Atlanta:  Chalice Press, 2000. 
 
 78 Defining what consists of a Christ-figure in film is itself a fairly involved study.  In his volume 
Imaging the Divine, Lloyd Baugh assembles positions on this topic and then presents his own 
interpretation, which delineates “Christ-figures” along a continuum of meaning.  His reading of Babette as 
a Christ-figure is governed by the following rubric:  the “Christ-figure is the central figure of a narrative, 
which in all of its parts runs parallel to the Christ-story:  the modality of extended metaphor or allegory” 
(op. cit., p. 110). 
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spirituality with Babette’s earthy, sanguine sensibility that is characteristically Catholic 
and “incarnational.”79 
Perhaps the strongest evidence of a christological-incarnational dimension can be 
perceived in two details:  though Babette was a famous chef in Paris, she, “poor 
among the poor,” humbly “disciplines herself into patience” and submits to 
learning the unsophisticated method of cooking cod and ale-bread soup.  Shortly 
after her arrival, her presence begins to have miraculous effects, suggested by the 
surprising reversal of the precarious economic situation of Martina and Philippa.  
Axel wants to suggest that in Babette, something new and wonderful, something 
salvific has entered into this community of believers and is quietly bringing about 
changes not possible under the old covenant of the Founder.  Here a new covenant 
is establishing itself.80 
 
 One important question that existing theological reviews of the film do not 
adequately explore, and which will drive our analysis, is this:  Why does Babette choose 
to give everything she has to prepare the feast?  The film does not give a direct answer to 
this question.  Ostensibly the feast is a token of Babette’s gratitude to the sisters for 
having given her asylum.  “Babette’s meal is a thank-offering:  for her life, her very 
survival, her art, her being welcomed.  It is not clear that she is giving thanks to God.  
But there is an inner need to give thanks, as strong an urge as her need to be artistic with 
food.  Babette’s feast is thus clearly comprehensible in terms of a gift-offering.”81  A 
related viewpoint, one which corresponds in part to the judgment that Babette is a type of 
Christ, is that her meal is a generous act of self-donation—a sacrificial action which 
“knows no bounds,”82 for she has expended all she has for the sake of others.  This 
position sees Babette as having “no ulterior motives.  She seeks nothing for herself.  She 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 79 Just as Israel was in need of deliverance from the letter of the law, so are the parishioners in 
need of liberation from their “world-denying asceticism” and resistance to God-given sensuality. 
 
 80 Baugh, op. cit., p. 139. 
 
 81 Marsh, op. cit., p. 213. 
 
 82 Baugh, op. cit., p. 141. 
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could easily have spent the entire ten thousand francs on herself.  The motivation for 
Babette’s offering is sheer excess; it is, in the fullest sense of the word, a mystery 
provided for the benefit of others.  It is sacrificial and unnecessary.”83  While doubtless 
the feast is extravagant and other-directed, the opinion that it is “unnecessary” and that 
Babette “seeks nothing for herself” needs to be measured against her own words: 
 Philippa:  Babette, you should not have spent everything on us. 
 Babette:  It wasn’t just for you. 
Here she hints that the meal holds a deeper significance, one she does not disclose to the 
sisters.  For who else did she prepare the feast—and why? 
 One response is that Babette has undertaken such an exhaustive task because she 
is at heart a gastronome of the highest order who cannot help but create.  As she says in 
the film, “Throughout the world sounds one long cry from the heart of the artist:  Give 
me the chance to do my very best.”  In the short story, Babette makes plain her 
motivation:  “‘For your sake?’ she replied.  ‘No.  For my own.’  She rose from the 
chopping block and stood up before the two sisters.  ‘I am a great artist!’ she said.”84  Her 
coming into fortune grants her the chance of creating with the finest materials available.  
Babette pours everything she has and is into one final masterpiece: 
Babette does not merely work over a hot stove to feed her friends because she 
wants to serve them and do something nice for them.  Her motivation is much 
deeper.  She is an artist.  What she provides through her culinary art is a vehicle 
for offering her very own self to the community—for, as with all good art, the 
meal is quite literally an extension of Babette.  Though she spends all she has on 
the meal, she is not depleted or impoverished.  She is made rich, as is the 
community that benefits from her art.85 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 83 Stone, “The Communion of Saints:  Babette’s Feast,” op. cit., p. 161. 
 
 84 Dineson, “Babette’s Feast,” op. cit., pp. 57-58. 
 
 85 Stone, “The Communion of Saints:  Babette’s Feast,” op. cit., p. 162. 
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This view, that Babette gives the feast “in one sense for herself”86 is also confirmed in the 
film.  When Babette confesses to the sisters that she has spent all her winnings on the 
feast, Philippa says, “Now you’ll be poor for the rest of your life.”  With an air of great 
dignity, Babette responds:  “An artist is never poor!”  The sentiment is expanded in 
Dineson: 
“Poor?” said Babette.  She smiled as if to herself.  “No, I shall never be poor.  I 
told you that I am a great artist.  A great artist, Mesdames, is never poor.  We 
have something, Mesdames, of which other people know nothing.”87 
 
 The foregoing opinions concerning Babette’s intentions are persuasive and 
authenticated in the film.  Yet they do not go far enough.  Too little critical attention has 
been paid to the backstory of Babette and the significance her pre-exilic life has on her 
making the feast.  Consequently, images in the film communicative of the deeper reason 
behind her actions are overlooked.  Axel suggests this additional purpose with such subtle 
camerawork and editing that, admittedly, it is discernable only after multiple viewings 
and with knowledge of the sources of Axel’s own artistic inspiration.  Our analysis will 
focus on three specific elements in the story that signify this “other” motivation:  the 
person of Babette; the film’s Christian iconography; and the dish Cailles en Sarcophage.  
Each symbol is meaningful in se.  And when they are interpreted in light of each other a 
thread of meaning can be detected that signifies Babette’s deepest motivation.  Once that 
motive is illuminated, we can apply a particular theological hermeneutic that discloses 
reasons why Babette might in fact need to give her feast. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 86 Marsh, “Eating in Community in Babette’s Feast,” op. cit., p. 211. 
 
 87 Dineson, “Babette’s Feast,” op. cit., p. 58. 
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 As discussed, several theological commentators have interpreted Babette as a 
“Christ-figure.”  Certainly, the preponderance of visual and textual indicators evidences 
that Axel consciously makes the association between Christ and Babette—which is 
something of an extension of Dineson’s book.  However, reading Babette first or only as 
a type of Christ can serve to color everything we see and know of her in the film.88  The 
judgment is problematic when it disregards Babette’s individual uniqueness.  Taken too 
far, “analysis” of the film can become simply a matter of “symbol-hunting”—assigning 
christic significance to everything Babette is, says, or does.  Because she plays “the part 
of the artist and, at points, of the unseen and self-giving host in the pattern of Christ 
(though never exactly or woodenly so),”89 as a corrective measure, more attention needs 
to be paid to how Axel honors the singularity of Babette and her experiences while 
simultaneously identifying her with Christ. 
 To demonstrate this, let us consider four scenes that match Babette directly with a 
Christian image.  Since the film does not use the spoken word to make the identification 
between Babette and Christ (e.g., Babette never talks of Jesus, or her Catholic faith; she 
is not seen at prayer or worship; nor does anyone from the community ever comment 
about her faith), one must look deeply into the mise en scène to find the visual cues for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 88 When judging so-called Christ-figures in cinema, one must bear in mind that such a character 
“is neither Jesus nor the Christ, but rather a shadow, a faint glimmer or reflection of him.  As a fully human 
being, the Christ-figure may be weak, uncertain, even a sinner, [who] may have all the limits of any human 
being in the situation at hand.  The Christ-figure is a foil to Jesus Christ, and between the two figures there 
is a reciprocal relationship.  On the one hand, the reference to Christ clarifies the situation of the Christ-
figure and adds depth to the significance [of his or her] actions; on the other hand, the person and situation 
of the Christ-figure can provide new understanding of who and how Christ is:  ‘Jesus himself is revealed 
anew in the Christ-figure,’” (Baugh, Imaging the Divine, op. cit., p. 112).  One important difference 
between Babette and many other Christ-figures in film is that she does not undergo “rejection” by a 
particular faction in the community.  She is misunderstood, surely; but she is uniformly accepted by the 
villagers. 
 
 89  Frank Burch Brown, Good Taste, Bad Taste, and Christian Taste:  Aesthetics in Religious Life.  
New York:  Oxford UP, 2003, p. 265. 
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the christic association.  Reviewers who regard her as a Christ-figure have overlooked or 
misread the scenes chosen for analysis.  Here the attempt to fix our gaze on what the 
audience is shown allows us to more clearly see that the Babette/Christ association is 
already embedded in the imagery.  Such a descriptive approach obviates any possible 
claim to theological eisegesis and does more to bolster the “Babette = Christ-figure” 
verdict. 
I. The first time we see Babette is in the first few minutes of the movie.  Although 
no explanation is given, the “moment” of the scene is sometime after the formal dinner of 
the film’s title.90  Babette is shown baking cookies and serving tea to the religious 
community who have gathered for prayer in the sisters’ house.  She wears a crucifix 
around her neck and the camera frames this prominently in close-up.  The film’s 
omniscient narrator asks how is it that two poor women on the western seashore of 
Denmark have come to have the service of a French maid.  To explain, the montage takes 
us back some fifty years to the time when the founder of the community was still alive 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 90 Lloyd Baugh interprets the film’s four-minute prologue differently.  He believes Axel has 
placed us in medias res, sometime after Babette has begun her work for the sisters but before the feast—
and not, as is suggested here, sometime after the feast.  There is no precise evidence either way.  Babette’s 
wearing a crucifix provides little indication since she begins to wear it sometime before she wins the lottery 
anyway.  The interpretation that the scene occurs after the meal makes better sense, however, for three 
reasons.  First, because it foreshadows Babette’s decision to remain in the community, symbolizing her 
continuing presence after the meal (a possible eucharistic parallel).  Second, we notice that the prayer 
meeting included in the scene is well-attended and that the members are participative and civil to one 
another, symbolizing the abiding effect of the feast.  Indeed, as Babette enters the room to serve the group 
she gives them all a gentle, knowing smile.  This contrasts to a later scene (yet earlier in the film’s time) 
whereupon entering the room to serve (only) tea she reproaches the bickering group:  “Well, now!  May we 
have some peace and quiet?”  Third, Babette is shown making cookies for the community, something we 
do not see elsewhere in the picture.  Could this not be a sign that after the feast the members become more 
open in their eating practices?  Could the fact that desserts are now acceptable not symbolize that the 
integration of spiritual and sensual at the feast has had a lasting impact?  Taken together, these changes, 
however subtle, suggest that this opening scene is actually the farthest in time that the movie ever takes us.  
In fact, the scene ends with a dissolve of a composite of the older sisters to a perfectly matched fade-in of 
the sisters when they were young.  Thus, the furthest point in time stretches back to the earliest point.  It is 
necessary to make this time sequence clear since in impinges on an accurate reading of the film’s final 
scenes. 
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and when Martina and Philippa were young women.  After the story of each lover is told, 
there is a flash-forward thirty-five years or so to when, as older, unmarried women, they 
(and we) are formally introduced to Babette. 
A:  Exterior, long shot:  dark of night, rainstorm, village huts.  Under a mysterious shaft of 
 white light (which source is above/beyond the screen), an enigmatic figure appears in the middle 
 of the screen, between two sets of huts, wearing a windswept cape. The person (we can't tell if it is 
 a man or woman yet) is stumbling along in the maelstrom apparently in search of something. 
 CUT TO 
B:  Interior, medium shot:  warm, soft light.  In the middle of the frame, the elderly Martina and 
Philippa are seated next at a table in their home—Martina is reading; Philippa is sewing.  On the 
table are a teapot and cups.  There is a wooden corner cabinet in the shadow to the left.  Atop it is 
a porcelain statue of Jesus, about a foot tall; his arms are slightly outstretched.  Martina turns a 
page in her newspaper. 
 CUT TO 
C:  Close-up:  newspaper detail.  On the page there is an illustration of a middle-aged woman 
laboring over a steaming washbasin (a reminder of their years of service to the community?  a 
foreshadowing of the servant Babette?). 
 CUT TO 
D:  Medium shot (same as B):  Martina leans forward to show Philippa the picture.  There is a 
wordless understanding between them.  At once, a thunderclap is heard.  Both look to the right of 
the screen, apparently toward the source of the sound. 
 CUT TO  
E:  Exterior, long shot (same as A):  The figure is now with a man in front of a hut at the right side 
of the screen.  The man says, “That's the house over there."  Without response the figure trudges 
diagonally across the quad in the strong wind and rain.  As the figure moves, the camera slowly 
pans to the left to follow.  As the individual gets closer to the foreground we can see that it is a 
woman, wearing a full-length dress underneath a dark cape.  She has a large bag in hand.  The 
camera stops as she nears the house.  Barely making it to the door, the woman collapses (upright) 
against the facade. 
 CUT TO 
F:  Interior, medium shot (same as B):  Martina and Philippa are surprised to hear a knock at the 
door.  A voiceover tells us the year is 1871.  The two get up and the camera pans left to follow 
them to the door.  Martina passes in front of the statue of Jesus. 
  CUT TO 
G:  Close-up:  The sisters are shown looking out the door to the mysterious figure.  There is a 
bewildered look in their eyes.  A reverse cut shows who it is they are looking at:  In close-up we 
see it is a wearied, disoriented Babette.  There is a short sequence of reverse shots alternating 
between Babette and the sisters as they invite her inside. 
 CUT TO 
H:  Medium shot, (same as F):  As the sisters lead Babette into the house the camera pans right to 
follow them.  As Babette passes in front of the corner cabinet, the camera pauses slightly to match 
Babette (shown in her dark cape from behind) first with the shadow of the statue of Christ and 
then with the statue itself.  Philippa helps Babette sit down; she is completely exhausted. 
 CUT TO 
I:  Medium shot:  Martina is standing screen left, the corner cabinet and statue are screen right.  
There are three shadows cast on the back wall:  Martina’s, the statue’s, and Philippa’s (she moves 
into the shot).  As the sisters decide in gesture to give Babette some tea, the camera moves to 
frame Martina and Philippa on opposite sides of the statue (at one point Christ’s hands appear to 
touch the heads of the women).  Martina takes out a teacup from out of the cabinet.  Its porcelain 
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color and sheen exactly match that of the statue.  As the sisters comfort Babette and pour her tea, 
the statue remains in the background above them all. 
 
The point of such a detailed study of this masterful scene is to demonstrate the care and 
precision which Axel brings to his direction.  There is a great deal of intentionality 
present in this two-minute montage.  The scene is an interesting study from a theological 
point of view, for we see how Axel, without voice-over narration or dialogue, associates 
not only Babette, but also Martina and Philippa, explicitly with Jesus Christ.  This 
observation—that Martina and Philippa are also types of Christ—is missed when too 
much emphasis is placed on Babette and her redemptive role in the community.91  Axel 
plainly illustrates the sisters’ Christ-like commitment to their father’s mission in long-
standing service to the community, which comes at a great personal cost to both.  Indeed, 
the charity the sisters show throughout the film constitute the seven corporal works of 
mercy:  they shelter the homeless (Babette); feed the hungry; give drink to the thirsty; 
visit the imprisoned (shut-ins); tend to the sick; clothe the naked (they knit socks for the 
shut-ins).  And, as will be explained later, they even help bury the dead.  These acts of 
mercy are inspired, as the statue symbolizes, by their Christian faith.92  At no time does 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 91 It is surprising how little critical attention among theologians is paid to the sisters as Christ-
figures.  This is certainly due to the inordinate attention given to Babette in this capacity.  It is as if they are 
treated in reviews the way they are treated by parishioners:  their presence is taken for granted! 
 
 92 The placement of the statue perhaps suggests Jesus’ presence “with” them and yet “above” 
them.  Lloyd Baugh writes the following about the scene:  “In the design of the film, Axel proposes a 
number of interesting details that are not mentioned in Blixen’s novella.  For instance, in the background of 
several scenes in the house of the pastor, both in the past and in the present, a white ceramic statue of Christ 
is clearly visible on a high cabinet:  a rather curious item in the house of a puritan Protestant preacher.  But 
Axel never shows the statue of Christ in a composition with Babette:  is it perhaps because he wants to 
avoid redundancy?  Or because he wants to suggest that Babette is a living figure of the Christ represented 
in the ceramic figure?” (Lloyd Baugh, Imaging the Divine, op. cit., p. 144).  Our analysis shows this to be a 
misreading of the scene, since Axel does show Babette directly in the presence of the statue.  There may be 
some truth to what Baugh says here concerning redundancy since, as noted, Axel does not show Babette’s 
face and the statue in the same frame (an indication that her mission has not yet begun?).  However, later in 
the film, when Babette enters the same room and sits down to announce to the sisters her wish to make the 
dinner for their father’s anniversary, the statue is clearly visible in the extreme top right corner of the 
frame.  Perhaps showing Babette’s full face and the statue together at this point in the film is Axel’s way of 
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either sister contribute to the testy rows that have become typical of the sect; instead, they 
bear these wrongs and patiently counsel the others93 to “seek Christ” and look “for the 
signs of his infinite kingdom.”94  As the narration says in the film’s prologue, “They 
spent all their time and almost all their small income on good works.”95 
II. Still, considering that all the action in the story depends on Babette, the film’s 
focus is on her as the community’s “redeemer”—not the sisters.  She acts in this capacity 
primarily through her sacrifice of an affluent life to give the dinner at the founder’s 
centennial.  The camera gives us an up-close view of the painstaking preparations: 
Early in the morning of the day of the feast, Babette begins slaughtering, disemboweling, 
dismembering, skinning, plucking, and slicing.  In the background, a fire crackles furiously.  A 
monstrous tortoise breathes eerily while moving its head slowly from side to side.  A flayed calf’s 
head, ghastly white, lies in a bowl, like a corpse laid out in a casket.  A barrow full of bloody 
innards and flesh, feathers, shells, hide, skin, heads, and feet is wheeled away.  The feathered 
quail, to which Babette had crooned affectionately “Ma petite caille” when carrying them in their 
cage from the boat, now lie limp and naked in a bowl.  The viewer watches Babette, wielding a 
sword-like knife, ruthlessly decapitate one of the little bodies and slit its back, spoon stuffing onto 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
communicating that Babette has fully become a figure of Jesus (like the statue behind her) in deciding to 
give away her life for the community.  Here, however, Baugh’s argument for non-redundancy founders, for 
in the same frame we are shown the statue, the crucifix around Babette’s neck, and Babette—herself a 
Christ-figure.  (Side note:  Baugh published his analysis in 1997, before DVDs were commercially 
available.  It is commonly known that many VHS transfers reduced up to one-third what viewers could see 
of the original film ratio.  It is certainly within the realm of possibility that the version available to Baugh 
was as such, in which case the statue, and several other items throughout the film, would not be visible). 
 
 93 In this way they also practice the seven spiritual works of mercy:  they instruct the ignorant; 
counsel the doubtful; comfort the sorrowful; bear wrongs patiently; forgive injuries; pray for the living and 
the dead.   The seventh—to convert the sinner—is shown to a greater degree in the book:  although the 
sisters are reluctant to invite a Catholic into their home, they nonetheless look forward to trying to convert 
her to their Lutheran faith. 
 
 94 Lines such as this have given some reviewers reason to claim that the Lutherans in the film are 
“world-denying.”  Such a view, however, must be counterbalanced by the fact that in other places the 
doxology of the sect is quite “incarnational.”  For instance, one of the hymns goes as follows:  “Oh, Lord 
allow thy kingdom to descend upon us here, so that the spirit of mercy may wipe out all trace of sin.  Then 
we shall know in our hearts that God lives here with us.  And that Thou art dwelling with those that trust in 
Thee.”  On this same point, the presence of the porcelain statue of Jesus—a kind of icon—must also be 
considered. 
 
 95 Earlier in the film the younger Philippa is matched directly with an image of Jesus.  She is 
shown in close-up singing in the chapel.  There is then a cut to an extreme close-up of the tortured face of 
Christ (the chapel’s main crucifix) followed by a return cut to Philippa singing:  the implication being that 
she is looking at the wooden image of Christ while singing praises to him. 
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the flattened carcass, gently fit the little body into its “coffin” of pastry, and delicately insert the 
severed head.  These preparations evoke the horrific animal and human sacrifices of the Old 
Testament or those of the followers of Dionysus.96 
 
This interpretation highlights the “carnality” of what goes on in a kitchen manned by 
Babette and contrasts to the sisters’ “bland” preps.97  Missing in this reading however is 
the scene’s christic significance, for Axel makes an explicit visual association between 
these “fleshy” preparations and Jesus.  After the parishioners have made the vow to 
remain silent about the food, in hushed voices they sing the hymn “Jerusalem, 
Jerusalem.”  While they are singing, the film cuts to a close-up of a black and white print 
of Jesus at prayer that was shown hanging on the wall in the background moments before.  
Immediately after this image of Jesus, the montage cuts to a shot of the aforementioned 
wheelbarrow filled with the bloody debris of animal cuttings.  Thus, not only might the 
preparations suggest Greek and Jewish temple sacrifices and therefore the meal’s 
association with death, they evoke something of Jesus.  Babette’s sacrifice of “losing” her 
life for the community is likened to the price Christ paid for his commitment to the 
Father’s will.  The scene is another “incarnational” moment that contrasts the 
community’s apprehension of “flesh” with Babette’s security with and love for earthy 
things.98 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 96 See Wanda Avila, “The Discovery of Meaning in Babette’s Feast,” at website The Jung Page:  
Reflections on Psychology, Culture, and Life: 
<http://www.cgjungpage.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=710&Itemid=40>. (last 
accessed 1/19/10). 
 
 97 This reading of the kitchen scenes itself needs a pinch of restraint.  Axel’s showing the 
meticulousness of the preparations is surely also meant to demonstrate Babette’s proficiency as a culinary 
artist—not a butcher!  Still, the “violence” of these scenes (such as the plucking of the quail) must be 
seriously considered.  We will return to this idea later in the analysis. 
 
 98 Throughout the film Babette, more than any other character, is shown in natural settings:  in a 
rainstorm; on the shore; in a field picking herbs; on a carriage riding along a rugged path.  In this way, 
Babette is like the “rough and ready” Jesus of Mark’s gospel.  Yet Axel balances this portrayal, as Babette 
also resembles Luke’s picture of Jesus, who is especially attractive to the fragile, elderly, sinners, and 
women:  one who proclaims “liberty to captives” (Luke 4: 17-19). 
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III. A more subtle instance of the association made between Babette and Jesus occurs 
in the film sometime after Babette has begun working for the sisters but before she comes 
into the prize money.  In this scene we are brought further into Babette's melancholy.  It 
also explicitly confirms that she has positively impacted the community and thus already 
begun her “redemptive” work: 
A:  Interior, medium shot:  Philippa is seated next to a woman from the community.  They are 
wearing drab winter clothes.  There is little color in the room or in their faces.  Philippa counsels 
the woman to “Turn your eyes on the vault of heaven."  The woman slowly turns her face away 
toward the (offscreen) window.  CUT to close-up of the woman.  We hear Philippa say to her, 
"There you will see the signs of His infinite Kingdom . . . the eternal light."  The woman nods her 
head and gives a slight smile. 
 CUT TO 
B:  Exterior, long shot:  The screen is filled with a still shot of blue sky and clouds reflecting the 
pinks and oranges of the sun setting over a rugged mountainscape.  In the distance we can hear a 
bell tolling.  A man's voiceover begins, "For Thine is the Kingdom, the power, and the glory . . .” 
 CUT TO 
C:  Interior, medium shot:  In a darkened room there is a table, a chair, and through a lone window 
above the table we look out over a field to the sun setting.  The windowpane forms the shape of a 
cross, dark against the illuminated background.  We hear the man continue his prayer “ . . . forever 
and ever.  Amen.”  The camera pans left to show an older, bearded man in bed saying the prayer.  
He is one of the community’s shut-ins.  He continues, "And thank you Lord for sending Babette to 
us."  There is a slow close-up on the man as he finishes with the line, "She helps our little sisters 
so they can devote themselves to those most wretched in Thy little flock."  In close-up we see him 
smile and, with his hands still clasped in prayer, he leans back into his bed into darkness. 
 CUT TO 
D:  Interior, close-up of Babette's face.  She is framed left-of-center sitting alone and motionless in 
her darkened bedroom.  A single lit candle is shown extreme screen right.  It is obvious that she is 
sad.  With the camera still, and her face illuminated by the candle, we see a tear begin to well up in 
her right eye.  Before it flows down her cheek however there is a dramatic CUT to a full-screen 
close-up of the intersection of four windowpanes.  It is raining outside and the glass is streaked 
with raindrops:  an associative match with Babette’s tears.  Like the window shown in C the 
wooden intersection forms a full-screen cross.  (A cut back from this window, however, shows 
that, unlike the window in C, its full shape is not a cross—a detail that expresses that Axel’s 
composition was deliberate to show a cross and not just the rain outside). 	  
 This scene has been interpreted in theological reviews as Babette “weeping over 
Jerusalem,” as Jesus does in Luke 19, the suggestion being that her sorrow is due to the 
community’s (“Israel’s”) infighting.  For instance:  “Axel makes it clear that Babette is 
aware of the precarious situation of the community.  She prays about it, and in a gesture 
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that recalls Jesus grieving over the hard-heartedness of Jerusalem, she weeps.”99  Here is 
an example of the analytical insufficiency that can stem from viewing Babette exclusively 
through the Christ-figure optic.  In imputing Babette’s lament to frustrations in the 
community, the analysis does not take seriously enough into account that she herself has 
suffered incalculable personal tragedy.  While there remains a certain legitimacy to 
reading Babette as “weeping over Jerusalem,” since the scene cuts to a prayer meeting 
during which the religious community is shown at the height of their bickering and 
hardheartedness, it is only against Babette’s backstory that her grief can be fully 
measured.  Dineson’s narrative provides this context in the letter from Achille Papin.  It 
reads that Babette herself was 
arrested as a Pétroleuse—(which word is used here for women who set fire to 
houses with petroleum)—and has narrowly escaped the blood-stained hands of 
General Galliffet.  She has lost all she possessed and dares not remain in 
France.100 
 
Babette left Paris amid such chaos and in such haste that she could not arrange for the 
burial of her murdered husband and son.  Although we do not receive such detail in the 
film, there is enough to know that everything which helped to define Babette was cut to 
bits in the Communard revolt.  She has lost everything dear to her, save her Catholic faith 
and skill as a chef.  On the Jutland peninsula, she has no family, no friends, no money, 
and must learn Danish.101  In this new language and because Babette is in hiding she 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 99 Baugh, op. cit.., pp. 139-140.  There is no explicit indication in this scene or others in the film 
that Babette “prays” over her situation. 
 
 100 Dineson, op. cit., p. 29.  Indeed, nothing in the film suggests that Babette was a revolutionary.  
At the end of the novella, she admits to the sisters, “Yes, I was a Communard.  Thanks be to God, I was a 
Communard!  . . . I stood upon a barricade; I loaded the gun for my menfolk!” (ibid, p. 58). 
 
 101 The novella takes place in Norway, not Denmark.  Dineson’s Babette does not learn to speak 
Norwegian.  Thus, Axel’s decision to have Babette learn Danish must be considered.  The choice is hardly 
incidental, as it links to the whole “incarnational” motif:  much as Christ “descends” to earth as a 
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cannot adequately express all that befell her.  As a Catholic in an isolated Protestant 
village, she is without a supportive sacramental system by which she may properly 
grieve.  There, among the poor and simple, her talent as a gourmet chef is wasted (or so it 
seems at first).  And this art, one of the only things salvaged from her recent chaos, 
Babette at first keeps secret out of fear that she will be misunderstood.102 
IV. With this in mind, let us turn now to a scene that links the previous three and 
conveys what is perhaps Babette’s deepest motivation for giving her feast.  Because the 
montage is protracted to a greater degree than the previous scenes, a simple description of 
what is shown will suffice. 
After Babette has cashed in her lottery ticket, she and Philippa place the prize money in a wooden 
box.  Babette thanks the sisters for all their help and leaves the room.  The camera follows Babette 
as she walks up an exterior staircase to her spare garret above the sisters’ house.  On the 
soundtrack, there is piano music.  There is a cut to a wide shot inside the room.  Babette sits down 
in a single chair holding the winnings in her lap.  For four seconds the camera holds this image of 
Babette in deep contemplation.  It then cuts to a close-up of her bedside.  Hanging on the wall just 
above her pillow are a photo of a man (we presume this is her husband) and a pocketwatch with a 
small ribbon in the colors of the French flag.  There is a quick cut to Philippa playing piano (the 
ambient music we hear all along) followed by a shot of Babette outside walking on the shore 
toward the ocean.  Though it could be the same day, there is a sense in the montage that some time 
has passed between Babette in her room to her standing on the seashore.  She stops to look out 
onto the sunlit, clear blue waters (one of the “freshest” scenes of the film).  There is an axial cut 
inward toward the sea as the camera follows what Babette is looking at:  a lone white bird passing 
over the waters.  The film then cuts back to Babette who promptly turns around from the sea and 
marches inland. 
 
Axel indicates through composition, timing, and Babette’s purpose of step that she has 
made a decision:  which we know will be to spend her entire fortune on a single dinner.103  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
“foreigner” and who must learn the language of the people, Babette is able to get closer to the villagers 
because of the Danish she speaks. 
 
 102 This gradual revelation of who Babette truly is can be likened to the Christ of Mark’s gospel, in 
which the “messianic secret” is disclosed progressively. 
 
 103 Baugh writes the following analysis of the scene:  “Her lottery winnings and the feast of the 
Founder provide the appropriate context, a kind of kairos or moment of opportunity, and inspired by a 
seagull (there are no doves on the Jutland seacoast) as she walks meditatively along the beach, Babette 
makes an about-turn, a radical decision, christological in its quality, content, and effects” (Baugh, ibid., p. 
140).  It is unclear what Baugh means by the “christological” quality of this scene.  Given that he reads the 
scene as a “kairos” moment, one might presume he is thinking of Christ’s baptism (the bird and water 
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At first the sequence does not appear to communicate more than what it shows, namely 
that Babette has weighed the many possibilities that her wealth now affords her and has 
chosen to give everything away in the memorial feast.  However, a deeper reading of the 
scene provides a clearer indication of why she makes her decision.  If we return to the 
four-second still shot of Babette in her room, the subject, framing, and lighting are highly 
reminiscent of James McNeill Whistler’s austere portrait Arrangement in Grey and 
Black:  The Artist’s Mother.  Axel’s painterly design of his compositions is well-
documented.  In interviews, he has indicated that several artistic works guided the 
cinematography, particularly those of Vermeer and Rembrandt.104  As he says, “In 
Babette there is hardly a story.  It’s just a series of portraits.”105  Though no critical 
attention has been paid to the possibility of Whistler’s influence on this particular scene, 
knowing Axel’s profound artistic acumen, there can be little doubt of his quotation of The 
Artist’s Mother here.106 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
suggest this); or Christ in the desert (the sand, her solitude, and her final existential choice above all other 
options would suggest this); or in Gethsemane (Babette’s purposiveness suggests this). 
 
 104 Donna Poulton, Moving Images in Art and Film:  The Intertextual and Fluid Use of Painting in 
Cinema (diss.), Brigham Young University, 1999, 179 pp.  Poulton devotes an entire chapter to the artistic 
influences on the film Babette’s Feast; however, she does not reference Whistler.  In fact, Poulton reads 
this particular scene as reflecting Vermeer’s style and that it echoes his Lady Weighing Gold (Woman 
Holding a Balance):  “The shot of Babette sitting in her room after she won the lottery, reveals the blurred 
edges of Vermeer’s camera obscura; the points of light that force the viewer’s eye to move expectantly 
around the room; the stillness of her character as time seems to have slowed.   She holds in her hands a 
fortune of 10,000 francs, but directly in front of her, brightly illuminated, sits the milkmaid’s jug.  It 
symbolizes her work in the parish and is a proof of ‘human loyalty and self-sacrifice’” (Poulton, ibid., p. 
89).  Whereas Axel’s composition of Babette in her room more directly reflects Whistler’s painting, there is 
good reason to think he may have had both painters in mind. 
 
 105 Poulton, ibid., p. 74. 
 
 106 Although it is only a supposition, Axel at the very least knew of Whistler’s painting.  Axel, of 
Danish extraction, spent his formative in Paris.  Whistler’s portrait hangs in the Musée d’Orsay on the left 
bank of the Seine. 
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 But how is this quotation of Whistler a visual clue to the intentions behind the 
banquet?  The date of the famous Artist’s Mother is 1871, exactly the year of the Paris 
Commune, and thus the same year that Babette’s husband and son are murdered.  This 
could be purely coincidental, (though this is unlikely given Axel’s comprehension of art 
history and his own extreme attention to detail); or it might be precisely the bit of 
information that confirms why Babette prepares the memorial dinner.  The montage from 
Babette sitting deep in thought, to the photo of her husband and the timepiece tagged with 
her country’s national colors, to her “kairos” moment on the beach:  together these 
suggest that the feast is her way of coming to terms with the untimely death of her 
husband and son and escape from Paris.  The dinner is a memorial for them as much as it 
is for the sect’s founder. 
[Babette’s] departure from France was hasty and traumatic.  A fugitive fleeing for 
her life, she was unable to bury her husband and son properly or to say goodbye 
to friends and place that made up her world in Paris.  With no time to absorb her 
losses before plunging into an ascetic life likely to magnify any preexisting sense 
of loss, Babette is forced to forestall or suspend mourning in order to survive.107 
 
The feast is thus not only a profound gesture of gratitude, nor merely a venue for her 
artistry:  it is her way of burying the grief that has been in suspension for fourteen years.  
Interestingly, Axel adapts from twelve years (in the book) the time period over which 
Babette serves the sisters.  No explanation has been given for the change, but Catholics 
may make the numerical connection to the fourteen Stations of the Cross.  The idea of 
Babette “carrying” her grief harks back to the scene of her “weeping”—along her own 
via dolorosa. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 107 Esther Rashkin, Unspeakable Secrets and the Psychoanalysis of Culture.  New York:  SUNY 
Press, 2009, p. 31. 
 
	   365	  
 This interpretation, that the planning, preparing, and serving of the dinner is the 
ritual by which Babette will finally put to rest all that was taken from her—family, 
country, career—is corroborated by the symbolism of the dish Cailles en Sarcophage and 
its distinct connection to death and burial.108  This dish of her own creation at the Café 
Anglais consists of a single quail tucked into a pastry “sarcophagus” and “reshaped into a 
form that mimics the appearance of the living bird; and the name itself reminds the 
partaker of the sacrifice of life that makes the meal possible.”109  When the ingredients 
for the feast arrive by boat, Babette picks up the cage of live quail and lovingly greets 
them, “Alors, mes petites cailles!”110  In French, the word caille or “quail” is also a term 
of endearment “used to refer to a loved one, as in the expression ma petite caille, 
translated as ‘my beloved, my darling, or my dearest.’”111  Thus, the quail that Babette 
“brings from France, kills, and then meticulously entombs in their sarcophagi are not just 
birds, but her loved ones.  The quail function as the fleshly embodiment of her husband, 
her son, the French aristocracy, and her cherished life in France.”112 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 108 This connection to death was, as noted, present in Babette’s preparation of the meal.  Now it is 
possible to better appreciate the “violence” of the preps.  The plucking and skinning of quail intimates the 
death of her family at the hands of Galliffet.  Except here, Babette’s “violence” leads to art and new life; 
Galliffet’s violence only led to death. 
 
 109 Frank Burch Brown, Good Taste, Bad Taste, and Christian Taste:  Aesthetics in Religious Life, 
op. cit., p. 268. 
 
 110 It is difficult to hear what Babette says exactly to the caged quails.  The subtitles translate the 
French as “My little quails.”  Rashkin claims she says, “Allo, mes petites cailles” (lit. “Hello, my little 
quails”).  However, one might also hear “Alors, mes petites cailles,” which might be rendered, “So, my 
little darlings . . ..”  This latter possibility makes the line almost a kind of prelude to Babette’s swan song.  
It is as if she is conspiring with the quail for one final performance.  (A note of gratitude is extended here to 
Dino D’Agata for the correct rendering of Babette’s words, their translation, and for this insight into why 
she says them). 
 
 111 Rashkin, op. cit., p. 34. 
 
 112 Ibid., p. 35. 
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 In his speech, Löwenhielm identifies the quail dish and, unwittingly, the true 
identity of Babette.  He states that in Paris he was once invited by General Gaston 
Galliffet to dine at Café Anglais.  There Galliffet spoke of the head chef—“surprisingly, a 
woman”—as having “the ability to transform a dinner into a kind of love affair that made 
no distinction between bodily appetite and spiritual appetite.”  He continued that there 
was “no woman in Paris for whom he would shed blood except this chef.”  Ironically, this 
Marquis de Galliffet is the same man who would repress the Commune and shed the 
blood of Babette’s husband and son.  Thus, the “love” meals that Babette made in Paris 
have taken on a new meaning here in the agape feast of the religious community:  as they 
celebrate their founder, she grieves through and memorializes the ones she loved.113  
There is a sense (made more explicit in the book) that Babette is also putting to rest the 
memories of those bourgeoisie, like Galliffet, who could appreciate her artistry.  Though 
she fought against them, still, they were the people who gave her an identity.  This detail 
also explains in part Babette’s suspension of grieving:  her losses conflict with each 
other.  Her need to mourn her family conflicts with the desire to mourn the French 
aristocracy who were the sine qua non of her vocation: 
“You see, Mesdames,” she said, at last, “those people belonged to me, they were 
mine.  They had been brought up and trained, with greater expense than you, my 
little ladies, could ever imagine or believe, to understand what a great artist I am.  
I could make them happy.  When I did my very best I could make them perfectly 
happy.”114 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 113 This is yet another possible connection to the Last Supper.  In the synoptic gospels, Jesus and 
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Though ultimately barbarous, the Parisian aristocracy recognized her talent and provided 
the means by which she could practice her art.  Thus, to mourn her husband and son 
would mean recognizing that the society for which she lives and that gave her life 
and love as an artists was oppressive and murderous.  To mourn the loss of this 
society and of her position as a culinary genius within it would be to express her 
love for those who mourned her husband and son and wronged the poor.  Caught 
in an impossible, unspeakable double bind where mourning is tied to shameful 
love, Babette’s solution . . . is to mourn no one:  to keep secret the drama of her 
loss, and to exclude from language any expression of her suffering.115 
 
This analysis, however, should not eclipse other issues behind the protraction of her grief:  
her loss of community (the need to grieve with survivors who also knew the deceased); 
the loss of her church (Catholic obsequies; a supportive pastoral system).  Nevertheless, 
on this level, Babette’s Feast is a story “about overcoming an inability to mourn.  It 
dramatizes the effects of a blockage to mourning and writes the prescription or recipe for 
transcending that blockage.  The preparation and consumption of food serve as the 
medium of transcendence, as the means by which a shameful loss is swallowed and the 
process of digestion begins.  The feast also functions as a vehicle for articulating a 
fundamental connection between artistic creation and bereavement . . . and the creation of 
art as a life-saving act.”116 
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 116 Ibid., pp. 26-27.  Rashkin writes specifically of the book, though she makes several references 
to the film.  There is much more that can be mined in her theory that the story is about devouring loss—the 
“psychic indigestion and the unburied dead.”  She details the “bird” symbolism throughout the story; 
extends the dimension of “loss” to the sisters, Löwenhielm, and the community; and interprets the feast 
itself in Protestant, not Catholic terms.  On this last point, Rashkin presents a corrective to the idea “shared 
to some degree by most interpreters of the text, that the feast is a Eucharistic banquet or Last Supper in 
which twelve members participate in a ritual celebration of Babette’s sacrifice.”  She writes:  “The 
‘Eucharist’ of Babette’s dinner, in sum, is a Protestant one in which the literal ingestion of bread and wine 
is understood as a symbolic or metaphorical communion with the flesh and blood of the dead.  In this form, 
it is distinct from the Catholic Eucharist in which the bread and wine are believed to become the actual 
flesh and blood of Christ” (ibid., p. 42). 
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Theological Analysis 
 How, from a theological, and not only psychoanalytical, perspective, can the feast 
be interpreted as connecting artistic creation, communion, and bereavement?  What 
Christian sense can be made of the link between Babette’s grief and her exquisite meal?  
Beyond the benefit it has for the community, why is the feast “life-saving” for Babette?  
To answer these questions this final portion of the analysis brings the film into 
conversation with certain ideas on the problem of evil presented by Anglican 
theologian/philosopher Marilyn McCord Adams in her text Horrendous Evils and the 
Goodness of God.117  Prima facie, Babette's Feast, a G-rated movie, might not seem 
concerned with suffering and the question of evil.  It is not an openly philosophic film; 
nor does it comprise the psychic angst and extraordinary circumstances characteristic of 
noir films.  And yet Babette’s Feast is quite “dark,” for the reasons presented above—
particularly the existential anxiety of Babette, which it only delicately implies.  Adams’s 
book can serve as a tool for uncovering this darker element in the film and for 
appreciating the depths of Babette and her circumstances as well as the role her faith 
plays in her decision to make the feast—a point that deserves more critical attention.  
Adams looks at the fundamental dilemma in Christian thought of how participation in the 
evils of the world can be reconciled with faith in a good and loving God.  Her concern is 
that when confronted by what she calls “horrendous evil,” even the most pious believer 
may question not only life’s worth but also God’s power and goodness.  Although 
Babette never rails against God or loses her faith, her distress is apparent, however 
understated.  Seen from Adams’s perspective, Babette is one who has indeed experienced 	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horrendous evils.  Correlatively, she has experienced the "goodness of God."  To 
understand this interpretive possibility, we will examine the concepts and logical thrust of 
Adams’s argument and apply her insights to our theological evaluation of Babette’s 
Feast. 
 Adams argues that many existing theodicies have discussed the problem of evil 
using religion-neutral values and focused too narrowly on morals—an approach she finds 
both intellectually and pastorally inadequate.  Not only do many theoretical approaches 
remain aloof from the real “problem,” which she takes to be the fact that participation in 
evil can leave persons in the position of absolute despair, but they overlook resources in 
the Christian tradition that are, to her mind, of essential importance in understanding 
God’s defeat of suffering.  Adams attempts to marshal the "wider resources" in 
Christianity and deploy them in order “to formulate a family of solutions to the so-called 
logical problem of evil."118  The details of her overall debate with logical positivism do 
not concern us here; and it is impossible, given the scope of the present study, to cover 
the many implications and questions her theory raises.  This section is neither an 
exhaustive explication nor an apologetic for Adams’s theory.  What we find in Adams’s 
Christian sense of suffering is a helpful resource for making Christian sense of the story 
and character of Babette. 
 Adams chooses the rather severe term “horrendous evils” quite deliberately.  
While the rubric connotes atrocious acts of collective trauma at the hands of some 
menacing power, she uses it to describe the acute personal consequences of individual 
participation in evil.  Rather than begin with genocide, war, famine, or abject poverty, she 	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starts more locally:  “I do not equate horrors with massive collective suffering because I 
want to focus on what such evils do to the individual persons involved . . ..”119  In other 
words, the rubric is not limited to a certain class of wicked deeds that would make their 
disastrous effect immediately; rather, the term suggests the insidious nature of evil, where 
its full impact often goes undiagnosed.  For Adams, experiences of evil are “horrendous” 
insofar as they can potentially snuff out all significance and value achieved in a person's 
life.  Participation in such experiences (by doing or suffering them) constitutes reason to 
doubt whether an individual’s life—given his or her inclusion in evil—can be a great 
good to him/her on the whole.  It leaves “reason to doubt whether the participants’ life 
can be worth living, because it is so difficult humanly to conceive how such evils could 
be overcome.”120  Horrendous evil not only frustrates, it radically thwarts or practically 
destroys the well-laid plans made in the life of an individual prior to his or her actual 
participation.  They are horrendous precisely because they leave one in the despairing 
position that perhaps no underlying meaning may be found in anything whatsoever.  
What makes horrendous evils “so pernicious is their life-ruining potential, their power 
prima facie to degrade the individual by devouring the possibility of positive personal 
meaning in one swift gulp.”121 
 Babette's multiple catastrophes constitute concrete participation in horrendous 
evils.  There are the events that make their effect immediately:  the Communard uprising; 
the death of spouse and child; exile; termination of her métier.  Then there are the 
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remnants of evil's whirlwind, the long-term consequences of those events that lead 
Babette into deeper anguish and isolation:  loss of language, kinship, and status; the 
privation of church and sacrament; protracted grief due to her inability to “bury the 
dead”—literally and symbolically.  Given this massive interruption in Babette's life, from 
Adams’s perspective the disproportion of these experiences relative to “human meaning-
making capacities” furnish reason to doubt that Babette can “fit them into a life that 
would be worth living."122  Indeed, there is every reason to think that Babette is on the 
cusp of absolute despair when she arrives at the village:  if the sisters do not take her in, 
Babette says she “will simply die.” 
 Having discussed Adams’s category of evil, how does she conceive of the 
“goodness of God”?  Theodicy, simply put, is a particular way of conceiving the problem 
of how a good, omnipotent, and gracious God at once permits human beings to act evilly 
and vindicates or “makes good” the lives of those thrust into evil’s vortex.  Although 
Adams maintains the doctrine that God is not obliged to humanity, she believes it would 
be “cruel for God to create (allow to evolve) human beings with such radical 
vulnerability to horrors, unless Divine power stood able, and Divine love willing, to 
redeem.”123  Thus, she attempts to identify ways that “participation in horrors can be 
integrated into the participants’ relation to God, where God is understood to be the 
incommensurately Good, and the relation to God is one that is overall incommensurately 
good for the participant.”124  She writes: 
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I contend that God could be said to value human personhood in general, and to 
love individual human persons in particular, only if God were good to each and 
every person God created.  And Divine goodness to created persons involves the 
distribution of harms and benefits, not merely globally, but also within the context 
of the individual person’s life.  At a minimum, God’s goodness to human 
individuals would require that God guarantee each a life that was a great good to 
him/her on the whole by balancing off serious evils.  To value the individual qua 
person, God would have to go further to defeat any horrendous evil in which s/he 
participated by giving it positive meaning through organic unity with a great 
enough good within the context of his/her life.125 
This last point is an important implication of her theology, namely that for God to be 
good to a person, God must guarantee that individual a life that is a great good to him or 
her and one in which any participation in horrors is defeated within the context of his or 
her life.  God’s goodness is pledged immediately and cannot be understood only as a 
post-mortem benefit.  For Adams the idea hinges on “the notion that God works 
continually—both during our lives and after our deaths—to give our lives new and fuller 
meanings far beyond what we could orchestrate for ourselves.”126 
 But precisely how does God guarantee a life in which horrendous evils are not 
only balanced off but endowed “with positive meaning, meanings at least some of which 
will be recognized and appropriated” by the participant?127  Adams grounds her theory 
that God communicates “goodness” to persons caught in evil’s web on the Christian 
teaching that God has already vanquished evil by personally entering directly into its 
nexus and dramatically breaking its grip on human life through humility, poverty, 
obedience, and brotherly love.  God “was not content to join Godself to material creation 
in relations of loving intimacy with created persons.  God’s desire for it was so great, that 
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God decided to enter it Godself, to unite a particular human nature to the Divine person 
as God’s very own nature, to become a human being.”128  Adams speaks here of God 
incarnate, who 
learned obedience through suffering (Heb. 5:7-8), working God’s way through 
our developmental struggles.  In God’s merely human personality, God gave 
Godself to persons of unstable loyalties who deserted and betrayed him.  In the 
crucifixion, God identified with all human beings who participate in actual 
horrors—not only with the victims (of which He was one), but also with the 
perpetrators.  For although Christ never performed any blasphemous acts in His 
human nature, nevertheless, His death by crucifixion made Him ritually cursed . . 
. and so symbolically a blasphemer.129 
 
God in Christ crucified “cancels the curse of human vulnerability to horrors.  For the very 
horrors, participation in which threatened to undo the positive value of created 
personality, now become secure points of identification with the crucified God.”130  The 
one cross and resurrection guarantees God’s solidarity with all creation:  nothing that the 
world suffers can separate it from God’s covenantal, atoning, and intimate love-made-
flesh (Rom. 8:31-39). 
 On this point, Adams emphasizes the insufficiency of merely created goods for 
shaping shattered lives into wholes of positive significance.  Only divine goodness 
thoroughly defeats horrendous evil and its power “to stalemate human meaning-making 
efforts, to make it prima facie impossible for participants to integrate the materials of 
their lives into a whole filled with positive meaning.”131  Applying Anselm’s notion of 
atonement, she writes that if what does “the soteriological job of meaning-making is 	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God’s identification with human beings and God’s own participation in horrors, this 
value cannot be obtained by sending someone else, however exalted.  It is God’s 
becoming a human being, experiencing the human condition from the inside, from the 
viewpoint of finite consciousness, that integrates the experience into an 
incommensurately valuable relationship.”132  Though present participation in horrors may 
not be prima facie meaningful, it is not meaningless because such experience is “partially 
constitutive of the most meaningful relationship of all.  [Adams’s] claim is that the 
Incarnation already endows participation in horrors with a good aspect that makes way 
for their objective, symbolic defeat, even if participants do not yet recognize or 
appropriate this dimension of meaning . . ..”133 
 In presenting her position, Adams bears in mind the question of the relevancy of 
theodicies in general.  Critics of theodicy contend that, where horrors are concerned, it 
“world be morally wrong to say anything that would not be credible in the presence of the 
burning children at Auschwitz, anything that would be morally inappropriate to address 
to people at the most intense moments of their torture.”134  To paraphrase her point, 
“Emmanuel” might not be the honest prayer in the presence of evil.  Indeed, Mark’s 
gospel is telling in that Christ’s final words on the cross are “Eloi, Eloi, lama 
sabachthani.”  Particularly “noxious are putative justifications of God, which—like the 
‘consolations’ of Job’s friends—fail to respect the depth of suffering by domesticating it 
under some overarching scheme.”135  Theoretical theodicies qua theoretical remain aloof 	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and discuss evil at too abstract a level, treating “persons as things and human problems as 
topics for analysis instead of meeting persons as persons to be loved and healed.”136  As a 
corrective, Adams frames the problem of horrendous evil in terms of felt repercussions.  
Regard “for the suffering person calls for empathy that enters into that person’s 
predicament to ‘taste and see’ just how bad it is.”137  In one of her strongest remarks, she 
states: 
I do not say that participation in horrors thereby loses its horrendous aspect:  on 
the contrary, they remain by definition prima facie ruinous to the participant’s 
life.  Nevertheless, I do claim that because our eventual postmortem beatific 
intimacy with God is an incommensurable good for human persons, Divine 
identification with human participation in horrors confers a positive aspect on 
such experiences by integrating them into the participant’s relationship with God.  
Retrospectively, I believe, from the vantage point of heavenly beatitude, human 
victims of horrors will recognize those experiences as points of identification with 
the crucified God, and not wish them away from their life histories.138 
 
 But this leads back to the question of how God aids the personal integration of 
horrendous experience into a life that is worth living.  Here, Adams turns to the category 
of aesthetics and claims that analysts have too often ignored the possibility that “aesthetic 
values” are not only instrumental, but essential in the overcoming of horrific 
involvement.  A central intent of her monograph is to “sabotage” the trend in thinking 
that aesthetic goods have nothing important to contribute to the problem of suffering and 
its overcoming in an individual life.  She proposes that aesthetic properties are the 
"currency" by which God benefits human beings who have participated in horrendous 
evils.139  Aesthetic properties “of the cosmos as a whole and of an individual’s life history 	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dramatically affect a person’s survival and sanity, the goodness and meaning of his/her 
life.  It follows that furnishing a person with satisfying relationships to aesthetic goods is 
one way to benefit a person, and so one way for God to be good to us.”140  To secure her 
point in tradition, Adams turns to moments in the history of Christian theology when 
interpretive modes operated aesthetically rather than strictly conceptually.  For instance, 
she appeals to the aesthetically-conceived drama of scripture:  Creator God as artist and 
orderer of chaos; the liturgical structure of creation with its Sabbath rest; its narrative 
tension (“multiple insurmountable obstacles, slapstick humor, and skin-of-the-teeth 
comic reversals”141); the radiance of the shekinah glory; the psalmist’s invitation to “taste 
and see” God’s goodness; the manifestation of God’s divine word as light in the world; 
the dazzling brilliance of Jesus’ transfiguration; his lordship over darkness.  Further, 
Adams references aesthetic values infused into Christianity via Platonism:  the great 
chain of beauty; divine wisdom’s endowing creation with symmetry, harmony, 
proportion, weight, and number; the soul’s reflection of divine beauty; its journey to “pull 
itself into an ever more sharply focused image of God.”142 
 Finally, she appeals to the aesthetic value of Christ as center.  Using 
Bonaventure’s aesthetic symbol of the “medium” (middle/center/means) to sum up the 
meaning of the incarnation, Adams writes that Christ is “the medium of creation, in the 
sense of being the Exemplar through Whom all things were made (cf. John 1:1-2).  Thus, 
all creatures are Godlike by being like the Son to Whom they owe their form and 
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structure . . ..”143  She points to the paradoxical beauty of the cross, upon which hangs the 
corpus of the one who takes up the un-beauteous (sin) by himself becoming prima facie 
un-beauteous: 
When sin mars the image of God with our human nature . . . Christ is the medium 
[middle/center/means] of salvation.  His Incarnate career takes its shape (humility, 
poverty, obedience, and brotherly love) form the requirements of our reform.  
Christ crucified is both an outward and visible sign of the caricature into which 
sin has contorted us and a symbol of the soul’s transformation through Christlike 
disciplines which “crucify the flesh and its desires.”  Spiritually, the soul journeys 
to cruciformity, finds its destination in the arms of the crucified, where like is 
known by like, knows even as it is known.  Thus, if Bonaventure draws on 
positive aesthetic values to characterize Christ’s role within the Godhead and in 
creation, the symbol of Christ crucified is bivalent, integrating negative into 
positive aesthetic values in the redemption and consummation.144 
 
 In establishing that aesthetic categories are vehicles for revelation and tradition, 
she evinces a divine and human “taste for modeling the world with aesthetic goods.”145  
Adams then turns to the question of “how aesthetic valuables are implicated in ways for 
God to be good to created persons.”146  Prescinding from a discussion of how Adams 
comes to define a “good” and “meaningful” life, we can appreciate her sense that it be 
partially constitutive of a range of aesthetic goods:  sensory pleasures; intimate personal 
relationships; some form of leisure and culture.  For these aesthetic values to be 
meaningful, one must have the wherewithal to discern how they are intrinsically “good” 
and organically related to each other and the whole of one’s life.  Life will have positive 
value for a person “only if s/he eventually recognizes some patterns organizing some 
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chunks of his/her experiences around goals, ideals, relationships that s/he values.”147  
What is so “horrendous about horrors” is their disproportion and incongruity in relation 
to aesthetic values—their ability to overwhelm and disintegrate human meaning-making 
capacities.  Horrendous evils stump us, and furnish 
strong reason to believe that lives marred by horrors can never again be unified 
and integrated into wholes with positive meaning.  Put otherwise, participation in 
horrors leaves us feeling in the position of postmodern artists, who juxtapose the 
incongruous without any unifying framework, so much better to send the 
despairing message that no underlying meanings are to be found.148 
 
If aesthetic goods are unqualifiedly ingredient to a wholesome life, then persons 
traumatized by evil must cultivate the ability to recognize and appropriate meanings 
sufficient to render their lives worth living through aesthetic means.  God’s production of 
“a world whose ‘objective’ aesthetic properties are so proportioned as to be able fruitfully 
to be modeled by human beings in terms of aesthetic goods is one way God has of 
benefitting and hence of being good to human beings.”149  Again, while Adams maintains 
that God does not have “any obligations to creatures at all,” revelation, she observes, 
seems to promise again and again that God overcomes horrendous ruin (the Hebrew 
exodus; Christ’s resurrection; the Messianic banquet).  Revelation, moreover, operates at 
the level of narrative—itself an aesthetic property.  Thus, Adams adduces, so must 
narrative play a role in the meaning-making required to make positive a life left in evil’s 
wake.  When “horrendous evils leave participants floundering, what is needed is not 
ontological reflection but plot invention!  . . .  [I]ndividual sufferers are historically 
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situated and so require a response tailored to their particular circumstances, whereas 
theoretical theodicies sacrifice specificity on the altar of generality.”150  The individual 
sufferer, who tries to shape the materials of her life into a meaningful whole, can scarcely 
be aloof, since she is the person being molded; she is working to become herself.  
Nor can she confine herself to a posture of analytical observation . . . nor one of 
aesthetic contemplation.  She is both painter and canvas, her actions—to adopt 
and pursue goals, to relate herself to others, to change directions in such a way as 
to redeem failures—add content and determine form.  Like the expert artist, 
however, she may bring theoretical knowledge to bear, step back and analyze 
where she has got up to now, appreciate what she has so far become, the better to 
know how to continue, to discern what she wants to do, how she want to develop 
next.151 
 
 Adams goes on to say that such “self-invention”—reshaping the pieces of a life 
shattered by the horrendous—is usually “a collaborative project involving a wide variety 
of intimate and distant human relations,” with intimate friends and family, 
psychotherapists and spiritual directors being typically the closest collaborators.152  
Christians, Adams explains, “would add the Holy Spirit” to this list.153  The Holy Spirit 
of God “is the personal environment that first pulls us into focus as spiritual beings 
capable of connecting with one another’s spirits, even of romancing with God.”154  
Overcoming participation in evil is a collaborative and aesthetic process whereby the 
Spirit “functions as agency-enabler and –developer.”155  It is thus parcel of Christian faith 
to trustfully acknowledge that God’s Spirit leads persons practically destroyed by 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 150 Ibid., p. 185. 
 
 151 Ibid., p. 186. 
 
 152 Ibid. 
 
 153 Ibid. 
 
 154 Ibid., p. 104. 
 
 155 Ibid. 
 
	   380	  
horrendous evils to see that their lives are already great goods to God—the quintessential 
meaning-maker.  Christian faith believes the restorative Spirit of God gives the suffering 
eyes to see where, on the brink of ruin, they can gather leftover shards of meaning and 
how to reassemble them into a life worth living.  Far from being merely therapeutic in 
this restorative process, aesthetic values (including but not limited to the traditional arts) 
symbolize a profound way in which God guarantees his loving goodness to persons: 
[Like] the elegant composition of Picasso’s Guernica or Grünewald’s crucifixion, 
or the rhythms of color and stroke in Van Gogh’s Starry Night or Francis Bacon’s 
cadaverous forms, cosmic order houses horrors in a stable frame with the result 
that we can face them and hear the outrageous truths that they tell.  This truth-
telling capacity endows horrors with a positive symbolic value that cannot be 
taken away from them; like the blood of Abel, they cry out from the ground.156 
 
Interpreted within the larger context of her experience, Babette’s own masterpiece, 
Cailles en Sarcophage—itself a “cadaverous form”—is the “stable frame” which gives 
order and shape to her own horrors.  Indeed, the entire feast is a vehicle for endowing the 
terrors of her past with a positive valence, however devastatingly they have made their 
impact.  The quail dish in particular simultaneously signals her need and readiness to 
finally put her “little darlings” to rest and her resolution not to let the evils of her life 
have the final say. 
 
Conclusion 
 Babette’s Feast is a singular artistic rendering of how God’s Spirit empowers 
individuals to "defeat" the vestiges of evil through aesthetic qualities.  The film illustrates 
one woman’s integration of her participation in evil into a life that is for her a great good.  
In the end, her life proves meaningful, even if her horrendous experiences remain 	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inconceivable, because she takes up her experiences and confesses them with integrity 
through aesthetic goods, i.e., the feast itself and every element that goes into its 
conception and creation.  Together Axel and Adams help us to see that these ordinary 
materials are truly graced goods to Babette, ingredients that in their assemblage become 
symbolic vehicles by which she may grieve through her loss and accord others a new 
sense of freedom.  Babette is now twice the artist she has always been, for her "meaning-
making and invention of integrative symbols are [themselves] artistic activities."157  As 
co-creator with the living God, she labors to shape the materials of her broken life into 
“wholes of positive significance."158  And whereas participants in horrors often have the 
resources of friends and family, psychotherapists and spiritual directors, as collaborators 
in such meaning-making, Babette has none of these.  Her faith, however, gives her 
confidence in another collaborator:  the life-giving Spirit of God.  The traditional symbols 
of the Spirit—water, wind, dove, fire—present in various forms in the film signify the 
enlivening power of the Holy Spirit in Babette’s life.  The film’s “discernment” and 
“announcement” scenes are particularly demonstrative of this:  As Babette stands on the 
shore, the white bird that glides over the crystal blue waters symbolizes the inspiring 
presence of the Holy Spirit in her life—the “necessary enabling condition for drawing 
[her] into vocational focus”159; and as she requests permission of the sisters to prepare the 
memorial dinner, flanked by the porcelain statue of Christ, Babette gently embraces her 
crucifix necklace—as a sign of faith, a gesture of hope, and a prayer for strength as she 
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walks her own via crucis.  By virtue of God’s personal experience of the horrendous, 
symbolized by the cross, God confers dignity on even the most ignominious experience:  
After all, “an artist is never poor.” 
 The planning, preparing, and serving of the dinner is Babette’s gleaning the 
fragments of her shattered past and assembling them in such a way as to finally put her 
anguish to rest.  The dinner vanquishes her participation in the horrendous and is her 
means of transcending the evils she has sustained.  God actively collaborates in Babette’s 
defeat of evil by aiding the integration of horrendous experience into a new life where 
meaning is possible.  The process by which Babette declines a life of pleasurable ease 
and decides to lavish her winnings on the community affirms her own free allowance of 
the Spirit to shape her life and, through her actions, the lives of those in the community.  
Both Axel and Adams might agree that for Babette God has become a "meaning-maker 
of extraordinary resourcefulness . . . a constant but often unrecognized teacher and 
collaborator, able to help [her] pick up and rearrange the pieces to make something 
new."160  Even more, Babette’s efforts “to cooperate with God’s ideas, and thereby 
contribute [her] best to cosmic beauty, is a way for [Babette] to love God back.”161 
 It is now possible to interpret the film’s final scenes as filtered through our 
discussion.  Axel uses visual bookends to express the narrative arc of the film.  Recall the 
scene of Babette’s entry into the village quad amid a maelstrom of rain, wind, and 
lightening.  In the film’s penultimate scene, Axel places the camera in the same position 
between the huts.  After the meal, the parishioners gather peacefully under a starry sky 
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and form a prayer circle around a well.  The elements are the same (the quad, water, 
light), only reassembled to symbolize the transformation that has taken place:  the Spirit’s 
rejuvenation of so many once distressed souls.  Axel likewise confirms the Spirit’s 
stilling of Babette’s woes in the film’s final shot of a single candle lit on a windowsill.  
This image harks back to the image of Babette alone in her room, where the tears that 
welled up in her eyes were only visible because of the candle next to her.  Deriving its 
meaning in part from what comes later in the film, the flame can suggest two things:  her 
disposition—her soul ablaze with anguish; and the presence of the Holy Spirit, who 
stands quietly with her in her grief.  Axel recapitulates this image at the film’s end with 
the candle on a windowsill.  Without warning the flame suddenly goes out and a waft of 
white smoke rises from the wick.  Babette’s anguish is extinguished, her spirit finally at 
peace.  Her prayer that the cumulative load of sorrow be lifted has been answered and 
rises as gratitude toward heaven. 
 Though it may be the final shot, it is not the end of the story.  The observant 
viewer knows this to be true since the film’s very first scene comes sometime after the 
feast and thus after the film’s final shot.  However, this same final shot suggests that the 
story continues in another sense, for outside the window it is beginning to snow—yet 
another water symbol.  Winter has set upon the village.  It has also set upon the lives of 
the elderly parishioners.  Just as Babette buried her dead at the feast, in the coming years 
they will have to bury each other.  The simulacrum Caille en Sarcophage thus 
foreshadows the entombment of the sect’s own “dearly beloved.”  Given the film’s 
unqualified and consistent “eschatology,” as sounded in the many hymns the group sings, 
the sisters’ pastoral counsel, and Löwenhielm’s speech, Axel (rightly) suggests the 
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transformation of the feast is only a beginning.  It should not distract from the final 
redemption that the community will achieve only in the beatific glory of a New 
Jerusalem.  And although the feast may have been Babette’s artistic coda, her artistry also 
remains incomplete.  Philippa makes this belief plain in the final line: 
But this is not the end, Babette.  I’m certain it is not.  In Paradise, you will be the 
great artist that God meant you to be.  Ah, how you will delight the angels! 
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CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS 
 
 It is appropriate to end this dissertation by asking whether its overall goal has 
been accomplished.  To answer that question, let us first trace the course of the study, 
from its conceptual germination to its fruition.  The dissertation emerged from out of a 
desire to more substantially correlate Catholic theology and film.  Whereas the two 
enterprises had already been fused there was need for greater tempering.  From the 
beginning, the project was something of a gambit given its non-traditional subject matter 
in the conventions of Catholic systematic theology and the fact that there are few existing 
models on which it might be based.  Moreover, several prerequisites would have to be 
satisfied by whichever approach was chosen to integrate theology and film more 
appreciably.  For instance, there was the desire to neutralize, if not formally counter, 
mainstream approaches to film criticism that either ignore religious influences on film or 
otherwise neglect the need for religious and, in particular, Catholic interpretive 
frameworks.  Also, the fairly substantive tradition of Vatican teaching on cinema would 
have to be considered along with the theoretical foundations laid down on smaller scales 
by Catholic writers on film.  Further, given the relative novelty of the subject within 
systematics, any method for linking theology and film would need to demonstrate its 
ecclesial warrant and rootedness in Christian tradition.  Finally, a constructive approach 
was sought, one that would build upon the existing infrastructure of church teaching on 
cinema and give foundation and facility to the analyst, the teacher, the homilist, and the 
catechist for making connections between theology and film. 
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 To better illustrate the need and legitimacy for a more comprehensive approach, 
the first and second chapters expounded the teachings on cinema by the Roman 
magisterium and the third chapter profiled a cross-section of Catholic thinkers on film. 
Together, these initial chapters related a story that has not been sufficiently told, namely 
the narrative of the many ecclesiastical and theological inroads made into film 
appreciation by Catholics.  They surfaced several theoretical features of what might 
justifiably be called a Catholic approach to film criticism.  However, the exposé found 
the existing literature to be inadequate from the perspective of systematic theology in that 
too little theoretical attention had been given to what engenders and sustains the 
relationship between Catholic theology and film, i.e., the anthropological and doctrinal 
preconditions for their association. 
 The conceptual model chosen to help fortify these foundations and lead the 
conversation into new directions was that of mystagogy.  The dissertation’s main thesis—
that film is an important, contemporary locus for and of Christian mystagogy—was based 
primarily on Karl Rahner’s interpretation of the tradition.  To appreciate how his retrieval 
expands the scope of what constitutes mystagogy, the fourth chapter examined 
mystagogy in Christian antiquity, highlighting especially the premium the church fathers 
placed on narrative, poetry, and imagination in evoking the mystery of God.  The fifth 
chapter described the salient features of Rahner’s transcendental method in theology, a 
method that correlates anthropology and theology in the attempt to demonstrate the unity 
of Christian faith and human experience.  This method was shown to be at once 
inherently mystagogical and a rich resource for the foundational principles demanded by 
a systematic exposition of theology’s relationship to a secular source like film.  The sixth 
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chapter turned to Rahner’s theological aesthetics to substantiate that there is an inherent 
unity between theology and the arts.  Rahner not only makes human expression in the arts 
a central theme for theology, he claims the arts have an implicit theological valence given 
their transcendental capacity.  The arts are indispensable to theology for leading people to 
God; and theology is an essential hermeneutic for the exegesis of religious assets and 
limitations in the arts.  These twin impulses underlie the dissertation’s theory that film is 
a source for and of the type of theology Rahner names “mystagogical.” 
 As a practical application of this theory, the final chapter turned to the film 
Babette’s Feast.  The first part of the analysis was an exposition of the film’s aesthetic 
aspects.  Attention was given to the qualities which make this multi-dimensional film a 
work of art whose visual and narrative tableaux—particularly its abundant use of christic 
symbols and analogues—require a Christian interpretation.  This justified a second 
analytical installment, one that placed Babette’s Feast into a larger theological 
conversation, beyond the film itself, and which sought to probe more deeply the darker 
undercurrents of the story so as to better appreciate their gentle stilling.  The film was 
considered in light of the ideas on evil and its overcoming presented by Marilyn McCord 
Adams and shown to succeed in communicating something of what human beings are at 
depth, namely in absolute need of God’s abundant goodness and blessed as capable of 
mediating that goodness to others.  Conversely, the film put flesh on the bones of 
Adams's theory that, from the perspective of belief in Christ crucified and raised, it is 
possible to trust God’s guarantee of goodness to victims of evil, in this life and the new 
life to come. 
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 It is now possible to draw out some final implications for the whole of the 
dissertation and judge whether in fact the project has proved successful.  One of the most 
important functions of theology is that it clarify and lead people more deeply into the 
mystery of existence as a preparation for their expression of faith.  The mystery of grace 
abounds as the seeds of God’s salvific word in every human life.  Theology’s task must 
be to furnish people with ways of perceiving these divine intimations in their concrete 
lives and relationships.  To accomplish this, theology needs to address people in their 
historical and cultural condition and point out the particular ways that they encounter 
Mystery.  If this is to occur, theologians must become mystagogues—novice masters 
familiar with those under their care and equipped with an inventory of means for 
orienting them toward transcendence. 
 The dissertation has argued that film is a crucial resource for theology’s 
mystagogical task.  If theology aims at expounding Christian faith in as clear and 
intelligible a manner as its subject matter will allow, then it must adapt its modes of 
presentation to the hearts and minds of those to whom it is addressed—believers, 
skeptics, and detractors alike.  Film presents human experience in ways no other art can 
and in styles particularly suited to contemporary sensibilities.  Film can interpret human 
experience in ways beyond the capabilities of conceptual theology.  It is thus a rich 
source for theological reflection, one that provides ever new perspectives for theological 
inquiry.  When explicit theology looks at film and sees that it is capable of opening in 
wonder and humility to the ever-greater God of mystery, then it is incumbent upon 
theology to bear witness to this artistry—to name its transcendental capability and extol 
it. 
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 At the same time the dissertation argued that theology is an indispensable 
resource for film.  Theology is a natural dialogue partner for film because it probes the 
deepest dimensions of existence and comes equipped with its own critical apparati for 
measuring cinematic impulses.  In particular, film needs theology as the hermeneutic that 
formally interprets religious experience—something that many human beings only 
vaguely sense, often misunderstand, and can easily misrepresent.  With the help of film 
experts, theology can turn its discerning eyes to the stories and images of film and present 
viewers with a unique language by which they can articulate a response to religious 
experience in film—a living language that comes built-in with its own history, stories, 
symbols, and culture. 
 Theology, however, is more than yet another framework for understanding film, 
more than an instrument for detecting cinematic elements that might escape other modes 
of interpretation and for asking questions that might not otherwise be asked of a film.  
And this is why Christian mystagogy has been chosen as the conceptual link between the 
two.  The intention behind understanding film as a locus mystagogicus is less a matter of 
leading people to better appropriate their film experiences as it is a matter of leading 
them to Jesus Christ. Theology has the duty to evangelize culture, cinema 
notwithstanding, and to bridge the gap between cultural experiences and faith.  It is in 
this sense that film needs theology:  because theology shows that when film pursues what 
is true it necessarily relies on the Incarnation.  To return to John Paul II’s exhortation to 
artists:  Art must not “cut itself off from the full truth about man, which is found in 
Christian revelation.”  Whereas film may in fact open people to what is true in very 
profound ways, there is no mechanism within film that assures the direction that such 
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transcendental openness might lead viewers.  Whereas film may have an implicit 
mystagogical intention, theology is explicit in its intention to lead people into the mystery 
of God.  In short, the theologian is beholden to the task; whereas for the filmmaker it is 
optional.  A Catholic film mystagogy accomplishes this task by encouraging people to 
discern the presence of the Spirit in their experiences of film.  Such discernment requires 
a criterion, a normative model by which the experience might be measured and measured 
with accuracy.  For the church this criterion is Jesus Christ.  When theology perceives 
truth and beauty in film art it must be acknowledged; but theology must also point 
beyond it to that ultimate source of beauty and truth, of which art can only be a mere 
reflection.  Therefore the mystagogical responsibility of theology vis-à-vis film is to 
convey this revealed, normative religious experience to viewers and even filmmakers. 
 I hope that this dissertation has further illuminated the promise film holds for 
theology and theology for film.  In particular, I hope that the analysis of Babette’s Feast 
has shown the way film can be an occasion of mystagogy:  how Babette’s story expands 
into our story.  If the model that film is a locus mystagogicus demonstrates that the 
enterprises of theology and art should have the shared aim of disclosing what is 
authentically human, I hope to have shown that this film affirms—at times expressly, at 
times subtly—that the truly human is comprehensible only by virtue of Jesus Christ.  
Certainly, much more could be said about the film on its own.  And writing from a 
Catholic theological perspective, there are any number of ways the film could be 
correlated with Christian doctrine. 
 Indeed, there remains the question of praxis.  If theology and film is a form of 
practical theology, how does a theologian now use the material on Babette’s Feast in 
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actual processes of mystagogical formation?  How might one lead people to better 
appropriate their film experiences as a movement toward Christ in connection with the 
tools of Christian discernment?  As noted in the dissertation’s introduction, this study was 
commenced with four audiences in mind:  academic theologians; film scholars with an 
interest in religious forms of film criticism; religious educators and catechists; and 
individual Catholics. 
 I speak from my own experience teaching college students and high school 
seniors at Catholic academies.  Admittedly, Babette’s Feast is not the most accessible 
film for that age group.  The fact that it is a foreign film with subtitles, has little dialogue 
and almost no “action,” and has a cast of seventy year-olds who sing lots of church 
hymns, does not attract a lot of enthusiasm.  However, my experience is that the film is 
profitable even for young audiences, and that they are charmed by the film’s humor and 
beauty.  With college students, it is possible (and ideal) to show the film in one sitting.  
However, this is not possible with high school classes and the film—any film in my 
opinion—loses its momentum when viewings are chopped up over days. 
 After watching the film, we then return to specific scenes and “read” them 
carefully (especially those four scenes discussed above).  Again, my experience is that 
students really enjoy this aspect:  of dissecting the mise-en-scène, of appreciating the 
many “layers” that form a scene and the time and intelligence that went into its making.  
Then they are given a worksheet with a series of questions about the film:   
 - What symbols do you remember most?  (think about natural elements, colors, 
 costumes, food); 
 
 - What role does the pastor (the father/founder) have in the film?  Beyond the 
 piety and heavenly hope of the religious sect, what was the religious vision of the 
 film?  Is the message particular to Christianity, or is its message more universal? 
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 - How would you compare Babette’s role in relation to the sisters, Philippa and 
 Martina?  How do they contrast?  What overall difference does Babette’s presence 
 have on the community? 
 
 - Why did Babette want to prepare the feast?  What was her purpose?  Why didn’t 
 she use the lottery money to return to France or in some other way for her own 
 benefit? 
 
 - The hymn “Jerusalem” is sung often by the community.  Clearly, the director 
 wanted to communicate something through this theme.  What might that be? 
 
 - Why did the community decided not to talk about the food? 
 
 - Do the types of food served hold any symbolic meaning?  Give one or two 
 examples. 
 
 - In what ways did the meal have a transformative effect on the whole 
 community? 
 
 - Babette has often been described as a “Christ-figure.”  What might this 
 mean and how does the film suggest this? 
 
Answers to these general questions are shared in an open discussion.  The students are 
then given the assignment to read chapters 7 and 8 in the text Doing the Truth in Love by 
Michael Himes.1  These cover the topics “Sacramental Vision” and “Eucharist,” 
respectively.  In an essay, students are asked to bring to bear the film and discussion on 
the doctrines presented in the book and vice versa.  I find that in teaching the text and the 
film in conjunction opens the riches of both and makes the learning that much more 
relevant and, indeed, fun for the students. 	   The approach that I take with my students is mystagogical.  I try to illustrate that 
the film and the doctrines of grace and sacrament uniquely disclose the sacred principle 
of human life by revealing where, how, and to whom God is present in the world. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 1 Michael Himes, Doing the Truth in Love:  Conversations about God, Relationships, and Service.  
Mahwah, NJ:  Paulist Press, 1995. 
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 Whether Gabriel Axel and the many other collaborators responsible for the film 
intended to help audiences get in touch with their deeper, more primordial lived 
experience of mystery—that we may never know.  Perhaps they are unwitting 
mystagogues.  Nor can it be presumed that the film will educate every audience toward a 
spontaneous realization of the significance of the ever-present transcendental dimension 
of life.  In the end, individuals who see the film must judge whether it succeeds in 
evoking their own religious experience and mediating knowledge of God.  Hopefully, the 
evaluation has succeeded in pointing out the many ways Babette’s Feast intimates the 
religious experience of God in the lives of its characters and will sensitize viewers to the 
goodness of God in their lives.  If my own analysis of the film has expanded the scope of 
critical theological reflection on the film, particularly on the point that it gives symbolic 
value to the belief that God is good to those who suffer the loneliness and passion of the 
search for meaning in the face of evil, then I feel the project has been worthwhile.  If this 
study in any way helps individuals uncover and contemplate the sacred element in life 
through the experience of film, then I believe the project has accomplished its goal.  In 
this dissertation, theology and film have met as mystagogical partners—guides which 
have led us just a little further down the path of human longing toward the Incarnate One 
through, with, and in whom we savor the Mystery of God. 	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